As those you say that the apocalpyse is upon us, of the prophecy of the Mayans, that in the year of our lord two thousand and twelve, thus it has been said:
That there existeth a great Christian empire, founded across the waves from the Old World of lore, by those founders who consider themselves as equal to the apostles in their piety and morality, created for the equality and freedom of the followers of the lord.
And in this New World, their empire would be greater in influence and ideals than all those other kingdoms of the lord, which in its greatness, would dominate over all the others.
For this Christian empire would in its magnimanity, act as a magnet for all the oppressed of the world; this emigrants' empire would act as a beacon of light, speading the word of God to those other parts of the world as yet untouched by His word; from Mesopotamia to the lands of the Hindu Kush, emulating the reach of Alexander the Great.
And by the year of our lord two thousand and eight, this Christian empire will elect as its leader a man of great intellect, taught in the ways of jurisprudence and preach morality, and he will be the son of the man descended from the first men on the Earth, coming from the lands of those beyond the Nile.
His name will mean "a gift" to the empire itself (as will be said in its language, that of the men of Mohammed, "al-Barakka"), though some will consider him a messiah in his own right, born to lead the Christian empire out of a time of darkness and injustice.
For the empire that he inherits would be broken; wars in the lands of Alexander's conquests still to be concluded; the recklessness of his predecessor, unfortunately to share the same name as that of the empire's founder, would be legendary, and an insult to the founder's memory; the evil and baseness of his predecessor's followers would poison the country yet.
For this "messiah" would be tested like few others before him - many of the empire would doubt him; those who profit from poverty and debasement will continue to poison and curse his name; the party of his predecessor would plot to destroy every good act he does, and they would do so falsely claiming the name of the Lord, for these are the followers of the anti-Christ.
And so it would come to pass in the year of our lord two thousand and twelve, the decisive confrontation would take place between "al-Barakka", the leader of the greatest of all Christian empires, against the forces who seek to usurp the name of our Lord and bring about the fall of the empire into the hands of the followers of the Lord of the seven deadly sins; greed, vanity, wrath, sloth, lust, gluttony and envy.
And so the party of those forces, who would name falsely name themselves after the republic's ideals, who elect an anti-Christ who symbolises all these deadly sins. For this anti-Christ would be as intelligent as this greatest of emperors, versed in the histories of mankind and geography. He would use his skills of rhetoric to inflame the passions of the people, using falsehoods and wrathful words to distort the words of the emperor.
And so it would be that in the year of our lord two thousand and twelve, this anti-Christ, whose name would literally be "new town", would cause to call the emperor a traitor, using lofy words to encourage evil deeds, as is the wont of Lucifer.
For the apocalypse that is predicted is entirely within the hands of those with the power to elect; to choose the reign of the worthy and the intellectual, "al-Barakka"; or to elect an emperor who would seek to use fine words to usher in a new age of the anti-Christ, where the greatest Christian empire is ruled by a man of high intelligence but of no moral character, who would seek to destroy everything that holds the empire together, to turn man against man for the sake of greed, turn brother against brother for the sake of envy; to turn benevolence to malevolence abroad, for the the sake of wrath, and destroy the earth in a thousand fireballs.
Thus is written is the revealation of the year of our lord two thousand and twelve.
Sunday, December 18, 2011
Sunday, December 11, 2011
Government in the UK: of the media, for the media, by the media.
The role of the media in Britain has been discussed to death in recent times. The hacking scandal and the long list of celebrities and ordinary families that were the victim to the Murdoch (and other) press' casual attitude to ethics and the law has been the ironic focus of the media itself. Navel-gazing has become the British media's recent obsession.
But this also brings to the surface the role that the Murdoch press and the media in general have in the decision-making process at the governmental level. The UK is not alone in the world in having an influential media, and this is in so many ways a great service to democracy.
But there is also a darker side to this. I wrote a short while ago about "Demarchy", and in that article I talked about something called "Ochliocracy", more commonly called mob rule. Mob rule is also another way of talking about decision-making by interest groups; when governments make their decisions simply based on the reaction to pressures by groups of people with special interests.
In the modern world this includes lobbyists and corporate interests, but in ancient and mediaeval times this was any number of periodic bouts of public hysteria, often engineered by populist demagogues eager for power themselves; in the Roman Empire, this was often how Emperors rose and fell from power; in mediaeval Italy, this was how city-states like Florence changed government; in modern Italy, it was how populist demagogues like Silvio Berlusconi were able to stay in power for so long while allowing the country to fall into financial ruin.
This is how riots start; in a dysfunctional society, this is how government policy is made. The modern term that spin doctors call it is "policy-on-the-hoof", but for successive British governments over the last twenty years, it was one way of trying to maintain their popularity.
The most important way that people in modern society get information is through the media; in Britain, this means news media like "The Sun" and "The Daily Mail"; the first is the most popular tabloid in the country, the second is the most popular "middlebrow" newpaper. As a result, much of the British public obtain their information from these newspapers. The newspapers would reply that no-one is forcing them to buy them, and that whatever viewpoints they share must therefore be reflected by their readers; this may be true.
But there is also another angle to this; by thinking about if the amount of column inches these newspapers spend on dicussing certain issues (such as violent crime, moral issues, celebrity intrigue, Europe, and so on) is a reflection of the relative concerns of their readers. By this measure, what comes first: the chicken or the egg? Do the media spend so many column inches on violent crime to reflect their readers' concerns, or are the readers so concerned about violent crime because they read about it so much in the media? Or is it a combination of both?
What has been proven by surveys is that compared to issues such as the economy and other immediate concerns, Europe is not a major issue for the average person on the street. They do not spend sleepless nights thinking about what bureaucrats in Brussels are doing.
It seems that the editors and journalists of "The Sun" and "The Daily Mail" do, though. Which brings us back to the point: where do people get their points of views from? If the media are there to reflect the public's concerns, why do some of them spend so many column inches talking about things that the average person has been proven not to be so concerned about?
"The Sun" and "The Daily Mail" are the two most Euro-sceptic newspapers in the country; they are also the two most popular. Of course the editors of these newspapers are entitled to their opinion, but I seriously wonder if their readers would be quite so sceptical of the EU if the editors of those newspapers spent a little more time focusing on what people can do to improve the British economy and less time on how bad the EU is for Britain.
There is a famous quote from Hitler: "If you repeat the lie long enough, people will believe it as truth". The problem with some sections of the media is that their journalists spend too much time on opinionated (and factually inaccurate or misleading) comment, and not enough on furnishing their readers with the ammunition to allow them to think for themselves. But it would be naive to think that this would change: newspapers are a business, after all.
So this means that news coverage by the likes of "The Sun" and "The Daily Mail" is fuelled by nothing more than profit. In theory (according to free-market proponents), this should mean that newspapers will be in a competition to tell the most factually-enlightening stories. Ha-ha, don't count on it. Newspapers are more often in a competition to sell stories that will either entertain or reinforce to people what they already think. In other words, market forces here act more as a dumbing-down mechanism rather than a way to encourage the spread of information. Who decides what "news" is? The newspapers, of course. In an open society, it is practically impossible to ignore what's happening in the world completely; in other other hand, media outlets are perfectly free to prioritise as they wish.
By "prioritising", newspapers like "The Sun" and "The Daily Mail" are deciding for their readers what is important and what is not, which brings us back to their reply that people are perfectly free to choose another newspaper if they don't like what they read.
But that's a simplistic argument. There are not an infinite number of newspapers, and it is true that most people in the UK, like everywhere else, buy it more for casual entertainment. There's nothing wrong with that, as much as those who would consider themselves "intellectual" might think so: it's human nature.
These newspapers know this, of course: that's how they remain so successful. But this media "prioritisation" also has an effect on government. The term "moral panic" is as old as the hills, and one about paedophiles was famously engineered by the tabloids ten years ago or so. The panic about Europe has been in the media for around twenty years, and has been consistently engineered by these same two newspapers. As a result, successive governments have been eager to pander and appease these sentiments.
We saw the partial result of that on Friday morning. Not wishing to seem "weak" on Europe, and eager for good headlines with the key newspapers, David Cameron pandered to the worst elements of the popular media. This is what happens when you allow the narrow interests of a few newspaper editors to dominate the affairs of government. This is the meaning of "Ochliocracy": the subversion of the democratic model through the media, moving from one moral panic to the next.
Alastair Campbell once described "The Daily Mail" as the worst aspects of British society masquerading as the best. In that sense, at least "The Sun" has the decency to be honest about its motives.
But this also brings to the surface the role that the Murdoch press and the media in general have in the decision-making process at the governmental level. The UK is not alone in the world in having an influential media, and this is in so many ways a great service to democracy.
But there is also a darker side to this. I wrote a short while ago about "Demarchy", and in that article I talked about something called "Ochliocracy", more commonly called mob rule. Mob rule is also another way of talking about decision-making by interest groups; when governments make their decisions simply based on the reaction to pressures by groups of people with special interests.
In the modern world this includes lobbyists and corporate interests, but in ancient and mediaeval times this was any number of periodic bouts of public hysteria, often engineered by populist demagogues eager for power themselves; in the Roman Empire, this was often how Emperors rose and fell from power; in mediaeval Italy, this was how city-states like Florence changed government; in modern Italy, it was how populist demagogues like Silvio Berlusconi were able to stay in power for so long while allowing the country to fall into financial ruin.
This is how riots start; in a dysfunctional society, this is how government policy is made. The modern term that spin doctors call it is "policy-on-the-hoof", but for successive British governments over the last twenty years, it was one way of trying to maintain their popularity.
The most important way that people in modern society get information is through the media; in Britain, this means news media like "The Sun" and "The Daily Mail"; the first is the most popular tabloid in the country, the second is the most popular "middlebrow" newpaper. As a result, much of the British public obtain their information from these newspapers. The newspapers would reply that no-one is forcing them to buy them, and that whatever viewpoints they share must therefore be reflected by their readers; this may be true.
But there is also another angle to this; by thinking about if the amount of column inches these newspapers spend on dicussing certain issues (such as violent crime, moral issues, celebrity intrigue, Europe, and so on) is a reflection of the relative concerns of their readers. By this measure, what comes first: the chicken or the egg? Do the media spend so many column inches on violent crime to reflect their readers' concerns, or are the readers so concerned about violent crime because they read about it so much in the media? Or is it a combination of both?
What has been proven by surveys is that compared to issues such as the economy and other immediate concerns, Europe is not a major issue for the average person on the street. They do not spend sleepless nights thinking about what bureaucrats in Brussels are doing.
It seems that the editors and journalists of "The Sun" and "The Daily Mail" do, though. Which brings us back to the point: where do people get their points of views from? If the media are there to reflect the public's concerns, why do some of them spend so many column inches talking about things that the average person has been proven not to be so concerned about?
"The Sun" and "The Daily Mail" are the two most Euro-sceptic newspapers in the country; they are also the two most popular. Of course the editors of these newspapers are entitled to their opinion, but I seriously wonder if their readers would be quite so sceptical of the EU if the editors of those newspapers spent a little more time focusing on what people can do to improve the British economy and less time on how bad the EU is for Britain.
There is a famous quote from Hitler: "If you repeat the lie long enough, people will believe it as truth". The problem with some sections of the media is that their journalists spend too much time on opinionated (and factually inaccurate or misleading) comment, and not enough on furnishing their readers with the ammunition to allow them to think for themselves. But it would be naive to think that this would change: newspapers are a business, after all.
So this means that news coverage by the likes of "The Sun" and "The Daily Mail" is fuelled by nothing more than profit. In theory (according to free-market proponents), this should mean that newspapers will be in a competition to tell the most factually-enlightening stories. Ha-ha, don't count on it. Newspapers are more often in a competition to sell stories that will either entertain or reinforce to people what they already think. In other words, market forces here act more as a dumbing-down mechanism rather than a way to encourage the spread of information. Who decides what "news" is? The newspapers, of course. In an open society, it is practically impossible to ignore what's happening in the world completely; in other other hand, media outlets are perfectly free to prioritise as they wish.
By "prioritising", newspapers like "The Sun" and "The Daily Mail" are deciding for their readers what is important and what is not, which brings us back to their reply that people are perfectly free to choose another newspaper if they don't like what they read.
But that's a simplistic argument. There are not an infinite number of newspapers, and it is true that most people in the UK, like everywhere else, buy it more for casual entertainment. There's nothing wrong with that, as much as those who would consider themselves "intellectual" might think so: it's human nature.
These newspapers know this, of course: that's how they remain so successful. But this media "prioritisation" also has an effect on government. The term "moral panic" is as old as the hills, and one about paedophiles was famously engineered by the tabloids ten years ago or so. The panic about Europe has been in the media for around twenty years, and has been consistently engineered by these same two newspapers. As a result, successive governments have been eager to pander and appease these sentiments.
We saw the partial result of that on Friday morning. Not wishing to seem "weak" on Europe, and eager for good headlines with the key newspapers, David Cameron pandered to the worst elements of the popular media. This is what happens when you allow the narrow interests of a few newspaper editors to dominate the affairs of government. This is the meaning of "Ochliocracy": the subversion of the democratic model through the media, moving from one moral panic to the next.
Alastair Campbell once described "The Daily Mail" as the worst aspects of British society masquerading as the best. In that sense, at least "The Sun" has the decency to be honest about its motives.
Saturday, December 10, 2011
David Cameron's Euro-message: a puppet at home; out-foxed abroad
There was a sad inevitiability to what happened at the European summit in the early hours of Friday morning. Thinking back to Britain's relationship with Europe since the Second World War, it seems obvious that Europe had always been planning further integration, while Britain writhed over what position it should take. That position seems clearer today.
The reason for the meeting over the last two days was (as always it seems these days) to save the Euro from collapse. Let's not forget that the reason for the crisis is twofold: firstly, chronic overspending by the likes of Italy and Greece (and Spain, and Portugal, and Ireland...) that put the credibility of the Eurozone at stake; and secondly, chronic financial mismanagement by banks that dug themselves, like Greece and Italy, into a very big hole.
Both Germany and France were the primary architects of the plan on the table to stabilise the financial and governmental system.
Let's remind ourselves that the main reason that the likes of Greece and Italy were allowed to get themselves into this mess was because at the foundation of the Euro there were not strong measures to ensure safety across all Eurozone countries; in other words, there was one currency, but no effective controls at a national level. A more common sense approach would have been to take the same appoach with joining the Euro as with new members joining the EU: if you can't follow the rules, then don't join until you can. Put in this light, Merkel's idea of setting a supra-national financial policy through the Eurozone is pure common sense, righting a wrong made at the birth of the Euro that contributed to the crisis in the first place.
The failure of many European and British banks to follow the most basic rules of economics (not to borrow more than you earn) was the other main factor to the Euro-crisis. Nicholas Sarkozy was the main proponent for the idea of having a stronger regulation of the banking industry across the continent in order to prevent banks from repeating the same mistakes (as they are wont to do). As British banks were the least-regulated in Europe, and, not coincidentally, the worst culprits of irresponsible casino banking, they were the most to blame for this problem (and, therefore, those with the most to fear from regulation).
These two proposals, then, have the benefit of making another financial crisis less likely, at least in theory. Regardless of what views you may have over sovereignty (and in the inter-connected 21st century, that term is increasingly losing its relevance), these proposals would make the EU a safer place to do business.
That's the context of the Euro-crisis. David Cameron, as the Prime Minister of the UK, was at the meeting to discuss these new powers (and the emergence of a new treaty to enforce it), and Britain's role to play. Before going to the meeting, he had promised he would use the veto (as any treaty cannot go ahead with all member states agreeing to it) to block these measures if they damaged the British national interest.
The point here is: what IS in the British national interest in this situation? To allow the continued de-regulation of the British banking industry? It appears that Cameron's thinking was purely on these lines: to protect The City of London at all costs. But does The City produce most of our exports (60% of which go to the EU)? The financial sector, at its height about five years ago, represented ten percent of the overall economy (in itself a lot compared to most other countries); but what about the other ninety percent?
In other words, Cameron, by using the veto, made it absolutely clear to European leaders, as well as his own British voters, that he is focused on the boys in The City, and has forgotten about everyone else that contributes to the British economy, and trades with Europe. By his actions on Friday morning, he has reinforced the stereotype that he is aloof from everyday British interests, even the average business that trades with Europe.
Then there is the issue of his party. It is true that even before leaving for the summit he had put himself in an impossible position back home: if he didn't produce the veto, his own party MPs would have been incensed and many would probably have begun plotting for a leadership challenge, in a repeat of John Major's misfortune back in the '90s. The problem Cameron has is that what Major once called "The Bastards" (a small number of strongly Euro-sceptic MPS) are now a significant number in his party, many of whom were elected only last year, so have no established sense of loyalty to the leadership.
By producing the veto Cameron has simply shown that he has caved in to the short-termist interests of The City (who also provide a great deal of financial support to the Tories), and the knee-jerk interests of his party. Cameron has proven himself to be a puppet; nothing more.
Then there is the way in which Cameron dealt with the negotiations themselves. When Gordon Brown was Prime Minister, he may well have been mocked at home, but was at least well-respected abroad, due to his management of the crisis. Sarkozy once famously told him: "I don't know what it is about you, Gordon, but somehow, I love you". By contrast, it seems that Sarkozy has nothing but disdain for Cameron. It seems also clear that the treaty vote that took place the other day was a real "do-or-die" moment for Europe, in particular the UK.
Sarkozy seems to have taken George W Bush's famous "you're-with-us-or-against-us" approach with Cameron: either sign the treaty, or get lost. Therefore, it was not Cameron who showed strength in using the veto; it was Sarkozy who forced Cameron into that position. Sarkozy is as wily as a fox in European politics, but has a savage bite to match. What's so worrying about Cameron's approach to European politics is a clear lack of knowledge or diplomacy about how to deal with these kinds of complex issues; he failed to even make a serious attempt to find out before the meeting what potential allies he had on his stance against the financial reforms. What some Conservatives might call "Bulldog Spirit" just seems like stubborn stupidity to Europeans.
No other Prime Minister has ever had to resort to using a veto in Europe. Even Margaret Thatcher was able to find a compromise; so was John Major. It is true that Sarkozy was in a stubborn mood over regulation, but still, a more experienced and skilled operator would have been able find some kind of way out that perserved Britain's status, but also could act as a way forward. That's the nature of negotiation: you negotiate. It's also worth remembering that all the EU's policies are decided in this way: there is no "diktat" as such, because all policies are the result of negotiation and supra-national compromise - this is the price of co-operation.
It seems that the experience of those five days in May last year, those long discussions and compromises that Cameron made to get a first taste of power with the LibDems, were all forgotten early on Friday morning. It's sad to think that Sarkozy and Cameron were the two prominent national leaders that worked together the most to bring about military action in Libya only nine months ago; there was none of that spirit of co-operation and careful negotiation on Friday. In that sense, Cameron is useless at European politics.
This now lives Britain in a special Euro-club of one. Cameron's failure to reach a compromise in Europe leaves Britain's position in Europe more danger than ever thought possible. Although still in the EU, thanks to Cameron, Britain is now officially in the second tier, with no-one to keep us company. So by his actions, Cameron has not only removed Britian's voice from the main table, but still powerless to complain about what actions the EU has that affect us; in other words, as long as we are in the EU, it still has influence on us, but we have less influence on it, as we are now a second-class European power.
More worryingly, by pandering to the Eurosceptics in his party, Cameron has simply traded the accusation of Chamberlain-esque "appeasement" to Europe, for appeasement to the lunatics in his own party. By doing so, he has surely opened up a can of worms; not Margaret Thatcher, nor even John Major, did that. Now they have tasted blood - what's next? The calls from his wilder backbenchers may well move on to the next bone of contention: getting out of the EU altogther. And let's not forget that Cameron owes his position as Prime Minister due to the co-operation of his coaltion partners, the LibDems, on paper the most pro-European party in parliament. Large numbers of their party are now livid with their leader, Nick Clegg, for allowing Cameron to take the position he did at the negotiations.
So, for the sake of appeasing the wilder members of his party, and the short-term interests of The City, Cameron has put Britain in a new, second-class position in the EU, and also created a huge (potentially splitting) headache within his own coalition government.
Well done, Dave.
The reason for the meeting over the last two days was (as always it seems these days) to save the Euro from collapse. Let's not forget that the reason for the crisis is twofold: firstly, chronic overspending by the likes of Italy and Greece (and Spain, and Portugal, and Ireland...) that put the credibility of the Eurozone at stake; and secondly, chronic financial mismanagement by banks that dug themselves, like Greece and Italy, into a very big hole.
Both Germany and France were the primary architects of the plan on the table to stabilise the financial and governmental system.
Let's remind ourselves that the main reason that the likes of Greece and Italy were allowed to get themselves into this mess was because at the foundation of the Euro there were not strong measures to ensure safety across all Eurozone countries; in other words, there was one currency, but no effective controls at a national level. A more common sense approach would have been to take the same appoach with joining the Euro as with new members joining the EU: if you can't follow the rules, then don't join until you can. Put in this light, Merkel's idea of setting a supra-national financial policy through the Eurozone is pure common sense, righting a wrong made at the birth of the Euro that contributed to the crisis in the first place.
The failure of many European and British banks to follow the most basic rules of economics (not to borrow more than you earn) was the other main factor to the Euro-crisis. Nicholas Sarkozy was the main proponent for the idea of having a stronger regulation of the banking industry across the continent in order to prevent banks from repeating the same mistakes (as they are wont to do). As British banks were the least-regulated in Europe, and, not coincidentally, the worst culprits of irresponsible casino banking, they were the most to blame for this problem (and, therefore, those with the most to fear from regulation).
These two proposals, then, have the benefit of making another financial crisis less likely, at least in theory. Regardless of what views you may have over sovereignty (and in the inter-connected 21st century, that term is increasingly losing its relevance), these proposals would make the EU a safer place to do business.
That's the context of the Euro-crisis. David Cameron, as the Prime Minister of the UK, was at the meeting to discuss these new powers (and the emergence of a new treaty to enforce it), and Britain's role to play. Before going to the meeting, he had promised he would use the veto (as any treaty cannot go ahead with all member states agreeing to it) to block these measures if they damaged the British national interest.
The point here is: what IS in the British national interest in this situation? To allow the continued de-regulation of the British banking industry? It appears that Cameron's thinking was purely on these lines: to protect The City of London at all costs. But does The City produce most of our exports (60% of which go to the EU)? The financial sector, at its height about five years ago, represented ten percent of the overall economy (in itself a lot compared to most other countries); but what about the other ninety percent?
In other words, Cameron, by using the veto, made it absolutely clear to European leaders, as well as his own British voters, that he is focused on the boys in The City, and has forgotten about everyone else that contributes to the British economy, and trades with Europe. By his actions on Friday morning, he has reinforced the stereotype that he is aloof from everyday British interests, even the average business that trades with Europe.
Then there is the issue of his party. It is true that even before leaving for the summit he had put himself in an impossible position back home: if he didn't produce the veto, his own party MPs would have been incensed and many would probably have begun plotting for a leadership challenge, in a repeat of John Major's misfortune back in the '90s. The problem Cameron has is that what Major once called "The Bastards" (a small number of strongly Euro-sceptic MPS) are now a significant number in his party, many of whom were elected only last year, so have no established sense of loyalty to the leadership.
By producing the veto Cameron has simply shown that he has caved in to the short-termist interests of The City (who also provide a great deal of financial support to the Tories), and the knee-jerk interests of his party. Cameron has proven himself to be a puppet; nothing more.
Then there is the way in which Cameron dealt with the negotiations themselves. When Gordon Brown was Prime Minister, he may well have been mocked at home, but was at least well-respected abroad, due to his management of the crisis. Sarkozy once famously told him: "I don't know what it is about you, Gordon, but somehow, I love you". By contrast, it seems that Sarkozy has nothing but disdain for Cameron. It seems also clear that the treaty vote that took place the other day was a real "do-or-die" moment for Europe, in particular the UK.
Sarkozy seems to have taken George W Bush's famous "you're-with-us-or-against-us" approach with Cameron: either sign the treaty, or get lost. Therefore, it was not Cameron who showed strength in using the veto; it was Sarkozy who forced Cameron into that position. Sarkozy is as wily as a fox in European politics, but has a savage bite to match. What's so worrying about Cameron's approach to European politics is a clear lack of knowledge or diplomacy about how to deal with these kinds of complex issues; he failed to even make a serious attempt to find out before the meeting what potential allies he had on his stance against the financial reforms. What some Conservatives might call "Bulldog Spirit" just seems like stubborn stupidity to Europeans.
No other Prime Minister has ever had to resort to using a veto in Europe. Even Margaret Thatcher was able to find a compromise; so was John Major. It is true that Sarkozy was in a stubborn mood over regulation, but still, a more experienced and skilled operator would have been able find some kind of way out that perserved Britain's status, but also could act as a way forward. That's the nature of negotiation: you negotiate. It's also worth remembering that all the EU's policies are decided in this way: there is no "diktat" as such, because all policies are the result of negotiation and supra-national compromise - this is the price of co-operation.
It seems that the experience of those five days in May last year, those long discussions and compromises that Cameron made to get a first taste of power with the LibDems, were all forgotten early on Friday morning. It's sad to think that Sarkozy and Cameron were the two prominent national leaders that worked together the most to bring about military action in Libya only nine months ago; there was none of that spirit of co-operation and careful negotiation on Friday. In that sense, Cameron is useless at European politics.
This now lives Britain in a special Euro-club of one. Cameron's failure to reach a compromise in Europe leaves Britain's position in Europe more danger than ever thought possible. Although still in the EU, thanks to Cameron, Britain is now officially in the second tier, with no-one to keep us company. So by his actions, Cameron has not only removed Britian's voice from the main table, but still powerless to complain about what actions the EU has that affect us; in other words, as long as we are in the EU, it still has influence on us, but we have less influence on it, as we are now a second-class European power.
More worryingly, by pandering to the Eurosceptics in his party, Cameron has simply traded the accusation of Chamberlain-esque "appeasement" to Europe, for appeasement to the lunatics in his own party. By doing so, he has surely opened up a can of worms; not Margaret Thatcher, nor even John Major, did that. Now they have tasted blood - what's next? The calls from his wilder backbenchers may well move on to the next bone of contention: getting out of the EU altogther. And let's not forget that Cameron owes his position as Prime Minister due to the co-operation of his coaltion partners, the LibDems, on paper the most pro-European party in parliament. Large numbers of their party are now livid with their leader, Nick Clegg, for allowing Cameron to take the position he did at the negotiations.
So, for the sake of appeasing the wilder members of his party, and the short-term interests of The City, Cameron has put Britain in a new, second-class position in the EU, and also created a huge (potentially splitting) headache within his own coalition government.
Well done, Dave.
Monday, December 5, 2011
Why Russia Doesn't Understand The West
In a class at my college the other day, I was talking about the Arab Spring (in particular, the fall of Gaddafi), and one of my Russian-speaking students pointed out that, as he was told by the media in his country, Gaddafi had provided cheap petrol and no taxes for his subjects. The reason he was removed, as he had understood, was because of Western imperialism.
In another class at my college the other week, I was talking about climate change, and the Russian-speaking students in the class were quick to talk up the climate change sceptics, and the many scientists who had questioned the validity of the generally-accepted consensus view. To counter this, I showed them a clip from Al Gore's "An Inconvenient Truth" (though I forgot to show them the part where Al G0re explains the inspriration for the title - the Soviet way of dealing with facts that didn't fit the "party line").
These two anecdotes exemplify a common thread in Russian thinking to Western thought and Western actions: instinctive suspicion and a liking for conspiracy theories.
From a Western point of view, the likes of Europe and the USA often are baffled by Russia's cold shoulder. To Western eyes, Russia is not so much different from the rest of Western civilisation: ethnically European, Christian, educated, a large drinking culture, sexually free-thinking, and so on.
What, then, is the problem? Two factors that decide a national culture are geography and history.
It's best to go back through a brief history to put things into perspective. The culture of "conspiracy theories" goes back a long way on Russian history, long before the Soviet Union made them almost official government policy. Even the rise of anti-Semitism in Europe in the late 19th and early 20th century, originated in Russia, encouraged by the ultra-conservative Orthodox church, even infecting the psychology of the Tsar and his family. A famous inflammatory pamphlet, "The Protocols Of The Elders Of Zion", fed paranoia about the Jews, then very successfully exported to a politically-fragile Germany after the fall of Tsarist Russia to the Bolsheviks. The rest is history.
The "conspiracy theory" tendency is long in Russian culture, and can be directly traced back to the legacy left by the Byzantines on Russia.
It is no coincidence that Moscow calls itself the "Third Rome" (although some call Washington DC the same these days, the original title, goes back centuries); called this after the "Second Rome", the Byzantine capital Constantinople, had been overrun by the Ottoman Turks.
The rise of Russia as a European power mirrors the decline and fall of the once-great empire of Byzantine Constantiople, which had been for nearly a thousand years the richest, largest and most important metropolis in Christian Europe. The national emblem of Russia is the double-headed eagle; the same that was that for the Byzantines. After the fall of Constantinople, the Greek Emperor's neice married the Russian prince; therefore saving the blood line of the Byzantines, and giving inspiration to the Russians to continue the torch of the Greek's legacy. Russia grew from a minor power at that time, over the centuries to become the largest land empire in the world; as it still remains, in effect, today.
So Russian culture, and in particular, high culture, was originally (in spite of Peter The Great's efforts, and the later use of French as the language of the Russian court) influenced by Greek (Byzantine) thought and temperament.
This leads, more longwindedly, to where the real suspicion of the West comes from, and the long-used claims of "imperialism". The Byzantines themselves were, for nearly a thousand years, the dominant Christian power in Europe, who had continued the direct culture of the Roman Empire (to the extent that they always called themselves "Romans", and called their empire the "Roman Empire" - the term "Byzantine" only having came about a few centuries after the fall of Constantinople); as a result they considered Western Europe to be inhabited by uncouth "barbarians"; Christan, yes, but uncultured and illiterate compared to them.
The Crusades caused the real crisis for the Greeks, as the Byzantine empire, due to its geography, was a large buffer between the (Muslim) Middle East and (Christian) Europe. Consequently, distrust was endemic between the Western Crusaders and the Orthodox Greeks, because both sides wanted different outcomes: the Greeks wanted the Crusaders to help restore lands that had been occupied by Muslims; the Crusaders wanted the very same lands for their own glory, and be damned to the "Orthodox" Greeks.
So as the geography of the Byzantine empire resulted often necessitated in a more pragmatic approach to its eastern and southern neighbours in the Middle East (to the bafflement and consternation of the West), the same can be said of Russia and its relationship to its southern neighbours (with the West these days feeling much the same way).
There had been times when the Byzantines and the West co-operated; but these were always brief, against the grain, and always unpopular on the streets of Constantinople, who were proud of their ancient culture, and would rather hang than be pawns to the "barbarians" of the West.
There have been times when the Russians and West co-operated; but the most recent example was this was during the time of Boris Yeltsin (when joining NATO was, briefly, seriously considered by Russia); but these were days when Russia was politically and economically weak, and very much a real pawn in a wider geo-political game of chess at the time. Since that time, Russia has been ruled by a real geo-political Grand Master, Vladimir Putin, and Russia has regained its world status.
So Russia will probably never understand the West, and vice versa, because, for all their similarities, the long history and simple geography give Russia different priorities. It will likely continue to scupper plans for the West to have regime change in Iran, because it causes them very real geo-politial concerns of encirclement; likewise, it will continue to quietly support "rogue regimes" like Syria because Russia's own press is effectively state-censored and Russia's ruling elite is terrified that Russians might get the idea to create their own "democratic revolution" - another idea being exported from the 21st-century Crusaders of the West.
As Russia sees it, they don't need "democracy" - code for Western interference; somewhat like how the Byzantines didn't need "church union" with the Catholic pope in Rome - code for being pawns to Western barbarians.
The irony of the Crusades was that it was originally a Byzantine idea; in the end, though, they got more than they bargained for. The First Crusade was in 1097 and "liberated" Jerusalem from Muslim rule; the Fourth Crusade of 1203 saw the Crusaders pillage, burn and loot Constantinople itself, leaving the Byzantine empire a ruined shadow of its former self.
The irony of the "democracy" project is that Russia was one of the first European powers to have a "democratic revolution", in 1917 (although it only lasted for less than nine months, before the Bolsheviks took over); no wonder the current Russian administration is looking at the goings on in the Middle East with continuing anxiety - how long before its own population picks up the "democratic revolution" virus?
As it happens, as we speak, there are increasing numbers of ordinary Russians, like those in the Middle East, losing their fear, out of frustration at a corrupt and ineffective state. No wonder then, that the Russian intelligensia are so keen to curse the West.
The Greeks probably know exactly how they feel.
In another class at my college the other week, I was talking about climate change, and the Russian-speaking students in the class were quick to talk up the climate change sceptics, and the many scientists who had questioned the validity of the generally-accepted consensus view. To counter this, I showed them a clip from Al Gore's "An Inconvenient Truth" (though I forgot to show them the part where Al G0re explains the inspriration for the title - the Soviet way of dealing with facts that didn't fit the "party line").
These two anecdotes exemplify a common thread in Russian thinking to Western thought and Western actions: instinctive suspicion and a liking for conspiracy theories.
From a Western point of view, the likes of Europe and the USA often are baffled by Russia's cold shoulder. To Western eyes, Russia is not so much different from the rest of Western civilisation: ethnically European, Christian, educated, a large drinking culture, sexually free-thinking, and so on.
What, then, is the problem? Two factors that decide a national culture are geography and history.
It's best to go back through a brief history to put things into perspective. The culture of "conspiracy theories" goes back a long way on Russian history, long before the Soviet Union made them almost official government policy. Even the rise of anti-Semitism in Europe in the late 19th and early 20th century, originated in Russia, encouraged by the ultra-conservative Orthodox church, even infecting the psychology of the Tsar and his family. A famous inflammatory pamphlet, "The Protocols Of The Elders Of Zion", fed paranoia about the Jews, then very successfully exported to a politically-fragile Germany after the fall of Tsarist Russia to the Bolsheviks. The rest is history.
The "conspiracy theory" tendency is long in Russian culture, and can be directly traced back to the legacy left by the Byzantines on Russia.
It is no coincidence that Moscow calls itself the "Third Rome" (although some call Washington DC the same these days, the original title, goes back centuries); called this after the "Second Rome", the Byzantine capital Constantinople, had been overrun by the Ottoman Turks.
The rise of Russia as a European power mirrors the decline and fall of the once-great empire of Byzantine Constantiople, which had been for nearly a thousand years the richest, largest and most important metropolis in Christian Europe. The national emblem of Russia is the double-headed eagle; the same that was that for the Byzantines. After the fall of Constantinople, the Greek Emperor's neice married the Russian prince; therefore saving the blood line of the Byzantines, and giving inspiration to the Russians to continue the torch of the Greek's legacy. Russia grew from a minor power at that time, over the centuries to become the largest land empire in the world; as it still remains, in effect, today.
So Russian culture, and in particular, high culture, was originally (in spite of Peter The Great's efforts, and the later use of French as the language of the Russian court) influenced by Greek (Byzantine) thought and temperament.
This leads, more longwindedly, to where the real suspicion of the West comes from, and the long-used claims of "imperialism". The Byzantines themselves were, for nearly a thousand years, the dominant Christian power in Europe, who had continued the direct culture of the Roman Empire (to the extent that they always called themselves "Romans", and called their empire the "Roman Empire" - the term "Byzantine" only having came about a few centuries after the fall of Constantinople); as a result they considered Western Europe to be inhabited by uncouth "barbarians"; Christan, yes, but uncultured and illiterate compared to them.
The Crusades caused the real crisis for the Greeks, as the Byzantine empire, due to its geography, was a large buffer between the (Muslim) Middle East and (Christian) Europe. Consequently, distrust was endemic between the Western Crusaders and the Orthodox Greeks, because both sides wanted different outcomes: the Greeks wanted the Crusaders to help restore lands that had been occupied by Muslims; the Crusaders wanted the very same lands for their own glory, and be damned to the "Orthodox" Greeks.
So as the geography of the Byzantine empire resulted often necessitated in a more pragmatic approach to its eastern and southern neighbours in the Middle East (to the bafflement and consternation of the West), the same can be said of Russia and its relationship to its southern neighbours (with the West these days feeling much the same way).
There had been times when the Byzantines and the West co-operated; but these were always brief, against the grain, and always unpopular on the streets of Constantinople, who were proud of their ancient culture, and would rather hang than be pawns to the "barbarians" of the West.
There have been times when the Russians and West co-operated; but the most recent example was this was during the time of Boris Yeltsin (when joining NATO was, briefly, seriously considered by Russia); but these were days when Russia was politically and economically weak, and very much a real pawn in a wider geo-political game of chess at the time. Since that time, Russia has been ruled by a real geo-political Grand Master, Vladimir Putin, and Russia has regained its world status.
So Russia will probably never understand the West, and vice versa, because, for all their similarities, the long history and simple geography give Russia different priorities. It will likely continue to scupper plans for the West to have regime change in Iran, because it causes them very real geo-politial concerns of encirclement; likewise, it will continue to quietly support "rogue regimes" like Syria because Russia's own press is effectively state-censored and Russia's ruling elite is terrified that Russians might get the idea to create their own "democratic revolution" - another idea being exported from the 21st-century Crusaders of the West.
As Russia sees it, they don't need "democracy" - code for Western interference; somewhat like how the Byzantines didn't need "church union" with the Catholic pope in Rome - code for being pawns to Western barbarians.
The irony of the Crusades was that it was originally a Byzantine idea; in the end, though, they got more than they bargained for. The First Crusade was in 1097 and "liberated" Jerusalem from Muslim rule; the Fourth Crusade of 1203 saw the Crusaders pillage, burn and loot Constantinople itself, leaving the Byzantine empire a ruined shadow of its former self.
The irony of the "democracy" project is that Russia was one of the first European powers to have a "democratic revolution", in 1917 (although it only lasted for less than nine months, before the Bolsheviks took over); no wonder the current Russian administration is looking at the goings on in the Middle East with continuing anxiety - how long before its own population picks up the "democratic revolution" virus?
As it happens, as we speak, there are increasing numbers of ordinary Russians, like those in the Middle East, losing their fear, out of frustration at a corrupt and ineffective state. No wonder then, that the Russian intelligensia are so keen to curse the West.
The Greeks probably know exactly how they feel.
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