The psychology of Conservatism and Nationalism: a "controlled environment", or is it just Narcissism?

Broadly-speaking, nationalism could be said to act as a psychological "comfort blanket". There is a lot to be said for the argument that people who are ideologically-conservative also desire a "controlled environment"; in other words, they require the psychological security of an environment where they feel "safe", where things are familiar, and where things don't change. This last point is the entire nature of Conservatism as an ideology.
The psychology of narcissism is inherently tied to this. The concept of a "controlled environment" is something that can be found in narcissists, who seek to have the last say in how people behave who they interact with, and require an environment where things stay exactly as they are, in a state of controlled inertia.
In the same way that the concept of change scares a conservative, "change" terrifies a narcissist. Both react to "change" as a threat, as it challenges the carefully-constructed environment that they have created for themselves. The carefully-constructed environment both narcissists and conservatives have created stems from insecurity.

The family member or partner of a narcissist, if they allow the narcissist to have their own way (as it is the easiest way to avoid conflict), will find decisions made for them by the narcissist, their possessions are no longer their own, and the company they choose no longer a matter of their free-will. The narcissist is a "control freak" at heart, because of their innate insecurity. That insecurity inhabits itself through the establishment of a "controlled environment" at home, and an irrational (and unethical) desire to impose their will on to others in the world in general; the world must be moulded to suit the narcissist's desires, rather than the narcissist adapt to reality.
This can also be exhibited as an intense and pathological inability to change their views (i.e. stubbornness), even if that causes them (and others) far more problems than it would if they had changed their mind in the first place. This is more accurately a kind of neurosis - mental incapacity - where things must be done as the narcissist decided, as to admit that they were wrong would create a crisis of confidence in their own fragile sense of self-esteem. In Britain, Theresa May seems to be a good real-world example of a personality that is so neurotic (and innately narcissistic) in her inability to change, she would rather the country go to ruin than bring herself to admit her judgement was wrong.
Again, this stems from insecurity, as it is psychologically difficult for the narcissist to change their perspective on the world; they see it as easier to get the world to change for them. The narcissists' sense of self-esteem is so fragile that anything that threatens to change their own carefully-constructed and cast-iron perception of the world must be either disregarded or disparaged.
And when that "carefully-constructed perception" is destroyed, the reaction from the narcissist is the same as a child's tantrum: anger, fury, vindictiveness and spite at the source of their "pain". At their worst, the narcissist reacts to their world-view being shown as an illusory fantasy as the highest form of betrayal, lashing out at even those that care for them if they are unable to "get even" with the ultimate source of the "problem". Someone must pay for the narcissist's emotional suffering, even if it redirected at the innocent, or even those that they claim to care about the most. The narcissist's rage can be something fearsome to behold.

The behaviour above that describes the narcissist also applies to the ideological nationalist, and to conservative thinking on general. At its most toxic level, this can manifest itself as far-right extremism, such as seen in the alt-right or Islamic fundamentalism. This is the psychology of the "loser" who wants to get revenge on society. In the male-dominated world of the far-right, it is about the creation of a society where men are superior to women, culture is homogeneous, and unorthodox thinking is suppressed and persecuted; the logical conclusion of a narcissist's "controlled environment", writ large. This is the narcissists' "power fantasy".
 The psychology of Hitler is the most extreme manifestation of this type of "malignant narcissism" embodied in one person, as his "nationalism" was a psychological projection of his childhood insecurities, creating Nazi Germany as the manifestation of his disturbed ego. In a different manner, J Edgar Hoover is another example of someone with his own insecurities (also seen in his widely-reported dysfunctional personal life) who led the FBI as his own personal "controlled environment" through the tenures of eight presidents, from Coolidge to Nixon. In this manner, he ruled the USA as a "power behind the throne" for decades, using his position to indulge his own prejudices on the nation, with the power to potentially decide the fate of millions at his whim. In the end it was Nixon, another personality with a mass of insecurities, that oversaw Hoover's slide into irrelevance.

Going into the psychology of nationalism (and Conservatism in general), the core tenet is about people wanting to preserve things they way they were when they were a child. At the most extreme embodiment, Hitler seemed to have his own fantastical version of Germany in his head: psychologists have talked of him having a "God Complex" coming from his mother, who  died when he was an adolescent. In this sense, his idolization of Germany before the First World War (and his desire to unite all German-speaking peoples) may have come from the insecurity felt by the loss of his beloved mother; to equate pre-war Germany with the time his mother was still alive, which then morphed into thinking that creating a greater Germany would somehow assuage his feelings of loss for his mother. With other accumulated insecurities piled on top of this, such as his acquired hatred of the Jews, we see the blinkered, twisted vision of a man who seeks to create the ultimate "controlled environment".
Hitler is the extreme embodiment of this; at a more prosaic level, conservatives in general seem to psychologically hark back to a time when things were more "familiar", when the world seemed like a simpler, less unpredictable, place. This inevitably goes back to the time of their childhood. But the desire to "turn back the clock" can itself only come from the desire to change reality as it exists now; an irrational (and even unethical) desire to impose their will on the rest of society. This is the core psychology of the narcissist.

While this desire for "turning back the clock" can in some ways be just harmless fantasizing ("stop the world, I want to get off!"), there are plenty of examples of where this has led to a surge of narcissistic rage when this fantasy is resisted by others. The violence of the alt-right in the USA, and now the surge of far-right violence in Britain and Europe, are all signs of narcissistic rage. Unwilling to accept that diversity of opinion and culture is a normal part of life in the developed world, the far-right seek to express their frustration that they cannot "turn back the clock"; thus they seek to impose their version of a "controlled environment" by use of violence and intimidation.
At a different level, the same can be seen in Britain with the rhetoric of "Brexiteers", who talk of saboteurs, appeasement and betrayal. This is the same language that a narcissist would use when confronted with people who refuse to follow their commands. When this is writ large in supportive elements of the media, this harsh rhetoric only encourages others to carry out violence in their name.

The psychology of Populism and Donald Trump is the psychology of narcissism, in the same way that "Brexit" is the irrational psychology of narcissism. But the world cannot be tamed to follow his vision as the narcissist would like to think it is. The politics of "Brexit" and Donald Trump are about "nativism", and wanting to make society more homogeneous and more predictable, as it was when its supporters were growing up. If the world cannot be made to do as the narcissist pleases, then they will construct their own "controlled environment" at home where they can feel safe. This is the psychological root of American isolationism; and it is the logical conclusion that "Brexit" will take, once its architects see that the world does not care what they think, and cannot be cajoled into doing what they want.
The stereotypical old-aged conservative is the man (or woman) who is sat at home, alone and friendless, complaining to anyone who will listen about how the world has changed beyond recognition, how nothing is as good as it used to be, and how he no longer feels like he belongs in the world.
It is a sad existence, and one that is entirely self-inflicted.

Personality politics, the media and extremism: Brexit, Trump, and the rise of Populism in the 21st century

There have long been complaints that the world has been getting more superficial, and in the case of media (and its coverage of politics) the complaint seems to be well-deserved.

The problem boils down to issues like "ratings". In essence, its about making television "entertaining", and newspapers making their coverage popular. Political coverage therefore has to fit into the same lens in order to be accessible to the general public. Equally, however, the media operate in an environment shared by their political masters, meaning that overt criticism of some figures can lead to negative consequences for a media outlet (such as losing "access"); so a fine line is often taken by the fourth estate. Both these factors together explain how media coverage of politics has gradually become more superficial and less informative (and informed). The degree of that superficiality has only become truly clear with the rise of Trump in the USA and the cause of "Brexit" in the UK.

"Personality politics" has its roots in the political campaigns for people like Reagan in the USA, continued by the likes of Bill Clinton, which was then copied by Tony Blair. Following from Blair in the UK, we had David Cameron, who molded the Conservative Party in his own image.
The personality politics that these figures harnessed was about capturing the "centre ground". While much of Reagan's rhetoric was Libertarian in its outlook, in office he was often more pragmatic - and more "centrist" - than some people realized at the time. This explained why he won successive elections. Clinton and Blair achieved the same, using the same centrist platform, albeit coming from the other side of the political spectrum.
However, personality politics doesn't work in a vacuum, and it needs a media platform in order to thrive. That media platform has been intertwined with the political sphere for decades, as those in politics and the media often share the same background, educational ties and peer groups. In short, media coverage of politics occupied its own bubble: in the USA it was all about life inside "The Beltway", while in the UK it was all about Westminster gossip.
That superficial fascination with "gossip" was another facet of the entertainment factor in politics. As much of politics is dry and technical to the layman, it requires titillation and personality to bring it alive. This explains why the most famous politicians in Capitol Hill or Westminster were always the ones who were used acts of showmanship. In Ronald Reagan, a former actor, the USA had someone who understood this very well. Donald Trump today has his own exaggerated (but very successful) form of showmanship, clearly modeled on that of Reagan.

A wit might say that politics is the realm of the failed actor. The politicians that have been successful have all used these skills in order to gain the limelight; the politicians that naturally have these skills can rise all the more quickly, along with the movement attached to them.
In the UK, the rise of UKIP is matched with the rise of the politician, Nigel Farage. Here is a figure who has had far more media coverage over the years - going back twenty years - than has merited the popularity of his party. And yet, it was only after the financial crisis (more on that later) that he came to dominate the political sphere so disproportionately.
On one hand, politics became more "professional" during the tenure of Clinton and Blair, so that by the end of the 1990s, there seemed to exist a kind of "conventional wisdom" in society, supported by the media and the political class, that made some issues seem "taboo" to talk about. This was the flip side to centrism. The political class and the media seemed complicit to those on the ideological fringes in shutting-down debate, so that the number of issues that came to be reported on and discussed dwindled. Social issues like racism and homophobia were tackled by government for he first time in living memory, leaving those on the ideological fringe to claim that they themselves were becoming a "persecuted minority". Thus were sown the seeds of the far-right claiming that they were fighting for "free speech", against a complicit media and centrist agenda.

Changes in technology and the rise of internet media have also seen a hollowing-out of traditional news media, like local newspapers. National news agencies have also had to rethink their priorities in the face of falling revenues thanks to these structural shifts in the media industry. What this has meant is that the kind of in-depth reporting that was once common (think how "Watergate" became exposed) has become increasingly difficult to finance. This has meant tough choices, and the result is that the level of reportage and knowledge of issues is not as thorough or as deep as it used to be.
This explains, for example, how the media in the UK have been so poor at grasping the many issues surrounding the implications for Brexit for the country. Apart from how these issues are reported (i.e. the degree of superficiality already mentioned), and the issue of media slant (i.e. not wanting to go against "established opinion") is the issue of how well it is reported in the first place. Simply, the lack of technical knowledge apparent in those working for the media means that they often don't even know what are the right questions to ask to begin with, let alone whether they choose to ask them or not.
In this way, dissemination and lies by politicians pass by unchecked, assumed as fact by media figures who often simply don't know what they're talking about. There is the facade of media interrogation when politicians are interviewed or asked questions after their public appearances, but this lack of technical knowledge, along with the media's own reasons for not wanting to "upset" politicians (as this could damage future "access") means that the public only ever get a "version" of the truth. This is one reason why, if you want to understand a story in any real detail, you need to read it from several media sources, and find the balance somewhere between them all.

This is where "fake news" gets its fuel from, and why Donald Trump's press office talked of "alternative facts". In a time when the media has been under financial pressures due to the structural changes talked of earlier, this allows the more unscrupulous parts of the media (i.e. those with overt ideological agendas) to claim that there is no "real" truth, only many different forms of it. Because the media have been attacked as being too "establishment" for before seeming to favor "centrist" candidates, this leaves them vulnerable to attack from those who have an agenda against centrism i.e. Populists.
Populism and personality politics have found the perfect environment to gestate in since the financial crisis. While prior to the financial crisis, personality politics usually favored centrist politics (thanks to a like-minded media), since then it has been the Populists that have gone from strength to strength.


The rise of Populism

The media were as blindsided by the financial crisis as the politicians were. In some ways, the financial crisis saw the end of unchallenged rule of "centrism". With the ideological walls of the establishment being shook by the financial crisis (let's not forget that only government bailouts prevented a second "Great Depression"), it forced the media to reassess the fluid political landscape. In the USA, the rise of the "TEA Party", a hard-right faction of the Republicans, matched the concurrent rise of UKIP in the UK, itself effectively a hard-right faction of the Conservative Party.

While the TEA Party lacked one unifying, charismatic figure (with several personalities vying for preeminence), UKIP had Nigel Farage. In the years after the financial crisis, Farage's brand of British Populism (which like the TEA Party, had a Libertarian agenda) captured the media's attention. With Westminster seeming to represent all that was tired and out-of-touch since the financial crisis, most of the political "excitement" seemed to come from Farage. 
The media superficiality during the long period of centrist dominance before the financial crisis, along with earlier accusations of bias of "political correctness", meant that the pendulum swung the other way: disproportionate (and flattering) coverage was then given to Farage, allowing him to be seen as someone on the side of "the people" against the "the establishment". His background in The City was something that was easily brushed under the carpet. Meanwhile, those media outlets that did criticize his agenda were labelled as part of "the establishment" themselves, and so in the now-antagonistic atmosphere after the financial crisis, they couldn't win either way.

The only person in the political establishment in the UK that matched this new form of "personality politics" was Boris Johnson. After being Mayor of London for eight years, he had become the "king across the water" as far as David Cameron was concerned. Conveniently entering parliament in 2015 during his last year of tenure as London Mayor, he was able to use his position in Westminster as well as his media coverage to great effect during the EU referendum in 2016. Along with Farage, these two figures were largely responsible for the success of the "leave" campaign - the most obvious indication of the success of Populist "personality politics" over a centrist establishment.

And of course, at the same time across in the USA, we had the rise of Donald Trump. While the EU referendum was in full flow in the UK, the USA was in the presidential primaries, which allowed Trump to take advantage of the same anti-establishment agenda. Using the same skepticism that the "leave" campaign had towards "experts", Trump attacked "fake news" by the established media. And now with both "Brexit" as an unstoppable force, and Trump as an immovable object, we've entered an age when media outlets can be called "enemies of the people", and it all seem completely normal.

Populist "personality politics" could only have come to prominence due to the financial crisis, and the media's close connection with the political establishment. This allowed the media to be tarnished with the label of complicity. The superficiality of the media that gradually seeped into its culture led to its own decline, leaving it completely exposed, as the political establishment was, when the financial crisis came along. Since then, the political culture had become dominated by the rhetoric of Populism, supported by a media culture that has either lost its way, or is part of the same corrupt bargain.
As Populists generate greater "ratings", this means they get more coverage. It might make for good entertainment, but it leaves the media destroying its own integrity, to help the agenda of people who only see them as their puppets.

Trump versus Brexit: Populist ideology and Fascist rhetoric

When Communism became a force in the political world in the late 19th and early 20th century, the last place people expected it to take hold was in Russia. The tsar ruled his empire with an iron grip and with (at the time) perhaps the most sophisticated secret police network on the planet. The idea that this state could be overthrown by Communists appeared ludicrous.
But it was precisely the overbearing nature of the state that helped to bring about its own downfall. This was it's own Achilles heel, as it brought about an equal and opposite reaction from beneath. All that was needed was the right circumstances. The 1905 revolution, itself brought about in part by the national humiliation of the Russo-Japanese War, was the turning point, followed by Russia's debilitating engagement in the First World War. The instability this caused gave further evidence of the actual fragility of the status quo and encouragement that only another small push would be enough to overthrow the state completely.
This was achieved in February 1917 with the initial liberal Kerensky government, whose own fragility was then ruthlessly exploited by the Bolsheviks in the autumn of the same year. After fighting a civil war to maintain their grip on power, through sheer brutal force of will, the Communists stayed in power for the next seventy years.


The politics of emotion

The rise of Populism in the USA and the UK, so that they now appear as the "standard bearers" of the ideological movement, is perhaps as similar a surprise to the establishment as the victory of Communism was in Russia. Populism was never meant to be able to succeed in Britain and the USA, as the political system meant that marginal and divisive ideologies would always be battling against the well-organised machinery of the establishment. And yet here we are: "Brexit" has utterly transformed British politics as powerfully as Trump has transformed American politics. Whatever happens, politics will remain changed by these two forces for the foreseeable future. Even though Trump may only be president for a few years, his politics and rhetoric will shape ideology and culture in America for years to come; Brexit, by its very nature, will transform Britain for (potentially) decades.
Brexit and Trump are two sides of the same coin: two different faces of Populism. As an ideology, Populism is the politics of emotion, appealing to the lowest common denominator in the electorate. In a different setting, Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Turkey is an earlier exemplar of this, who set the trend and "wrote the playbook" for others to follow. Erdogan and his Islamist agenda have now dominated Turkey for fifteen years, and look to continue to do so for a long time to come. Unlike in Russia, where it was always easy for one man to dominate politics, Turkey's political environment was more well-grounded and relatively pluralistic, if imperfect. It took an inflationary crisis for Erdogan and the Islamist agenda to take control of the democratic machinery, then use emotional rhetoric and authoritarian tactics to keep control of it. In a different setting, we see echoes of the same trend happening with Brexit and Donald Trump.
The financial crisis was the common spark that created the agenda for Brexit and the politics of Trump. In seeking a simple answer to the problems that the lowest rungs of society were struggling with, in Britain the reason given was "Europe", while in America it was "Globalisation". In identifying a complicit establishment that was seen to be working with foreign powers against their own people, we see the common narrative that runs through the rhetoric of Brexit and Donald Trump; the same rhetoric seen in Populism time and time again. This common narrative is the divisive rhetoric that creates "winners" and "losers", "us" and "them": Populism is about the "losers" regaining their self-respect and sense of control, by removing the power of a corrupt establishment. It is by its nature a violent and radical creed.
The violent undercurrent that runs through Populism is why it appears as the ideological kin to Fascism: both share a narrative that divides society, that creates enemies to be hated, that creates a belief that those in power are by their nature corrupt, that creates scapegoats to explain its supporters' difficulties in life, that creates a justification for the use of violence (both rhetorically and physically), and the use of extra-judicial powers. All these themes can be found in the rhetoric of Brexit and Donald Trump. This is what happens when the politics of emotion is unleashed.


"America First"

The politics of Donald Trump are the politics of the ego-driven Populist. Nearly forty years ago, the younger Trump was asked of his interest in politics, and his stated reason for not wanting to get involved was because he thought his ideas were too radical for mainstream opinion. Given what we know now about his politics, we can guess that he understood that he knew his views were those of the extremist (Populist? Fascist?), and that he had no chance of becoming elected on such a platform.
It is clear that those views never changed; he simply discovered a way to get around the barriers to entry for such a platform: by becoming part of the establishment, and taking control of the agenda from the inside.

Both the UK and the USA have notoriously-difficult systems for outside parties to break into, which was why Populism was never really meant to happen there. In the USA, Trump got around that through a combination of strategic planning and fortuitous timing. As with all extremist agendas (be it Communism or Fascism), they can only succeed under a very specific set of circumstances. Trump saw that these were coalescing in his favour as Barack Obama was reaching the end of his second term.
While some of his rhetoric mirrors that of Erdogan in Turkey (and his role models seem to be dictatorial authoritarians), his personal style is more like the bombastic Mussolini (or perhaps more accurately, Trump's Italian near contemporary, Berlusconi). In essence, Trump's "ideology" is simply whatever he happens to think at that moment: as he has few coherent thoughts, he flips from one idea to the next; any inconsistencies pointed out by his critics are then decried as "fake news". In this way, Trump's America (and his vague ideology of "America First") is really a kind of personal rule, a dictatorship of the ego. It is up to those around him to put his chaotic thoughts into some kind of coherent agenda. And as his is a "personal rule" (not unlike England's Charles II), those working under him can be fired at whim, or are forced out if unable to deal with the day-to-day anarchy. This explains the unprecedented rate of attrition among White House staff, as well as the poisonous atmosphere.
As the nature of Trump's Populism is highly-personal, it also follows that his supporters are deeply-loyal towards him, and thus deeply antagonistic towards his critics. This is how Trump has divided America; by dividing friends and families in caustic ways not seen for generations. To his supporters, Trump is a kind of "saviour", speaking a language that relates to them in a way no other politician has before. For this reason, they are forgiving (or even dismissive) of any perceived personal faults, because to them he represents something more than just a man: he represents an idea. Whatever that "idea" is depends on the person, but the necessity to have belief in the idea is more important than questioning the reality that is the man. So to his supporters, Trump is a symbol, a symbol that cannot be seen to be imperfect; for his supporters to accept that Trump could be wrong would mean accepting that they could be wrong.
And here lies the inner pathology of Populism: because Populism appeals to those who are life's "losers" it follows that these people also lack self-esteem; they see Populist rhetoric as making themselves feel better about themselves and boosting their ego. So if Trump succeeds, they feel as though they are succeeding (regardless of the reality); "America First" to them means "Me First". It is when that fragile sense of ego is tested in the real world when the trouble really starts, and when the violent rhetoric becomes something much more dangerous to everyone else.


A divine cause

The "personal rule" in the style of Donald Trump was also attempted in Britain after Theresa May became Prime Minister. As the "Brexit Prime Minister" (or as the Polish government recently called her, "Madame Brexit"), a decision was taken that May's initial personal popularity should be exploited. This resulted in the Conservative government being re-branded as "Theresa May's Team", and by the time of the local elections in 2017 and the snap election soon afterwards, it was all about May and her agenda.
The fact that this then spectacularly backfired during the campaign once it was seen how she lacked any noticeable charisma or strategic thinking showed how this approach only works with the right kind of personality. While Trump's egomania and bombast have been the primary source of Populist rhetoric, in Britain "The Brexit Agenda" was carried forward mostly due to the charisma of Nigel Farage as the iconic leader of UKIP. The fact that, unlike Trump, he remained outside of the conventional party system meant that he was unable to personally take advantage of this when the moment came. In the end, it was May's decision to ape large parts of UKIP policy for the Conservative government that meant she was the main beneficiary. Once the EU referendum was won by the leavers, and therefore that the Conservative government had carried out a key UKIP aim, May's was in the right place at the right time.

But, unlike Trump and Farage, she didn't have the right personality, and this is what has made Brexit much more of an ideology of its own than any one politician's personal crusade. In this way, Brexit has become almost a kind of national religion in Britain, where no one person can claim divine ownership. It is a form of Populism that manifests itself as a transcendental faith, above personality. Whereas Populism in America is deeply-personalised in the ego of Donald Trump, in Britain it is something above personality and a movement in its own right. This is why Brexit cannot be stopped: it has been divined as "the will of the people".
In Britain, Fascist rhetoric is now used routinely in the Brexit-supporting media. While Donald Trump's tweets in support of Britain First demonstrate where his inner loyalties really lie, Theresa May uses the language of the delusional fantasist to describe Britain's future outside the EU, while presiding over a government that is routinely degrading Europeans that live and work here legally. Meanwhile, she makes efforts to befriend "rogue" governments like Poland who are now under sanction from the EU.

Outside of the USA and Britain, the people who support Trump and Brexit are not the friends of democracy. That should tell you all you need to know.

Extremism, Populism and malignant Narcissism

What do the American "alt-right", white supremacists, hard "Brexiteers" and Jihadists have in common?

A common thread that runs through each of these "extremist" movements, regardless of their background and religion, is a sense of feeling "left behind" or "lost" in modern, globalist society. Identity politics is something that has been gradually gaining traction in the Anglo-Saxon sphere for some time, but the financial crisis seems to have given it a substantial leg-up.
The extent to which this has been quietly brewing under the surface had been ignored or played down, until it was no longer possible to deny its influence: the recent events in Charlottesville, USA, simply add to the danger of pretending this issue doesn't exist. When the ranks of the "left behind" suddenly emerge from the shadows, the effect is all the more frightening.

In some ways, the hand-wringing and moral equivalence by Donald Trump of these extremists is as bad as those in the UK (both in the Muslim community and left-leaning liberals) who are wary of calling-out the hateful racism and misogyny evident in the "sex gangs" that exist in the Pakistani community. In spite of the different motivations, what connects the  Muslim "sex gangs" and the home-grown Jihadist network is the common vein of malignant narcissism that runs through their psychology: the basic desire to control others (either through sexual domination or violence) regardless of the consequences.
In a different way, the same accusation could be leveled at the "alt-right", white supremacists/nationalists, and the devil-may-care attitude seen in some hard "Brexiteers": they are determined to do what they want, regardless of the consequences on others (or the national interest).

The author has stated before that Islamic extremism could well be seen as a form of malignant narcissism; it takes only a small leap of logic to identify all forms of extremism (both religious and ideological) as a form of malignant narcissism.

From a psychological point of view, narcissism has been identified as an increasingly-conspicuous problem in modern society. Over the last thirty years, changes to the structure of the economy have created greater inequality as well as greater work insecurity. At the same time, this has led to an explosion in under-educated men from run-down parts of the country finding it more and more difficult to identify their place in society. It can be no surprise that white men from under-educated, low-skilled backgrounds tend to be the ones that flock towards nationalist extremist movements, and that Muslim men from under-educated, low-skilled backgrounds tend to be the targets for Islamic extremist movements. While this might be a simplification (there are graduates that can also be drawn to the same movements), the overall trend is clear: violence and hate are now seen as legitimate means of expressing the frustration these men feel at modern society.
The issue of Islamic extremism is more complex than that of what (for the sake of simplicity) can be broadly called "White Nationalism" i.e. including the American alt-right and British far-right. "White Nationalism" has more palatable tones in the "take back control" style of rhetoric used in Brexit, in the same way how Donald Trump's populism found a more mainstream method of expression for this undercurrent of malignant narcissism. The alt-right and British far-right (such as the EDL) are merely violent expressions of the same form of frustration as that expressed by Jihadists; the only difference is cultural.

In the Anglo-sphere, a clear up-welling of political violence has occurred in the years since the financial crisis: shootings of politicians, attacks on ethnic minorities, violent protests by ethnic minorities etc. etc. Meanwhile, the superseding of Al-Qaeda by ISIS in the public consciousness has led to a similar exodus of home-grown Muslims to fight for "Jihad". If one were to be stereotypical of the trend, it would be to say that poor White men become neo-Nazis, poor Muslim men become Jihadists, and poor Black men become gang members. On the last point, the London riots of 2011 were sparked by the killing of a young black gang member, and recent riots in Hackney were sparked by similar violence by the police against a black man.
As said earlier, what links these types of men together, in spite of the difference in culture, is the under-privileged backgrounds and lack of education. This has been a growing issue for the last thirty years in the Anglo-sphere: a lack of opportunities simply can lead to frustration; the outlet many seek is to transfer the blame through violence and hatred.

This malignant narcissism is the psychological vein that runs deep in these segments of society. The vote for Brexit was also a vote from the "left-behind" for something different; anything that wasn't the status quo. The same psychology was evident in the kind of areas of the USA that voted for Donald Trump; the same "neo-Nazis" that claim his support do so because of the feeling he supports the "left behind" white men; the same "left behind" white men from places like Burnley and Darlington than voted for Brexit.
Voting for Brexit and voting for Trump psychologically amounted to the same thing: a vote against a system (neo-liberal globalisation) and a retreat to "cultural nativism"; Jihadism is simply a more violent expression of the same psychology from frustrated Muslim men (and women).

In this sense, it is the pendulum swinging back the other way: after thirty-odd years of dominance of the neo-liberal model, some of those "left behind" by these changes to the economic system are finding violence and extremism as the best way they can make their point. The sad truth is that a society that creates inequality (and considers inequality to be a good thing) is one that implicitly gives sanction to a psychology of violence; it is this culture of violence that breeds "angry white men". There is plenty of research evidence to support the view that more unequal societies are more violent, and it is well-understood that it is the underclass of those societies that descend into a career of casual violence. From a criminology point of view, therefore, could Brexit and the rise of Donald Trump be partly because of a malignant psychology that has been allowed to stew unchecked for the last three decades?

These may well be the dark forces that have been unleashed on the Anglo-Saxon world; coalescing into something identifiable since the financial crisis, while quietly stewing for the last thirty years, an under-current of violence and hate have now found their vehicle on both sides of the Atlantic. The question is what will be done next.

Donald Trump: Is he the Kaiser Wilhelm of our time?

This isn't the first article to be written on the subject (one of the earliest articles, from more than a year ago, is seen here). There have been numerous articles written on the personality and psychology of Donald Trump, claiming that he is a narcissist or, worse, a potential sociopath. The author instead looks to explore the personality and psychological parallels between Donald Trump and Kaiser Wilhelm in more detail, and let the parallels speak for themselves.

The author wrote a piece on Kaiser Wilhelm's personality a few years ago, in particular looking at the relationship that developed between him and Enver Pasha, a like-minded belligerent in effective control of the Ottoman Empire's war machine.

Observers and historians have noted some of the personality similarities between these two leaders, separated a hundred years apart, highlighting the similar tendencies in character towards arrogance, boorishness, shallowness, exuberance and unpredictability. Other similar details of both their life histories are worthy of study.
In some senses, these two men came of age at around the same time: Donald Trump becoming the figurehead of his family's company in his late twenties, and Wilhelm II becoming Kaiser of the German Empire around the same age. Likewise, they also had some similar traits in childhood and while growing up. Both Donald and Wilhelm were troublesome children during their schooling, showing some violent tendencies, as had been recorded about Wilhelm, and as Donald himself has openly alluded to. Equally, both took a period of military schooling to iron out these anti-social traits into something more productive. In Donald's case, it could be argued that the disciplinarian atmosphere helped to channel his energies into focusing on the family business; with Wilhelm, the military aspect took on a wholly-absorbing character, which stayed with him for the rest of his life.

In other ways, it can be argued how each person's relationship with their parents affected their personality as an adult.
Wilhelm's parents - his father, the heir to the throne (who would later die after only a few months as Kaiser), and his English mother, a daughter of Queen Victoria - cared very much for their son, who was tragically disfigured with a withered left arm from a botched birth. However, it appears that Wilhelm did not return the sentiment, seeing his parents as soft liberals. In particular, he had a very troubled relationship with his mother, which later would become evolve into a conflicted relationship with the land of her birth.
So we see that Wilhelm's embrace of the military and his "strong" Prussian sense of identity could be traced to the rejection of his father's perceived "softness"; equally, his love-hate relationship with Britain, and ultimately an integral part of Germany's foreign policy, arguably came from his rejection of his mother. He initially wanted Britain as a strong German ally, and when that failed, Britain had to be beaten.
Donald Trump's parentage is also interesting, as he is of German stock on his father's side, while his mother is Scottish. In other words - and by strange coincidence - Trump, like Kaiser Wilhelm II, is from a "German" father and a "British" mother.
However, it is clear that Donald's relationship to his parents was much more conventional. His mother and father were seen as nothing if not role models, once Donald had developed into a more disciplined adult. The drive he developed for business seems to have come from his innate competitive spirit, and the desire to make a name for himself. He has in the past called himself a "warrior", and talked of his formative experiences with his father's business as a youngster being key to developing his dog-eat-dog view of the world. In that sense, it could be argued that his drive to expand the Trump Corporation into Manhattan from its roots laid by his father in Brooklyn and Queen was the wish to supersede the successes of his father: he would use the "good name" that his father had established to create an empire of his own. In that respect, he certainly succeeded. In Frank Trump, Donald Trump had the kind of father figure that someone like Kaiser Wilhelm probably wished would have had: instead of wanting to emulate his father, like Donald Trump did, Wilhelm turned to the military and his own Prussian identity to make up for what he perceived as his own father's "failings".
In this comparison, we can see that the roots of Wilhelm's insecurities and malignant narcissism may well have come from this aspect of his childhood; on the other hand, Donald Trump's gross narcissism may well simply have been something that was always there.

Donald Trump's relationship with his mother's home country is also worth mentioning, as it can be argued that, at least to some extent, he shares the same "love-hate" relationship that Wilhelm had for Britain. Trump's property empire is international in scope, and includes golf courses in Scotland. He famously has had controversies with the building of a golf course in Aberdeenshire, which can also be seen as a result of Trump's driven personality. More recently, he traveled to Scotland a few days after the Brexit vote to congratulate Scotland, seemingly not realising that Scotland had, in fact, mostly voted to remain in the EU. Since becoming President, his relationship with Britain as a whole has become even more tortuous: receiving the attention of the British Prime Minister for trade talks and an official invite, while receiving an "un-invite" by the British Speaker of parliament. Such grating diplomatic blunders and mis-steps were also characteristic of Kaiser Wilhelm.

We have talked about the driven aspects to both Donald Trump and Kaiser Wilhelm's personalities. Both share a strong desire to lead, and to be seen to be a leader. In Wilhelm's case, this was seen with his admiration for the the Russian Tsar and the autocratic model, going so far as to wish to become allies (he abjectly failed in this mission). While Germany was not an autocracy, the Kaiser still had personal control of the military and the cabinet, if not the parliament. It was due to this that he was able to personally mould German foreign policy without oversight, and surround himself with like-minded belligerents.
It could be argued that Donald Trump sees his Presidency (or would like to see it) as being able to mould the country and the world as he sees fit, as the de facto "leader of the world". To an extent, all Presidents may like to see it this way, though the US Constitution clearly marks out the limits of a President's mandate. However, it is also evident that Donald Trump sees himself as different: he has all the hallmarks of being a demagogue in the mould of, for example, Turkey's Recep Tayyip Erdogan. So far, his slew of "executive orders" indicate a desire to trample on the limitations that ordinarily restrict presidential powers, even if that is unconstitutional or even illegal.
Like Wilhelm, Donald Trump's political role models appear to be "strongmen": Trump has professed respect for Vladimir Putin and his manner of ruling, and seems to have adopted a flexible ("realpolitik"?) approach to Russia. His policy of "America First" is in the mould of many other authoritarian leaders, while also shadowing some of the foreign policy aims that Kaiser Wilhelm had, such as protectionism, military might and defense of national interests.

Lastly, both these individuals seem to have shared a chaotic and impulsive style of governing. We have already looked at how Kaiser Wilhelm took personal control of military and diplomatic affairs, even against the advice of his generals and diplomats. The same signs can be seen in the first weeks of Donald Trump's administration, with his senior staff seemingly unable to keep up with his frequent contradictory statements.
With these unpredictable personalities as leaders, both saw the result being that individuals like-minded to the leader would prosper; Wilhelm surrounded himself with belligerents, while Trump seems to have as his key advisers those who share in his, at times apocalyptic and fatalistic, world-view.

It's early days in the Trump Presidency, and already people on his own side are wondering if (or rather, when) it will all end in tears...