Brexit, nationalism and fall of UKIP: a new realignment in British politics?

The results from the local elections have told us a number of things, but perhaps the most important one is that the decision for Theresa May to turn the Conservative Party rhetorically rightwards into UKIP territory has paid off.

That this was a coldly-calculated political decision there can be no mistake; the signs were there in the fiery rhetoric of the Conservative Party conference last autumn. Once the vote had happened, Theresa May decided that she was going to "own" Brexit, with the hope that UKIP supporters would therefore transfer to the Tories, giving them an unassailable advantage over Labour. And this is infact what has happened. On top of the weakness of the Labour leadership itself, the effect of the UKIP vote effectively transferring to the Tories means we are in a whole new political ball park (more on that below).
For Labour, this is another mortal blow. After the Scottish referendum effectively killed off their party's historic dominance north of the border, the EU referendum has brought another blow all across England, leaving them with few "heartlands" left. If anything, Labour has come to represent parts of what its critics call the "urban liberal demographic" (what has also been called "Remainia" as opposed to Tory-held "Brexitland"); however this leaves them fighting over a segment of the vote also divided between the Libdems and the Greens, with the Conservatives now seen as fully representing the interests of "Brexit". In this way, the demographic split between these two ("Remainia" and "Brexitland") could as easily be seen as an updating of the classic conflict that pits "city versus country" and "rich versus poor".

How The UK became like Turkey

Political parallels are always inexact, but nonetheless can be useful. The author has been an observer of Turkish affairs for more than ten years, after having lived there in the past.
Before the rise of the Islamist AKP fifteen years ago, religion was kept strictly out of politics, following in the Turkish republic's secular constitution and traditions. Apart from a brief period in the 1990s, religious parties in Turkey had never been able to achieve power, or anything close to it: simply, the issue of religion was in effect politically off the table.
Turkish politics had always traditionally been dominated by either the CHP (the vaguely left-leaning party of the republic's founder, Mustafa Kemal "Ataturk"), or by a right-leaning party (these changed over the years, but the politics was generally consistently conservative). This left no real room for religion to enter the debate.
This changed when there was an inflationary, financial crisis in Turkey in the late 1990s, which ended up tarring the main secular parties with the charge of corruption and incompetence. The AKP, a newly-established Islamist party, took advantage of this by appealing to moderates (both secularists as well as Islamists) who wanted a change. They also played down their Islamist credentials.

We now know what happened afterwards: Turkey has been ruled by the AKP for the last fourteen years, and looks destined to be ruled by it for the foreseeable future. Why? Because by the introduction of a new dynamic into the mix, politics became unrecognisable: the "old" secular parties became old hat, and their natural electoral base became sidelined by the agenda of the more dominant Islamists. Because the AKP were the only party seen to represent the interests of Islamists (i.e. they "owned" the brand), it meant the AKP could rely on a consistent "base" that would vote for it regardless of how extreme it appeared to the rest of society, or to outsiders. The rhetoric has become more and more extreme as the tendencies of the government became gradually more openly authoritarian. Meanwhile the opposing secular parties remained divided and impotent. The vote for the secular parties have thus been restricted to the relatively-affluent, more liberal urban areas of the country; like in the UK, where the Labour/ LibDem vote has remained more robust in places like London and Manchester, while it has retreated everywhere else.

"Brexit" seems to have had a similarly-radical effect on British politics as what happened to Turkey. The issue of "Europe" had never been something high up in the minds of the British electorate. This began to change slowly, and then seemed to suddenly be taken advantage of by UKIP after the years of the financial crisis and the first difficult years of the Coalition government.
It was the fateful decision of David Cameron to go ahead with the EU referendum that set the ball rolling, to destroy his career.
By opening the issue of "Europe" to the electorate (in effect, "confecting" a political fissure from a previously-unchallenged orthodoxy), it gave all the advantage to UKIP and the Eurosceptics in Cameron's own party.  Like how secularism in Turkey was a previously unchallenged statement of fact, then turned on its head by the AKP, the issue of Britain's position in Europe had been a long-unchallenged fact, turned on its head by the decision to have the EU referendum. This gave an in-built advantage to the "Leave" camp: whatever the problem was, "Europe" was the cause of it. This was how they managed to turn the EU referendum into a vote about everything that people were unhappy with - whatever you were unhappy with, it was Europe's fault! In the febrile atmosphere of Britain in the years following the financial crisis, like in the years of Turkey's inflationary crisis that preceded the AKP's success, it gave an advantage to "outsider" movements, and an excuse for people to vote against the political orthodoxy.

The comparison with Turkey here becomes muddied, because unlike in Turkey where the AKP took advantage of the Islamist vote, UKIP were not the ultimate beneficiaries of winning the EU referendum.
And this shows us something of the chameleon-like nature of the Conservative Party, which never misses an opportunity to cement power. By Theresa May's calculated decision to fully embrace the cause that was UKIP's raison d-etre, she had effectively turned the Conservative Party into UKIP. UKIP no longer had any reason to exist.

In this way, by re-aligning the Conservative Party (i.e. the party of "the establishment") to quickly take full control of this new "fissure" in British politics, it has left the other parties looking out-of-date and moribund. In the same way that the secular parties in Turkey now represent a segment of the electorate that can never have a realistic chance of power, the same could be said of the "pro-European" parties in the UK, at least for the foreseeable future.

Both Turkish politics, and now British politics, have experienced events that have seismically-changed the electoral landscape, but the beneficiaries have been different in each case. In Turkey, the rise of Islamism was partly due to an inflationary crisis that damaged its traditional parties, which have not been able to recover since. In Britain, however, the Conservative Party, after initially being a "victim" of UKIP over the issue of Europe, then took advantage of its own fractured situation to copy UKIP's agenda post facto, leaving it as the "master" of the new political reality. As with the AKP, "moderates" in the Conservative Party had nowhere else to go politically, even as its rhetoric became more and more extreme. The Conservatives now have both the nationalist votes from UKIP over "Brexit", as well as the tribal loyalty of their traditional party supporters, who could never bring themselves to leave: the "moderates" are effectively hostages to the extremist agenda that has been thrust upon them by an opportunistic few.

We have already seen a sign of things to come, from Theresa May's hostile and paranoid rhetoric towards Europe, and her authoritarian tendencies at home, to see where this kind of ugly nationalism could take Britain in the coming years.

This is the other similarity that The UK now shares with Turkey: that Theresa May appears to be copying the nationalist authoritarian rhetoric of Turkey's leader, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. In the same way that Erdogan's regime has brought about a new sense of Turkish identity that has been called "Neo-Ottomanism", it appears that Theresa May's strategy is turn the country's self-imposed isolation from Europe into some kind of "renaissance".
This would have Britain (or more exactly, England) hark back to a time when Britain was isolated against a hostile Continent, reviving the jingoism of the Second World War. The difference now, of course, is that Britain's isolation is a self-inflicted wound, when the rest of Europe sees us as the "bad guy" by wanting to wrangle our way out of previously-made financial commitments, and wanting to have our cake and eat it. In other words, in some quarters Britain is now seen as something of a bad joke. At the same time, much of the rest of the world sees Britain's choice on "Brexit" as an opportunity to take advantage of its self-inflicted weakness. Meanwhile, the self-inflicted hardships to come can be blamed on "Europe" and scheming outsiders; and like other authoritarian leaders, using a cult of national solidarity and sacrifice (in Britain's case, what's called "the spirit of the Blitz") at home to quell opposition.
Like Erdogan, May and her supporters paper over this weakness with a resurgence in rose-tinted nationalism, which turns to hostile paranoia when concerning outsiders and opponents at home. Erdogan's foreign policy engagement with the Middle East (a re-kindling of historic Ottoman ties) may be seen as a potential inspiration for Theresa May's administration to want to re-kindle former Imperial attachments.
In this way, "Brexit" can be seen by the government as Britain's way to find its own form of "Neo-Ottomanism" from the wreckage of its Imperial influence.

ISIS and Islamofascism: are they the modern-day Nazis of the Middle East?

The "caliphate" that de facto controls a huge swathe of territory across Eastern Syria and the West and North-west of Iraq is the "new normal" in the Middle East.

The rise of ISIS/ ISIL/ the "Islamic State" was due to a number of factors. I've talked about these factors before, when ISIS spectacularly came onto the radar nearly six months ago: the main one being the collapse of central power and authority/ legitimacy in both Iraq and Syria. As nature abhors a vacuum, so it is the case with humanity.

The "Nazis" on the Euphrates

In many ways, it could be said that ISIS are to the modern Middle East what the Nazis were to Europe in the 1930s and '40s. The rise of fascism that began in the '20s was a result of perceived "humiliation", economic deprivation, and loss of cultural identity: a violent counter-reaction to the modern Western values and socio-economic orthodoxy that was commonplace after the First World War.
In the search for simple answers, the Nazis in Germany took the ideas of Italian fascism, and applied them to their own circumstances. Adolf Hitler wanted to create a "thousand-year reich" that would extend from the Atlantic to the Urals. As he saw it, Germans were historically the "master race" of Europe, so they should take what was rightfully theirs: subdue the nations of the "lesser" Europeans, and cleanse Europe of Jews, who he saw as behind a worldwide conspiracy against Germany.

Change some of the names, and the ideology of ISIS is little different: Modern-day "Islamofascists" have created a brutal, despotic, anti-Western de facto state in the heart of the Middle East, and will use any means at its disposal to expand across the entire region; in the same way that fascism in Europe once brutally expanded across the entire continent, Islamofascism has the same aims today in the Middle East. Islamofascism is a reality, not a point of view: Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda were the forerunners of ISIS, and ISIS are simply a more updated, tech-savvy offshoot of the same ideology. The only difference is that ISIS are applying their selfsame ideology with greater efficiency on the ground, and have honed to brutal near-perfection their methods of recruitment, warfare, and the iron fist of how to govern conquered territory, with a combination of "charity" and the ruthless application of power. Also, having lots of money to pass around - through oil revenues and the product of mass larceny - doesn't do any harm, either.

The irony here is that Al-Qaeda - once the most-feared terror group in the world - are now looking somewhat irrelevant compared to ISIS (as brilliantly summarized by John Oliver here); in the same way that Hitler's brutal form of fascism made Mussolini's earlier ideas seem "quaint" by comparison?

Here to stay?

No-one in the West has a real plan of how to defeat ISIS. Part of the problem is that ISIS appeals to disaffected Sunnis in Iraq and Syria in the same way that the Nazis held an appeal to large segments of German society in the 1930s. This is not to say that masses of Sunnis have suddenly become Islamic extremists: like the Germans in the thirties, they simply have little alternative on the ground, and would rather hold their noses to the reality rather than choose the chaotic alternative. They are not going to rise up against ISIS, because there is no-one who can rise to fill the hole that ISIS have filled in the Middle East.

For foreseeable future, ISIS and their "Islamic State" look to be a semi-permanent feature of the new
Middle East. As the Nazis filled the hole left by the weak authority of Weimar Germany left by Versailles, modern-day ISIS claim their legitimacy comes from the injustice of the Sykes-Picot Treaty that divided up the Sunnis of the Levant and Mesopotamia between Iraq and Syria. This is the core of their claim to be the representatives of Sunni Islamic values (whatever they may be).

The campaign to defeat ISIS isn't helped by the politics and rivalries of the Middle East. Turkey, a key member of NATO, seems to be turning a blind eye to ISIS: Ankara's policy seems to be a case of live-and-let-live; allowing recruits from Europe pass almost without hindrance across Turkey's border with Syria, and meanwhile seeming to give ISIS a free rein for its adherents to operate in the south of Turkey, moving against Syrian exiles that oppose them. While it many be too much of a stretch to say that this is because of shared Sunni Islamic values, it is more likely the case that the Turkish authorities (rightly) fear the consequences of going against ISIS: the thought of terrorist outrages in Turkish resorts would fill the government with dread. In this very real sense, Turkey's hands are tied. It is partly for this reason why they did so little to help the beseiged Syrian Kurdish town of Kobani, just across its border.

The Arab Spring has spawned many conflicts: from Syria, to Libya, and now to Iraq once more, thanks to the summer blitzkrieg by ISIS. The road to Kobani, the looting of Mosul, the uprisings in Syria, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia were all partly inspired by the renaissance of political Islam that first happened by the ballot box in Turkey twelve years ago.
Turkey is now the main player in much of what happens in the Middle East, and is as much a victim of its own success. As the progenitor of the ideology that led to the Arab Spring, having ISIS as Turkey's southern neighbours is partly a consequence of that: by stirring Sunni Arabs to do the same that devout Sunnis in Turkey did democratically in 2002. Except that there were no democracies in the Middle East, so how else to achieve it? The result in Syria was a civil war, that could only benefit the extremists.

ISIS is now the wolf at the door of many Middle Eastern governments, a monster that few know how to tame. People would do well to read the history books again.

Islam: moderates versus extremists. Why are the extremists winning?

In a recent article about Islam, I discussed what drew some Westerners to become Muslim. Indirectly, I also posed the question "what is "wrong" with Islam?".

The main "problem" within modern Islam is the ideological battle between moderates and extremists. With the rise of "Islamo-fascism" in recent times, and the increasing influence that extremists have over the direction of Islam, it is clear that the extremists are "winning".

Silenced into submission

The extremists are winning within Muslim society mostly because of the passivity of the (far more numerous) moderates. To use a famous quote, evil,wins when good men do nothing. The same can be said of religious extremism: extremism wins when moderates do nothing.

To talk of "Muslim society" is a simplification. But broadly-speaking, most Muslim societies, whether they are a majority of society (such as in the Middle East, Pakistan, Indonesia and North Africa), or a minority (such as in Britain and Europe), are roughly divided into "moderates" and "extremists".

Apologists for Islam's poor image in the world argue that it is not a problem with the religion in itself, but with the misuse of the religion by people (almost always men) who use Islam as a weapon to attack anyone who displeases or defies their will.
This is a poor argument, because it simply shows how easy it is to manipulate Islam for evil intent. The same inane defence could be made for any ideology or religion; it excuses the responsibility of those in positions of ideological/religious authority to properly guide their flock into moral behaviour. It is the "a few bad apples" argument" that resolves nothing.
That in itself is a poor reflection on the ease that its teachings can be abused; due to the attitude of "playing to the gallery" by those in authority, or those in authority choosing the easy path and simply turning the other way in the face of inhumanity.

From the "Trojan Horse" conspiracy in the UK, to the expansion of "sharia" law to places like Brunei, moderation in Muslim society is on the wane. There may be a number of factors (and arguments used by the radicals) that explain the "passivity" of the moderates:

Islam is under attack: since the "war on terror", Islam around the world has been identified by various governments, directly or implicitly, as an "enemy". As a result, Muslims should be seen to clearly unite. As the radicals present the most forceful and "pure" interpretation of Islam, the onus is on the "moderates" to fall into line.
It's time to rediscover our faith: The radicals, following from the previous point, may well argue that, as Islam is "under attack", it's an opportune moment for moderates to put down their beer and start reading the Koran again, properly. And that means listening to the "purest" interpretation of the writings.
Simplicity is easy to follow: The easiest way to follow Islam, as the radicals would explain, is to simply do what the Prophet said in his writings and in the "hadiths". The fuzzy and ambiguous "liberalism" and "modernism" of the moderates means they would find it more difficult to explain how they interpret their faith. Radicals therefore win arguments simply from quoting the Koran.
Cultural differentiation: Relating to the second point, the "renaissance" of radical Islam can also be justified as a way to, in the multi-cultural, "Godless" world of globalisation, have a clear identity. This is also true of what I said previously about Western converts to Islam: it's the easiest way to give yourself a definitive identity, separate from the crowd. It's a form of cultural rebellion against globalisation.
If in doubt, bully: if the above tactics don't work, use aggression instead. This seems to be how many Islamic moderates have been cowed into submission. From Britain to Brunei, radicals have seized control of the agenda by threatening unpleasant consequences. This is how unpleasant people have always used religion as a weapon of control and fear.

In the contemporary world, Islamic fundamentalism is just the most potent and visible form of religious intolerance and control. There are others, such as Hindu radicals, Christians and Orthodox Jews, but they seem to pale in comparison in terms of their effect on the world at large.

A history of violence

Islamic radicalism only really came to the world's attention with the fall of the Shah in Iran. While the Gulf States had been ruled by extremely conservative Islamic governments (ruling dynasties), the influence of Islam as a radicalising agent was seen as almost microscopic, and no-one took it seriously.

The fall of the Shah changed all that in 1979, as well as the attack on the holy sites in Mecca by Islamic fundamentalists. The Islamic revolution in Iran led to a horrific, US-backed war by its neighbour, Iraq. Yet conversely, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 led to the US covertly financing and supplying military hardware to Islamic radicals (later known as "Al-Qaeda") to fight against them. A few years later in Syria, there was the attempted Sunni uprising against the secular (Alawite-led) government. Also in the early eighties, there was the creation of (Iranian-backed) Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the creation of Hamas, a radical Islamist group, that countered the secular power of Fatah in Palestine. So by the end of the Eighties, Islamic fundamentalism had become far more overt in its presence compared to ten years previously.

The end of Communism brought about further "opportunities" for radical Islam. The break-up of Yugoslavia led to radicals gaining a foothold during the war in Bosnia, while over in the Caucasus, wars were raging in Karabakh and the Northern Caucasus (Chechnya and Dagestan); in the latter, radical Islamists had gained a very visible presence, while in the Karabakh war, Islamic radicals used the bitter war between Azerbaijan and Armenia as another "playground".
In the last years of the twentieth century saw "Al-Qaeda" become a household name with the East Africa terror attacks of 1998. Since the turn of the century, radical Islam has spread at an ever greater rate across the Middle East and North Africa, especially since the aftermath of the "Arab Spring".

Put into this context, it is beyond reasonable doubt that radical Islamists are "winning" the war within Islam itself.
Apart from the Arab states of the Middle East, Turkey's own form of Islamism (in government since 2002) has been seen to be becoming increasingly uncompromising and polarising over time. With Turkey's Islamist government being so clearly allied to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, it looks ever more so that Erdogan was simply playing a cunning waiting game, until it was too late for the secular moderates in Turkey to turn back the clock. The "mask of moderation" that Turkey's government had used effectively for some years, has now well and truly been discarded.

As things stand, the future of Islam belongs to those who are prepared to fight for it. The moderates look to have long given up the fight.

Islam and Western converts: from the "Trojan Horse" to the Danish Cartoons, what is "wrong" with Islam?

I recently found out that one of my old acquaintances converted to Islam. I listened to his explanation of his decision with polite respect, and was intellectually interested to discover his reasons for becoming Muslim.

This experience got me thinking more about why Westerners in particular become Muslims. As with many people who are religious in general (I am not), the most common explanation for the attraction of Islam to Westerners is the moral and ideological certainty inherent in the faith. In Islam, there is little room for equivocation; for the most part, there is only right or wrong - halal and haram.

In many cases, Westerners who convert to Islam are either people who were non-religious (and usually morally lax, or even entirely absent of morality), or people who were religious (eg. Christian) but had fallen out with their former faith. In these circumstances, the appeal of Islam is obvious: such people are attracted to the certainties of the moral guidance that Islam provides. Submit, and be happy.

Can't you take a joke?

There is a reverse side of the coin to this. After what has happened in the Islamic world in the last fifteen years, it is hard to see how Westerners can convert to Islam, and yet ignore (or rationally explain) the reality that Islam has brought to the world compared to other major world religions. There is little objective doubt that in the contemporary world, Islam is the most uncompromising, polarising and extreme of the major faiths on the planet.

I should emphasize from the last sentence the part "in the contemporary world". Islam was not always so uncompromising or extreme in its methodology, but gradually became so over the last hundred years (more on that here). But the radicalisation of Islam in the last fifteen years or so is impossible to refute or ignore. Compared to other major world religions (Catholicism and its many Christian Protestant off-shoots, Hinduism and Buddhism), Islam is the most-feared religion in the world today. And for good reason.

There is a stereotype that Muslims are cheerless, and take their religion and life too seriously. Unfortunately, this "stereotype" is often proven to be truth in many cases. Recently, some British Muslims made a version of the Pharrell song "Happy". The response to this from some quarters of the Muslim community was less charitable, calling it "haram". This has then led to a debate about whether the idea was "haram" or not. Seriously. This tells you the mentality of some Muslims, living up to the stereotype of being cheerless and taking things too seriously.

Much more controversial was the "Danish Cartoons" issue, that provoked outrage across much of the Muslim world. The worst that can be said of some of the cartoons is that they were in poor taste, but some of the cartoons featuring "Mo" were actually helpful to the agenda of moderate Muslims: one cartoon featured the Prophet at the gates of heaven, saying to two suicide bombers "I'm sorry, we've run out of virgins".
The best way to refute the ideas of extremism is to ridicule and lampoon them.

The controversy about picturing the Prophet Mohammed is that the prophet's face isn't shown because it is considered idolatrous in Islam. And yet "Mohammed" is the most popular name given to men in Islamic countries. There was also a controversy some years ago in Sudan when a female English teacher was arrested for allowing local children to name a school teddy-bear "Mohammed".
Yet why is it not idolatrous for parents to name their children after the prophet? Surely this should be "haram" too, for encouraging the idolatrous idea that the boy is equal to the prophet himself?

A "Trojan Horse"

The most recent scandal relating to Islam in Britain was the unearthing of the so-called "Trojan Horse" project within the school system in urban areas with a high number of Muslims. Again, we see an example of what might be called "Islamic exceptionalism": Muslims being given ground to change the teaching of the national curriculum (as well as breaking schools policy, if not the law) in state schools. The creeping Islamisation of Britain has been going on for decades, but its only in the last ten years that people have paid any attention to it.

Another example is the "halal" controversy just uncovered in some of Britain's biggest food chains. Some food companies had been serving "halal" meat to its unwitting, non-Muslim customers for years. Regardless of the "animal rights" aspect to this issue, which I'll ignore for the sake of the argument, there is the central issue of a) choice, and b) minority rights subverting majority rights. In a supposedly democratic, free-market society, it is extraordinary that private companies are happy to autocratically decide what their customers should eat, out of fear of the wishes of a small minority of their customers.

These two examples demonstrate what is "exceptional" about Islam compared to other contemporary major religions: the disproportionate amount of bullying some of its adherents use to get what they want from society, and the fear that they create in the rest of society. Apart from isolated cases of fundamentalist Christians in the USA, or occasional stories about conservative Hindus in India, the prevalence of this aggressive attitude that emanates from many Muslims is unprecedented in modern society. Of the theocratic states that exist in the world, almost all of them are Islamic; of the most religiously-conservative nation-states that exist in the word, almost all of them are Islamic.

Rebels with a cause

I've digressed from the original theme of this article, which was about why Westerners convert to Islam. Apart from the "moral" reasons, there may well exist a more superficial one. Because it is the ultimate act of rebellion towards "Western values".

Back in the days of the Cold War and the earlier threat of Bolshevism, some Westerners became drawn to some idealistic romanticism of equality and morality that they saw in the principles of Communism. Some journalists had a word for these types: "useful idiots".
While I don't wish to make direct comparisons, it is a self-evident truth that some "real" (i.e. born into the faith) Muslims have a wariness towards Western converts, being initially sceptical of the converts' true belief in Islam. They are wont to "test" them. On the other hand, Western converts often turn out to be much more uncompromising in their Islamic faith than those actually "born into it", often shocking even "real" Muslims about how seriously they take things.

Those imams that are responsible for a Westerner's conversion to the faith often use the strategy of preying on those Westerners that seem pliant and willing to listen to an alternative telling of the "accepted" Western world-view. Tied in with the moral underpinning of Islam is the implicit politics of the faith: that, like Communism, becoming Muslim is the ultimate act of rejecting the "New World Order".
Modern Islam is fused with the politics of conspiracy theories: like Communism (and Fascism), it uses conspiracy theories to argue that Muslims are the world's great "victims", have been oppressed, and that "the Jews" can be squarely blamed for much of it.

It goes without saying that some of these imams are responsible for radicalising converts into suicide bombers or for fighting "Jihad".

The irony these days is that Islam's biggest "war" is not against non-Muslims, but fighting a sectarian war against the Shia Alawite government of Syria. After fighting a "jihad" against the West for ten years, radical Sunnis like Al-Qaeda and others are now fighting a civil war against Shias in Syria instead.

Then again, there is a further ideological divide within the Islamic world, at least in the Middle East. Apart from the sectarian Shia-Sunni civil war in Syria, there is the wider, ideological "cold war" between those supporting the Muslim Brotherhood (such as Qatar and Turkey), and those opposed to it, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

So for those Westerners converting to Islam, please understand what kind of world you're signing up for.

Putin, Erdogan, and the new authoritarianism of the 21st century

I wrote last year about some of the differences between the cultures and politics of the East and West. As I said back then:

"Easterners may well therefore look at the current economic and ideological malaise in the West as being a direct result of their "freedom". What a Westerner considers freedom, an Easterner could instead call "weakness", or "moral degradation". The USA is currently struggling economically; the UK is moribund; the Eurozone has become a German economic protectorate. So while the East is prospering because it has found a formula that marries Eastern authoritarianism with Western elements of Capitalism, the West is failing (and getting comparatively poorer) because of weaknesses in the structure of its ideology."

The current "Ukraine Crisis" looks like a test case of these two ideologies and perspectives. It is the countries of the East and the developing world that look at what Vladimir Putin is doing with implicit approval, or at best, transparent indifference.

This attitude even extends into Europe. The rise of nationalism in Europe in recent years is married with an attitude of hostility to an out-of-touch bureaucracy in Brussels. Nigel Farage in the recent European debates in the UK was able to clearly articulate the view of many Britons who are tired of EU expansion for the sake of it, sabre-rattling in affairs that are far from our shore (as the Ukraine Crisis has shown), and European intransigence of the self-determination of various movements across the continent. And that's before even getting on to the effect European migration has had on the European economy. In many ways, the EU is ruled more like the bygone Austria-Hungary than any contemporary organisation or pseudo nation-state.

Managing democracy

Both Vladimir Putin and Turkey's Recep Tayyip Erdogan have shown themselves to be masters of "managed democracy".

I wrote last year about how these two contemporary authoritarian leaders compare to some of Europe's earlier faces. Both leaders came to power on a wave of popular support after an economic crisis: in Russia, it was after the 1998 default led to an economic breakdown, and Putin's rise to power the following year; in Turkey, it was after an inflationary crisis destroyed the reputation of the established secular parties that led to Islamist AKP coming to power in 2002.

Since those two leaders have come to power, they have held a firm grasp of the art of politics. In recent years, with the "Gezi Park" protests that started in Turkey last summer, and anti-Putin protests of late 2011, both Putin's and Erdogan's hold of the popular will has looked far shakier than ten years ago. But what has to be remembered is that, in both cases, Putin and Erdogan presided over an almost unprecedented economic expansion in their countries, that lasted until the financial crisis. It was this surge in living standards that explained their popularity. While the liberals of Turkey and Russia decried the creeping authoritarianism that was apparent from the first few years, the people who lived outside of these circles felt either untouched by it, or never cared. Not for the first time, people in the East were more than willing to sacrifice personal freedoms for the sake of economic gains. In the West the attitude is that both personal freedom and economic freedom go together to create socio-economic progress; in the East, the opposite view prevails.

With Russia's "United Russia" party, and Turkey's AKP, these two authoritarian leaders were able to create a "managed democracy" that applied Western PR techniques (such as accusing the opposition of going against progress and wanting to "turn the clock back") as well as gathering as broad a coalition of support as possible.

When the financial crisis started to bite, that's when the strategy for both Putin and Erdogan began to be refined.

"One Of Us"

The financial crisis didn't initially have a huge effect on either of Putin's or Erdogan's support, perhaps due to the amount of good-will that had been stored up by the unprecedented growth in both their countries. Their support base was able to cut them considerable slack.

In Russia, things only seriously started to turn against the "big tent" approach for Putin when he announced his candidacy for the presidential elections of 2012. When that happened, and the financial crisis finally started to seriously eat into Russia long "oil boom", Putin faced his first serious signs of dissent in December 2011. This made him re-make "United Russia" into a party of low populism, using the renaissance of the power of the Russian Orthodox Church, and appealing to the innate distrust and hostility towards the values of the West.
In this way, the members of "Pussy Riot" were almost a gift sent from God, validating all the Kremlin's propaganda about Russia's liberal opposition being a group exclusive to the swanky parts of Moscow, with values alien to most Russians, and never venturing into "real Russia" over the Volga or the Urals. Putin's thousands of miles of travel across Russia are as much a way to give the impression of standing up for "real" Russia, instead of the perceived narrow perspective of the Moscow or St Petersburg liberals.
And again, with the onset of the Ukraine Crisis, this is another almost God-sent opportunity for Putin to decry as another Western plot to demasculate Russia's influence, allowing him to ride of a wave of popular nationalism. For Putin, ruling Russia is about him, or who else? Only Vladimir Putin is truly "one of us", he wants Russians from Vologda to Vladivostok to think. Russia may be corrupt and inefficient, but could anyone else do things better?

In Turkey, Erdogan's popularity began to wane gradually after the financial crisis. The ineffectiveness of the secular opposition perhaps allowed Erdogan to think he was almost untouchable; there is little to suggest otherwise. His government passed progressively more authoritarian laws, neutering the historic power of the military so that it was full of AKP yes-men, as well as the judiciary, and making journalism a career where it was dangerous to criticise the Prime Minister too openly. As a result of this, Turkey had the highest number of journalists in jail in any developed country. Journalists didn't get killed, like in Russia; they were simply thrown in prison instead.
This all came to a head with the dispute over "Gezi Park" in May 2013. Like Putin, Erdogan, after initially being unsure about how to act, followed the same strategy as Putin, calling his opponents Western puppets. In a more incendiary manner than Putin, however, the result of the "Gezi Park" protests has been a radical polarisation of society between secularists and AKP-minded Islamists. While the opposition in Russia has been quite effectively marginalised by its own flawed strategy, the Turkish opposition has shown itself to be more ingenuous. This has resulted in a harsher, more polarising strategy from Erdogan. His rhetoric, like that of Putin, comes from low populism (with a whiff of Islamic values). The AKP is popular in the working-class suburbs of the major cities and the regions of Turkey, especially in the East. A similar point could be made about Putin's "United Russia". The corruption scandal that emerged in Turkey in December last year was seen by his supporters as another example of a Western conspiracy.
So far, Erdogan's "divide and rule" strategy has worked well, following from successful recent local elections. The talk of Turkey's role in Syria has led some in the opposition to fear that, like Putin, Erdogan may also want to flex his muscles...

The new role model?

Nationalism and authoritarianism has always been an ideology based on the root of populism. The rise of nationalism in Europe is seen as a rejection of the "metropolitan liberalism" of the ruling establishment, be that in Westminster, Brussels, or Paris. The politics of UKIP, for example, are clearly populist, as well as seeming economically libertarian. They are Britain's newest "working class party", as unlikely as it may seem. The same can be said of the FN in France, or many of the other nationalist parties in the European parliament. After creating a "liberal consensus" across Europe, the EU establishment has itself created the conditions for authoritarian nationalism to thrive; this form of populism is seen by many as the only effective way to oppose the status quo.

Putin and Erdogan have shown themselves to be "role models" for nationalist parties in Europe. Dismissing the "establishment" in Europe or Westminster as out-of-touch with the concerns of everyday people, nationalists across Europe look at the actions of Putin and (to a lesser extent) Erdogan with envy. "Intellectualism" and "bleeding heart liberalism" is increasingly scoffed at across Europe.  It's no wonder that the likes of Nigel Farage have a sneaking admiration for Vladimir Putin's gall in Ukraine: he is showing them how authoritarianism is done.

Erdogan's Neo-Ottomanism, Political Islam, Fascism and Anti-Semitism

Last month I wrote about some of the divisive and fear-mongering language that Erdogan and his ministers have used since the rise of the "Gezi Park" movement.

Over the last few weeks, the language has become more aggressive and paranoid: the latest salvo from the AKP is the accusation from the Deputy Prime Minister is that the "Jewish diaspora" is also involved with foreign conspirators in a plot to destroy Turkey's economy.
As well as blaming the foreign media (and even threatening legal action against CNN), Erdogan himself has rounded on his those Turkish journalists who have reported on the protests, using the example of Selen Girit, a Turkish BBC correspondent, who he called a "traitor". The purpose of such appallingly-aggressive language is clear - to threaten all domestic journalists into not daring to criticise the government. So while critical foreign media are called "conspirators" who want to destabilise Turkey, critical native journalists are called traitors.
As well as the war on the media, there is a clear trend of victimising foreigners. In the last two weeks, a British teenager was attacked until unconsciousness by Turkish men in the tourist resort of Marmaris because he was seen kissing a Turkish girl in a bar.
Apart from such vigilante attacks, the state itself has deported two foreign women for being involved in the protests, even if only incidentally: a Swedish tourist was deported for being seen to chant along with anti-government slogans; while a French foreign student was deported for being in a DSP (Democratic Left Party) building during mass disturbances with the police.
The message here is clear: for foreigners to mind their own business, and not interfere with Erdogan's "national will".

I wrote last year about Kaiser Wilhelm's plan to ally himself with the Ottomans in order to raise a "jihad" against the British and the Russians. Linked to this is the rise of anti-Semitism, which was first exported from Imperial Russia (using the propaganda tract "The Protocols Of The Elders Of Zion"), to post-war Germany, where it quickly got the attention of would-be Nazis. Anti-Semitism then spread to the Middle East, the Nazis (and other Fascist movements) taking up Kaiser Wilhelm's old cause of raising trouble with the West through the force of Islam, by forming loose alliances.

The gradual rise of Political Islam

Like Fascism, the rise of Political Islam in the Middle East in the inter-war period grew through a perceived "victim complex", and a desire to purge society of impurity.
Most of the Middle East had been under the power of the Ottoman Turks for centuries, but hadn't had power in their own right. Similarly, Egypt had been under the power of the British Empire. Organisations like the Muslim Brotherhood grew in the 1930s, as Fascism was becoming a force to be reckoned with in Europe. They had spread across much of the Middle East by the Second World War. Both political creeds were viciously anti-Semitic and against what they saw as Western immorality; their answer was pure authoritarianism and tight social control. Both creeds blamed the Jews for much of their plight.

Political Islam was kept under close watch by the various regimes around the Middle East, so as Fascism was defeated in Europe, Political Islam and organisations like the Muslim Brotherhood were not allowed to spread. Meanwhile, the Jewish state of Israel was created out of the ashes of old Palestine, adding further insult to injury. The Cold War gave another reason for the West to financially prop up secular dictators in the Middle East, in competition with the Soviet Union. Neither "The Great Satan" or the atheist Soviet Union wanted anything to do with Political Islam. While Nasser of Egypt was the nearest thing that the "Arab Street" had to an "anti-Semitic idol" in the Cold War, it all ended in humiliation in the Six Day War of 1967. The re-match, the Yom Kippur War six years later, fared little better, leaving Arabs feeling humiliated and impotent.

That idea received a shock with the Islamic Revolution in Iran, making the West realise its complacency in thinking that Political Islam could be forever kept down on a diet of bullying and political marginalisation. Yet, there was still no other method that anyone could think of. While the Arabs remained divided by borders drawn up after the First World War, the strongest Arab state in the Middle East was Saudi Arabia, followed by Egypt. As one was a hardline Islamic state, and the other a secular dictatorship, the chance of the two ever getting their act together seemed remote in the extreme. It would take a revolution to bring Political Islam to the fore, and no expert thought that was conceivable.

Turkey, another Muslim secular state, provided the answer. As I've described before, Recep Tayyip Erdogan was able to "break the mould" in Turkish politics in 2002, becoming the first party of Political Islam to gain a foothold in a Middle Eastern country.
Erdogan's path to power, and his manner of maintaining it, became an exemplar to other would-be parties of Political Islam across the Middle East. For ten years, he had successfully deceived the West into thinking he was a true democrat, gradually consolidating his grip on power through a smokescreen of "democratic reforms" on a path to eventual EU membership - destroying the influence of the military, judiciary, opposing parties and the media in turn. At the same time, he has taken baby-step after baby-step towards an Islamic state in Turkey, so that by the time of the Arab Spring, Erdogan was the benchmark that Arabs could use to bring Political Islam to power across the Middle East.

In Egypt, Political Islam's biggest "success story" in the Middle East, the Muslim Brotherhood has overstepped its mark. Unlike in Turkey, Egypt's military had not been yet "neutralised". let alone filled with government sympathisers, so it would have been much wiser had the Muslim Brotherhood's President Morsi taken a much more careful and gradual approach like Erdogan. Instead, the Muslim Brotherhood showed their cards far too early, and it is difficult to say what the next step for them will be.

Neo-Ottomanism, the main force of Political Islam

In the meantime, Erdogan's "Neo-Ottomanism" is more and more becoming a force to be reckoned with. With Egypt's future still uncertain, the other Arab governments dominated by Political Islam will continue to look to Erdogan as their mentor.
Erdogan and his ministers are increasingly looking back to the old Ottoman Empire as their inspiration. The secular symbols of Turkey are, one by one, subtly (and sometimes not-so-subtly) being discarded, and being replaced by an increasing affection for the "old ways". Erdogan himself had implied years ago that he was keen to restore some of the old symbolism. The replacing of Gezi park with an Ottoman-era barracks is but one small sign of that.
The expansion of Turkey's ties and alliances with the Middle East, and the rapid frosting of relations with the West is a statement of Neo-Ottoman geopolitics put into practice: to restore Turkey's relations, power and influence so that it is comparable with that before the First World War, when the Turks controlled much of the Middle East. "Neo-Ottomanism" is therefore a kind of localised neo-colonialism; except that while Western Neo-Colonialism is resisted by its erstwhile "colonies", the contemporary Middle East is largely embracing Neo-Ottomanism, as a means to an end: as the coming-together into an informal alliance of a restored "Ottoman Muslim" power that protects the conjoined interests of Political Islam in the Middle East.

"Neo-Ottomanism" as the main agent of Political Islam in the Middle East might therefore be more similar to the politics of Fascism than one might think. Neo-Ottomanism might not threaten the political integrity of Europe, but it does put the Arab Spring in a new light. The Syrian Civil War can be seen as a battle between a (failed) "secular" regime and a militant force of Political Islam. In this way, Neo-Ottomanism has the same kind of stake in the Syrian Civil War as the Fascists had in the Spanish Civil War.

The battle for Syria has become a symbol of the wider future of the Middle east: "Neo Ottoman" Political Islam (and supported by the Gulf States), or Iranian-backed satellite? Iraq is another toy for the larger forces nearby to play with, squeezed between Turkey's Neo-Ottomanism and Iran's Shia theocracy in one direction, and with the Syrian Civil War boiling over in another.

Europe in the 1930s was an ideological battleground between the forces of Fascism and liberal democracy; but also behind that was the threat of Communism, which tempted liberals to indulge Fascism as the "lesser of two evils", and then allowed Fascists to claim "democratic" support.
The Middle East in the 2010s faces a similar ideological battle between the forces of Political Islam, and the varied regimes of the "old order" still allied to the West; but also behind that is the threat of Iran. Thus in the Middle East of the 2010s, Iran has become the bogeyman that Communism was to Europe in the 1930s. While in the Europe in the 1930s it was Fascism versus Communism, in the Middle East in the 2010s it is "Sunni" Muslim Political Islam versus "Shia" Islam Iranian-style theocracy; ideological battles in Europe are instead sectarian battles for control in the Middle East, with liberals used as pawns in the same manner.

Thus the initial indulgence of Political Islam by Westernised liberal Arabs compares with European liberals' indulgence of Fascism in the 1930s.

Following this comparative logic, as Mussolini pre-dated Hitler's rise to power by a decade, so Erdogan pre-dated the rise of Political Islam in the Middle East (i.e. The Arab Spring) by a decade. Hitler learned from Mussolini's example. However, Morsi failed to learn the proper lessons from Erdogan's careful, incremental approach to applying Political Islam (and, fatally, never had the support of the army), leaving Erdogan as the unopposed ideological leader of Political Islam in the Middle East, with no near-comparable rival in the scene.
Thus, in an ironic way, Erdogan may actually benefit politically from Morsi's fall from power: giving greater ammunition to the "victim complex" trait that Political Islam shares with Fascism, sowing further unrest in Egypt, and giving Erdogan further scapegoats to use for his own advantage. The fact that Erdogan's AKP supporters have so clearly allied themselves with Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood tells you how closely-linked the two are.

The rise of Political Islam back in the 'thirties was originally intended to restore the old Islamic caliphate, which had resided for five centuries in Istanbul. Day by day, the Islamist Turkish government distances itself from the West, and opens its arms more and more to the East. Turkey is building a hospital in Gaza, in partnership with the Hamas government (and doubtless to Israel's fury); Turkey is looking to buy a missile system from China instead of the West, that would render it incompatible with NATO.

To what end are these symbolic moves?

The anti-Semitism coming from Erdogan's ministers is more likely opportunism rather than paranoia, but whatever its reason, its purpose is to cement the divisions in Turkish society, between an "us" and "them"; leaving it unspoken but obvious that "they" are not "real" Turks.

And in the cynical numbers game that Erdogan and his ministers are playing, they hold all the trump cards. And if "they" don't like it, it goes without saying, "they" know where the door pointing West is: in the other direction, the East beckons with open arms.

Why religion and politics don't mix: From Northern Ireland to Syria, The Arab Spring and Turkey

I wrote an article last year about the relationship between intelligence and free thought. While religion provides the function of giving a moral code to humanity, it also takes away from humanity the ability to arrive at a judgement using their own intellect. When that judgement is a political one, the influence of religion should be looked at even more critically.   

The link between church and state (or religion and politics) has been severed in Europe for as long as anyone can care to remember. In America, that link is more nuanced, but still there on paper, if not always clearly there on the floor of Congress.
Secularism has been established in the West as the method to separate religious teachings from the official business of government.
In the UK, the most recent example of an openly-religious leader was former PM, Tony Blair, who waited until he stood down as premier before converting to Catholicism; then again, there were his infamous shared prayer-meetings with former US President, George W Bush, which were ridiculed in the British press. In a secular state, when a premier's private religious views become openly-displayed habits, ridicule is probably the best reply to remind a politician that religion is a private matter outside of the realm of government. So he then made sure to keep his religious sentiments more to himself.

Staying in the UK, the problem of what happens when when religion and politics fuse together is seen daily across the water from London, in Northern Ireland. The clash of two Christian branches, Catholicism and Protestantism, led to a sectarian conflict. After the thirty years of "The Troubles", the religious divides are as sharp as ever, even if the violence has subsided. The politics of Northern Ireland are divided as always; the Catholics voting one way, the Protestants another.
Not long ago, the province was ruled by Rev. Ian Paisley, a hardline Protestant priest. While his rhetoric had undergone a massive toning-down compared with his earlier days, Paisley had been the recipient of the polarisation of the two sides. Until the late '90s, when the "peace process" had begun in earnest, the main Protestant party was the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP); after this point, Protestant views became more intransigent against surrendering their position in favour of the Catholics, and flocked to the more hardline Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), represented by Paisley. So for a time in the 2000s, Paisley became the provincial head of government, in tandem with his Catholic deputy (and former terrorist) Martin McGuinness.  More recently, trouble has flared up again from the Protestants, who rioted as a result of a compromise with the Catholics over the flying of the British flag from government buildings in the province. But the UUP are finished as a political force, and the hardline DUP still hold sway over the Protestant vote in Northern Ireland, demonstrating that religion is often anathema to moderation.
For Brits who live on "the mainland", the politics of Northern Ireland is an unfathomable mess.

The same can be said of Syria, but in this, Syria's "troubles" are far more extensive, horrifying, and potentially explosive.
Like its neighbour Iraq, Syria is a religious melting-pot of four or five major religious and ethnic denominations: Sunni Muslims, Alawite (Shia) Muslims, Druze (Muslims), and Christians (of a few different Orthodox churches). And there are also the Kurds, too, who are a significant ethnic minority in the east. Given the delicate religious mix, it has seemed sensible that secularism would be the best way to avoid a sectarian war. That had been the case during the French Mandate between the First and Second World War, and also after Syria became independent.
Things became more complicated (and a ticking time-bomb of resentment) when Hafez Al-Assad, an Alawite, took power in the sixties. Although he officially continued the secular (and quasi-socialist) form of government, he began to fill the government with fellow-Alawites, who were far outnumbered by Sunni Muslims in the general population.
This reached a head when there was a Sunni "uprising" in the early eighties, which was brutally suppressed, and also suppressed to the outside world. It was only finally after the "Arab Spring" in 2011, when Hafez's son, Bashar, was in power, that the Sunnis were able to properly make their voices heard against the persecution and maltreatment from the Alawite-led "secular" government.
The problem with the Assad regime in Syria was not that it was secular; it was that it was clearly not secular, but favoured the Alawites (and to an extent, the Christians) at the expense of the Sunni majority. The rebellion against Bashar Al-Assad's government then quickly took on a religious dimension, which has broadened ever since, attracting the attention of Al-Qaeda-linked fighters to the Sunni Muslim side. The original aims - to make Syria a "free" country - has become confused amidst the conflicting aims of two major factions fighting on the ground against the regime, as well as the conflicting aims of the foreign powers (the West and the Gulf States) that supply them.
The rebels' political aim of "freedom" has now become merged with the religious aim of creating a Sunni Muslim-majority state, which has spurred-on horrifying levels of violence and reprisals on both sides.
For the West, the politics of Syria has become and unfathomable mess.

Thus in Northern Ireland, thus in Syria.

The "Arab Spring" that first sprouted in Tunisia, which toppled regimes there and in neighbouring Libya and Egypt (as well as, indirectly, Yemen), was meant to be about freedom and democracy.
These states had been ruled for decades by secular dictatorships. During the Cold War, America tolerated this as it feared what the result would be if the Arabs gained the right to vote with their religious conscience. Iran was a short lesson that matched its greatest fears: what had originally been a "democratic" revolution against Iranian Shah, turned into an Islamic revolution when anti-Shah secularists, lacking a clear leader of their own, sided with the Muslim conservatives to install Ayatollah Khomeini as an "apolitical" leader.

The "Arab Spring" took its inspiration from contemporary Turkey, which had put some of the West's fears of mass Islamic revolution across the Middle East to rest.
While the Arab world had been under the thumb of American-backed secular dictatorships, Turkey had been a secular democracy since the around the Second World War, or thereabouts. To be fair, its form of "democracy" was far from perfect, and in some areas bore little relation to the West, such the strong weight that the military had over how the country was governed (and intervened directly when it felt necessary). Furthermore, grievances by ethnic and religious minorities tended to be swept under the carpet in the name of unity.
But some conservative Muslims felt that for too long Turkey's secular democracy was not properly representative of its religious values, and that the various official parties had brushed their views under the carpet like with other marginalised groups. One person who held this view was Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who had been istanbul's mayor during the nineties.
Knowing how Turkey's political system effectively banned religious parties from parliament, he created the AK ("Justice and Development") Party, which was not overtly religious; conservatively Muslim in values, but capitalist in economics and tolerant and pro-European in outlook (or so it seemed). Once his party came to power in 2002, he emphasized the need for "democratic" reforms that broadened freedom of (religious) expression; similarly, he sought to "democratise" Turkey by removing the influence of the army. It was this, and the steps to improve Turkey's economy, that earned him the respect of the West. It was for these reasons that the West had felt reassured by the "Arab Spring's" inspiration from Turkey.

We know now that this story does not end well. As in Turkey, as in The Arab Spring.

While Erdogan in Turkey was "democratising" the country, the West was wilfully ignoring the real purpose for the "reforms", while also ignoring the obvious signs over the years of creeping authoritarianism and Islamification, as I've explained before.
The same process can be seen in the Middle East, post-Arab Spring. While Arab states are ruled by AK Party-like groups, they make the claim that because they are the largest party, it means they have a mandate to implement Islamic policy. Thus they subvert the purpose of democracy for religious purposes to mean Islamic majoritarianism. All those who therefore do not subscribe to a religious government are therefore against the popular will.
The hideous irony is that two years on from the Arab Spring, with his reaction to the Gezi Park protests, Erdogan has finally been recognised by the West as the religious authoritarian he was all along, while using the masquerade of democracy to achieve his aims; and now the Arab Spring bears all the hallmarks of following the same pattern as Erdogan's "Turkish Spring" at the ballot box in 2002.

This is another example of why religion and politics don't mix. The result is often ugly.

Pakistan is another example of what happens when you have religious parties in a (supposedly) democratic system. Politicians then start using religion as a weapon against their enemies; the same has been done in the past in neighbouring India during the rule of the Hindu nationalist BJP. Religion was used as a weapon there by Hindu politicians to blame Muslims; the result was massacres and the destruction of religious sites.

Let the religious leaders stick to the religion, in the confines of their religious places. Let politicians stick to the politics, in the dull confines of their drab government buildings.
Let the religious leaders deal with personal morality, and the politicians deal with social policy.
And never the two should meet!

Erdogan, the AKP, and the language of Fascism

Ten days on from my last article about the Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the language coming from Erdogan and his ministers has reinforced the point I made comparing him to other authoritarians in recent European history.

Erdogan praised "his police" as "heroes"(see link) for dealing with the harsh conditions while dealing with protests. This is a hideous contortion of the truth for two reasons: not only were the police tactics absolutely brutal at times and inexcusably disproportionate; Erdogan's "heroes" were forced to work without breaks even for food, sometimes for days - surely with Erdogan's knowledge. There are two possible reasons for this: either Erdogan and his allies knew that the police were loyal to man, and could push the police to the limits; or second, and following from this, they also knew that ill-treated (and thus short-tempered) police would make a stronger "impression" on the protesters. Considered how appallingly cynical much of what has come out of Erdogan's mouth in the last few weeks, anything is possible.
In the meantime, the police's brutish behaviour is praised as heroic, while peaceful protest (and social media) is damned as akin to terrorism, and thus worthy of the strongest response possible. Thus language is used by the AKP (like Fascist regimes before) to create the opposite meaning.

It is clear that the police are effectively working as the AKP's foot-soldiers. Erdogan, as I said in my previous article, has followed in the footsteps of previous authoritarians. In order to control the country and prevent him from being kicked out in a coup, Erdogan needed to neuter the army. This was done through the "Ergenekon" scandal that erupted several years ago, which was then used to make a widespread overhaul of the pro-secular military top ranks, replacing them with Erdogan place-men. At the time this was done in the name of "democratising" the establishment from military interference, which gained Erdogan some Western plaudits.
In a similar manner (though in different circumstances), the "Night Of Long Knives" in 1934 was used by Hitler as a way to gain the trust of the army, who at the time were still loyal to President Hindenburg, and were seen as protectors of the constitution. The "Night Of Long Knives" was a wholesale destruction of the leadership and power of the SA (the main Nazi militia), who were seen as a threat to the army (and whom the SA's leader, Ernst Rohm, wanted to replace). Hitler claimed there was a threat of a coup by the SA, and used this as an opportunity to gain the eternal trust of the army and destroy the rival power-base of the SA.
Hitler used the threat of an SA coup to gain the trust (and control) of the army, and the respect of President Hindenburg for "saving the country" from the SA; in the same way, Erdogan used the "Ergenekon" scandal as a way to gain effective control of the army, and the respect of the West for appearing as a "democratic reformer".

Over the last few weeks, the rhetoric from the AKP has become increasingly intolerant of "Western morals", resorting to outright lies to create further polarisation and hatred of the protesters.
Erdogan, for instance, has continually stated as a bland fact the complete lie that protesters drank beer, and other disrespectful behaviour in Dolmabahce mosque, in Besiktas, Istanbul. The imam of the mosque itself has stated that no such behaviour happened; regardless, Erdogan continues to state this lie as truth; clearly continuing Hitler's maxim that if you repeat a lie often enough, people will believe it is true.
Furthermore, Erdogan has said at a rally that headscarved women were being attacked; meanwhile, Turkey's Deputy PM, when seeing a woman standing in a bikini in Istanbul's central Taksim Square, stated he "could barely restrain himself", such was his anger. He then went on criticise the woman for thinking that "nudity is freedom", while seeming to completely misunderstand that "nudity" requires no clothes at all; the woman was simply wearing what any Western-minded woman would wear at a beach - she was not nude.

Using "facts" to fit into a moral agenda (such as in Erdogan's "National Will" rallies), is as old as the hills in the language of authoritarianism. Phrases such as Erdogan's use of the "national will" is redolent of Fascism; though he uses it with a supposed democratic connotation, its real meaning is much darker, implying that those against him are against the "national will" and thus unworthy of his supporters' respect. The use of religion gives an even further sense of righteousness, and less need for respecting the wishes of one's (infidel) inferiors. Violence thus lurks just barely beneath the surface, as the police (and zealous AKP supporters) have been keen to demonstrate.

Thus Erdogan's AKP and his supporters are fighting a "moral battle" against the forces of Western immorality, like the Fascist regimes of the past, and Putin's of the present.

But the earlier woman's "nudity" is another example of facts being besides the point when dealing with authoritarians. "Facts" are malleable with Fascists and authoritarians; the same with truth. The truth is whatever a Fascist is saying at the time. If it contradicts what he said before, then his previous contradiction becomes "disinformation" or a "wicked distortion", as Erdogan has seen saying repeatedly of the Western media.
The Western media are the new target of Erdogan and his AKP. In behaviour that would have seemed unthinkable before, the Turkish government is fighting a war of words with Germany, the UK (over historic allegations of phone-tapping), the EU in general, and also the USA. Such a sudden backlash by another European country has not been seen in Europe since perhaps the Second World War. Serbia had its fair share of attacking Western media in the recent past, but Turkey is probably the only major European country to have resorted to such vehement rhetoric and propaganda against the foreign press in living memory. The fact that Turkey is now at the strongest position it has been in compared to other powers since before the Second World War, is also another unprecedented development.

Where does Erdogan intend to take this? His foreign policy has been described as "Neo-Ottomanism". Like how Mussolini was intent on restoring the ancient Roman Empire, Erdogan seems eager to recreate his own, "soft-power" version of a reconstituted Ottoman power across the region.
While Erdogan seems to have no desire for using the military directly, he has already done much of the hard work over the last ten years, making Turkey as the de facto power-broker and trade giant in the Middle East, and the bridge between the East and West. Though Erdogan appears to be doing his best to burn those bridges westward, he is reinforcing them to the East.
It seems when he looks to the Middle East and the way the Gulf States (not to mention Iran) have managed Capitalism with Islamic authoritarianism, Erdogan perhaps sees his future vision for Turkey. But Capitalism and authoritarianism (regardless of if religion is in the equation) is a recipe for Fascism.

Erdogan's behaviour all fits in with that of previous Fascist regimes, as I said in my previous article about Erdogan and authoritarianism. The only difference is in the detail.
Sometimes you just have to call a spade a spade. If the "spade" is Muslim, Christian, pagan or atheist, it makes no difference.

Gezi Park and the Turkey Protests; Erdogan and the "Turkish model"

The so-called "Turkish model" has been said to have been the main inspiration for the "Arab Spring". Turkey's political model of marrying Islam within a democratic state was supposed to be the exemplar for the Arab world. In the space of a few days, that "exemplar"'s political model has been seriously shaken, if not shattered.

It's worth remembering on what basis Turkey's political system operates. Turkey was founded by Ataturk, who wanted to create a secular (non-religious) state out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire. As Turkey was a Muslim country, this required an authoritarian government to bring about this social change, and a multi-party democratic system only came properly in practice years after Ataturk's death.
It was only after the Second World War that Turkey began to experience a functioning multi-party system, although this also included intermittent periods of military rule. Religion and politics were still kept well apart. Prior to the "breakthrough" of the AKP in 2002, there had only been one government by an openly-religious party: that of the "Refah" (welfare) Party in the mid-nineties, which was quickly removed after only a year in office for overstepping the lines between secularism and Political Islam.

Recep Tayyip Erdogan's Islamist AK Party "broke the mould" in 2002. After the mistakes made by the "Refah" Party in the nineties, Erdogan realised that to gain a real breakthrough, his party had to find a balancing act between adhering to secularism while still appealing to the views of the many Turks (perhaps as many as half) who were practising Muslims. This "balancing act" has paid-off at the ballot box, by keeping Erdogan in power for a third consecutive term, something unprecedented in contemporary Turkish politics.

But by "breaking the mould" of secular Turkish politics, Erdogan was also able to effectively re-cast a new one that would give him and his party an in-built advantage. As the AK Party was the only major party that was moderately religious, and whose standpoints were generally moderate, this meant the AK Party ruled the roost over a crowded field of secular parties. In other words, while the "Muslim vote" could well remain united behind the AK Party and Erdogan (as long as they appealed to them), the "secular vote" was effectively splintered - by leftist, centre and rightist parties.

This is a simplification, though, because in reality many secularists have also voted for the AK Party as they approved of their economic policies and tolerated the AK Party's (seemingly) mild Islamism. But over time, Erdogan has shown more overt signs of Islamism and authorianism, as well as an intolerance for criticism. In his first term, Erdogan seemed eager to look as harmless as possible, but over time it seems his true nature underneath gradually began to appear. Laws began to appear to remove some of the "secular restrictions" on freedom of religious expression (such as wearing headscarves in public buildings); this then turned to restrictions on freedom of speech and a covert censoring of the press. Journalists became covertly harassed and some jailed. The military were also "reformed" so they were more acceptable to Erdogan's liking. Abdullah Gul, Erdogan's former foreign minister, became President. And then there were also the more obvious signs of "creeping Islamisation": the government making laws to restrict certain types of public behaviour and more conservative social policy, and finally the laws to restrict the sale of alcohol. Which leads us to Gezi Park.

This was the straw that broke the camel's back, but it was the brutality of the police response to a peaceful "sit-in" by environmentalists in a small leafy park in the middle of Istanbul's modern centre (next to the city's main square) that what provoked the mass response.
It would be a simplification to say that the protests are by the "other fifty percent" who are secularists rather than Islamists, but this is still largely true. While there are some devout Muslims who are showing solidarity with the movement, the majority of demonstrators are secularists who want to preserve Turkey's founding values, and also see Erdogan personally as a natural authoritarian who has eroded the rights of Turks during his time in office. A third issue is the anti-Capitalism platform, who see Erdogan and the AK Party as shameless capitalists who have made great strides with Turkey's economy, but at the expense of civic and environmental issues.
So in this way, the "Gezi Park" demonstrators are pro-secular, anti-authoritarian and anti-Capitalist. Or more exactly, their supporters may come from a wide spectrum of political beliefs (from anarchists and communists, to right-wing nationalists, including gay rights and environmental campaigners), but they are united in their acceptance of each other. If there is one thing they all agree on, they would agree that they stand for freedom of expression and respecting each other and the shared environment. They see Erdogan as embodying the opposite.

The protests have been compared to the Arab Spring and the Occupy movement, but it would be more accurate to say that the protesters have simply learned from both these past experiences, and applied a strategy and tactics to suit the situation. The widespread nature of the demonstrations, still ongoing in different cities across the country after a week (with no signs of disappearing), is evocative of Tahrir Square and Egypt two years ago, but Turkey is not a dictatorship, and its Muslim population do not feel under-represented.

The protests seem to have a life of their own. There are no leaders. The group of demonstrators are so disparate that it might seem hard to understand what keeps them from arguing amongst each other (as they had been for the last ten years), but as I said, it seems to be the bigger picture - their dislike of Erdogan and the aggressive police - that unites them.
The spirit of "Gezi Park" is that of live-and-let-live, or so it seems. Since the police left Gezi Park and Taksim on Saturday (1 June), barricades were constructed on all the roads leading up from Besiktas (where the police retreated to), leaving Gezi Park and Taksim Square as a virtual "police-free" state. Since then, a self-contained (if crowded!) community has established itself in the park and environs, right in the middle of the city centre; complete with shops, a library, art open-air art galleries, as well as tents. To all intents and purposes, like Christiania in Copenhagen, this looks like the spontaneous creation of a community of free-will and free speech: where people care for each and respect each other, without the need for laws or police (or money) to control them. The difference is that the Gezi Park community is overtly a political forum as well as a place of freedom of expression and behaviour.

In some ways the protests are also reminiscent of the Poll Tax riots against Margaret Thatcher in her last years in office, who - like Erdogan - was a populist demagogue in many ways, using divide-and-rule tactics to run the country, and became more and arrogant, dictatorial and aggressive as time went on. She was finally ousted by her own party. Some claim that she was a psychopath; many populist demagogues are.

Erdogan's style of rule therefore has more parallels with that of Thatcher's in the UK than Mubarak in Egypt. But since then the nature of protest has changed and matured, become more inventive and dynamic. People like Erdogan are left to feel like political dinosaurs of a different age when events suddenly are changed by a new dynamic. Like Thatcher, who was forced from power without really understanding why it happened, Erdogan refuses to see the need to adapt, as he has never needed to before, and would consider it a humiliation to do so.

His populist and divisive tactics may well finally work against him now.

Syria and the Great Game Of The Middle East

It's ironic that the so-called "Domino Theory" that the USA predicted would cause South-East Asia to collapse into Communism in the Cold War was proved so wrong, whereas the same "Domino Theory" has been proved right where it applies to democratic uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa.

A year on from the Arab Spring, and of all the uprisings and protests that proliferated across the region, the one that was one of the first, and in the country with so much strategic and political baggage, remains the most violent, the most tenacious, and the most intractable; a situation that retains the strongest danger of being a Pandora's box.

The first thing to be understood about Syria is the nature of its society and its government, before we talk about the plethora of wider issues.

Like Iraq and Lebanon, Syria is a multi-faith, multi-ethnic country created in the aftermath of the First World War. The ruling Baath party came to power in the sixties, the same as their former namesake in Iraq. In Iraq the Baath party was a party that had the support of the Sunni minority over a Shia majority (as well as Kurds and a small number of Christians); in Syria, the Baath had the support of the Alawites (a Shia sect), who ruled over the Sunni majority, with Christian acquiescence.

In both Iraq and Syria, in spite of the religious differences, the Baath were a secular party that encouraged the active suppression of religion; during the Cold War, and as allies of the Soviet Union while the USA were allies of Israel, even the Prophet was in danger of being seen almost as a person of ridicule, although the Baath in Syria and Iraq were always keen to indulge Islam where useful.

So, with Iraq liberated, Syria remains the only bastion of the Baath party: a party that, by definition, is the party representing a small religious sect, now atrophied by five decades of rule into an elite clan that remains in power by sheer force of will over an opposing Sunni majority, backed up by the fear of religious and civil war.

Bashar Al-Assad has remained in power through using similar techniques to Saddam Hussein; a personality cult, an efficient police state, and fear of sectarian civil war as the only alternative to the father of the nation. Saddam Hussein used his sons to ensure that his regime stayed in place through brutality and paranoia; Bashar Al-Assad uses his brother, Maher for the same purposes (more about him later).

But Bashar's situation still has some crucial differences. For a start, there is the personality. Saddam Hussein seemed to come across as the "Stalin of Iraq"; a gangster-like figure who ruled Iraq by his singular force of will, backed up by his male offspring and extended family. By comparison, Bashar Al-Assad seems on a personal level as threatening as, say, John Major: as much as Bashar might sound the tough guy, it hardly ever sounds natural or believable. In fact, Bashar does not appear to have the natural leadership skills, because it seems not natural to his personality; in every interview seen of him, he sounds passive, his voice soft, difficult to carry. When you see him at party rallies in front of his closest, most fanatical supporters, his body language even there seems slightly awkward, almost embarrassed of his supposed supreme power and popularity.

This is where Maher, his younger brother, comes in. Bashar was not, in fact, meant to be destined for power; that was meant to go to his elder brother, Basil, who died in the mid-nineties. The status as heir apparent then passed to Bashar, so that when his father, President Hafez, died a decade ago, Bashar was still getting to grips with the role.

Interestingly, soon after Bashar came to power, there was a movement towards modest political reforms backed by the new President, seemingly in order to make some sort of clean break with his father's leadership style. This didn't last long, though: Maher has been leader of the army and security services since Hafez died, and he quickly put wind to any real steps towards reforms. Those calling for freedom and a democratic process were quickly suppressed by the military; since that time, Bashar has not bothered to make any further efforts at reform.

And so we get to the situation of a year ago. With what we know of Bashar's personality, it can be quickly guessed that it is Maher who is the real power behind the throne, along with the elderly patricians of Hafez's generation. It is Maher who has been orchestrating the military campaign against the majority of his own country's people; Bashar has, more than likely, been stuck in a bubble of his Baath hardliners who urge further fighting and brutality because they fear for their own lives if they fall. Meanwhile, the likes of Maher and others like him are in a psychotic death-march to genocide, intent on killing anyone who gets the way of the regime, using any spurious justification possible.

So that's a summary of the internal situation: a virtual genocide by a government, who have declared war on most of their own people; furthermore, it has become a sectarian genocide, because it is effectively the government of the Alawite sect persecuting the majority Sunnis. Gaddafi also committed genocide; due to the swift actions of the international community, the worst of the violence was over within the first few months, leaving the remaining six months a gradual war of attrition across the wide open spaces and desert towns and cities of Libya.

Alas, those being persecuted in Syria have seen no such response from outside after almost a year of unrest and virtual civil war. Apart from the political reasons, which are many (and I'll go into those shortly), there are also tactical differences that explain why the same response as in Libya has not happened.

To begin with, the UN declared a no-fly zone to prevent attacks on civilians. The air attacks happened in Libya partly because the sheer size of the country, the distances between towns, and the terrain, meant that air attacks were the easiest way for the Gaddafi regime to deal with the unrest. The Al-Assad government has had no urgent need for air support, so therefore a no-fly zone, even if it were supported in the UN, would be pretty pointless.

The Western powers then took the UN resolution with such a broad interpretation that they used it to justify air attacks on Gaddafi's military instillations and hardware. Furthermore, some countries also began supplying the opposition with more effective firepower. These things have not happened either because there is no UN agreement on a tactical resolution to the conflict; Syria is seen as "messier" from a tactical point of view because there are more closely-packed urban areas than in the open desert of Libya.

But the main issues are political, and these are many. Apart from the sectarian nature of society that brings about discouraging comparisons with Iraq, the wider outside implications of the fall of the Al-Assad government is what caused the real sleepless nights in the major capitals in the region and the wider world.

Going back to the Cold War, Syria contains Russia's only naval base that exists outside of the immediate Russian sphere of influence; of obvious strategic value to Russia, any change of government would make Russia feel uncertain to the status of this prized piece of real estate. Apart from that, Russia has always been keen to discourage any country's internal affairs being interfered in from the outside. This is a point of principle, but one that houses an obvious self-interest. Looking back to 2008: in February of that year, Kosovo declared independence from Serbia, a historic Russian ally; almost immediately, Russia supported the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia from Georgia, resulting six months later in war. So, point taken.

The Al-Assad government are Alawites, a Shia sect; since the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the ties between Iran and Syria have got closer and closer; these days the Middle East is diplomatically as divided like during the Cold War (or like the years leading up to the First World War in Europe), with Iran and Syria on one side (implicitly backed up by Russian and Chinese "neutrality"), and Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States on the other (implicitly backed up by Western "democratic values" from the US, Turkey and Europe).

For that reason, no-one is really sure how Iran would react if the Al-Assad government fell.

This partly depends on the nature of its removal (a clear outside intervention could easily be seen as a "provocation" leading to God-knows-where, whereas internal removal by the opposition would put Iran in a trickier position).

It also depends on the state of play within Iran itself: whoever is really in charge, the Ayatollah or Ahmadinajad or the more "moderate" in the regime voices at the time.

And it also depends on whatever mood music is coming from the West; if the Iranians feel threatened and encircled due to Western intransigence and rhetoric, they may well lash out in desperation if the Al-Assad regime fell. If the West plays a more considered game, some sort of accommodation might be reached; if not, then things could get very sticky, very quickly.

In that sense, although the Middle East in 2012 may seem like a re-hash of the Cold War alliances, in another sense it feels more like Europe in 1914: Syria is like Bosnia, Damascus like Sarajevo; in itself a fairly small and not massively important country on paper, but a geopolitical powder-keg sitting on a melting-pot, primed to explode.

It's often forgotten that the Balkans, the birthplace of the Great War, had for the first thirteen years of the 20th century, been host to a number of minor conflicts and internal insurrections. So, in the same way, has the Middle East for the first eleven years of the 21st century. The territorial boundaries of the Balkans were drawn and squabbled over by various imperial powers from the 1820s onwards, right up to the 1910s; the same could be said of the Middle East if you shift the timeline forward a century.

In any case, it seems almost unthinkable that the current situation in Syria could last as it is for another twelve months. Somehow, it appears that there will be some sort of Syrian endgame in 2012. But what?

As things stand, with the Arab League shunning Syria, yet still not yet ready to take the plunge militarily, and with the USA and Europe most likely to do what they can to cause problems for the Al-Assad regime short of getting involved militarily, the most openly vocal critics, with the means at their disposal, as well as the moral force and support of regional powers to do something meaningful, are Turkey.

There is a kind of clear logic to the thinking that, since the Turks' excellent relations with the Arabs, some kind of intervention, with the support of willing Arab forces from, say Jordan and/or Saudi Arabia and Qatar, could well happen. This, at least would have clear moral support from the likes of the Arab League, and without the need for direct Western involvement. Besides, much of the Syrian opposition are based in Turkey.

Although what Iran might think of such an intervention is another matter, but as I suggested earlier, what Iran thinks about the likes of Turkey is also important. As far as I know, Turkey retains cordial relations with Tehran, so this might hold back the more hard-line elements of the Islamic regime from winning the argument.

But, then again, it's also hard to deny that if the Al-Assad regime does fall sometime this year, that there could well be a bloodthirsty period of revenge by Sunnis against the Alawites. After what they have been subjected to for the past year, one could hardly blame them for wanting it. That could then, at its worst, provoke a further counter-backlash by Shias in Iraq and Lebanon, instigated by Iran.

But that's just one of many possible outcomes. Like throwing dice in a deadly game of chance. The Middle East in 2012 could turn out into a new version of the Balkans in 1914; albeit, with even higher stakes.

The "New Ottomanism" and the "New Middle East"

I wrote an article about six months ago comparing the Turkish and Egyptian experiences of democracy. Now that, so to speak, the smoke has cleared a little and the pieces are falling into place after these months of the "Arab Spring", it's a good time to look at what is what and who the "winners" and "losers" are from the events of 2011.

At this point there have been three changes of government in the Arab world since early 2011 (Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, chronologically in that order); one is on the verge of changing, with its leader in self-imposed exile (Yemen); there is continual mass civil unrest in another (Syria); and a fifth government (Bahrain's) only stemmed the threat of continual mas civil unrest by calling on the support of a neighbour's armed forces (Saudi Arabia) to help brutalise and terrify the majority of its citizens (the Shias). A number of other Arab governments (mostly monarchies - such as Jordan, Morocco and Oman) pre-empted mass unrest by granting some modest "democratic" reforms and subsidies.

That's the summary, and it covers most countries in the Middle East. Each of those individual countries' circumstances are unique in their own way, and I don't want to go into that much detail here. I want to look at who the "winners" and "losers" are from these events, what they mean, and their historical context.
Of the ideas I just mentioned, I'll look at each idea in reverse order.

The historical context of the "Arab Spring", while surprising most of the intelligence agencies in the world (or so it seems), with the benefit of hindsight (and a look at the cycle of ideological movements of the last few decades) things start falling into place.

Most "Middle East experts" say that Arab politics had been in a state of inertia after decades of stifling monarchical or military rule. This was because, some said, the Arabs were incapable of controlling themselves under a democratic regime; they point to the proof of the Islamic revolution of 1979 in Iran as proof that Arabs are incapable of "democratic revolution".
The irony here is that, in the case of Iran, they had a "democratic revolution" back in 1953 (around the same time, incidentally, that Abdel Nasser of Egypt got rid of the British-backed king to set up a military dictatorship). But Iran in 1953 was too soon for "real democracy" in the middle of the Cold War, so their elected prime minister was deposed by the West and the Shah put back on the Peacock throne. The Shah eventually proved incapable of governing the country effectively, and there was a broad-based revolution against him in 1979, symbolically headed by Ayatollah Khomeini. However, that "broad-based" revolution was soon hijacked by Islamic clerics, reaching a nadir nine months later with Khomeini backing the storming of the US embassy and a referendum that gave all powers to the Ayatollah.
The rest, in Iran's case, is a familiar story. Iraq under its new dictator, Saddam Hussein (with US backing), went to war with Iran, ending eight years later in a horrendous death toll and pointless stalemate. Iran, fancying a stab at proxy-war, supported Hezbollah in Lebanon against Israel. Iran's Islamic fundamentalist regime now being ostrasized by the US, with the Cold War still in full flow, the US then armed the Islamic fundamentalist fighters in Afghanistan (which included a group called "Al-Qaeda") to fight against Soviet occupation.
With the effective birth of state Islamic fundamentalism in 1979 in Iran, the nineties saw the the political wing of Islam time to grow in this decade amidst the confusion of the post-Soviet world (such as in Chechnya), as well as (briefly) in such countries as Turkey (in the brief rule of the Islamic "Refah" party).
The turn of the century saw a sudden and dramatic turn of tactics by the extreme side of political Islam. "Al-Qaeda" declared war on the US, attacked a US navy vessel in Yemen in 2000, then spectacularly attacked the US homeland with four hijacked planes in 2001. Islamic terrorism then enveloped many parts of the world, and continues to do so up to today.
The "War On Terror" posed a huge question to the Arab nations of the Middle East, with some Arabs becoming inspired to join in the "jihad" (such as in Saudi Arabia and Yemen). Arab governments, encouraged by the "anti-terror" measures being put through by the US government, and worried for their own safety, turned the screw even tighter on their peoples' rights. As instability became the norm across much of the world, this increased prices and a huge spike in the cost of living in the Middle East, especially after the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the resulting occupation, civil strife and insurgency.
So by the end of the 2000s, the Arabs in general were living under regimes that were often not living in the real world; they certainly seemed to act like it, as they were mainly impervious to change, paranoid of dissent, and had a schizophrenic relationship to the West (needing their support economically and diplomatically, but still happy to insult them to their own people for domestic consumption).
Most of the Arab goverments were paranoid of their populations because of the example of Iran that had taken place thirty years before. But, while some of their populations turned to Islamic fundamentalism in either perverse inspiration or desperation, there was another Islamic model that was also on the Arab world's doorstep from another direction: that of Turkey.

Those Turkish politicans who had been involved in the ill-fated administration of the "Refah" party in the mid nineties had learned their lesson by 2001. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, leader of the AK party, was one of them, and he saw that it might be possible to "break the mould" of Turkish politics by producing a mass-supported, more modest, Islamic party that would appeal to the average person.
Although had been a democracy for most of its time as a republic (see my earlier article from six months ago comparing Turkey and Egypt), it also suffered from a straightjacket of a powerful military, an immovable civil code and a strong secular tradition. But in 2002, the AK party easily won the national elections.
The AK government under Erdogan went on to prove the critics at home wrong by creating a vibrant and rapidly expanding Turkish economy, a stable government, and a more balanced foreign policy.
The last point is the one that most interested Arab governments; prior to the AK government, Turkey's relationship to the Middle East (except Israel) was indifferent at best. By the end of the 2000s, Turkey's AK government was paying far more attention to the Arab governments than any previous Turkish government; the AK government's "good neighbour" policy of paying attention to all its neighbouring relations - the EU, Russia, Iran, the Middle East and so on.
Arab rulers probably thought that it was just good business sense on the part of the Turks; what they thought that their populations thought about it may not have been on their mind. If that was the case, it was to be a huge mistake.

So the factors that led to the "Arab Spring" can be traced more exactly: the economic instability caused indirectly by the "War On Terror"; the increased security measures against the native Arab populations (excused by the "War On Terror"); the rise of political Islam and the example of good government and good relations offered by the moderate Islamic government of Turkey. Oh, and also the new possibilities brought about in the last few years through social networking. All it then needed was a spark.

The "Arab Spring", therefore, was a result of the changes in political Islam, radicalised after the 1970s, which (for the majority) had matured by the beginning of the 2000s into something else; less extreme and direct, more pragmatic and moderate. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 had the effect of transplanting an embryonic (if anarchic) democracy in the heart of the Middle East. The argument that this created a positive example for other Arab populations is, putting it politely, unproven. The Middle East for the past thirty years had been dominated by two Islamic fundamentalist powers: Iran and Saudi Arabia; one pro-West, one anti-West. The emergence of Turkey in the last ten years as a regional power changes the game; if Egypt, now more openly democratic, follows the Turkey model as seems likely, then the Middle East will become even more an even playing field rather than a battle of wills between regional powers.

I talked before of "winners" and "losers".
The prime "winner" of the Arab Spring, apart from the Arab populations themselves, is undoubtably Turkey. Turkey is the exemplar that the people behind the "Arab Spring" most readily follow; its influence in the region, already important as a power-broker and an economic bridgehead, is bound to increase. And the wily Turks are never likely to miss an opportunity to make a wide-ranging, long-term economic investment, as can be seen in Libya and elsewhere. Erdogan is the Arab populations' role model, at least until they find their own in their respective countries. This is what is meant by the "New Ottomanism": moderately Islamist Turkey regaining its former power and influence across the wider region more than a century of being either on the sidelines or the pawn of other powers.
Then there are the "losers". Strangely enough, the losers are mutual antagonists: Iran and Israel. The loss of Iranian influence is obvious enough to see; its ideological war to impose and encourage its view of Islam across the Middle East has clearly failed overall. Although there are more extreme Islamic elements within each of the countries touched by the "Arab Spring", they are clearly a minority, and the moderate view is bound to win in the medium and long term. Iran as a power is distrusted by the Arabs in general (except for the Shia Muslims), and the Arab governments in particular. Iran's only real ally in the Middle East, Syria, is fighting its own battles from within, and the ruling regime is utterly discredited. Secondly, Turkey's diplomatic focus on the Arab world, and its canny re-positioning strongly against the human rights violations of the Israeli government (especially after the "Mavi Marmara" incident), puts Israel in a corner. The only Arab government on good terms with Israel had been the former regime of Egypt; no longer. Israel is truly without friends in the Middle East or even in the neighbouring locality.

The "Arab Spring" has also put fresh impetus into the cause of the Palestinians: if the Palestinians were really smart, Israeli Arabs would organise mass demonstrations to bring Israel to a standstill, and use Erdogan as their diplomatic attack dog. That would be something that might make even the unswervingly loyal US question its principles.