Thursday, February 27, 2014

The Ukraine Crisis: Russian manoeuvres, Crimean games, and the Kiev conundrum

In my last article about the ongoing "Ukraine Crisis", I talked about the "Russian Gambit":

"What are Russia's intentions? While accepting a de facto split of Ukraine on the ground (at least in the short term), accepting it de jure would be another matter, and we know that Russia follows the line that the opposition now in power in Kiev is engineered by fascists that have come to power through a violent coup. On Saturday, having fled Kiev, Yanukovich may well have asked for Russian protection for a Russian-speaking eastern and southern rump state. But the Kremlin may have explained their own motivation, based on their analysis of the opposition: to allow the opposition a taste of power in Kiev (while having no control of the east), playing a waiting game for the disparate opposition to violently turn on each other, allowing Yanukovich and his party to return to power in Kiev soon afterwards, with Russian help or not, depending on the situation."

Seen from this perspective, the events of the past twenty-four hours in particular make some sense. On Wednesday, Putin declared a sudden "mobilisation" of forces in the west and centre of Russia, with full "exercises" to begin on Friday, and for several days. This also led to naval forces being stepped up in readiness.
With convenient timing, this was followed overnight by the seizure in Simferopol (Crimea's capital) of two key government buildings (the parliament and government house) by a large group pro-Russia militia. Surrealism had become the norm on Thursday in the Crimean capital, as the gunmen were cheered on by supporters outside, while the local police that had briefly surrounded the building, disappeared.
While this was going on, local MPs were being allowed into the building, albeit without the use of their phones; official parliamentary business was thus being guided by the wishes of several dozen armed men.

Who the men are is unclear; Russian special forces "incognito"? If not directly or indirectly guided by Moscow, they could instead be members of the "Berkut" forces, disbanded by the new Kiev government for their brutality against anti-government protesters, but welcomed in Crimea, out to make a name for themselves and push events along.
By the evening, the (still occupied) Crimean parliament had agreed to hold a referendum on Crimea's future status and election for the same day as presidential elections declared by the Kiev government. What is clear is that Crimea represents a "low-hanging fruit" for Moscow; easy to pick away from the loose grasp of a distant and impotent Kiev government.

As mentioned in my "Russian gambit", it looks as though Putin took one look at the makeup of personalities in Kiev and has decided to bide his time; they appear divided and out of their depth. While the Kiev government has declared  presidential elections three months from now, this is a suitable length of time (neither too short nor too long) for the former opposition in Kiev to screw things up, as Putin guesses they will. Meanwhile, Yanukovich's "Party Of The Regions" has declared his successor as their candidate for the May elections.

By June, Crimea could easily be part of Russia in all but name, with Yanukovich's successor in power in Kiev, all without a shot being fired. Exactly as Putin would prefer.

The Kiev conundrum

Events in Kiev in the past few days have hardly given much confidence that those in power in Kiev have a strong idea of what they are doing, or with a clear understanding of the task facing them.

The interim government announced today the new line-up of the cabinet: many of them are politicians from Yuliya Tymushenko's "Fatherland" party (some of them with a corrupt reputation of their own); the others are non-political figures such as journalists and actors, as well as a few posts for the right-wing "Svoboda" (Freedom) party.

This line-up of figures has the appearance of a coalition of corrupt party hacks in collusion with unpleasant nationalists and inexperienced (and naive?) non-partisan figures. In short, it looks like a mess. When the cabinet was announced for approval (like in a Roman forum) to the "Euromaidan", many of them received heckles. Worse, the interim government's finance minister then explained that they would have to make many unpopular economic decisions: this is code for "austerity", given that the government has inherited a massive debt that the EU and the IMF are keen to restructure by taking the economy to pieces.

Even ignoring the inevitable unpopularity that "austerity" would bring to the protesters that had supposedly supported the "revolution", most of Ukraine's productivity is the east, the natural homeland of Yanukovich's supporters. There is next to no chance that the reforms that the EU and the IMF are talking about would ever get through without getting the approval of "the east", which is never going to happen.

Apart from the "cloud cuckoo land" ideas of the interim government, what's more baffling is the stance of EU. It's clear to any objective observer that the Ukraine "revolution" that had been brewing for a few months now was supported on the ground by the foot-soldiers of "Svoboda" and "Pravy Sektor" (Right Sector); the latter are a fascist mob that consider "Svoboda" a group of soft moderates. Since the "revolution" over the weekend, the fascist mob have been acting as the street security throughout most of Kiev, as well as in their real stronghold in the west, Lvov. There is little evidence that the mob have put away their weapons yet, or have any serious intention of doing so.

What on earth are the EU doing so conspicuously supporting a government of uncertain designs and unstable character, that was brought to power with the help of a fascist militia? It looks for all the world that the EU has seriously lost the plot.

Anything that makes the West look incompetent makes Putin look ever smarter; the "chess grand master" whose moves are unplayable against.

Ukraine in early 2014 now resembles some of the weak and unstable governments that were established in Europe in the aftermath of the First World War, and in the run-up to the Second World War. A more contemporary comparison would be to the weak post-Soviet governments that existed in the first years after the fall of Communism.
In each of these comparisons, the result was messy, often resulting in extreme governments and conflict. In a previous article, I compared the Ukraine crisis to the so-called "July Crisis" that led to the First World War. While we're not at that stage yet (and may never be, if the "Russian Gambit" holds true), the end game is still mired in uncertainty.

It has been announced that Yanukovich is to give a press conference on Friday afternoon in Rostov-on-Don. For what possible purpose? As Moscow has declared that they are willing to support his person, this may be yet another manoeuvre  in the great "chess game" of Ukraine...






















Sunday, February 23, 2014

The Ukraine Crisis: the players in a European "chess game"

In a recent analysis of the Ukraine Crisis, I talked about three possible outcomes; optimistic, middling, and the "worse case" scenario. The "worse case" scenario was:

"Civil war erupts, with Crimea seceding. Russia decides to intervene directly to protect its strategic interests, as Ukraine represents its "last line of defence"

As of Sunday, now seventy-two hours on from that "worse case" scenario, events seem much closer to that than the most optimistic resolution.

The Russian gambit

As the deal was signed between Yanukovich and the opposition politicians on Friday, it appears that Yanukovich had already decided that the "deal" wasn't worth the paper it was written on.

The decision of Yanukovich to make a "tactical withdrawal" to Kharkov in the middle of the night, while initially bringing reactions of surprise and victorious exultation from the opposition in Kiev come Saturday morning, in reality had a much more ominous motivation.
Later that afternoon, it became clear that Yanukovich's decision to flee from the Ukrainian-speaking capital, Kiev, to the Russian-speaking "eastern capital", Kharkov, was not an acceptance of defeat, or an abrogation of his presidential duties. In the same way that Charles I's decision to flee London for the safety of Oxford was the opening move that created the English Civil War, Yanukovich's retreat to Kharkov had a similar motivation.

During Saturday, Yanukovich's supporters in the eastern districts initially gave serious consideration to forming a breakaway, Russian-backed province of the (Russian-speaking) east and south of Ukraine. Then there were rumours that he was trying to flee to Russia, along with some of his most senior supporters. It was after this, however, that Yanukovich, later in the day, made an announcement that he was the legitimate president, and that those in Kiev were fascists and thugs: words than sound like they were manufactured in Moscow.

An educated guess is that he had been on the phone to the Kremlin, who had their own reasons for not wanting him to surrender half the country so easily. Since yesterday, Yanukovich's support base (The Party Of The Regions) seem to be abandoning him, while still considering the Kiev government to be illegitimate; this may also be part of a Kremlin-formulated gambit.

What are Russia's intentions? While accepting a de facto split of Ukraine on the ground (at least in the short term), accepting it de jure would be another matter, and we know that Russia follows the line that the opposition now in power in Kiev is engineered by fascists that have come to power through a violent coup. On Saturday, having fled Kiev, Yanukovich may well have asked for Russian protection for a Russian-speaking eastern and southern rump state. But the Kremlin may have explained their own motivation, based on their analysis of the opposition: to allow the opposition a taste of power in Kiev (while having no control of the east), playing a waiting game for the disparate opposition to violently turn on each other, allowing Yanukovich and his party to return to power in Kiev soon afterwards, with Russian help or not, depending on the situation.

The above scenario makes some sense in Russian eyes, and events on the ground give some credence to Moscow's thinking, if this is indeed what is on their mind. The Kremlin is playing a long game in Ukraine, and may be happy in the short-term to see opposition in-fighting cause a rapid disintegration of a new Kiev government; all the better if the EU, in its ignorance of the make-up of the opposition, ally themselves with fascists and thugs, who will soon become discredited. It will vindicate Moscow's gambit in the Ukraine Crisis, and lead to the Russia-leaning party coming back into power, with a much weaker opposition.

At the moment, with Yanukovich leaking support from his own party base, Moscow's loyalty to him personally also looks increasingly expendable. For Moscow, he is just one man; the preservation of Yanukovich's party is much more important than the man himself, in order for their gambit to succeed.

The players in Kiev

Who are the opposition? As just mentioned, the EU's support for them seems more in hope than expectation; they support the opposition's "Euro-philia" without looking too carefully at the motivations of the different players that the opposition are made of.

Already, as of Sunday, the opposition in parliament in Kiev look to be over-reaching: repealing laws that give Russian-speakers in the east and south linguistic equality with Ukrainian-speakers. While this may only look like it's reversing a perceived Yanukovich indulgence, this sends a clear signal to Yanukovich's supporters in the east, and given the polarised climate of Ukraine at the moment, hardly sends a message of mutual understanding and goodwill. At present you have a government in Kiev that considers itself the government of whole country, and an almost identical situation in "eastern capital" Kharkov and the rest of the east and the south. This is the recipe for a civil war: all you need is a spark.

Those in Europe who compare these events in Kiev to the Orange Revolution are dangerously behind the times. Yuliya Tymushenko, the now-released former-PM, no longer has a serious power-base; since her time in prison, she has become discredited (as the catcalls during her speech to the protesters show), and others have taken her place.

Furthermore, as Moscow already knows, the opposition movement itself is a disparate group: the only aim that truly united them was to oust Yanukovich. Now that's done, what next? The opposition comprises pro-EU groups, as well as anti-Semitic extreme nationalists. Those nationalists already have a serious hold on the city of Lvov, the "second city" of "western" Ukraine. There is therefore the very real danger that even in the firmly-opposition half of the country, in-fighting over "territory" could break out between nationalists and moderates.
And then there are those areas that are more "contested", where the mix between Ukrainian speakers and Russian speakers is more even. What happens there? A linguistic (and election) map shows you that the westernmost regions are the most "Ukrainian", and those in the south-east and Crimea are the most "Russian". Most of the rest is one big grey area. It is here where the risk of violence may be the highest, and could result in a "worse case" scenario.

Meanwhile, the Kremlin looks on, waiting to see if its gambit will come off; and whether "intervention" will be necessary...





























Thursday, February 20, 2014

The Ukraine Crisis: The Russian Angle, Scenarios, and the ghost of 1914

The "Ukraine Crisis" that erupted a few days ago has been smouldering beneath the surface for years, with the current anti-government (Pro-European) protests ongoing for three months.
The initial cause of those protests was the rejection of the government of further EU agreements, in favour of greater economic co-operation with Russia; the deeper reason was endemic corruption of the governing administration.

On one side, there is the incumbent (pro-Russian) government, supported by Russia; on the other, are the "pro-European" (and pro-EU) opposition, backed by the EU and the USA.

Now the situation has turned to armed violence in the centre of Kiev, with the situation unravelling in the regions, especially those dominated by the largely Ukrainian-speaking opposition in the west and north. Even Crimea, an ethnically Russian region on the Black that also hosts Russia's Black Sea fleet, has threatened to secede and join Russia if things get much worse.
On the one hand, the West has decisively thrown its lot in with the opposition, supporting sanctions against the government; on the other hand, Russia has decisively thrown its full support behind the government (what that means precisely at this stage is unclear), calling the opposition "fascists", and the EU's demands "blackmail".

Seen through a Russian lens

Ukraine broke away from Russia (then the Soviet Union) a little over twenty years ago, but Russia has only really took Ukraine as being nominally independent ever since. The reasons for this are cultural and historical; regardless of what Ukrainians (Russian-speaking or not) may think of it, the Russians still consider Ukraine to be firmly part of Russia's sphere of influence.

Apart from Ukraine and the break-up of the former Soviet Union twenty years ago, Russia's perspective on the current Ukraine Crisis must be considered in relation to recent actions in Russia's back-yard, and areas of Russian influence in general.
From this point of view, we must go back to the Balkans. The break-up of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s and the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo resulted in the collapse of the Milosevic government in Belgrade, Russia's last firm ally in the Balkans.
Moving on to the 21st century, you had the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in the middle of the first decade, as well as the Rose Revolution in Georgia, both bring pro-Western governments on to Russia's doorstep. Regardless of the exaggerated Russian paranoia at these events, these both happening only a couple of years after their neighbouring Baltic States has joined NATO (as a result of the "War On Terror"), it meant that Russia had very few "friendly" nations left around it. 
Furthermore, with China rapidly growing in stature, Russia had also lost economic influence in Central Asia; and the USA was using the "War On Terror" to utilise military bases in places like Uzbekistan. By this point, Russian paranoia of "encirclement" begins to gain an element of credence.

Things began to hot up in 2008. Early in that year, Kosovo declared independence from Serbia, Russia's one-time ally. Russia supported Serbia's protests, and in the end only a modest number of countries recognised the new nation's sovereignty.
However, Russia got its own back soon afterwards, by unilaterally accepting the independence of two breakaway (Russian-speaking) regions of Georgia; then when the pro-Western Georgian President, Saakashvili, ordered the "reclaiming" of those two regions while Vladimir Putin was watching the opening ceremony of the Beijing Summer Olympic Games, Russia had reason to believe they were being taken for fools, regardless of Saakashvili's claims of Russian provocation. A brief war led to those regions being kept firmly from Georgian control, with the West unwilling to directly intervene; only Russian restraint, under pressure from the West to cease hostilities, allowed Saakashvili to remain in power.

The "Arab Spring" that began in early 2011 brought another challenge to Russia's "perspective" on the world. During the Cold War, the Middle East has been as much a battleground for influence has any other part of the world, and Russia's friendly relations with Syria (and Russia's naval base on the Syrian coast) have been the still-fruitful product of that.
The UN-backed war against Libya in 2011 was considered a dastardly trick by the West on Russia, hoodwinking them into backing what would ultimately be the collapse of the anti-Western (and implicitly, pro-Russian) government of Gaddafi. 
Thus, last summer, when the US, France and the UK supported military action against the savage crimes of the Syrian (pro-Russian) government during its ongoing civil war, Russia did everything it could to prevent it from happening, successfully keeping their sole remaining ally in the Middle East from harm.

Russia's geopolitical positioning since the end of the Cold War has been to promote the status quo in the developing world, and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. Naturally, this is because it is in Russia's interests to do so. This follows also with relations with Iran, as Russia has been playing its part to be "helpful" to both Iran and the West.

It is from this chain of events that we get a better perspective of Russian thinking. Seen through this lens, Ukraine represents to the Russian administration something more like a "red line" that cannot be crossed. After the perceived humiliations, encirclement and loss of allies in the last fifteen years, Ukraine is Russia's last "big prize", along with Syria. It has naval assets it both countries. The Orange Revolution led to a short-lived pro-Western government; the current (pro-Russian) government replaced it in the following elections.

Politically, strategically and culturally, it cannot afford to "lose" Ukraine.

Russian paranoia about Western-backed "fascists" attempting a coup against the pro-Russian government therefore has a long history to back it up. The timing of the violence, happening during the Winter Olympics in Sochi, would be seen as no coincidence in Moscow; neither would the fact that the US military sent a surveillance boat to the Black Sea to help with "anti-terrorism". 

Ghosts of 1914

The hundredth anniversary of the start of the First World War brings back some uncomfortable parallels to the current situation in Ukraine.

It should be remembered that the spark that led to the war starting was in the Balkans: A Bosnian Serb nationalist, backed by elements of the Serbian military and government, killed the heir to Austria-Hungary. Russia supported Serbia, encouraging her to reject the demands of Austria. 

What is important here is the role of Russia; without Russia's support, Serbia would likely have given in to Austrian demands (which, incidentally, where modest compared to those that NATO demanded of Serbia/Yugoslavia in 1999; while Austria was looking for a way to humiliate Serbia, it still gave plenty of room for Serbia to wriggle out of war). In this respect, Russia shares a large part of the blame for escalating the situation: first, by telling Serbia to stand up against Austrian aggression; second, by creating the narrative orthodoxy (regardless of the truth) for the reasons for the war in the first place i.e. Austrian aggression, which gave France and Britain a reason to join on Russia's side.

Jump forward a century, and we see much the same narrative played out again, albeit in the theatre of Ukraine and not Serbia, with the West (EU/USA) playing the role of Austria against Russia. Like in 1914, Russia accuses the West of aggression and blackmail with its demands on its ally; and also like in 1914, by Russia encouraging the Ukrainian government to "stand firm" and offering its full support, it risks escalating the situation further.

It should also be remembered that the years preceding the First World War included various "crises" and regional wars; the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913, like the unrest in the Middle East since the "Arab Spring" resulted in unpredictable and unstable politics in strategically-important countries. 

In this way, we see that Russia's perspective has never really changed; only the situation has.

Three scenarios

Where will this lead? Three possibilities offer themselves.

The optimistic scenario:
Government ministers soon withdraw their support from the President, forcing him to do a deal with the opposition. Mediation with both Russia and the West working with both sides to calm the situation. At present, this looks unlikely, at least in the short-term; violence is intensifying as the two camps are drifting apart.

The middling scenario:
Low-level violence continues for some weeks, until ministers tire of the chaos, and encourage both Russia and the West to mediate. 

The worst-case scenario:
Civil war erupts, with Crimea seceding. Russia decides to intervene directly to protect its strategic interests, as Ukraine represents its "last line of defence"; the West's response depends on the level of influence that "hawks" have in the EU nations and Washington. Hawks in the West may argue for a strong response after being denied by Russia a "just war" in Syria the previous year. 

Although last this scenario looks far-fetched, the psychology of the various players in the West is important; Obama's rhetoric against Russia in the Ukraine Crisis has thus far been (uncharacteristically) very strong. In this way, perhaps the thought of "missing out" on a strike against Syria is playing on his mind? 

On such things can wars be decided.

A further analysis of the situation in Ukraine (and Moscow's intentions) can be found here.
















Sunday, February 16, 2014

The UK Floods Crisis: summing up how Cameron's Conservatives rule Britain

The "Floods Crisis" has taken many weeks to build up into a political crisis, which finally happened around Monday morning last week (10 February), when the Thames Valley west of London began to flood on an scale not seen for generations.

Since then, the flooding has intensified. Large areas of the Somerset Levels have now either flooded completely, or cut off from the "mainland" a number of villages for weeks, as well as tens of square miles of prime agricultural land. And the flooding is predicted to get only worse, with the Severn Valley badly affected, as well as many other parts of Southern England. And that doesn't even mention the storms that have hammered coastal communities in recent weeks, tearing parts of the national infrastructure to pieces.

The strange irony for the government is that whereas before the New Year, the talk was of the political threat of thousands of Romanians and Bulgarians flooding the country once they have the right to freely come to The UK. That threat never materialised; instead, we have a "natural flood" of historic proportions, flooding thousands of hectares of prime agricultural land, towns, villages and affluent suburbs, providing an entirely different sort of political crisis.

A damning indictment of "austerity"

An excellent piece by Jonathon Freedland pointed out how the cuts to the workforce of the Environment Agency (EA), as well as overall reductions in their budget, demonstrate how low down on their list of priorities the government takes the natural environment, in spite of all Cameron's earlier talk of the "greenest government ever".
With climate change making flooding an increasing problem for Britain, the only sensible action is to increase investment in flood protection, or actions that can at least mitigate their effects. If you can't move thousands of people off flood plains, then you have to provide adequate protection, like the Dutch have been doing for centuries.
The Floods Crisis has shown the intellectual poverty of "austerity". You may think you're saving money in the short term, but you will pay far, far more in the long-term if you don't defend yourself against future threats. In fact, the analogy may be taken to that of the armed forces. The government's attitude to the EA seems to be only to spend money on them when there is a crisis: equivalent in attitude to saying that armies are only useful in wartime, so why spend money on them in peace-time? It is this bone-headed reactive rather than proactive attitude to government that has helped to contribute to this crisis. And since the knee-jerk response of the government has been to "send in the army", we can also see how ill-equipped our armed forces are for genuine crises.

"Make do and mend" government

While the military on a personal level are doing only their very best, their civilian masters have spent the last four years doing them down, reducing their numbers and their budget to a minimum. The numbers of forces on the ground seem pitifully small compared to the crisis; the government talk of deploying a thousand here of there; where are the rest of them?

Again, like a hundred years ago at the start of the First World War, we see a situation that invites the "lions led by donkeys" comparison. This time, however, it is the Westminster bubble, and Cameron's circle of Eton-educated incompetents that are the "donkeys", leading their troops into floods without so much as a pair of Wellington boots. Worse, they send these ill-equipped (but well-meaning) troops to flood-hit areas without a clear plan, and too late. The main job the army has done is fill and lay down thousands of sand bags, often in areas already under three feet of water. It's not their fault that they're carrying out orders that appear utterly stupid and ineffective. But, as filling and laying down sand bags looks like something is being done, that seems to be the main thing.
Apart from "sand bag duty", do "the donkeys" in government have no other ideas for the army?

Like the incompetent elite that sleepwalked into war a hundred years ago, we have an Eton-educated elite that is sleepwalking Britain into a snowballing disaster from nature. And the reasons for their incompetence are the same now as they were then.

A damning indictment of Cameron's priorities

Cameron was finally pushed into doing something only after The Thames Valley flooded. Prince Charles went to the Somerset Levels more that a week ago, which had been flooded (and completely ignored by the government) for six weeks; only after Charles intervened did Cameron start to pay attention.

This also invites comparisons to the pitiful and ignorant response that George W Bush's government had to Hurricane Katrina; but in some ways, this is even worse, because the hypocrisy of Cameron's attitude was laid bare when he quickly jumped to attention once the wealthy homes of Tory heartland of The Thames Valley were flooding. And the hypocrisy of "austerity" was displayed when he announced that "money was no object". It is "austerity" for those outside of Cameron's range of thought (eg. the poor, those on benefits, those living in "the regions"), but "money is no object" for those close to his heart (the rich, and the Eton-educated elite).

This is another variation on the principle that has guided much of economics since the Financial Crisis: namely, "Corporate Socialism".

Lastly, Cameron's personal response to the floods has made his superficiality clear to see. His tours of affected areas have appeared like no more than photo opportunities. True, others have done the same, but his obvious insincerity as the national leader simply putting on a show of Churchillian "Dunkirk spirit" goes unequalled to his rivals. Ed Milliband's visit into the flooded Tory heartland was a PR disaster waiting to happen, but Cameron's "floods tour" simply looks like over-kill long after the crisis started.

Cameron talks about it being not the right time to start the blame game. No wonder: he knows who's really to blame. He had to intervene to quell in-fighting between his ministers over the right response to the floods, after his lack of leadership over his ministers turned into a farce involving Lord Smith last week.  

Ultimately, the "Floods Crisis" is likely to be "Cameron's Katrina", and for good reason. Cameron's failings as a person and a leader have been adding up over the years he's been in office, and this national emergency has shown them as clear as day.