The election of Jorge Mario Bergoglio as the new Pope Francis has made many "firsts". The first pope from South America and the Southern Hemisphere, as well as the first Jesuit pope, are all significant in themselves, but these mould-breaking "firsts" are not even the most significant.
The cardinals deciding to "break the mould" had already known a lot about Bergoglio from the last conclave in 2005, as Bergoglio had come second that time around. Sources said at the time that Bergoglio insisted that other cardinals stop voting for him and transfer their votes to Benedict to ensure a smooth election; this sign of humility - a now-familiar trait of Pope Francis' personality - makes it clear why he was so widely respected amongst his peers.
Bergoglio had not been considered one of the papabile by observers this time around due to his age. The fact that he was also an "outsider" (as not part of the Curia or with any obvious links or experience in the Vatican bureaucracy) was considered another barrier; as was the fact that he was a Jesuit, a Christian order that had been mistrusted by previous Popes, most recently John Paul II.
As it happened, Vatican observers had been led up the garden path by the gossip that had been circulating about the conclave, and possibly by their own preconceptions: that there were no clear favourites, implying a more lengthy voting process than the last time. But the unique context that prompted the conclave being called in the first place - Benedict XVI's resignation - seems to have played a large part behind the cardinals' thinking, and this crucial factor was what many observers did not fully appreciate.
Benedict XVI's resignation may have officially been down to exhaustion from old age, but it's clear that the various scandals - abuse and corruption in the Catholic church - had taken their toll on Benedict's mental and physical state, to the extent that he felt the best thing to do was to pass on the baton to someone with a clearer mind and better health who could better deal with the huge task of reform. Benedict's last remarks when resigning as pope displayed a clear moral revulsion at what had unbeknownst happened to the Vatican under his watch; in the manner of his standing down, Benedict displayed more about his high moral character than at any other time during his papacy. Nothing marked the symbolism of Benedict XVI's papacy better than the manner of his resignation.
It is this - reform - which is what is most needed in the Catholic church, and it is this reason why the cardinals decided that the best person to carry out this task was Cardinal Bergoglio, now Pope Francis. As Benedict XVI had resigned due to the scandals that had engulfed the Vatican, the cardinals realised that with the Catholic church facing a moral crisis unprecedented in modern times, they needed to be bold and bring in someone with the force of personality to bring about a decisive shift. As one priest said, what the Catholic church needed was "a miracle"; Jesus with a MBA, part manager, part radical reformer, with a Christian moral compass to match. With Bergoglio seemingly in the cardinals' mind from the last conclave, they chose a man who they thought would best fit the bill.
So, although Pope Francis has "broken the mould" in being the first Jesuit and South American pope, the main reason he was chosen was because of what he stood for, not just where he was from. As Pope Francis jokingly told the cardinals on the first day of his papacy, "May God forgive you for what you have done!".
Behind this joke is a clear point: Francis' morality is sincere and deeply-held. His years of pastoral work, his connection to helping the poor and disadvantaged had left a strong impression of what the true purpose of the Catholic church should be - morality, yes; but more importantly, improving social justice. The real meaning behind Francis' comment to the cardinals may be to make them understand that the pope is there as a moral icon. Taking the name of his namesake St Francis of Assisi, he means to demonstrate what Catholicism means to him personally, but also where he thinks the long-term future of the Catholic church lies; less in dogmatic points of morality, but in practical, on-the-street action. In the past when an archbishop, he strongly admonished those of his peers who he felt were enjoying too many of the comforts of their positions; as pope, cardinals and the Curia may well need to expect the same. Although Pope Francis joked to his cardinals, what he perhaps really meant was: I hope you realise what you have voted for.
For those in the Curia used to easy comfort, majesty and the splendour of Vatican life, Pope Francis may well be "the austerity pope" in more ways than one. In the coming weeks and months, the new pope may well take a very firm brush to what he sees as the perceived excesses, inefficiency and corruption in the Vatican.
What has caught the imagination of many Catholics and Vatican watchers, more than his simple personal manner of dress, is Pope Francis' easy-going and expressive personality. Francis comes across as a "man of the people" so easily because it seems to be his second nature. This has been honed through decades of pastoral service, selflessly dealing with the poor and the sick in Buenos Aires, making him almost a male comparison to Mother Teresa. In becoming pope, Francis already gives the impression of being close to sainthood; the charismatic and spontaneous personality more often seen in a populist leader married to a deep and sincere concern for social justice.
It is therefore by strange coincidence that the papacy has been endowed upon a man who has the qualities of a natural populist and icon of the poor, only a matter of days after the passing of another charismatic leader and social campaigner, Hugo Chavez. Chavez may have been a polarizing figure to the outside world and the moneyed classes of Venezuela, but he was a charismatic icon to the poor, whose concern for social justice he put into practice on the ground. In a strange act of poetry, it almost as though the torch of social justice held by a charismatic populist has passed from Hugo Chavez to the person of the pope himself.
Pope Francis' election to the papacy, as an outsider voted in with a mandate for vigorous reform, comes to Italy at the same as the rise of Beppe Grillo's "Five Star Movement" in reaction against the corruption of the Italian political class. A parallel comparison could be drawn from the events in the Vatican in the last month. In both cases, Italy and the Vatican, we see administration mired in scandal and corruption, its electors (cardinals in the case of the Vatican) choosing that it's time for a new approach led by an untarnished outsider, to save the broken system from itself.
The "pop star status" that Beppe Grillo has received since he became involved in the Italian elections, and even more since he became Italy's "kingmaker", is now mirrored by that of Pope Francis. In both cases, the near-hysteria of their respective "fanbase" is not just down to the protagonists' charisma and open personal style, but also to the fact that at times of moral and social crisis, people need to have someone they can believe in.
To an extent, over in the UK, the personal popularity of Nigel Farage and his UKIP is also a result of the moral and social crisis that has gripped the country since the beginning of the Financial Crisis. When "the system" is so clearly failing the people, it is often at these moments that individuals of special charisma and vision suddenly appear as if from nowhere. In reality, they may have been there for a long time; the people simply weren't listening very hard because it wasn't the right time.
Jorge Mario Bergoglio may well have had the opportunity to become pope in 2005, but the time was not right; Benedict was the natural choice, and Bergoglio saw no reason to change that. This time around, with the Catholic church facing multiple scandals and in need of a radical overhaul, the cardinals realised that this was Bergoglio's time.
Cometh the hour, cometh the man.
Sunday, March 17, 2013
Monday, March 11, 2013
Censorship, religion, liberalism and the West
I've recently been reading the excellent book by Nick Cohen called "You Can't Read This Book"; though a more accurate title would be "You Should Read This Book".
Cohen tackles the long-overlooked issue of censorship in the modern era; specifically in the last twenty-five years since the publication of Salman Rushdie's "The Satanic Verses". He focuses on censorship based on fear of reprisal from religious groups (including Islamists and Hindu extremists); he also looks at the ways that the rich and powerful use their influence to silence critics (in the workplace as well as in the media), in particular how the UK's absurd libel laws are abused to silence unwanted publications, and use such crippling financial punishments to keep others quiet.
As Cohen points out, we naively think that we are living in an unprecedented age of freedom. But there is plenty of evidence to the contrary.
It's worth remembering what "freedom of speech" really means in the West, and what is needed to maintain it. "Freedom of speech" means you are free to say what you like: criticise, lambast, or insult, if the mood suits you. If a person doesn't like what you say, they are free to reply in a like mind. As long as what you say is not openly dishonest, "freedom of speech" means exactly that: the freedom to say what you like.
Of course, we are all human. If you say what you really think all the time, you may quickly run out of friends and get into fights with strangers. But when you live in a country that abides by the principle of freedom of speech, hearing things you don't like from time to time is the price you pay. As the saying goes: if you don't like the heat, get out of the kitchen.
If you can't handle people's criticism, then go somewhere where you won't be criticised.
It is this basic principle that comes to mind when I think about the frenzy of hate that was first stirred by the publication of "The Satanic Verses", and more recently by the Danish cartoons that poked fun at Mohammed and Islamic Fundamentalism.
The rise of Islamic Fundamentalism put the West's liberal values to the test. The vast majority of Muslims in the West are moderate; many of those are non-practising Muslims born in the West, or brought up in the West, who have little in common with the way Islam is practised in the Middle East or Pakistan. But Islamic extremism in the West is a more recent phenomenon, one that has grown in the last twenty years or so, often as the children of Muslim immigrants became seduced by the simplicity of the "old culture".
This reverence of the "old culture" in Islam is a simple reversion to the tenets of Sharia law and a literal understanding of the Koran. There is no room for compromise; you either obey or are an infidel. In this mentality, Western liberalism was the enemy: "freedom of speech" was therefore an enemy of Islam.
The publication of "The Satanic Verses" was the first time that the liberalism and "free speech" in the modern era were tested by the reactionary forces of Islamic Fundamentalism, and were found sorely lacking. In his novel, Rushdie, in the middle of a contemporary tale about South Asians in Britain, he took a look at the origins of Islam, and drew his own conclusions. For doing that, a "fatwa" was pronounced upon him by Ayatollah Khomeini: in effect a declaration of war by Iran's supreme leader against the person of Salman Rushdie.
The liberal West's reaction was two-fold: publishers were terrified of publishing works that might be deemed offensive to Islam (which could mean almost anything that was not openly supportive or sympathetic); and Western liberals turned on those who were willing to speak their minds on the injustices of Islam, called them "racists", or criticised those authors for putting the lives of the wider public under threat by their irresponsible actions.
This tendency by liberals to misrepresent and black-mark those who are still willing to hold up the values of free speech is the most shameful way in which the West has turned its value of "free speech" on its head. For the meaning of "free speech" for the last twenty years, especially from some aspects of the liberal elite, has come to mean tolerating the views of those who wish to destroy and kill them. This might be justifiable if it meant that the liberal elite were at least free to equally deride and discredit the intolerant and hateful words of the Islamic Fundamentalism they indulge, but they were not.
The traumatic experience of Salman Rushdie's "fatwa" left the West's liberal elite too terrified to challenge the reactionary forces of Islamism, as they still are today. Thus it has given the extremists the "proof" that the liberal West was soft and decadent, there for the taking. If no-one in the West was ready to intellectually fight for its core values of free speech, while at the same time indulging those of Islamic extremism, what did that say for how strong they thought of their own?
Islamic Fundamentalism has grown around the world, and in the West in particular, on the back of the idea that Muslims are victims to a Zionist conspiracy, and that the West is a decadent and morally vacuous society in league with the Zionists. In this mindset, it makes "Zionism" and the West legitimate targets. If the West is to destroy this perception, its own values must be restored and fought for on the intellectual battlefield.
"Freedom of speech" is one of the West's most integral values. As said before, this means accepting hearing things that you won't like. To act violently whenever someone pokes fun at you or criticises you is not the act of an adult living in a civilised society: it is the act of a petulant child.
Islamists living in the West who are offended by cartoons that make fun of their religion are therefore entirely missing the point of living in the West. If they do not like, they always can choose to live where they know their views will not be challenged. In fact, it would be fair to say that for the West to recapture the full value of "free speech", such outraged Islamists should be encouraged to do so; the alternative is to create a state within a state where Islamists have complete control over their religion, and no-one is able to challenge them under threat of death. To an extent, in the UK in particular, this already exists in faith schools that clearly flout the basic tenets of Western values; possibly even the law itself. When there are imams that live in the UK that encourage violence against "infidels" what they are really saying is: I do not accept the values and laws of the UK. This is what the law, police and prison is for.
If religious extremists (of any faith) who live in the UK cannot accept criticism and advocate violence against Britons, they have no place in a free society. It is as simple as that.
The views here are not based on racism; and they are certainly not based on right-wing conservatism. The points made here are simply about free speech and rationalism. It is irrational and self-defeating to have a society based on free speech that is terrified of speaking freely about Islam, or any other religion. Similarly, it is irrational and self-defeating to have a section of a free society (such as Islamic Fundamentalists) that are against freedom.
The irony is that Islamic Fundamentalists come the the UK and other Western nations in order to take advantage of freedoms unavailable in their own country. The best method to fight against Fundamentalism is education and intellectually challenging its ignorant and prejudiced points of view. This is what should be done in countries such as Pakistan, as well as in towns and cities in the UK where Fundamentalism is growing in Muslim communities.
Where this method fails, the law should swiftly step in to prevent female exploitation, hate crime and worse.
Cohen tackles the long-overlooked issue of censorship in the modern era; specifically in the last twenty-five years since the publication of Salman Rushdie's "The Satanic Verses". He focuses on censorship based on fear of reprisal from religious groups (including Islamists and Hindu extremists); he also looks at the ways that the rich and powerful use their influence to silence critics (in the workplace as well as in the media), in particular how the UK's absurd libel laws are abused to silence unwanted publications, and use such crippling financial punishments to keep others quiet.
As Cohen points out, we naively think that we are living in an unprecedented age of freedom. But there is plenty of evidence to the contrary.
It's worth remembering what "freedom of speech" really means in the West, and what is needed to maintain it. "Freedom of speech" means you are free to say what you like: criticise, lambast, or insult, if the mood suits you. If a person doesn't like what you say, they are free to reply in a like mind. As long as what you say is not openly dishonest, "freedom of speech" means exactly that: the freedom to say what you like.
Of course, we are all human. If you say what you really think all the time, you may quickly run out of friends and get into fights with strangers. But when you live in a country that abides by the principle of freedom of speech, hearing things you don't like from time to time is the price you pay. As the saying goes: if you don't like the heat, get out of the kitchen.
If you can't handle people's criticism, then go somewhere where you won't be criticised.
It is this basic principle that comes to mind when I think about the frenzy of hate that was first stirred by the publication of "The Satanic Verses", and more recently by the Danish cartoons that poked fun at Mohammed and Islamic Fundamentalism.
The rise of Islamic Fundamentalism put the West's liberal values to the test. The vast majority of Muslims in the West are moderate; many of those are non-practising Muslims born in the West, or brought up in the West, who have little in common with the way Islam is practised in the Middle East or Pakistan. But Islamic extremism in the West is a more recent phenomenon, one that has grown in the last twenty years or so, often as the children of Muslim immigrants became seduced by the simplicity of the "old culture".
This reverence of the "old culture" in Islam is a simple reversion to the tenets of Sharia law and a literal understanding of the Koran. There is no room for compromise; you either obey or are an infidel. In this mentality, Western liberalism was the enemy: "freedom of speech" was therefore an enemy of Islam.
The publication of "The Satanic Verses" was the first time that the liberalism and "free speech" in the modern era were tested by the reactionary forces of Islamic Fundamentalism, and were found sorely lacking. In his novel, Rushdie, in the middle of a contemporary tale about South Asians in Britain, he took a look at the origins of Islam, and drew his own conclusions. For doing that, a "fatwa" was pronounced upon him by Ayatollah Khomeini: in effect a declaration of war by Iran's supreme leader against the person of Salman Rushdie.
The liberal West's reaction was two-fold: publishers were terrified of publishing works that might be deemed offensive to Islam (which could mean almost anything that was not openly supportive or sympathetic); and Western liberals turned on those who were willing to speak their minds on the injustices of Islam, called them "racists", or criticised those authors for putting the lives of the wider public under threat by their irresponsible actions.
This tendency by liberals to misrepresent and black-mark those who are still willing to hold up the values of free speech is the most shameful way in which the West has turned its value of "free speech" on its head. For the meaning of "free speech" for the last twenty years, especially from some aspects of the liberal elite, has come to mean tolerating the views of those who wish to destroy and kill them. This might be justifiable if it meant that the liberal elite were at least free to equally deride and discredit the intolerant and hateful words of the Islamic Fundamentalism they indulge, but they were not.
The traumatic experience of Salman Rushdie's "fatwa" left the West's liberal elite too terrified to challenge the reactionary forces of Islamism, as they still are today. Thus it has given the extremists the "proof" that the liberal West was soft and decadent, there for the taking. If no-one in the West was ready to intellectually fight for its core values of free speech, while at the same time indulging those of Islamic extremism, what did that say for how strong they thought of their own?
Islamic Fundamentalism has grown around the world, and in the West in particular, on the back of the idea that Muslims are victims to a Zionist conspiracy, and that the West is a decadent and morally vacuous society in league with the Zionists. In this mindset, it makes "Zionism" and the West legitimate targets. If the West is to destroy this perception, its own values must be restored and fought for on the intellectual battlefield.
"Freedom of speech" is one of the West's most integral values. As said before, this means accepting hearing things that you won't like. To act violently whenever someone pokes fun at you or criticises you is not the act of an adult living in a civilised society: it is the act of a petulant child.
Islamists living in the West who are offended by cartoons that make fun of their religion are therefore entirely missing the point of living in the West. If they do not like, they always can choose to live where they know their views will not be challenged. In fact, it would be fair to say that for the West to recapture the full value of "free speech", such outraged Islamists should be encouraged to do so; the alternative is to create a state within a state where Islamists have complete control over their religion, and no-one is able to challenge them under threat of death. To an extent, in the UK in particular, this already exists in faith schools that clearly flout the basic tenets of Western values; possibly even the law itself. When there are imams that live in the UK that encourage violence against "infidels" what they are really saying is: I do not accept the values and laws of the UK. This is what the law, police and prison is for.
If religious extremists (of any faith) who live in the UK cannot accept criticism and advocate violence against Britons, they have no place in a free society. It is as simple as that.
The views here are not based on racism; and they are certainly not based on right-wing conservatism. The points made here are simply about free speech and rationalism. It is irrational and self-defeating to have a society based on free speech that is terrified of speaking freely about Islam, or any other religion. Similarly, it is irrational and self-defeating to have a section of a free society (such as Islamic Fundamentalists) that are against freedom.
The irony is that Islamic Fundamentalists come the the UK and other Western nations in order to take advantage of freedoms unavailable in their own country. The best method to fight against Fundamentalism is education and intellectually challenging its ignorant and prejudiced points of view. This is what should be done in countries such as Pakistan, as well as in towns and cities in the UK where Fundamentalism is growing in Muslim communities.
Where this method fails, the law should swiftly step in to prevent female exploitation, hate crime and worse.
Saturday, March 9, 2013
The Eastleigh by-election: what the LibDems and UKIP learned
I wrote earlier about the Eastleigh by-election, and how it may well signify a turning-point for UKIP.
UKIP's popularity comes from finding a clever niche that has developed in Britain's political spectrum from the effects of David Cameron's "modernisation" project of the Conservatives. Cameron's strategy since being leader has been to de-toxify the Tory brand by adapting it to the new social consensus that developed during the tenure of "New Labour". The direct effect of that was to alienate his core vote in the same way that Blair alienated his core voters.
Nigel Farage therefore saw "a gap in the market": in effect he is re-branding a "Thatcherite" vision for the 21st century: traditional Tory values for traditional Tory voters on one hand, and a more populist "core issue" stance (immigration, Europe, jobs etc.) to appeal to the aspiring working classes that Thatcher appealed to. In this way he appeals to a mixed demographic of disillusioned Conservatives and working-class Labour voters.
Farage is a populist demagogue, but a charming and charismatic one that makes UKIP a potential game-changer. The rise of UKIP, which seems irreversible due to the clever positioning of Farage's party, points to a new four party system in England. Scotland and Wales already have had their own versions with nationalists competing with the other three major parties; UKIP completes this trend now in England. I wrote in my previous article about UKIP that for them to make a significant breakthrough they would need to find a way of getting the system to work for them.
The surprising resilience of the LibDems is Eastleigh was a sign to UKIP of the way forward to their success. Eastleigh has shown that the LibDems' success in parliament comes from localism. They have steadily built up their base over the last twenty years, using the FPTP system to their advantage. By making each constituency a LibDem bastion of local support and focus on local concerns, they have ensured loyalty to the sitting LibDem MP, and expanded gradually using the same approach. In effect, they have turned the disadvantage of the constituency-based British system for smaller parties to an advantage to create an electoral system based on local support rather than national issues. They are using the FPTP system for the purpose that it was actually intended, turning the system on its head against the top-down approach from Westminster.
This is the route that UKIP would be wise to take, and there are many indications that they have already learned that valuable lesson even before Eastleigh's near-breakthrough. The local council of Ramsey in Cambridgeshire is UKIP-ran, and UKIP makes a visible effort to show that they care deeply about the locality.
The Lib Dems are still likely to lose a fair number of their seats come 2015, but it is also likely that there will still remain a solid "core" of LibDem constituencies (say twenty to thirty) due to the focus on local issues that has bred a resilient loyalty to the party. A similar point is made here by Johnathon Freedland. This has given the LibDems a "teflon" quality that UKIP will want to replicate; a permanent feature in Westminster, and a force for the "big two" need to contend with.
Even the most optimistic UKIP activist cannot expect UKIP to gain more than a handful of seats come the 2015 election. But the LibDems were in a similar position twenty-five years ago; barely registering in the polls, with a handful of Westmister MPs. But that soon changed, and may well be the same for UKIP; using each election to improve on their previous result, as more and more people look to UKIP a serious party - not just as a "protest", but representing a serious voice in the political spectrum.
Changes in the British constitutional system may also play in their favour. Although Scots are unlikely to vote for independence (and the effective end to the UK), they are still likely to get their wish for more powers as a semi-detached part of the UK. And this will have an effect on the rest of the UK, in particular England and Westminster, as there will be more demands for greater powers to be passed down to the "big cities" and regions. This effect on localism may well also work in UKIP's favour, as it has done for the LibDems.
Then there is the "promised" EU referendum. But I suspect that UKIP will have a role to play even if this goes ahead, just as Cameron foolishly thought he had "killed the UKIP beast" with his promise of a referendum. Farage is rightly making the point that people are voting for UKIP not as a one-issue, anti-European party, but for a variety of reasons: the main one being that they are the only national party that stands against the "social democratic consensus".
As Farage justly points out, Cameron's "modernisation" of the Conservatives has had the effect of making the three major parties' stance very similar on many social issues. For those of the "non-PC club", UKIP is the only party that represents their views.
The UK in 2020 may be politically very different from the UK of twenty years before, especially for the Conservatives and Labour.
UKIP's popularity comes from finding a clever niche that has developed in Britain's political spectrum from the effects of David Cameron's "modernisation" project of the Conservatives. Cameron's strategy since being leader has been to de-toxify the Tory brand by adapting it to the new social consensus that developed during the tenure of "New Labour". The direct effect of that was to alienate his core vote in the same way that Blair alienated his core voters.
Nigel Farage therefore saw "a gap in the market": in effect he is re-branding a "Thatcherite" vision for the 21st century: traditional Tory values for traditional Tory voters on one hand, and a more populist "core issue" stance (immigration, Europe, jobs etc.) to appeal to the aspiring working classes that Thatcher appealed to. In this way he appeals to a mixed demographic of disillusioned Conservatives and working-class Labour voters.
Farage is a populist demagogue, but a charming and charismatic one that makes UKIP a potential game-changer. The rise of UKIP, which seems irreversible due to the clever positioning of Farage's party, points to a new four party system in England. Scotland and Wales already have had their own versions with nationalists competing with the other three major parties; UKIP completes this trend now in England. I wrote in my previous article about UKIP that for them to make a significant breakthrough they would need to find a way of getting the system to work for them.
The surprising resilience of the LibDems is Eastleigh was a sign to UKIP of the way forward to their success. Eastleigh has shown that the LibDems' success in parliament comes from localism. They have steadily built up their base over the last twenty years, using the FPTP system to their advantage. By making each constituency a LibDem bastion of local support and focus on local concerns, they have ensured loyalty to the sitting LibDem MP, and expanded gradually using the same approach. In effect, they have turned the disadvantage of the constituency-based British system for smaller parties to an advantage to create an electoral system based on local support rather than national issues. They are using the FPTP system for the purpose that it was actually intended, turning the system on its head against the top-down approach from Westminster.
This is the route that UKIP would be wise to take, and there are many indications that they have already learned that valuable lesson even before Eastleigh's near-breakthrough. The local council of Ramsey in Cambridgeshire is UKIP-ran, and UKIP makes a visible effort to show that they care deeply about the locality.
The Lib Dems are still likely to lose a fair number of their seats come 2015, but it is also likely that there will still remain a solid "core" of LibDem constituencies (say twenty to thirty) due to the focus on local issues that has bred a resilient loyalty to the party. A similar point is made here by Johnathon Freedland. This has given the LibDems a "teflon" quality that UKIP will want to replicate; a permanent feature in Westminster, and a force for the "big two" need to contend with.
Even the most optimistic UKIP activist cannot expect UKIP to gain more than a handful of seats come the 2015 election. But the LibDems were in a similar position twenty-five years ago; barely registering in the polls, with a handful of Westmister MPs. But that soon changed, and may well be the same for UKIP; using each election to improve on their previous result, as more and more people look to UKIP a serious party - not just as a "protest", but representing a serious voice in the political spectrum.
Changes in the British constitutional system may also play in their favour. Although Scots are unlikely to vote for independence (and the effective end to the UK), they are still likely to get their wish for more powers as a semi-detached part of the UK. And this will have an effect on the rest of the UK, in particular England and Westminster, as there will be more demands for greater powers to be passed down to the "big cities" and regions. This effect on localism may well also work in UKIP's favour, as it has done for the LibDems.
Then there is the "promised" EU referendum. But I suspect that UKIP will have a role to play even if this goes ahead, just as Cameron foolishly thought he had "killed the UKIP beast" with his promise of a referendum. Farage is rightly making the point that people are voting for UKIP not as a one-issue, anti-European party, but for a variety of reasons: the main one being that they are the only national party that stands against the "social democratic consensus".
As Farage justly points out, Cameron's "modernisation" of the Conservatives has had the effect of making the three major parties' stance very similar on many social issues. For those of the "non-PC club", UKIP is the only party that represents their views.
The UK in 2020 may be politically very different from the UK of twenty years before, especially for the Conservatives and Labour.
Tuesday, March 5, 2013
How Labour can beat the Conservatives on the economy
The Cameron government, in spite of its combination of continual incompetence and failing policies, has two main arguments against the Labour opposition's economic policy.
Cameron, Osborne and their allies give the repeated criticism of Labour that firstly, Labour's economic policy would increase borrowing and not reduce the deficit; and second, that it was Labour's overspending and lax financial controls that led to the financial crisis in the UK.
The Labour party, to its shame, still lacks a serious reply against the Conservatives' accusations.
Labour may be comfortably ahead in the polls, but that lead may well shrink significantly in the next two years up to the election. I watched "Question Time" last week, with Angela Eagle MP as Labour's representative on the panel. Faced with the typical accusation from a female Conservative MP (that Labour would only increase borrowing even more, and failed to regulate the banks when in office), the Labour MP was forced on the back foot, lamely talking about "good" and "bad" borrowing.
It was appalling to watch, and completely avoidable. The Conservative stance against Labour is not only amoral, it is also completely deceitful.
For a start, Conservatives chiding Labour for failing to control the banks is utterly absurd - the kettle calling the pot black - when the Conservatives while Labour were in office, were against even Labour's "light touch" approach to regulation, preferring as little as possible.
If the Conservatives had been in office at the time, the banks would have done either the same as before, or behaved even worse. For the Conservatives to claim otherwise is simply unbelievable.
Second, the Conservatives still go on to claim that the massive deficit was the result of Labour overspending, as though the financial crisis was a result of government overspending. Even a cursory look at the government's finances at the time would tell you that the government bailing out the banks created a massive hole (still to be filled) from the catastrophic failure of the banks to keep even a rudimentary control of their balance sheets. The massive debt is a result of the government needing to pay off the huge losses it took on from the banks. Yes, the Labour government's spending was unsustainable in the long-run, but the claim that this is the primary reason for the government's debt is simply dishonest. Simple as that.
Lastly, the Conservatives deride Labour's plan for the economy as simply more borrowing. This is a remark that is as insulting as it is infantile. Considering that the Conservatives are supposed to be the party of business, if a business followed the Conservatives' logic, no business would ever considering investing in anything. Conservatives either refuse to see (or are intellectually incapable of seeing) the difference between "spending" and "investment". The Obama administration's plan, like FDR's during the Depression, is one centred on using government money to invest in the economy. This is also Labour's plan, as far as I can tell. But the Conservatives, like the Republicans across the pond, either refuse to see or cannot see, the simple economics behind this idea.
So this is what Labour should be saying in response to the Conservatives' repeated accusation: an entrepreneur, and any sound business, knows that you have to invest in your future to grow and adapt to a changing economy. A business needs to lend money from investors to fund an expansion project; a self-employed worker needs a loan in order to build is business. All businesses need to borrow sometimes in order to invest in their future. Government operates on the same principle. When the economy is failing, a private business is understandably reluctant to take risks; this is where government comes in, to rectify the stagnant market, and stimulate demand through investment. This is what government is for when the private sector lacks confidence. Labour do not need to mention the "toxic" word "borrowing"; they should be emphasizing how government should be "investing" in Britain's future. It is only serious government investment that will ensure that Britain has a future worth talking about.
It is for this reason why the Conservatives' belief that the private sector by itself will drag the country out of such a deep recession is not only false, it is dangerous to the economy.
If Labour simply used the three main points to counter the Conservatives' criticisms of Labour, the government would have nothing left to say.
Cameron, Osborne and their allies give the repeated criticism of Labour that firstly, Labour's economic policy would increase borrowing and not reduce the deficit; and second, that it was Labour's overspending and lax financial controls that led to the financial crisis in the UK.
The Labour party, to its shame, still lacks a serious reply against the Conservatives' accusations.
Labour may be comfortably ahead in the polls, but that lead may well shrink significantly in the next two years up to the election. I watched "Question Time" last week, with Angela Eagle MP as Labour's representative on the panel. Faced with the typical accusation from a female Conservative MP (that Labour would only increase borrowing even more, and failed to regulate the banks when in office), the Labour MP was forced on the back foot, lamely talking about "good" and "bad" borrowing.
It was appalling to watch, and completely avoidable. The Conservative stance against Labour is not only amoral, it is also completely deceitful.
For a start, Conservatives chiding Labour for failing to control the banks is utterly absurd - the kettle calling the pot black - when the Conservatives while Labour were in office, were against even Labour's "light touch" approach to regulation, preferring as little as possible.
If the Conservatives had been in office at the time, the banks would have done either the same as before, or behaved even worse. For the Conservatives to claim otherwise is simply unbelievable.
Second, the Conservatives still go on to claim that the massive deficit was the result of Labour overspending, as though the financial crisis was a result of government overspending. Even a cursory look at the government's finances at the time would tell you that the government bailing out the banks created a massive hole (still to be filled) from the catastrophic failure of the banks to keep even a rudimentary control of their balance sheets. The massive debt is a result of the government needing to pay off the huge losses it took on from the banks. Yes, the Labour government's spending was unsustainable in the long-run, but the claim that this is the primary reason for the government's debt is simply dishonest. Simple as that.
Lastly, the Conservatives deride Labour's plan for the economy as simply more borrowing. This is a remark that is as insulting as it is infantile. Considering that the Conservatives are supposed to be the party of business, if a business followed the Conservatives' logic, no business would ever considering investing in anything. Conservatives either refuse to see (or are intellectually incapable of seeing) the difference between "spending" and "investment". The Obama administration's plan, like FDR's during the Depression, is one centred on using government money to invest in the economy. This is also Labour's plan, as far as I can tell. But the Conservatives, like the Republicans across the pond, either refuse to see or cannot see, the simple economics behind this idea.
So this is what Labour should be saying in response to the Conservatives' repeated accusation: an entrepreneur, and any sound business, knows that you have to invest in your future to grow and adapt to a changing economy. A business needs to lend money from investors to fund an expansion project; a self-employed worker needs a loan in order to build is business. All businesses need to borrow sometimes in order to invest in their future. Government operates on the same principle. When the economy is failing, a private business is understandably reluctant to take risks; this is where government comes in, to rectify the stagnant market, and stimulate demand through investment. This is what government is for when the private sector lacks confidence. Labour do not need to mention the "toxic" word "borrowing"; they should be emphasizing how government should be "investing" in Britain's future. It is only serious government investment that will ensure that Britain has a future worth talking about.
It is for this reason why the Conservatives' belief that the private sector by itself will drag the country out of such a deep recession is not only false, it is dangerous to the economy.
If Labour simply used the three main points to counter the Conservatives' criticisms of Labour, the government would have nothing left to say.
Friday, March 1, 2013
The Eastleigh by-election: UKIP's turning-point?
The Eastleigh by-election was a technical victory for the LibDems, but it was moral victory for UKIP, and an unmitigated disaster for the Conservatives.
David Davis, the former Conservative leadership contender, said before the by-election that coming third would suggest a crisis for his party. But he probably never thought that it would actually happen. But why did it happen?
UKIP's support came mostly from disaffected Conservatives and LibDems, as well as first-time voters and the usually apathetic. UKIPs vote surged in an inverse amount to that which the Conservatives and LibDems collapsed. Any boost that Labour might have expected to have gained as being the official opposition to the Coalition, failed to materialise: instead, it went to UKIP.
More interestingly, the postal vote went mostly to the LibDems, before the campaign (and the sex scandal) started. UKIP claim, with some justification, that they probably won the election on votes cast on the day. It was less that that the LibDems won, but that UKIP lost by less that 1800 votes. UKIP had turned Eastleigh into a three-way marginal.
Conservatives officially (as well as some analysts) have dismissed Eastleigh as a "protest vote". In other words, that many of those UKIP voters would "return to the fold" come a general election. Some Conservative research by Michael Ashcroft with UKIP voters in Eastleigh seems to have confirmed this thought. But that makes some dangerous assumptions.
Eastleigh, in some ways, was not a "typical" by-election. The LibDems control the local council in its entirety, giving them a huge natural advantage on the ground. Technically, although Conservative chairman Grant Shapps claims this seat as one his party need to win in order to gain a majority next time around, it was in reality a fairly "safe" LibDem seat, which has had a comfortable LibDem majority for nearly twenty years. It would have taken a huge (and unrealistic) swing for the Conservatives to gain this seat from the LibDems. Both LibDems and the Conservatives are in government, and Labour are the official opposition; therefore it would be reasonable to expect for Labour to benefit from the drain in Con/LibDem support. But, as I said, UKIP's support came from disaffected Conservatives, LibDems, and most significantly, previously disconnected voters. The fact that UKIP is attracting the attention of the previously-apathetic is the most significant contribution that UKIP has brought to the political establishment. UKIP may be dismissed as a "protest vote", but it is attracted voters who have never voted before, let alone for the other three main parties. And it is this that the three main parties have no answer to.
In this sense, it makes UKIP a potential game-changer.
To assume that UKIP's surge in Eastleigh was just a "protest vote", and therefore not significant, is to fatally misunderstand what has happened to British politics in the last two years.
I've spoken before about UKIP's appeal, and see that UKIP has found a "wedge" in the political spectrum. Until the Coalition government, UKIP's popularity was restricted to European elections, and to a lesser extent, local elections. But that has changed since then, most dramatically in the last year. UKIP has been able to shrewdly find a gap in the political spectrum. Nigel Farage correctly says that UKIP talk about issues that the other three refuse to discuss. It is this point that makes UKIP much more than a simple protest vote, and more of a party taking advantage of the failings of the established parties.
Now would be a good time to remember how British politics has adapted over the decades, and what brought about those changes. In the 19th century, Westminster was a two party system: the Tories (Conservatives today) and the Whigs (LibDems today). When the vote was extended in the late 19th century to all men of working age, it did not take long for the political system to adapt to the change. The ILP (Labour today) was formed at the turn of the 20th century. For about thirty years (up to the Great Depression) there was effectively a three party system, which saw the Liberal vote gradually ground down to insignificance by Labour. There was a new two party system between Labour and the Conservatives between the Second World War and the end of the Cold War. The LibDems (reformed Liberals) began to recapture their significance from the 1990s onward, with a reconstituted three party system culminating in the 2010 election that saw in the Conservative-LibDem Coalition.
So British politics is not as creaking and immobile as feared; it just takes longer for change to work through the political system. Politics is about dialectic: having an established point of view (thesis) which is challenged by something else (antithesis), resulting in a compromise and new consensus (synthesis). This is how politics changes to circumstances.
UKIPs rise since 2010 is therefore a natural part of this process of change in politics. UKIP is following this political tradition of challenging the established point of view. Because the three main parties are (to a greater or lesser extent) pro-EU and struggle to have a clear immigration policy, UKIP naturally fills the void left behind. It will continue to fill this void, and hold a clear-cut and defined role in British politics as long as the three main parties fail to decisively deal with these issues. This is just how politics works. Until the established parties (representing the "thesis") can deal with UKIP (representing the "antithesis"), there can be no resolution ("synthesis") leading to a new kind of politics.
In other words, UKIPs rise is a natural consequence of the failings that developed from the complacency of the three established parties.
UKIP is more than a simple "protest vote": it is a protest against all the established parties, and the beginning of a new kind of British politics. Eastleigh may well represent the end of a three party system and start of an unprecedented four party system in the UK.
Of course, that doesn't mean that UKIP can become the next government in the UK. A much better comparison is how the LibDems started the 1990s from a very low base, and gradually built up their grassroots so that they had more than forty MPs by the 1997 election, and nearly sixty by 2010. UKIP, like the other three established parties (in particular the Conservatives), is popular across the country, but mainly in England. It is not restricted by region; the LibDems in the 1990's still had much of their support concentrated in the South West, however. UKIP doesn't have that problem; it is almost as strong in the North Of England as the South. For this reason, it is a potential headache even for Labour, let alone the Conservatives.
This is what I mean by a new four party system effectively being created during this parliament. UKIP's appeal is to two main types of voters - the disaffected traditional Tory, and a more working-class appeal to core "values" - fear against immigration, jobs, crime, and so on. UKIP is looking more Thatcherite than Cameron's supposed "neo-Thatcherite" government. Nigel Farage knows this, and this is where he draws the appeal from - to a more clear-cut, simpler politics that Thatcher adhered to, which got her the respect of a section of the upper working class and lower middle class. This explains why the "Daily Mail" and "The Sun" are fans of Farage. They know who reads their papers, and so does Farage.
Cameron's clan have forgotten this; by copying Blair's metropolitan socially-liberal obsession with the "middle class suburbanite", he, like Blair, has taken the working classes for granted. It didn't take long for this to have an effect. Now that the economy has tanked and the three main parties still appeared the same, the time was ripe for someone to fill the void. Nigel Farage and UKIP have taken it.
And for the three main parties, UKIP really has thrown the cat amongst the pigeons. The trend for UKIP is only going to be up, as psychological momentum feeds on itself. Now that UKIP has become so close to winning a seat in Westminster, it makes it all the more likely the next time a by-election comes around; more and more voters will think "why not vote UKIP?". Looking ahead to 2015, some analysts argue that UKIP's vote will largely fall away to the main three parties. To an extent, this is possible, but at the same time, 2010 is also an argument against this assumption. Analysts said much the same of the LibDems prior to the 2010 election; even though they did not make a significant increase in the number of their seats, they did indirectly bring about a hung parliament, by sucking away votes from the other two. And then the LibDems became part of the government.
So UKIP makes a hung parliament a very real possibility in 2015, as they suck away votes from the other three (although the Conservatives will be the worst to lose out), as well as previously disconnected voters brought into participation by UKIP. The effect that UKIP could have on seats across the country is difficult to assess, and very hard for analysts to predict due to the broad social spectrum of UKIP-supporting voters. In 2015, you could see some areas in Tory heartlands where the Conservative vote is split by UKIP, resulting in a LibDem or Labour MP. In some Northern towns, former Labour supporters (as well as Tories) could switch to UKIP, resulting in UKIP or LibDem MP. That could then result in some very bizarre results in some seats, and a potentially-permanent muddying of the waters.
All things considered, Labour are still more than likely to be the largest party, though another hung parliament a real possibility, even probability. The LibDem vote, due to the chaotic effect of UKIP, may well leave them less badly damaged than previously thought: perhaps their MPs numbers' cut by around half. I would be surprised if UKIP didn't get at least a small clutch of MPs, perhaps even into double figures, with the Conservatives somewhere in the high-two-hundreds mark.
Where that would leave British politics is another question.
UKIP in 2015 could well turn the political establishment on its head.
David Davis, the former Conservative leadership contender, said before the by-election that coming third would suggest a crisis for his party. But he probably never thought that it would actually happen. But why did it happen?
UKIP's support came mostly from disaffected Conservatives and LibDems, as well as first-time voters and the usually apathetic. UKIPs vote surged in an inverse amount to that which the Conservatives and LibDems collapsed. Any boost that Labour might have expected to have gained as being the official opposition to the Coalition, failed to materialise: instead, it went to UKIP.
More interestingly, the postal vote went mostly to the LibDems, before the campaign (and the sex scandal) started. UKIP claim, with some justification, that they probably won the election on votes cast on the day. It was less that that the LibDems won, but that UKIP lost by less that 1800 votes. UKIP had turned Eastleigh into a three-way marginal.
Conservatives officially (as well as some analysts) have dismissed Eastleigh as a "protest vote". In other words, that many of those UKIP voters would "return to the fold" come a general election. Some Conservative research by Michael Ashcroft with UKIP voters in Eastleigh seems to have confirmed this thought. But that makes some dangerous assumptions.
Eastleigh, in some ways, was not a "typical" by-election. The LibDems control the local council in its entirety, giving them a huge natural advantage on the ground. Technically, although Conservative chairman Grant Shapps claims this seat as one his party need to win in order to gain a majority next time around, it was in reality a fairly "safe" LibDem seat, which has had a comfortable LibDem majority for nearly twenty years. It would have taken a huge (and unrealistic) swing for the Conservatives to gain this seat from the LibDems. Both LibDems and the Conservatives are in government, and Labour are the official opposition; therefore it would be reasonable to expect for Labour to benefit from the drain in Con/LibDem support. But, as I said, UKIP's support came from disaffected Conservatives, LibDems, and most significantly, previously disconnected voters. The fact that UKIP is attracting the attention of the previously-apathetic is the most significant contribution that UKIP has brought to the political establishment. UKIP may be dismissed as a "protest vote", but it is attracted voters who have never voted before, let alone for the other three main parties. And it is this that the three main parties have no answer to.
In this sense, it makes UKIP a potential game-changer.
To assume that UKIP's surge in Eastleigh was just a "protest vote", and therefore not significant, is to fatally misunderstand what has happened to British politics in the last two years.
I've spoken before about UKIP's appeal, and see that UKIP has found a "wedge" in the political spectrum. Until the Coalition government, UKIP's popularity was restricted to European elections, and to a lesser extent, local elections. But that has changed since then, most dramatically in the last year. UKIP has been able to shrewdly find a gap in the political spectrum. Nigel Farage correctly says that UKIP talk about issues that the other three refuse to discuss. It is this point that makes UKIP much more than a simple protest vote, and more of a party taking advantage of the failings of the established parties.
Now would be a good time to remember how British politics has adapted over the decades, and what brought about those changes. In the 19th century, Westminster was a two party system: the Tories (Conservatives today) and the Whigs (LibDems today). When the vote was extended in the late 19th century to all men of working age, it did not take long for the political system to adapt to the change. The ILP (Labour today) was formed at the turn of the 20th century. For about thirty years (up to the Great Depression) there was effectively a three party system, which saw the Liberal vote gradually ground down to insignificance by Labour. There was a new two party system between Labour and the Conservatives between the Second World War and the end of the Cold War. The LibDems (reformed Liberals) began to recapture their significance from the 1990s onward, with a reconstituted three party system culminating in the 2010 election that saw in the Conservative-LibDem Coalition.
So British politics is not as creaking and immobile as feared; it just takes longer for change to work through the political system. Politics is about dialectic: having an established point of view (thesis) which is challenged by something else (antithesis), resulting in a compromise and new consensus (synthesis). This is how politics changes to circumstances.
UKIPs rise since 2010 is therefore a natural part of this process of change in politics. UKIP is following this political tradition of challenging the established point of view. Because the three main parties are (to a greater or lesser extent) pro-EU and struggle to have a clear immigration policy, UKIP naturally fills the void left behind. It will continue to fill this void, and hold a clear-cut and defined role in British politics as long as the three main parties fail to decisively deal with these issues. This is just how politics works. Until the established parties (representing the "thesis") can deal with UKIP (representing the "antithesis"), there can be no resolution ("synthesis") leading to a new kind of politics.
In other words, UKIPs rise is a natural consequence of the failings that developed from the complacency of the three established parties.
UKIP is more than a simple "protest vote": it is a protest against all the established parties, and the beginning of a new kind of British politics. Eastleigh may well represent the end of a three party system and start of an unprecedented four party system in the UK.
Of course, that doesn't mean that UKIP can become the next government in the UK. A much better comparison is how the LibDems started the 1990s from a very low base, and gradually built up their grassroots so that they had more than forty MPs by the 1997 election, and nearly sixty by 2010. UKIP, like the other three established parties (in particular the Conservatives), is popular across the country, but mainly in England. It is not restricted by region; the LibDems in the 1990's still had much of their support concentrated in the South West, however. UKIP doesn't have that problem; it is almost as strong in the North Of England as the South. For this reason, it is a potential headache even for Labour, let alone the Conservatives.
This is what I mean by a new four party system effectively being created during this parliament. UKIP's appeal is to two main types of voters - the disaffected traditional Tory, and a more working-class appeal to core "values" - fear against immigration, jobs, crime, and so on. UKIP is looking more Thatcherite than Cameron's supposed "neo-Thatcherite" government. Nigel Farage knows this, and this is where he draws the appeal from - to a more clear-cut, simpler politics that Thatcher adhered to, which got her the respect of a section of the upper working class and lower middle class. This explains why the "Daily Mail" and "The Sun" are fans of Farage. They know who reads their papers, and so does Farage.
Cameron's clan have forgotten this; by copying Blair's metropolitan socially-liberal obsession with the "middle class suburbanite", he, like Blair, has taken the working classes for granted. It didn't take long for this to have an effect. Now that the economy has tanked and the three main parties still appeared the same, the time was ripe for someone to fill the void. Nigel Farage and UKIP have taken it.
And for the three main parties, UKIP really has thrown the cat amongst the pigeons. The trend for UKIP is only going to be up, as psychological momentum feeds on itself. Now that UKIP has become so close to winning a seat in Westminster, it makes it all the more likely the next time a by-election comes around; more and more voters will think "why not vote UKIP?". Looking ahead to 2015, some analysts argue that UKIP's vote will largely fall away to the main three parties. To an extent, this is possible, but at the same time, 2010 is also an argument against this assumption. Analysts said much the same of the LibDems prior to the 2010 election; even though they did not make a significant increase in the number of their seats, they did indirectly bring about a hung parliament, by sucking away votes from the other two. And then the LibDems became part of the government.
So UKIP makes a hung parliament a very real possibility in 2015, as they suck away votes from the other three (although the Conservatives will be the worst to lose out), as well as previously disconnected voters brought into participation by UKIP. The effect that UKIP could have on seats across the country is difficult to assess, and very hard for analysts to predict due to the broad social spectrum of UKIP-supporting voters. In 2015, you could see some areas in Tory heartlands where the Conservative vote is split by UKIP, resulting in a LibDem or Labour MP. In some Northern towns, former Labour supporters (as well as Tories) could switch to UKIP, resulting in UKIP or LibDem MP. That could then result in some very bizarre results in some seats, and a potentially-permanent muddying of the waters.
All things considered, Labour are still more than likely to be the largest party, though another hung parliament a real possibility, even probability. The LibDem vote, due to the chaotic effect of UKIP, may well leave them less badly damaged than previously thought: perhaps their MPs numbers' cut by around half. I would be surprised if UKIP didn't get at least a small clutch of MPs, perhaps even into double figures, with the Conservatives somewhere in the high-two-hundreds mark.
Where that would leave British politics is another question.
UKIP in 2015 could well turn the political establishment on its head.
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