The "Ukraine Crisis" gradually escalates day by day. Like a time-clock, there is the daily drip-drip of new events that make the spiral of escalation slowly swirl down ever deeper. The capture and parading of OSCE monitors by the separatist "government" of Donetsk over the weekend, followed by the shooting, only today, of Kharkov's mayor, adds more tension and psychological game-play to the power-play that is Ukraine.
The separatist East of Ukraine is becoming more and more a lawless territory, where "law" is instantaneously prosecuted at whim. The deaths of ethnic Ukrainians in the Donetsk "oblast", as well as the rule of the land by "men in black", make the place appear as a legal black hole, effectively out of legal reach of the Kiev government, and only listening to the words of the Kremlin.
The Kiev government has its forces in the region, but they are hamstrung by the wish to avoid civilian casualties in any military action. As I've said before, they're damned if they do, and damned if they don't.
Exactly how the Kremlin would want it.
If you stand still, you're dead
Again and again we get back to the motivations that have spurred Putin into this course of action. First of all, there is the historical perspective: the view that over the twenty years since the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia has been betrayed by the initial good-will it gave to the West, feeling encircled. Seen in this light, Putin's "aggression" has been compared to Hitler, and obtaining Crimea his own "Sudetenland".
But this is a false narrative, as convenient as it may be. The truth is more subtle: Putin is a consummate "chess player" at geopolitics, and (like another contemporary authoritarian, Turkey's Erdogan) is a ruthless opportunist. The outside world is naturally keen to see Putin's actions in Ukraine as based solely on irridentism and "revanchism". While this is partly true, the reasons for this are purely opportunistic.
It is more effective to see Putin's actions as a response to the internal political changes that have happened within Russia in the last five years. The financial crisis was the impetus for the liberal opposition to begin to get seriously organised, resulting in the anti-government protests at the end of 2011. But the problem with the liberal opposition (in some ways like the secular opposition in Turkey) is that it is too centred on the big cities, and failed to represent the views of the masses in the hinterland.
Although it is a simplification to say that Putin's popularity comes from "real" Russians, it is true that in some ways the real "opposition" is cultural and nationalistic, not Western-leaning liberals. Putin's "revanchism" appeals more to the instincts of rising numbers of the far-right, as well as to the innate conservatism and historical sympathies of everyday Russians. His actions in Crimea and Ukraine speak more of Putin's view of how Russians feel about Russia's prestige, less than his own.
It is his image with his supporters and the far right that Putin is really paying attention to when he thinks about how to react to the West's courting of Kiev.
Seen this way, his "aggression" in Crimea and Ukraine is a way of restoring popularity at home and mollifying the baneful influence of the nationalist far right. The Ottoman Empire lasted as an imperial force for five hundred years, but the height of its power was when it was expanding, reaching its zenith under Suleiman the Great in the 16th century. After he died, the body politic stagnated, and there were no more gains, only losses of territory, leading to the empire's slow death.
In the same way, Putin views the power of Russia. Putin sees Russian assertiveness in the "near abroad" as a strategy to maintain power. Seeing Russia as an intrinsically unstable state (given the geography, amongst other factors), the only way to prevent its collapse is if the government keeps moving forwards; the war with Chechnya was an example of the start of reversing the near-terminal decline of the nineties. The war in Georgia in 2008 was a way to cement the prestige of the Putin regime. Now that the financial crisis has led to another shaking of the Kremlin's power-base, the events in Ukraine are an opportunity to continue this process.
By standing still in the nineties, the Russian body politic came close to death; Putin has now demonstrated that he has definitively learnt those lessons.
The "new Bosnia"?
Russia has said that it has no wish to dismember Ukraine. Technically, they may be telling the truth, but the reality is that what Putin may ultimately be looking for is a kind of "Dayton Accord" for Ukraine.
Present-day Bosnia is ruled as a highly autonomous nation-state. While it has a functioning central government, the vast majority of its everyday affairs have been passed on to the two autonomous governments; that of the "Respublika Srpska", and the Bosnian-Croat alliance. This arrangement came about only after several years of brutal civil war. Since the "Dayton Accord", the Bosnian Serbs (who make up nearly half the population) have ruled their own mini-statelet; being part of Bosnia, but there being little doubt on the ground that their allegiance lies more towards Belgrade than Sarajevo.
Putin's ultimate aim, if not for a full annexation of "New Russia" (the historical name for the South and East of present-day Ukraine), will be along these lines, but preferably minus all the horrible bloodshed. The "referendums" in those areas in a couple of weeks are simply in place to rubber-stamp this process, to present a fait accompli to Kiev and the West on the ground. Once these "referendums" are done with, the onus then lies on Kiev to accept "the will of the people" and a constitution that meets the wishes of Moscow.
It has been clear so far that there is little that the Kremlin is not capable of; they simply make liberal use of what the Americans would have called "plausible deniability". Invasion would be too crude an instrument for a Kremlin so full of former KGB agents; much more satisfying to use cloak-and-dagger tactics. Any illegal acts in the east of Ukraine are pinned on "fascists" trying to provoke civil war; the Kremlin then dismisses any link to violent acts by the separatists, saying that they are the actions of Ukrainian nationals, and thus the Kremlin has no control over them. Thus it pins the blame back on to the weakness of Kiev.
So far, this strategy has worked brilliantly.
How long will it take for the West to realise that they have "lost" Ukraine, and to make a deal with Putin?
Monday, April 28, 2014
Saturday, April 19, 2014
David Cameron and the Maria Miller scandal: Cameron's personality flaws exposed again.
The resignation of Culture Secretary, Maria Miller after a week of political theatre, has exposed the flaws of David Cameron's personality once more.
I wrote an article last year summarising the many flaws evident in Cameron's personality and manner of governing. Again, similar traits have been on show for the past week, culminating in Miller's resignation. An article (here) explains some of the key points that stand out about Cameron's handling of the whole matter. It was Osborne that pushed for Miller to be sacked; Cameron simply caved in, after refusing to budge on the whole issue, seemingly out of a combination of pride and a poor sense of priorities.
A "wannabe" Vladimir Putin?
First and foremost, Cameron's handling of Miller's wrongdoing displays his tendency to prefer loyalty in his staff over competence. The common perception is that Miller was so staunchly supported by Cameron because she was one of the few token women in his cabinet, as well as one of his "loyalists" who supported the "Cameroon" project (such as his stances on social issues). The fact that Cameron rules his cabinet like a closed cabal of medieval courtiers lends unhelpful comparisons to the way that Vladimir Putin rules Russia and the Kremlin in a similar way. In such a dysfunctional polity, loyalty and connections rules over competence and morality.
It's not often that you can compare David Cameron and Vladimir Putin in the same sentence; the exception in Cameron's case is that although he tries to rule his cabinet and party like a medieval despot, he can't even do that competently. Cameron's staff the other day tersely reminded the political sphere that it was the Prime Minister that appointed and dismissed ministers, and not MPs. The minister was then forced to quit anyway. So, Cameron's circle of aides then look like ineffective bullies and tyrants; not a good combination. Cameron's style of governing is like Putin, minus the cunning and competence.
Fraser Nelson, editor of the "Spectator", explained in a conversation with "The Guardian" why Cameron's personality flaws may well be a factor in preventing the Conservatives from staying in power beyond next year. I made some similar points a few months ago, such as Cameron's poor managerial skills over his party, as well the lack of trust that much of the public have with the Conservatives as a brand (apart from appearing economically-competent, regardless of the reality).
As Nelson said, Cameron appears to have two modes: complacency and panic. This analysis gives credit my the analysis I made last year about Cameron's personality. His approach to government veers between beaming self-confidence (that then turns into mocking arrogance over his opponents), leading to a cock-up and crisis of his own creation (which he then seems to thrive on).
A Third World government
But such behaviour is comparable to a medieval despot or (more contemporaneously) a leader of a corrupt, Third World country. The sad truth is that, in many ways, Britain is run like a Third World country.
The leader of the country chooses his ministers according to how well he knows them; if they are long-term friends, this makes them all the more trustworthy. Errors, cock-ups and even casual corruption are ignored or excused when they are in the "circle" of the Prime Minister. The government's economic plan is based on an intellectually-bankrupt model: property inflation, financial mismanagment and speculation, selling off national assets to foreign companies, reducing the rights of employees in order to create more "jobs" - it's the same broken economic model that Blair and Brown had before, but with less money spent on welfare, and a degradation of economic lifestyle of the average Briton.
The Palace of Westminster may be a venerated institution, but it is now truly showing its age. The culture within Westminster has been shown to compare poorly to that of a corporation, for example. But this is what happens when many of the MPs come from the same, privately-educated background, especially those in the Conservatives.
Cameron is simply a product of this closed and stagnant political culture. It's no wonder that people are looking to UKIP as the only alternative to a stale political orthodoxy in Westminster; Nigel Farage looks like the only politician who has charisma as well as sounding like a normal person.
I wrote an article last year summarising the many flaws evident in Cameron's personality and manner of governing. Again, similar traits have been on show for the past week, culminating in Miller's resignation. An article (here) explains some of the key points that stand out about Cameron's handling of the whole matter. It was Osborne that pushed for Miller to be sacked; Cameron simply caved in, after refusing to budge on the whole issue, seemingly out of a combination of pride and a poor sense of priorities.
A "wannabe" Vladimir Putin?
First and foremost, Cameron's handling of Miller's wrongdoing displays his tendency to prefer loyalty in his staff over competence. The common perception is that Miller was so staunchly supported by Cameron because she was one of the few token women in his cabinet, as well as one of his "loyalists" who supported the "Cameroon" project (such as his stances on social issues). The fact that Cameron rules his cabinet like a closed cabal of medieval courtiers lends unhelpful comparisons to the way that Vladimir Putin rules Russia and the Kremlin in a similar way. In such a dysfunctional polity, loyalty and connections rules over competence and morality.
It's not often that you can compare David Cameron and Vladimir Putin in the same sentence; the exception in Cameron's case is that although he tries to rule his cabinet and party like a medieval despot, he can't even do that competently. Cameron's staff the other day tersely reminded the political sphere that it was the Prime Minister that appointed and dismissed ministers, and not MPs. The minister was then forced to quit anyway. So, Cameron's circle of aides then look like ineffective bullies and tyrants; not a good combination. Cameron's style of governing is like Putin, minus the cunning and competence.
Fraser Nelson, editor of the "Spectator", explained in a conversation with "The Guardian" why Cameron's personality flaws may well be a factor in preventing the Conservatives from staying in power beyond next year. I made some similar points a few months ago, such as Cameron's poor managerial skills over his party, as well the lack of trust that much of the public have with the Conservatives as a brand (apart from appearing economically-competent, regardless of the reality).
As Nelson said, Cameron appears to have two modes: complacency and panic. This analysis gives credit my the analysis I made last year about Cameron's personality. His approach to government veers between beaming self-confidence (that then turns into mocking arrogance over his opponents), leading to a cock-up and crisis of his own creation (which he then seems to thrive on).
A Third World government
But such behaviour is comparable to a medieval despot or (more contemporaneously) a leader of a corrupt, Third World country. The sad truth is that, in many ways, Britain is run like a Third World country.
The leader of the country chooses his ministers according to how well he knows them; if they are long-term friends, this makes them all the more trustworthy. Errors, cock-ups and even casual corruption are ignored or excused when they are in the "circle" of the Prime Minister. The government's economic plan is based on an intellectually-bankrupt model: property inflation, financial mismanagment and speculation, selling off national assets to foreign companies, reducing the rights of employees in order to create more "jobs" - it's the same broken economic model that Blair and Brown had before, but with less money spent on welfare, and a degradation of economic lifestyle of the average Briton.
The Palace of Westminster may be a venerated institution, but it is now truly showing its age. The culture within Westminster has been shown to compare poorly to that of a corporation, for example. But this is what happens when many of the MPs come from the same, privately-educated background, especially those in the Conservatives.
Cameron is simply a product of this closed and stagnant political culture. It's no wonder that people are looking to UKIP as the only alternative to a stale political orthodoxy in Westminster; Nigel Farage looks like the only politician who has charisma as well as sounding like a normal person.
Thursday, April 17, 2014
Putin, Erdogan, and the new authoritarianism of the 21st century
I wrote last year about some of the differences between the cultures and politics of the East and West. As I said back then:
"Easterners may well therefore look at the current economic and ideological malaise in the West as being a direct result of their "freedom". What a Westerner considers freedom, an Easterner could instead call "weakness", or "moral degradation". The USA is currently struggling economically; the UK is moribund; the Eurozone has become a German economic protectorate. So while the East is prospering because it has found a formula that marries Eastern authoritarianism with Western elements of Capitalism, the West is failing (and getting comparatively poorer) because of weaknesses in the structure of its ideology."
The current "Ukraine Crisis" looks like a test case of these two ideologies and perspectives. It is the countries of the East and the developing world that look at what Vladimir Putin is doing with implicit approval, or at best, transparent indifference.
This attitude even extends into Europe. The rise of nationalism in Europe in recent years is married with an attitude of hostility to an out-of-touch bureaucracy in Brussels. Nigel Farage in the recent European debates in the UK was able to clearly articulate the view of many Britons who are tired of EU expansion for the sake of it, sabre-rattling in affairs that are far from our shore (as the Ukraine Crisis has shown), and European intransigence of the self-determination of various movements across the continent. And that's before even getting on to the effect European migration has had on the European economy. In many ways, the EU is ruled more like the bygone Austria-Hungary than any contemporary organisation or pseudo nation-state.
Managing democracy
Both Vladimir Putin and Turkey's Recep Tayyip Erdogan have shown themselves to be masters of "managed democracy".
I wrote last year about how these two contemporary authoritarian leaders compare to some of Europe's earlier faces. Both leaders came to power on a wave of popular support after an economic crisis: in Russia, it was after the 1998 default led to an economic breakdown, and Putin's rise to power the following year; in Turkey, it was after an inflationary crisis destroyed the reputation of the established secular parties that led to Islamist AKP coming to power in 2002.
Since those two leaders have come to power, they have held a firm grasp of the art of politics. In recent years, with the "Gezi Park" protests that started in Turkey last summer, and anti-Putin protests of late 2011, both Putin's and Erdogan's hold of the popular will has looked far shakier than ten years ago. But what has to be remembered is that, in both cases, Putin and Erdogan presided over an almost unprecedented economic expansion in their countries, that lasted until the financial crisis. It was this surge in living standards that explained their popularity. While the liberals of Turkey and Russia decried the creeping authoritarianism that was apparent from the first few years, the people who lived outside of these circles felt either untouched by it, or never cared. Not for the first time, people in the East were more than willing to sacrifice personal freedoms for the sake of economic gains. In the West the attitude is that both personal freedom and economic freedom go together to create socio-economic progress; in the East, the opposite view prevails.
With Russia's "United Russia" party, and Turkey's AKP, these two authoritarian leaders were able to create a "managed democracy" that applied Western PR techniques (such as accusing the opposition of going against progress and wanting to "turn the clock back") as well as gathering as broad a coalition of support as possible.
When the financial crisis started to bite, that's when the strategy for both Putin and Erdogan began to be refined.
"One Of Us"
The financial crisis didn't initially have a huge effect on either of Putin's or Erdogan's support, perhaps due to the amount of good-will that had been stored up by the unprecedented growth in both their countries. Their support base was able to cut them considerable slack.
In Russia, things only seriously started to turn against the "big tent" approach for Putin when he announced his candidacy for the presidential elections of 2012. When that happened, and the financial crisis finally started to seriously eat into Russia long "oil boom", Putin faced his first serious signs of dissent in December 2011. This made him re-make "United Russia" into a party of low populism, using the renaissance of the power of the Russian Orthodox Church, and appealing to the innate distrust and hostility towards the values of the West.
In this way, the members of "Pussy Riot" were almost a gift sent from God, validating all the Kremlin's propaganda about Russia's liberal opposition being a group exclusive to the swanky parts of Moscow, with values alien to most Russians, and never venturing into "real Russia" over the Volga or the Urals. Putin's thousands of miles of travel across Russia are as much a way to give the impression of standing up for "real" Russia, instead of the perceived narrow perspective of the Moscow or St Petersburg liberals.
And again, with the onset of the Ukraine Crisis, this is another almost God-sent opportunity for Putin to decry as another Western plot to demasculate Russia's influence, allowing him to ride of a wave of popular nationalism. For Putin, ruling Russia is about him, or who else? Only Vladimir Putin is truly "one of us", he wants Russians from Vologda to Vladivostok to think. Russia may be corrupt and inefficient, but could anyone else do things better?
In Turkey, Erdogan's popularity began to wane gradually after the financial crisis. The ineffectiveness of the secular opposition perhaps allowed Erdogan to think he was almost untouchable; there is little to suggest otherwise. His government passed progressively more authoritarian laws, neutering the historic power of the military so that it was full of AKP yes-men, as well as the judiciary, and making journalism a career where it was dangerous to criticise the Prime Minister too openly. As a result of this, Turkey had the highest number of journalists in jail in any developed country. Journalists didn't get killed, like in Russia; they were simply thrown in prison instead.
This all came to a head with the dispute over "Gezi Park" in May 2013. Like Putin, Erdogan, after initially being unsure about how to act, followed the same strategy as Putin, calling his opponents Western puppets. In a more incendiary manner than Putin, however, the result of the "Gezi Park" protests has been a radical polarisation of society between secularists and AKP-minded Islamists. While the opposition in Russia has been quite effectively marginalised by its own flawed strategy, the Turkish opposition has shown itself to be more ingenuous. This has resulted in a harsher, more polarising strategy from Erdogan. His rhetoric, like that of Putin, comes from low populism (with a whiff of Islamic values). The AKP is popular in the working-class suburbs of the major cities and the regions of Turkey, especially in the East. A similar point could be made about Putin's "United Russia". The corruption scandal that emerged in Turkey in December last year was seen by his supporters as another example of a Western conspiracy.
So far, Erdogan's "divide and rule" strategy has worked well, following from successful recent local elections. The talk of Turkey's role in Syria has led some in the opposition to fear that, like Putin, Erdogan may also want to flex his muscles...
The new role model?
Nationalism and authoritarianism has always been an ideology based on the root of populism. The rise of nationalism in Europe is seen as a rejection of the "metropolitan liberalism" of the ruling establishment, be that in Westminster, Brussels, or Paris. The politics of UKIP, for example, are clearly populist, as well as seeming economically libertarian. They are Britain's newest "working class party", as unlikely as it may seem. The same can be said of the FN in France, or many of the other nationalist parties in the European parliament. After creating a "liberal consensus" across Europe, the EU establishment has itself created the conditions for authoritarian nationalism to thrive; this form of populism is seen by many as the only effective way to oppose the status quo.
Putin and Erdogan have shown themselves to be "role models" for nationalist parties in Europe. Dismissing the "establishment" in Europe or Westminster as out-of-touch with the concerns of everyday people, nationalists across Europe look at the actions of Putin and (to a lesser extent) Erdogan with envy. "Intellectualism" and "bleeding heart liberalism" is increasingly scoffed at across Europe. It's no wonder that the likes of Nigel Farage have a sneaking admiration for Vladimir Putin's gall in Ukraine: he is showing them how authoritarianism is done.
"Easterners may well therefore look at the current economic and ideological malaise in the West as being a direct result of their "freedom". What a Westerner considers freedom, an Easterner could instead call "weakness", or "moral degradation". The USA is currently struggling economically; the UK is moribund; the Eurozone has become a German economic protectorate. So while the East is prospering because it has found a formula that marries Eastern authoritarianism with Western elements of Capitalism, the West is failing (and getting comparatively poorer) because of weaknesses in the structure of its ideology."
The current "Ukraine Crisis" looks like a test case of these two ideologies and perspectives. It is the countries of the East and the developing world that look at what Vladimir Putin is doing with implicit approval, or at best, transparent indifference.
This attitude even extends into Europe. The rise of nationalism in Europe in recent years is married with an attitude of hostility to an out-of-touch bureaucracy in Brussels. Nigel Farage in the recent European debates in the UK was able to clearly articulate the view of many Britons who are tired of EU expansion for the sake of it, sabre-rattling in affairs that are far from our shore (as the Ukraine Crisis has shown), and European intransigence of the self-determination of various movements across the continent. And that's before even getting on to the effect European migration has had on the European economy. In many ways, the EU is ruled more like the bygone Austria-Hungary than any contemporary organisation or pseudo nation-state.
Managing democracy
Both Vladimir Putin and Turkey's Recep Tayyip Erdogan have shown themselves to be masters of "managed democracy".
I wrote last year about how these two contemporary authoritarian leaders compare to some of Europe's earlier faces. Both leaders came to power on a wave of popular support after an economic crisis: in Russia, it was after the 1998 default led to an economic breakdown, and Putin's rise to power the following year; in Turkey, it was after an inflationary crisis destroyed the reputation of the established secular parties that led to Islamist AKP coming to power in 2002.
Since those two leaders have come to power, they have held a firm grasp of the art of politics. In recent years, with the "Gezi Park" protests that started in Turkey last summer, and anti-Putin protests of late 2011, both Putin's and Erdogan's hold of the popular will has looked far shakier than ten years ago. But what has to be remembered is that, in both cases, Putin and Erdogan presided over an almost unprecedented economic expansion in their countries, that lasted until the financial crisis. It was this surge in living standards that explained their popularity. While the liberals of Turkey and Russia decried the creeping authoritarianism that was apparent from the first few years, the people who lived outside of these circles felt either untouched by it, or never cared. Not for the first time, people in the East were more than willing to sacrifice personal freedoms for the sake of economic gains. In the West the attitude is that both personal freedom and economic freedom go together to create socio-economic progress; in the East, the opposite view prevails.
With Russia's "United Russia" party, and Turkey's AKP, these two authoritarian leaders were able to create a "managed democracy" that applied Western PR techniques (such as accusing the opposition of going against progress and wanting to "turn the clock back") as well as gathering as broad a coalition of support as possible.
When the financial crisis started to bite, that's when the strategy for both Putin and Erdogan began to be refined.
"One Of Us"
The financial crisis didn't initially have a huge effect on either of Putin's or Erdogan's support, perhaps due to the amount of good-will that had been stored up by the unprecedented growth in both their countries. Their support base was able to cut them considerable slack.
In Russia, things only seriously started to turn against the "big tent" approach for Putin when he announced his candidacy for the presidential elections of 2012. When that happened, and the financial crisis finally started to seriously eat into Russia long "oil boom", Putin faced his first serious signs of dissent in December 2011. This made him re-make "United Russia" into a party of low populism, using the renaissance of the power of the Russian Orthodox Church, and appealing to the innate distrust and hostility towards the values of the West.
In this way, the members of "Pussy Riot" were almost a gift sent from God, validating all the Kremlin's propaganda about Russia's liberal opposition being a group exclusive to the swanky parts of Moscow, with values alien to most Russians, and never venturing into "real Russia" over the Volga or the Urals. Putin's thousands of miles of travel across Russia are as much a way to give the impression of standing up for "real" Russia, instead of the perceived narrow perspective of the Moscow or St Petersburg liberals.
And again, with the onset of the Ukraine Crisis, this is another almost God-sent opportunity for Putin to decry as another Western plot to demasculate Russia's influence, allowing him to ride of a wave of popular nationalism. For Putin, ruling Russia is about him, or who else? Only Vladimir Putin is truly "one of us", he wants Russians from Vologda to Vladivostok to think. Russia may be corrupt and inefficient, but could anyone else do things better?
In Turkey, Erdogan's popularity began to wane gradually after the financial crisis. The ineffectiveness of the secular opposition perhaps allowed Erdogan to think he was almost untouchable; there is little to suggest otherwise. His government passed progressively more authoritarian laws, neutering the historic power of the military so that it was full of AKP yes-men, as well as the judiciary, and making journalism a career where it was dangerous to criticise the Prime Minister too openly. As a result of this, Turkey had the highest number of journalists in jail in any developed country. Journalists didn't get killed, like in Russia; they were simply thrown in prison instead.
This all came to a head with the dispute over "Gezi Park" in May 2013. Like Putin, Erdogan, after initially being unsure about how to act, followed the same strategy as Putin, calling his opponents Western puppets. In a more incendiary manner than Putin, however, the result of the "Gezi Park" protests has been a radical polarisation of society between secularists and AKP-minded Islamists. While the opposition in Russia has been quite effectively marginalised by its own flawed strategy, the Turkish opposition has shown itself to be more ingenuous. This has resulted in a harsher, more polarising strategy from Erdogan. His rhetoric, like that of Putin, comes from low populism (with a whiff of Islamic values). The AKP is popular in the working-class suburbs of the major cities and the regions of Turkey, especially in the East. A similar point could be made about Putin's "United Russia". The corruption scandal that emerged in Turkey in December last year was seen by his supporters as another example of a Western conspiracy.
So far, Erdogan's "divide and rule" strategy has worked well, following from successful recent local elections. The talk of Turkey's role in Syria has led some in the opposition to fear that, like Putin, Erdogan may also want to flex his muscles...
The new role model?
Nationalism and authoritarianism has always been an ideology based on the root of populism. The rise of nationalism in Europe is seen as a rejection of the "metropolitan liberalism" of the ruling establishment, be that in Westminster, Brussels, or Paris. The politics of UKIP, for example, are clearly populist, as well as seeming economically libertarian. They are Britain's newest "working class party", as unlikely as it may seem. The same can be said of the FN in France, or many of the other nationalist parties in the European parliament. After creating a "liberal consensus" across Europe, the EU establishment has itself created the conditions for authoritarian nationalism to thrive; this form of populism is seen by many as the only effective way to oppose the status quo.
Putin and Erdogan have shown themselves to be "role models" for nationalist parties in Europe. Dismissing the "establishment" in Europe or Westminster as out-of-touch with the concerns of everyday people, nationalists across Europe look at the actions of Putin and (to a lesser extent) Erdogan with envy. "Intellectualism" and "bleeding heart liberalism" is increasingly scoffed at across Europe. It's no wonder that the likes of Nigel Farage have a sneaking admiration for Vladimir Putin's gall in Ukraine: he is showing them how authoritarianism is done.
Monday, April 14, 2014
The Ukraine Crisis: The Crimean Strategy in The "Donetsk People's Republic"
Vladimir Putin is enjoying himself.
I talked back in late February about the "Russian Gambit" in Ukraine. Today, that "gambit" looks to be nearly fulfilled on the ground. After taking the "low-hanging fruit" of Crimea a month ago, and allowing a few weeks to pass, now the next "act" of this piece of political theatre is afoot.
Last weekend, pro-Russian forces (who clearly look like Russian special forces without insignia) took over strategic buildings in Donetsk and Lugansk in the east of Ukraine, close to the Russian border. Those two provinces then declared their "independence" in local parliaments filled with pro-Russian figures. On Friday, an ultimatum set by the Kiev government came and went without action to repel the "rebel" forces from their positions. On Saturday and Sunday, more "pro-Russian forces" took control of strategic buildings and police stations in a network of towns across the region, effectively making the region beyond Kiev's control. With the local police either siding with the "protesters" or just going home, this region of South-eastern Ukraine is de facto no longer controlled by Kiev.
Yesterday saw the first casualties so far of the crisis on Ukraine's "mainland", when Ukrainian special forces attempted to retake Slavyansk; after a firefight that caused one fatality and a number of casualties on both sides, the Ukrainian forces withdrew.
It's Crimea all over again, the nightmare scenario for the interim government in Kiev.
The Crimea Strategy
Perhaps years in the future, historians will look back on how Putin handled the "Ukraine Crisis", and say that he effectively created a template for how to annex a country from the inside out, without using a conventional army to invade.
The "strategy" runs as follows:
1) Secretly infiltrate special forces as civilians.
2) Foment unrest and a crisis of legitimacy in the country's government.
3) Special forces, dressed in anonymous-looking fatigues, take control of a strategic building or two, such as the local parliament.
4) An "emergency session" of the said parliament is convened, filled with supportive "politicians".
5) The "politicians" vote for a referendum on the status of the said area from the offending government.
6) Cue crowds of supporters who swarm outside the parliament.
7) Man barricades and take weapons if necessary to defend against possible counter-attack by offending government.
8) Carry out a propaganda war against those supporting the offending government against the "human rights" of the supporters.
9) Territory becomes part of nation (or client state) with minimum of fuss.
The "Crimea Strategy", if you disregard the moral question, represents a brilliant piece of tactics and political theatre. For the poor government on the receiving end, in this case, the interim government of Ukraine, there is little they can do. If they do nothing, Russia wins. If they fight back, Russia wins.
This is what Putin doubtlessly calculated back in late February, when his ally, former president, Yanukovich. fled Kiev. It's worth remembering that back on that weekend when Yanukovich first fled Kiev for the eastern heartland of his support, the "Donbass" region that has now unilaterally declared its "independence", briefly (for a few hours) considered the same thing back in late February. From what it's possible to gather, after talking to Putin, Yanukovich changed his mind at that time.
A war of opportunism
Perhaps Putin thought it was the wrong time, and wanted to get as much political mileage out of the chaos? He wanted to choose when to strike, rather than have it forced upon him. Taking Crimea was pure opportunism; dividing Ukraine in two and taking the choice parts (the industrial heartlands, plus whatever can be easily "got" - as far west as Odessa?) looks like a more carefully-planned event, made necessary by the reality on the ground.
Since the annexation of Crimea, a propaganda war has been raging by Russia on Ukraine and her western allies. In the immediate aftermath of the referendum and annexation of Crimea a month ago, there were similar (doubtlessly orchestrated) calls for "referendums" in the eastern regions of Ukraine. These passed, to replaced by a number of plots to undermine the Kiev government by undercover (Russian) agents; these were discovered and foiled, but included seizing control of the parliament in Kiev and other, similarly ambitious plans. In the days just before the seizing of the buildings in Lugansk and Donetsk just over a week ago, another plot in Lugansk was also foiled; the seizures in Lugansk and Donetsk may well have been simply accelerated by this.
Now the "Crimea Strategy" is in full swing in the "Donbass". The apparent "lull" in the three weeks between the Crimean referendum and the first military occupations in Donetsk and Lugansk now looks more like the necessary "interval" between acts in Putin's power-play. The speed that undercover Russian forces have taken over so many strategic buildings in towns and cities across the south-east of Ukraine (an area considerably larger than Crimea, with a much bigger population), indicates that they would have needed time to properly "recon" the area, using willing locals to help them, while the political moves helped to mask the real military strategy. The thousands of Russian troops across the border look more like stage props; their effect more psychological, and a useful distraction from the real plan.
In other words, the timing of this second part of the "power-play" is unlikely to have been a coincidence.
What's next?
Some have suggested that Putin's ambitions may even extend as far as annexing Finland. While this looks wide of the mark, the main reason that advocates of this idea give is that, like Sweden, Finland is not a part of NATO, and was part of Russia up to the First World War (Lenin arrived in St Petersburg on an internal train from Helsinki). As Putin is getting a great deal of kudos from the average Russian for turning back the clock on twenty years of Russian "retreat", there is little incentive for him to stop just yet.
Something indicates that stirring up the idea of "recovering" Finland may be just causing mischief, but as said as the start, Putin is enjoying himself. Sergei Lavrov also seems to be a master in the art of diplomatic double-speak and semantics. Russia has no intention of invading Ukraine, Lavrov has said; similarly, it regards the borders of Ukraine to be sacrosanct. Well, this all depends on your definition of an "invasion", and Russia's opinion of the borders of Ukraine are meaningless if it encourages Ukrainians in the east to redraw them for themselves, like in the "Donbass".
More intriguingly, there is the matter of Moldova and Transnistria, a strip of land populated by ethnic Russians that makes up most of the border between Ukraine to the east and Moldova proper to the west. This is a self-declared independent state that hosts a number of Russian "peacekeepers", making it effectively a Russian military protectorate, albeit separated from Russia by the wide expanse of Ukraine. Transnistria's "president" has asked for the region to be joined with Russia. So far, Russia's response has not been publicly forthcoming.
The motivations for having this strip of land as a de facto part of Russia are more strategic than anything else, as well as a strong stamp of Russia's influence on the region. Moldova recently started talks with the EU, just like Ukraine has; the stumbling block is Transnistria, whose economy is dependent on smuggling. The Kremlin therefore has good reason to enjoy raising merry hell in Moldova. The question is: how to bridge the gap between the Russo-phile "Donbass", and the hundreds of kilometres of the rest of (mostly ambivalent) southern Ukraine, that divide it from Transnistria?
Might that call for another use of the "Crimea Strategy" further along the Black Sea coast; in Odessa, for example? This city has a long Russian history, and has quite a high number of ethnic Russians, compared the the regions between it and the South-east of Ukraine.
One last point: Kaliningrad. This Russian Baltic enclave, sandwiched between Poland and Lithuania, may now be getting more of Putin's attention because of NATO's moves to increase its military presence in the area. In Putin's psychology, NATO's actions may be considered a provocation on the military viability of this Russian territory. Might this also backfire badly for NATO in the future?
I talked back in late February about the "Russian Gambit" in Ukraine. Today, that "gambit" looks to be nearly fulfilled on the ground. After taking the "low-hanging fruit" of Crimea a month ago, and allowing a few weeks to pass, now the next "act" of this piece of political theatre is afoot.
Last weekend, pro-Russian forces (who clearly look like Russian special forces without insignia) took over strategic buildings in Donetsk and Lugansk in the east of Ukraine, close to the Russian border. Those two provinces then declared their "independence" in local parliaments filled with pro-Russian figures. On Friday, an ultimatum set by the Kiev government came and went without action to repel the "rebel" forces from their positions. On Saturday and Sunday, more "pro-Russian forces" took control of strategic buildings and police stations in a network of towns across the region, effectively making the region beyond Kiev's control. With the local police either siding with the "protesters" or just going home, this region of South-eastern Ukraine is de facto no longer controlled by Kiev.
Yesterday saw the first casualties so far of the crisis on Ukraine's "mainland", when Ukrainian special forces attempted to retake Slavyansk; after a firefight that caused one fatality and a number of casualties on both sides, the Ukrainian forces withdrew.
It's Crimea all over again, the nightmare scenario for the interim government in Kiev.
The Crimea Strategy
Perhaps years in the future, historians will look back on how Putin handled the "Ukraine Crisis", and say that he effectively created a template for how to annex a country from the inside out, without using a conventional army to invade.
The "strategy" runs as follows:
1) Secretly infiltrate special forces as civilians.
2) Foment unrest and a crisis of legitimacy in the country's government.
3) Special forces, dressed in anonymous-looking fatigues, take control of a strategic building or two, such as the local parliament.
4) An "emergency session" of the said parliament is convened, filled with supportive "politicians".
5) The "politicians" vote for a referendum on the status of the said area from the offending government.
6) Cue crowds of supporters who swarm outside the parliament.
7) Man barricades and take weapons if necessary to defend against possible counter-attack by offending government.
8) Carry out a propaganda war against those supporting the offending government against the "human rights" of the supporters.
9) Territory becomes part of nation (or client state) with minimum of fuss.
The "Crimea Strategy", if you disregard the moral question, represents a brilliant piece of tactics and political theatre. For the poor government on the receiving end, in this case, the interim government of Ukraine, there is little they can do. If they do nothing, Russia wins. If they fight back, Russia wins.
This is what Putin doubtlessly calculated back in late February, when his ally, former president, Yanukovich. fled Kiev. It's worth remembering that back on that weekend when Yanukovich first fled Kiev for the eastern heartland of his support, the "Donbass" region that has now unilaterally declared its "independence", briefly (for a few hours) considered the same thing back in late February. From what it's possible to gather, after talking to Putin, Yanukovich changed his mind at that time.
A war of opportunism
Perhaps Putin thought it was the wrong time, and wanted to get as much political mileage out of the chaos? He wanted to choose when to strike, rather than have it forced upon him. Taking Crimea was pure opportunism; dividing Ukraine in two and taking the choice parts (the industrial heartlands, plus whatever can be easily "got" - as far west as Odessa?) looks like a more carefully-planned event, made necessary by the reality on the ground.
Since the annexation of Crimea, a propaganda war has been raging by Russia on Ukraine and her western allies. In the immediate aftermath of the referendum and annexation of Crimea a month ago, there were similar (doubtlessly orchestrated) calls for "referendums" in the eastern regions of Ukraine. These passed, to replaced by a number of plots to undermine the Kiev government by undercover (Russian) agents; these were discovered and foiled, but included seizing control of the parliament in Kiev and other, similarly ambitious plans. In the days just before the seizing of the buildings in Lugansk and Donetsk just over a week ago, another plot in Lugansk was also foiled; the seizures in Lugansk and Donetsk may well have been simply accelerated by this.
Now the "Crimea Strategy" is in full swing in the "Donbass". The apparent "lull" in the three weeks between the Crimean referendum and the first military occupations in Donetsk and Lugansk now looks more like the necessary "interval" between acts in Putin's power-play. The speed that undercover Russian forces have taken over so many strategic buildings in towns and cities across the south-east of Ukraine (an area considerably larger than Crimea, with a much bigger population), indicates that they would have needed time to properly "recon" the area, using willing locals to help them, while the political moves helped to mask the real military strategy. The thousands of Russian troops across the border look more like stage props; their effect more psychological, and a useful distraction from the real plan.
In other words, the timing of this second part of the "power-play" is unlikely to have been a coincidence.
What's next?
Some have suggested that Putin's ambitions may even extend as far as annexing Finland. While this looks wide of the mark, the main reason that advocates of this idea give is that, like Sweden, Finland is not a part of NATO, and was part of Russia up to the First World War (Lenin arrived in St Petersburg on an internal train from Helsinki). As Putin is getting a great deal of kudos from the average Russian for turning back the clock on twenty years of Russian "retreat", there is little incentive for him to stop just yet.
Something indicates that stirring up the idea of "recovering" Finland may be just causing mischief, but as said as the start, Putin is enjoying himself. Sergei Lavrov also seems to be a master in the art of diplomatic double-speak and semantics. Russia has no intention of invading Ukraine, Lavrov has said; similarly, it regards the borders of Ukraine to be sacrosanct. Well, this all depends on your definition of an "invasion", and Russia's opinion of the borders of Ukraine are meaningless if it encourages Ukrainians in the east to redraw them for themselves, like in the "Donbass".
More intriguingly, there is the matter of Moldova and Transnistria, a strip of land populated by ethnic Russians that makes up most of the border between Ukraine to the east and Moldova proper to the west. This is a self-declared independent state that hosts a number of Russian "peacekeepers", making it effectively a Russian military protectorate, albeit separated from Russia by the wide expanse of Ukraine. Transnistria's "president" has asked for the region to be joined with Russia. So far, Russia's response has not been publicly forthcoming.
The motivations for having this strip of land as a de facto part of Russia are more strategic than anything else, as well as a strong stamp of Russia's influence on the region. Moldova recently started talks with the EU, just like Ukraine has; the stumbling block is Transnistria, whose economy is dependent on smuggling. The Kremlin therefore has good reason to enjoy raising merry hell in Moldova. The question is: how to bridge the gap between the Russo-phile "Donbass", and the hundreds of kilometres of the rest of (mostly ambivalent) southern Ukraine, that divide it from Transnistria?
Might that call for another use of the "Crimea Strategy" further along the Black Sea coast; in Odessa, for example? This city has a long Russian history, and has quite a high number of ethnic Russians, compared the the regions between it and the South-east of Ukraine.
One last point: Kaliningrad. This Russian Baltic enclave, sandwiched between Poland and Lithuania, may now be getting more of Putin's attention because of NATO's moves to increase its military presence in the area. In Putin's psychology, NATO's actions may be considered a provocation on the military viability of this Russian territory. Might this also backfire badly for NATO in the future?
Sunday, April 6, 2014
The Farage and Clegg Europe debates: when UKIP became "the unofficial opposition"
It's clear that when Nick Clegg offered to debate Farage on TV about the EU, he knew he had nothing to lose politically, and everything potentially to gain. If he had shown that he clearly had the better arguments and reasons for Britain's part in the EU, he reasonably thought this would burst some of the momentum for Farage's populism and UKIP's support, as well as boosting the LibDem's credibility and political support. With LibDem support so low, Clegg felt there was little to fear from his party's position becoming any worse.
Such a strategy was always very risky, and we saw that it backfired badly. We will only know how badly it has backfired when the European and local elections happen in May.
Clegg's strategy was always going to be very risky, but there was another factor that he maybe had forgotten about. Clegg and Farage represent parties that have directly opposite views on the EU. As these parties are neither of the "big two", the event had been cast as comparatively "safe" for both Labour and the Conservatives. But what was clear from Farage's stance was that he was casting UKIP (correctly) as the only "real" anti-establishment party on the issue of Europe. Both Labour and the Conservatives agree with the LibDems on the fundamental idea of Britain being in the EU; Labour and the LibDems point of view is essentially the same; the Conservatives' official view only differs on the detail, not the premise.
In this sense, Clegg's decision to call for the debates with Farage (and Clegg's two "defeats") was also calling for a show-down between the pro-EU (status quo) establishment of the "big three" against the anti-establishment UKIP. The "establishment" lost.
Losing the plot
The establishment lost the argument against Farage because they have lost the ability to see beyond the confines of Westminster. They no longer represent a point of view that matches closely with that of the ordinary voter; instead, they talk with other "politicos" and like-minded journalists who, like many of them, have been to public schools, lead a very cocooned lifestyle, and have no personal experience of what effect on the labour market the EU's free movement of labour has had on Britain.
The establishment's perspective of what effect the EU has had on the internal labour market is the same as what it is for many employers. The free movement of labour is great for employers because it means they can hire East Europeans, thus bringing down their overheads. As Farage pointed out, it is a disaster for the white working class, who are undercut by East Europeans. As I wrote in an article late last year:
"The rise of UKIP in recent times has been a result of the (correct) perception that the mass influx of East Europeans to The UK has brought about a labour crisis for some parts of the "native" population.
The government has blamed the freedom of movement around the EU for this, which is accurate, but fails to mention that it is also part of the government's intention. Much of UK PLC's "shareholders" (British and foreign investors) are strongly pro-EU because it helps them to lower wages by using workers from elsewhere in the EU (from Southern Europe as well as Eastern Europe).
At the same time, however, British people are far less likely to have linguistic ability compared to foreigners. Lulled into a false sense of security by the government, the electorate were led to believe that their economic stability would last forever because English is "the world's language". Now the UK government blames their own electorate for not taking advantage of the EU's freedom of labour mobility by not bothering to learn foreign languages.
It is not surprising that some people are left feeling "betrayed" by their own government"
Such a strategy was always very risky, and we saw that it backfired badly. We will only know how badly it has backfired when the European and local elections happen in May.
Clegg's strategy was always going to be very risky, but there was another factor that he maybe had forgotten about. Clegg and Farage represent parties that have directly opposite views on the EU. As these parties are neither of the "big two", the event had been cast as comparatively "safe" for both Labour and the Conservatives. But what was clear from Farage's stance was that he was casting UKIP (correctly) as the only "real" anti-establishment party on the issue of Europe. Both Labour and the Conservatives agree with the LibDems on the fundamental idea of Britain being in the EU; Labour and the LibDems point of view is essentially the same; the Conservatives' official view only differs on the detail, not the premise.
In this sense, Clegg's decision to call for the debates with Farage (and Clegg's two "defeats") was also calling for a show-down between the pro-EU (status quo) establishment of the "big three" against the anti-establishment UKIP. The "establishment" lost.
Losing the plot
The establishment lost the argument against Farage because they have lost the ability to see beyond the confines of Westminster. They no longer represent a point of view that matches closely with that of the ordinary voter; instead, they talk with other "politicos" and like-minded journalists who, like many of them, have been to public schools, lead a very cocooned lifestyle, and have no personal experience of what effect on the labour market the EU's free movement of labour has had on Britain.
The establishment's perspective of what effect the EU has had on the internal labour market is the same as what it is for many employers. The free movement of labour is great for employers because it means they can hire East Europeans, thus bringing down their overheads. As Farage pointed out, it is a disaster for the white working class, who are undercut by East Europeans. As I wrote in an article late last year:
"The rise of UKIP in recent times has been a result of the (correct) perception that the mass influx of East Europeans to The UK has brought about a labour crisis for some parts of the "native" population.
The government has blamed the freedom of movement around the EU for this, which is accurate, but fails to mention that it is also part of the government's intention. Much of UK PLC's "shareholders" (British and foreign investors) are strongly pro-EU because it helps them to lower wages by using workers from elsewhere in the EU (from Southern Europe as well as Eastern Europe).
At the same time, however, British people are far less likely to have linguistic ability compared to foreigners. Lulled into a false sense of security by the government, the electorate were led to believe that their economic stability would last forever because English is "the world's language". Now the UK government blames their own electorate for not taking advantage of the EU's freedom of labour mobility by not bothering to learn foreign languages.
It is not surprising that some people are left feeling "betrayed" by their own government"
The white working class have felt abandoned in recent years, since the financial crisis and the influx of EU workers from Eastern and Southern Europe. On paper, a Briton has the same freedom of movement (to get a job) as any other EU worker, but because the government has never seriously encouraged Britons of the utility of learning other European languages, comparatively few of them can take advantage of the right to look for work elsewhere in the EU. You can blame Brits themselves for this, but the government also has a large hand to play in this, and has fed Britons with a feeling of complacency about the stability and security of the home-grown labour market against the threat of a "foreign invasion".
Due to this inadvertent "linguistic handicap", the British worker cannot look for jobs across the EU in the same way. Back in the 'eighties, many manual workers left Britain to work in Germany (the "Auf Weidersehn, Pet" effect). but that opportunity has now been taken up by East Europeans. In this way, a British worker therefore is unable to have as much labour mobility within the EU as many other Europeans; everyone in Europe knows of the utility of speaking English, but this is only really useful within the British Isles. Europeans in general are also far more motivated to learn another European language, be it German, or French, or whatever. Britons aren't, partly due to government education policy.
So what does the average British employee get out of being in the EU, compared with his mainland European counterparts? On this evidence, very little.
A detached elite
The rise of nationalism in Europe is the most noticeable effect of the financial crisis within the EU; nationalism is now at its greatest resurgence since the 1930s. Britain in no different. Like many other Europeans, Britons now also see that many powers have been transferred to an unaccountable elite in Brussels, and that the main beneficiaries of the EU seem to be employers and large corporations, not ordinary people. I've mentioned in a recent article the curious historical comparison of the modern EU and the former European power, Austria-Hungary: both multi-lingual political projects that seemed to work well for a while, before a combination of factors brought the house crashing down.
In the debate with Nigel Farage, Nick Clegg predicted that ten years from now the EU will probably be the same as it is now. In April 1914, the Austro-Hungarians probably felt the same way. While it is absurd to make direct comparisons with a hundred years ago, the Ukraine Crisis is in some ways a sign of the foolish hubris of the European elite, as Nigel Farage rightly said. His words may have been better-chosen, but many Britons would agree with him that the EU walked into the Ukraine Crisis with its eyes closed. Putin is simply reacting according to his (sovereign) interests, and considers the Ukraine to be "his backyard". That is simply political reality. It is pure foolishness for European politicians to think that the EU could really extend from the Atlantic to the Urals, as Cameron has advocated in the past. But Cameron for one has a long history of behaving like a political fool.
Nick Clegg seems like all the other members of the EU establishment, and those in Westminster that support it: out of touch with the everyday reality of life, and an unconvincing advocate of his own ideas brought about by years of complacent consensus of Europe. When put up against someone like Nigel Farage, they fall back on old stereotypes about the perils of "xenophobia" and "extremism"; ideas that seemed convincing before the financial crisis, but now look hopelessly out-of-date. When that fails, they talk about the apocalyptic consequences of not being in the EU, which also look frantically over-done.
This is why Nigel Farage is winning the argument. This is why the political establishment, of all three main parties, have right to be very worried. The chances of the UK really leaving the EU may be over-estimated, but the damage that UKIP is doing to their credibility, is not.
Wednesday, April 2, 2014
George Osborne's budget and the recovery: flying with your eyes closed
George Osborne's recent budget has been considered much more accomplished than his infamous "omnishambles" budget of 2012. Then again, that wasn't difficult to achieve.
There are two stand-out changes brought in: the "reforms" to the pension system, that allow someone to "buy back" their pension once they reach retirement; and the the expansion of the ISA system to allow people to save more of their money at a higher interest rate each year. Also, the "help-to-buy" scheme is being extended further. More on that point later.
On the first two points, what's clear is that from these stand-out changes, Osborne is marking out his political territory quite ruthlessly, aiming for the "strivers" on one hand, and those reaching the end of their working lives with the other. The first problem with this approach is that it looks too obviously political in its motivation (as was with the budget this time last year), and more importantly, demonstrates how Osborne's sense of priorities are all wrong.
Dealing with the wrong problem
As Andy Burnham wonderfully pointed out on BBC's "Question Time" about the budget recently, these changes make it appear that Osborne thinks that the main problem British people have is not being able to make the most of their savings. In reality, many people are simply struggling each month to manage paying the bills and not get into debt. Many others cannot manage without using their savings, and for still others, living with debt each month is now the norm. For these people, Osborne has no answer.
In other words, Osborne's budget looks like it benefits those who already have a decent sum of money stashed away, but are unable to make the best use of it financially. These stand-out measures simply help most those who are already earning well above the average national income. To remind ourselves, the average national income is around £25,000 pa. For many people on that salary, it is near-impossible to save any serious amounts of money to start thinking about making better use of ISAs or buying back their pensions. These are the daydreams of the comfortably middle-class; not the average family.
These changes simply demonstrate Osborne's out-of-touch view of Britain, thinking that they could seriously benefit most people. In reality, they can only truly benefit (and politically influence) people who already vote Conservative, or may consider voting Conservative. This is the clinical political calculation behind these changes that Osborne has no doubt thought about: how will they go down in the marginals?
Not dealing with the real problem
Meanwhile, Osborne has further extended the "help-to-buy" scheme, another partly political ploy. The effect this has had on the property market is there for all to see: an out-of-control property bubble that is economically separating London and the South-east from the rest of the country. I wrote about this same topic in the article I wrote this time last year about Osborne's budget then. Since then, as experts have predicted, the disparity has grown further.
The statistics speak for themselves, in the link in the "Telegraph" article. Economically, Britain is two countries, which are getting further apart economically under the current housing and credit policy of the government. In some ways, the current property bubble (calling a "housing boom" just seems deluded and completely missing the point) is even worse than that which ended with the financial crisis. For a start, current London housing prices are twenty percent higher than they were in 2007, before the market crashed. This is insane. There is no economic logic to this whatsoever, other than that it is being inflated by artificial (and extremely dangerous) factors. People in London are not twenty percent richer than they were in 2007; practically no-one in Britain is. The only explanation for this is reckless speculation, rich foreigners inflating the average price, and Osborne's "help-to-buy" scheme.
Osborne's "help-to-buy" scheme is economically more dangerous than anything Labour did because it is essentially state-sponsored property inflation. This is the worst form of "help" imaginable for many people, especially in the South-east of England, where the property market is already far overpriced. It simply gives a green light for the market to "factor in" the extra cash available to buyers.
No-one in government seems to have the intellectual capacity, or political courage, to do the only thing that can make the housing market sane again: build lots more houses, and therefore bring down the price of property down .
The evidence suggests that Osborne simply doesn't want to go down the road of a state-sponsored house-building programme for three reasons: first, the effects would be long-term, and so there would be little short-term political benefit; second, it gives an open goal to Labour to call him a hypocrite; and thirdly, it would be electorally suicidal on the opinions of those who live in the "marginals".
Because property has become ingrained into British psyche as the ultimate "must-have" asset (as opposed to Germany, where no such attitude exists), people would find it hard to understand that more houses are a good thing for the country; they would only care about the effect it has on the value of their "asset". This pervasive mentality has also been the result of thirty years of right-wing neo-liberalism.
Britain as a one-trick pony
Thirty years of Conservative economic orthodoxy had their effect on Labour, because although they made some modest improvements to social affairs, from an economic point of view, they simply followed on much of what the Conservatives had done before. While its undeniable that Labour spent too much money, the Conservative implication that "they're paying down the debt that Labour left" simply misses the main point. Why did the financial crisis happen?
The Conservatives seem keen to play up the idea that the "austerity" that Britain faces is because of Labour overspending. It isn't. The "austerity" we're facing is because the financial system (in Britain as well as around the world) collapsed because the banks got into massive debts dealing with money that didn't exist. The banks ignored the first rule of economics, because they thought they were smarter than the system. They weren't, and now that the British Labour government bailed out the banks' stupidity, the taxpayer is left paying the bill in the form of "austerity".
The real mistake that Labour made in power was that, in terms of economic policy, they were too similar to the Conservatives. Labour wanted to out-do the Conservatives in kissing-up to the financial sector while in power, feeding it full of financial steroids and turning a blind eye to their conduct in order to cover over the lack of serious investment in others sectors of the economy. In this sense, Blair and Brown in power simply followed much of Conservative financial and economic policy. This is the truth that the current Conservative government cannot be seen to admit.
After thirty years of neo-liberal economic policy, Britain is now so reliant on the London-centred financial sector, those in Westminster don't know how else to run the country.
Britain now has one of the highest household credit problems in the Western world, due to a combination of high cost of living, a "credit card culture", and the ease of getting credit from banks and people like "Wonga", even after the lessons of the financial crisis. The "recovery", as people in the know are aware, is a London-centred affair, dependent on a weakness for credit, which acts as a fuel on spending. Where does all this "money" come from?
Like many people spending in the high street, George Osborne doesn't seem to fully know where the "recovery" has come from. Like many others, he is flying with his eyes closed. He should look for the wall that may be fast approaching...
There are two stand-out changes brought in: the "reforms" to the pension system, that allow someone to "buy back" their pension once they reach retirement; and the the expansion of the ISA system to allow people to save more of their money at a higher interest rate each year. Also, the "help-to-buy" scheme is being extended further. More on that point later.
On the first two points, what's clear is that from these stand-out changes, Osborne is marking out his political territory quite ruthlessly, aiming for the "strivers" on one hand, and those reaching the end of their working lives with the other. The first problem with this approach is that it looks too obviously political in its motivation (as was with the budget this time last year), and more importantly, demonstrates how Osborne's sense of priorities are all wrong.
Dealing with the wrong problem
As Andy Burnham wonderfully pointed out on BBC's "Question Time" about the budget recently, these changes make it appear that Osborne thinks that the main problem British people have is not being able to make the most of their savings. In reality, many people are simply struggling each month to manage paying the bills and not get into debt. Many others cannot manage without using their savings, and for still others, living with debt each month is now the norm. For these people, Osborne has no answer.
In other words, Osborne's budget looks like it benefits those who already have a decent sum of money stashed away, but are unable to make the best use of it financially. These stand-out measures simply help most those who are already earning well above the average national income. To remind ourselves, the average national income is around £25,000 pa. For many people on that salary, it is near-impossible to save any serious amounts of money to start thinking about making better use of ISAs or buying back their pensions. These are the daydreams of the comfortably middle-class; not the average family.
These changes simply demonstrate Osborne's out-of-touch view of Britain, thinking that they could seriously benefit most people. In reality, they can only truly benefit (and politically influence) people who already vote Conservative, or may consider voting Conservative. This is the clinical political calculation behind these changes that Osborne has no doubt thought about: how will they go down in the marginals?
Not dealing with the real problem
Meanwhile, Osborne has further extended the "help-to-buy" scheme, another partly political ploy. The effect this has had on the property market is there for all to see: an out-of-control property bubble that is economically separating London and the South-east from the rest of the country. I wrote about this same topic in the article I wrote this time last year about Osborne's budget then. Since then, as experts have predicted, the disparity has grown further.
The statistics speak for themselves, in the link in the "Telegraph" article. Economically, Britain is two countries, which are getting further apart economically under the current housing and credit policy of the government. In some ways, the current property bubble (calling a "housing boom" just seems deluded and completely missing the point) is even worse than that which ended with the financial crisis. For a start, current London housing prices are twenty percent higher than they were in 2007, before the market crashed. This is insane. There is no economic logic to this whatsoever, other than that it is being inflated by artificial (and extremely dangerous) factors. People in London are not twenty percent richer than they were in 2007; practically no-one in Britain is. The only explanation for this is reckless speculation, rich foreigners inflating the average price, and Osborne's "help-to-buy" scheme.
Osborne's "help-to-buy" scheme is economically more dangerous than anything Labour did because it is essentially state-sponsored property inflation. This is the worst form of "help" imaginable for many people, especially in the South-east of England, where the property market is already far overpriced. It simply gives a green light for the market to "factor in" the extra cash available to buyers.
No-one in government seems to have the intellectual capacity, or political courage, to do the only thing that can make the housing market sane again: build lots more houses, and therefore bring down the price of property down .
The evidence suggests that Osborne simply doesn't want to go down the road of a state-sponsored house-building programme for three reasons: first, the effects would be long-term, and so there would be little short-term political benefit; second, it gives an open goal to Labour to call him a hypocrite; and thirdly, it would be electorally suicidal on the opinions of those who live in the "marginals".
Because property has become ingrained into British psyche as the ultimate "must-have" asset (as opposed to Germany, where no such attitude exists), people would find it hard to understand that more houses are a good thing for the country; they would only care about the effect it has on the value of their "asset". This pervasive mentality has also been the result of thirty years of right-wing neo-liberalism.
Britain as a one-trick pony
Thirty years of Conservative economic orthodoxy had their effect on Labour, because although they made some modest improvements to social affairs, from an economic point of view, they simply followed on much of what the Conservatives had done before. While its undeniable that Labour spent too much money, the Conservative implication that "they're paying down the debt that Labour left" simply misses the main point. Why did the financial crisis happen?
The Conservatives seem keen to play up the idea that the "austerity" that Britain faces is because of Labour overspending. It isn't. The "austerity" we're facing is because the financial system (in Britain as well as around the world) collapsed because the banks got into massive debts dealing with money that didn't exist. The banks ignored the first rule of economics, because they thought they were smarter than the system. They weren't, and now that the British Labour government bailed out the banks' stupidity, the taxpayer is left paying the bill in the form of "austerity".
The real mistake that Labour made in power was that, in terms of economic policy, they were too similar to the Conservatives. Labour wanted to out-do the Conservatives in kissing-up to the financial sector while in power, feeding it full of financial steroids and turning a blind eye to their conduct in order to cover over the lack of serious investment in others sectors of the economy. In this sense, Blair and Brown in power simply followed much of Conservative financial and economic policy. This is the truth that the current Conservative government cannot be seen to admit.
After thirty years of neo-liberal economic policy, Britain is now so reliant on the London-centred financial sector, those in Westminster don't know how else to run the country.
Britain now has one of the highest household credit problems in the Western world, due to a combination of high cost of living, a "credit card culture", and the ease of getting credit from banks and people like "Wonga", even after the lessons of the financial crisis. The "recovery", as people in the know are aware, is a London-centred affair, dependent on a weakness for credit, which acts as a fuel on spending. Where does all this "money" come from?
Like many people spending in the high street, George Osborne doesn't seem to fully know where the "recovery" has come from. Like many others, he is flying with his eyes closed. He should look for the wall that may be fast approaching...
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