The Charlie Hebdo attacks, and the reactions to them, have brought the spotlight on to the place that free speech and religion have in society, and how people arrive at different points of view.
An excellent article by a learned Muslim recently pointed out how science and Islam at one time went hand-in-hand; what has changed is that the faith has been hijacked by - in effect - a multitude of tyrants over the centuries, who decided to use "Islam" as a way to control society, by peddling the temptation of forty virgins, for instance. I mean what educated person, of any faith, could take such things seriously?
While it has always been argued by atheists that religion has been a weapon to control society with, it was also true that, in the early years of Islam, Islamic countries were much more progressive and innovative in their relation to science compared to Christian nations of the time. The Islamic world invented astronomy, for example, at a time when Christian Europe was engulfed in the Dark Ages. What changed was not about the nature of the religion in itself, but in the situation on the ground, and how respective societies were run.
The "renaissance" was a breakthrough for the Christian West, but this happened around the same time that large parts of the Islamic world were overrun by the Mongol Empire. In the case of Baghdad, one of Islam's and the Middle East's key cities of learning, the city was destroyed and its population massacred. While no one event can be blamed, in the same way that the ideas of the "renaissance" occurred gradually over many decades, the same can be said of Islam's turning away from science and free-thinking. The evolution of the West into a free-thinking, democratic society was due to a series of events and factors; the same can be said of how the Islamic world became engulfed in scientific and innovative lethargy, which, sadly, exists to the present day. The question is:why?
If all else fails, rule by fear
To reiterate the point, it was not inevitable that Islamic countries would become more socially and economically backwards: it was the result of historical factors, and the decisions of those in power.
The Middle East, Islam's core heartland, has been fought over for centuries; that said, so has Europe (most recently in the first half of the 20th century). In the excellent book, "Why Nations Fail" (more on that here), one of the key factors the authors explain is responsible for poverty and lack of innovation in a society is the elite's fear of creative destruction. In a traditional tyranny (or a modern-day dictatorship), the elite rules by fear, and uses a system of corruption and amoral use of force to maintain their hold on power.
In short, if a clever innovator has an idea that might improve society, the elite would rather discredit and destroy the inventor than have the risk that the innovation might make life better for others, which could make other people rich, and thus, more powerful. It is a simple, if purely malicious, rationale. There are many examples of this throughout history, as well as today, explained in the book mentioned - including the Middle East.
The reason why the West is rich is because decisions were taken at different points in the past that led to a "virtuous" circle of events, whereby more and more freedom was given to society, which led to more opportunities for innovation and technological and scientific progress.
In this way, what has happened in the Islamic world since those bright, innovative early years is a type of "vicious circle". After the Mongol Empire overrun parts of the Middle East, it appears that science and innovation declined to insignificance, along with the various tyrants that ran the region as their own personal fiefdoms. This led to them being overrun by the Ottomans in the sixteenth century. But science and innovation didn't improve under the Ottomans either; for instance, while the West began printing books on a large scale by the start of the sixteenth century; the Ottomans only allowed this to happen in the nineteenth century. This was not because printing was "against Islam" ; it was because it appeared to be against the ruling elite's interests. It was surely for this reason that while levels of literacy in England in 1800 were at around half the population, in the Ottoman Empire - the most powerful Islamic state in the world - levels of literacy were at most 3 per cent.
Likewise, when the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was established after the First World War, was not pre-ordained or instinctive that the country should be a theocratic, ultra-conservative state: it became like this due to the king seeking the support of the local imams, in order to give the king and his elite a solid support base, and a moral code to control society with. The British also went along with this, for their own, self-interested, reasons. The Arabs of "Saudi Arabia", and the other Arab monarchs, such as the Hashemites of Jordan, relied on tribal support, and prior to the First World War hadn't known anything like a properly-organised Arab polity (let alone innovation and free thinking) for around six hundred years. So the fact that they used their religion as a basis for building support and maintaining power is unsurprising.
"Not In Our Name"?
The resurgence in Islamic extremism historically ties in with this. I wrote previously about how Islamic extremism emerged on to the world stage thirty-five years ago, and how the Charlie Hebdo attacks are another indication of its mutation into a force against "Western decadence". While the number of moderate Muslims far outnumbers the extremists, it does appear that there are more extremists than there were previously, and certainly are far more "active" in displaying their views compared to any other contemporary world religion. It is not surprising that some in the West are content to play to the extremists' game by saying that there is a de facto "clash of civilsations".
The closer truth is that the moderates are losing the "war" against the extremists in their faith. While some say this is the fault of the religion itself, it might be better to say that, quite simply, the moderates are too scared to say anything publicly (though if this amounts to the same thing is another point).
You might think that in a normal situation, moderate Muslims would be so horrified and angered by the extremists' actions said in their name that they would be all on the street in their thousands angrily protesting against them (e.g. like the "Not In My Name" anti-war Iraq protests). There are a few, but they are few and far between. The moderates may well not do this because they are simply too scared of the possible consequences; in contrast, usually the only Muslims you see protesting are the very "extremists" calling for tyrannical actions against non-Muslims.
Likewise, there have been calls by the British government for the Muslim elders to get more involved in preventing the radicalisation of their youth. Unfortunately, for one, there may be a "generational gap" that is dividing younger from older Muslims in the West. Like the classic case of a teenager who complains that their parents "don't understand them", the same many be true of today's radicalised young Muslims. They are getting most of their information, and indoctrination, from the internet. This is how the "elders" are being cut out of the loop. So for all the British government's good intentions, it may well be aiming for the wrong target.
In other words, Islamic extremism is on the rise in the West because, for wont of a better word, it feels "cool" (read some of the lingo of the kids who go to Syria, and you'll get how close to the mark this really appears!) and thus appeals to insecure young people in need of a "cause"; extremism is strong in the Middle East because it is a useful weapon and diversionary tactic to control society (while blaming the West for Arab poverty).
But this use of power is as old as the hills.
Thursday, January 22, 2015
Sunday, January 18, 2015
The 2015 General Election: confusion, hung parliaments, UKIP, and a war on many fronts
A recent poll clarified the depth of the confusion over what the likely outcome of this year's general election will look like.
I wrote this time last year that Labour would probably win the election, giving some of the reasons why. In the present circumstances, Labour look like they will either win outright, with a small majority (e.g. of less than twenty), or come out as the largest party in a hung parliament (e.g. with somewhere in the region of 280-320 seats). The latter scenario is still quite possible, though (more on why in a moment).
On the polling figures the Tories have had more-or-less consistently for the past year or more, they may well lose around fifty or so of their MPs; possibly more given their lack of appeal in the North of England, where UKIP looks likely to supplant them as the opposition to Labour in many areas.
The LibDems look like a spent force. Charitable estimates are that they will lose something like twenty of their MPs (currently on 57 in this parliament); more apocalyptic scenarios - which are still very feasible given their dire poll ratings - are that they could lose more than half their MPs, including some current ministers. In the event of a hung parliament, the LibDems are likely to have too few MPs remaining to make a viable "tandem" coalition with the biggest party (e.g. Labour); at best, if a coalition involving the LibDems were formed, it would have to involve a third party to make the numbers work in parliament.
A war on three fronts
While Labour look set to be the biggest party in parliament, barring some unforeseen circumstances, being a few points ahead of the Conservatives in the polls is no guarantee that they would still have enough MPs to govern alone.
The poll mentioned at the start of the article shows how strong the three "minor" parties are - UKIP on 20%, with the Greens biting at the heels of the LibDems for national share of the vote...and with the SNP on 5%.
The last figure is the most stunning, because the SNP are not a "national" party. They only have candidates standing in Scotland. In many ways, the "5%" figure is meaningless, if they only have candidates in on part of the UK. But if their support is 5% on average nationally, that tells you the level of support they have in Scotland must be many times higher than that; proportionally, the SNP are by far the most popular party in Scotland. Recent polls put their support on something twenty points ahead of Labour, the next biggest party, which is why analysts are estimating that, at a conservative estimate, the SNP could take at least twenty seats away from Labour.
Indeed, due the the FPTP system for Westminster, the SNP could take the majority of all of Scotland's seats to Westminster, leaving them with anything as high as forty or more MPs in parliament (most of those representing former Labour strongholds).
This scenario would be nothing less than an apocalypse for Scottish Labour. And, obviously, causes massive problems for Labour getting a majority in parliament.
The UKIP factor is a second front that Labour knows it cannot be complacent about. While most analysts think that UKIP would struggle to get into double figures in terms of winning seats in Westminster (having more than, say, six MPs in parliament, would be considered a phenomenal result for UKIP under the circumstances). That doesn't mean that they wouldn't cause problems in the election itself regardless.
Because UKIP's voter base is spread widely across the country, their demographic impacts on both the Tories as well as Labour.
As said earlier, UKIP look to have supplanted the Tories in large parts of the north as Labour's main opposition. This is may be a blessing in disguise for Labour as, although some Labour supporters may switch to UKIP, many "natural" Tory voters could well tactically vote purple as well. It's uncertain if this will seriously challenge Labour in its heartlands, but it would certainly do more damage to the Tories than to Labour.
The problem Labour has with UKIP is more in the south and the Midlands. While the Tories will shed support to UKIP, Labour could equally shed support to UKIP in the same way (and in some of the same constituencies, due to the demographics). Clacton-on-Sea, and Rochester and Strood are good examples of this: seats that have, at one time or another, swung either to Labour or the Tories (but historically more Tory than Labour). So we know that with UKIP polling 20%, this will damage Labour almost as much as it will the Tories. There are seats in the south that Labour would normally expect to win in order to become the biggest party, but where UKIP are strong due to the demographics. This will cause some problems, possibly resulting in failing to win those seats, and thus presenting further problems in what should, ordinarily, be "winnable" seats.
The question is in what way, and that is the problem that analysts are having: with UKIP being such a new political player, it is difficult to compute exactly how they will affect the results in many constituencies. We will only know the truth in May. And this is why Labour should not be complacent about thinking that having an outright majority is "in the bag" even if they are ahead of the Tories in the national vote. In Scotland, Labour are facing a potential nightmare; in England, the UKIP factor is the great unknown. And then there is the fast-growing threat of the Greens...
The Green Party now have more members than UKIP, according to recent figures, and their popularity has soared in the last twelve months. I talked about the threat of the "minor parties" a few months ago, but since then the Greens have gone from strength to strength. With their polling figures being almost comparable to the LibDems, and even the Prime Minister (as often seen, an amoral man of no principle) is using their popularity as a convenient excuse to get out of the TV debates.
But more seriously, the rise of the Greens is mostly at the expense of the LibDems; it's unclear how much of the "Green surge" is due to lost Labour voters. The Greens themselves are optimistic about increasing their number of MPs, by concentrating their efforts on constituencies with favourable demographics.
Although even the most optimistic Green campaigner wouldn't expect the Greens to win more than a few seats in Westminster, again, like UKIP, they may "split the vote" in some seats, eroding the support for Labour or the LibDems, possibly resulting in some surprising results (e.g. the Tories winning in a place they wouldn't expect).
So while the Conservatives have UKIP to worry about, Labour have a fight on three other fronts as well. A hung parliament is still more than possible, even if Labour finished ahead of the Tories in the polls in May. It all depends on how things play out with the so-called "minor parties".
But they may not be "minor" for long - the SNP, for instance, may well have a lot to say come May...
I wrote this time last year that Labour would probably win the election, giving some of the reasons why. In the present circumstances, Labour look like they will either win outright, with a small majority (e.g. of less than twenty), or come out as the largest party in a hung parliament (e.g. with somewhere in the region of 280-320 seats). The latter scenario is still quite possible, though (more on why in a moment).
On the polling figures the Tories have had more-or-less consistently for the past year or more, they may well lose around fifty or so of their MPs; possibly more given their lack of appeal in the North of England, where UKIP looks likely to supplant them as the opposition to Labour in many areas.
The LibDems look like a spent force. Charitable estimates are that they will lose something like twenty of their MPs (currently on 57 in this parliament); more apocalyptic scenarios - which are still very feasible given their dire poll ratings - are that they could lose more than half their MPs, including some current ministers. In the event of a hung parliament, the LibDems are likely to have too few MPs remaining to make a viable "tandem" coalition with the biggest party (e.g. Labour); at best, if a coalition involving the LibDems were formed, it would have to involve a third party to make the numbers work in parliament.
A war on three fronts
While Labour look set to be the biggest party in parliament, barring some unforeseen circumstances, being a few points ahead of the Conservatives in the polls is no guarantee that they would still have enough MPs to govern alone.
The poll mentioned at the start of the article shows how strong the three "minor" parties are - UKIP on 20%, with the Greens biting at the heels of the LibDems for national share of the vote...and with the SNP on 5%.
The last figure is the most stunning, because the SNP are not a "national" party. They only have candidates standing in Scotland. In many ways, the "5%" figure is meaningless, if they only have candidates in on part of the UK. But if their support is 5% on average nationally, that tells you the level of support they have in Scotland must be many times higher than that; proportionally, the SNP are by far the most popular party in Scotland. Recent polls put their support on something twenty points ahead of Labour, the next biggest party, which is why analysts are estimating that, at a conservative estimate, the SNP could take at least twenty seats away from Labour.
Indeed, due the the FPTP system for Westminster, the SNP could take the majority of all of Scotland's seats to Westminster, leaving them with anything as high as forty or more MPs in parliament (most of those representing former Labour strongholds).
This scenario would be nothing less than an apocalypse for Scottish Labour. And, obviously, causes massive problems for Labour getting a majority in parliament.
The UKIP factor is a second front that Labour knows it cannot be complacent about. While most analysts think that UKIP would struggle to get into double figures in terms of winning seats in Westminster (having more than, say, six MPs in parliament, would be considered a phenomenal result for UKIP under the circumstances). That doesn't mean that they wouldn't cause problems in the election itself regardless.
Because UKIP's voter base is spread widely across the country, their demographic impacts on both the Tories as well as Labour.
As said earlier, UKIP look to have supplanted the Tories in large parts of the north as Labour's main opposition. This is may be a blessing in disguise for Labour as, although some Labour supporters may switch to UKIP, many "natural" Tory voters could well tactically vote purple as well. It's uncertain if this will seriously challenge Labour in its heartlands, but it would certainly do more damage to the Tories than to Labour.
The problem Labour has with UKIP is more in the south and the Midlands. While the Tories will shed support to UKIP, Labour could equally shed support to UKIP in the same way (and in some of the same constituencies, due to the demographics). Clacton-on-Sea, and Rochester and Strood are good examples of this: seats that have, at one time or another, swung either to Labour or the Tories (but historically more Tory than Labour). So we know that with UKIP polling 20%, this will damage Labour almost as much as it will the Tories. There are seats in the south that Labour would normally expect to win in order to become the biggest party, but where UKIP are strong due to the demographics. This will cause some problems, possibly resulting in failing to win those seats, and thus presenting further problems in what should, ordinarily, be "winnable" seats.
The question is in what way, and that is the problem that analysts are having: with UKIP being such a new political player, it is difficult to compute exactly how they will affect the results in many constituencies. We will only know the truth in May. And this is why Labour should not be complacent about thinking that having an outright majority is "in the bag" even if they are ahead of the Tories in the national vote. In Scotland, Labour are facing a potential nightmare; in England, the UKIP factor is the great unknown. And then there is the fast-growing threat of the Greens...
The Green Party now have more members than UKIP, according to recent figures, and their popularity has soared in the last twelve months. I talked about the threat of the "minor parties" a few months ago, but since then the Greens have gone from strength to strength. With their polling figures being almost comparable to the LibDems, and even the Prime Minister (as often seen, an amoral man of no principle) is using their popularity as a convenient excuse to get out of the TV debates.
But more seriously, the rise of the Greens is mostly at the expense of the LibDems; it's unclear how much of the "Green surge" is due to lost Labour voters. The Greens themselves are optimistic about increasing their number of MPs, by concentrating their efforts on constituencies with favourable demographics.
Although even the most optimistic Green campaigner wouldn't expect the Greens to win more than a few seats in Westminster, again, like UKIP, they may "split the vote" in some seats, eroding the support for Labour or the LibDems, possibly resulting in some surprising results (e.g. the Tories winning in a place they wouldn't expect).
So while the Conservatives have UKIP to worry about, Labour have a fight on three other fronts as well. A hung parliament is still more than possible, even if Labour finished ahead of the Tories in the polls in May. It all depends on how things play out with the so-called "minor parties".
But they may not be "minor" for long - the SNP, for instance, may well have a lot to say come May...
Sunday, January 11, 2015
The Charlie Hebdo attack: Islam, extremism, and the elephant in the room
I wrote a few days ago about some of the possible reactions and consequences of the Charlie Hebdo attack. In the mainstream liberal media, there have been a number of articles (see here and here) by Muslims attempting to put the actions of these terrorists into context. More exactly, the two examples highlighted attempt to put distance between the authors' faith and the perpetrators' interpretation of it.
This is all good and well, but misses the larger (and more glaring) point that many others (in the comments sections) were happy to remind them of: that there are many acts of terror committed in the world today, and a large number of them are by Muslims. In this sense, Islam appears unique in the 21st century in its adherents' motivation to plot and carry out many acts of terror across the world on an almost daily basis (aimed at Muslims and non-Muslims alike), compared to any other religion (or ideology, for that matter).
The lunatics running the asylum?
One of the writers compared to the Charlie Hebdo attacks to the Oklahoma bombing by Timothy McVeigh, saying that as Christians were not required to apologise for that individual's action, so therefore neither should all Muslims have to apologise for the actions of a few "lunatics". This thinking is wrong on two counts: first, McVeigh's hate was aimed at the government, and not fueled primarily by his religion; second, yes the Charlie Hebdo attackers may have been "lunatics", but there seem to be an awful lot of "lunatics" that are using Islam as an excuse to kill.
Those "lunatics" may be hijacking the religion, but that also begs the question: why is it so easy for so many "lunatics" to hijack Islam in the first place? Another article (although highly-satirical) talked about how Christians weren't all blamed for the actions of Anders Breivik, but again, this misses the point: the number of violent Christian extremists in society is very small indeed, while the number of Muslims who consider themselves to be "fundamentalists" is comparatively large. Besides, Christianity mostly dealt with these issues three hundred years ago. By comparison, it appears that Islamic extremism has been undergoing a "renaissance" in recent times. This tells us that there is a fundamental weakness somewhere in how the faith is interpreted, if it allows so many people to use it as an excuse to terrorise society. The extremists are winning the battle within Islam because the moderates seem to lack the intellectual or doctrinal weapons to neutralise (or successfully ostracise) the extremists in the faith.
More bluntly, when there are spectacular attacks like these, regardless of if they are aimed Muslims or non-Muslims. it is not enough to say "they're not true Muslims". The actions of ISIS, for example, are applauded by many in Saudi Arabia; likewise, the Taliban are supported by a significant number of Pakistanis. And in the West, from Bradford to Bordeaux, police uncover terror plots by home-grown extremists almost every week. While there was a great deal of terrorism in the seventies and eighties, by the likes of the IRA in Britain, such a level of continual terror activity by those professing to one faith alone, is unprecedented. This is what makes it unique. And if ordinary Muslims cannot (or refuse to) see that, they are deluding themselves.
The enemy of my enemy...
As said earlier, the number of people professing to be "fundamentalist" Muslims seems to have undergone a "renaissance" in recent decades. This also includes Western converts.
By a strange coincidence, it's worth considering the rise of modern-day Islamic fundamentalism in concert with the rise of economic neo-liberalism. Both of these "ideologies" emerged as a world force around thirty-five years ago: more exactly, the year 1979 was pivotal to both.
In 1979, Margaret Thatcher became premier of the UK, and initiated the neo-liberal project, to be followed shortly afterwards by fellow neo-liberal disciple, Ronald Reagan in the USA. Since that time, this doctrine, also known as the "Anglo-Saxon model" has been responsible for the rise in the corrupt financial system: after markets became deregulated, banking abandoned economic logic and any remaining moral scruples, which led to the financial crisis of 2008. This disastrous doctrine is still the economic orthodoxy in the West.
In 1979, the Islamic revolution overthrew the rule of the Shah in Iran. Later that year, Islamic militants seized the grand mosque in Mecca. In Saudi Arabia, the social effect of the seizure, after taking it back, was to make the country even more fundamentalist than before, which has existed ever since. In Iran, the theocratic regime encouraged the spread of Islamic fundamentalism through entities such as Hezbollah. Further afield, Islam took a stricter course in Pakistan with its new military ruler, Zia ul-Haq in the same year, instigating a process of cementing stricter Islamic values, for instance, by making blasphemy a capital offence.
The Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan, also in 1979, made ul-Haq a useful ally to the USA in its fight against Communism, and thus began the relationship between Islamic fundamentalism and the West, in the theatre of Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda became one beneficiary of this. Thus the USA and the UK, the two arms of the "neo-liberal" model, became key financial and military allies of the regimes of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. This has continued to the present day. It should also not be forgotten that Reagan did a deal with the Iranian leadership for the release of the US embassy hostages - after he became president in 1981. There was also the infamous "Iran-Contra" imbroglio.
At this point, conspiracy theorists may be having a field day. The relationship between the Bush family and the Bin Ladens is well-established; others may well talk darkly of a convenient overlap between elites in the Middle East talking up their anti-Western rhetoric, and the "military-industrial complex" in the West talking up the threat of terrorism. That's for others to consider.
Many Muslims talk about extremists who carry out acts like the Charlie Hebdo being "bad apples"; coincidentally, this was the same excuse that was said of those at the banks who were responsible for the financial crisis. It doesn't wash. It was structural failures, and failures of the system itself, that brought about the financial crisis; likewise, it is problems with the structures and implementation of Islam that have brought about the "extremism" crisis in Islam today.
Swimming against the tide
The talk since the 1990s, and especially after 9/11, has been of a "clash of civilisations". More specifically, this is a dialectic played up by ideologues on the far-right in the West, as well as elements of the so-called "neo-cons"; similarly, it is the same rhetoric used by the radicalised edge of Islam, now fronted by the likes of ISIS and Al-Qaeda. For both it is a convenient card to play for their own ends: since the first "intifada", the fall of Communism and the first Gulf War, events have been used by Muslim extremists to justify their actions against the "Great Satan"; likewise, since 9/11, "neo-cons" and other far-rightists (e.g. in Europe) have used terror events and "the enemy within" to play up the threat, playing into the hands of the extremists to play the "victim" card, and turn more recruits to their cause.
In a wider sense, the stance taken by extremist Muslims, such as those who carried out the Charlie Hebdo attack, was a symptom of the inter-connected nature of today's world. Globalisation and the mass accessibility of the internet means that the cartoons designed to appeal to CH's narrow consumer base (itself a segment of French society) could be easily seen by fundamentalist Muslims in the Middle East, the last people who would be expected to be readers of CH. The same point could be made of the infamous "Danish cartoons", which resulted in furious protests as far afield as Indonesia. Only in the 21st century could a cartoon drawn in Denmark result in violent protests on the other side of the world!
In this sense, what these extremists (European far-rightists, as well as Islamic fundamentalists) are doing is stubbornly and violently swimming against the tide: their anger and violence is a reaction to the powerlessness they feel against the opening-up of global society. They want to turn the clock back to a time when their religion and values were unchallenged, and are prepared to use violence to make it happen.
Ultimately, they will fail, as the Counter-Reformation failed. Terrorism is the counter-reaction to the opening-up of global society, and the way that technology and ideas are spreading to places where they didn't exist before. There is no easy answer to the threat of terrorism; it may be the price that society must pay until global society eventually turns the corner and wins the intellectual battle. This is the battle that Islam is also going through, an intellectual battle to find its place in the modern world.
We must all wait, patiently, until that ends.
This is all good and well, but misses the larger (and more glaring) point that many others (in the comments sections) were happy to remind them of: that there are many acts of terror committed in the world today, and a large number of them are by Muslims. In this sense, Islam appears unique in the 21st century in its adherents' motivation to plot and carry out many acts of terror across the world on an almost daily basis (aimed at Muslims and non-Muslims alike), compared to any other religion (or ideology, for that matter).
The lunatics running the asylum?
One of the writers compared to the Charlie Hebdo attacks to the Oklahoma bombing by Timothy McVeigh, saying that as Christians were not required to apologise for that individual's action, so therefore neither should all Muslims have to apologise for the actions of a few "lunatics". This thinking is wrong on two counts: first, McVeigh's hate was aimed at the government, and not fueled primarily by his religion; second, yes the Charlie Hebdo attackers may have been "lunatics", but there seem to be an awful lot of "lunatics" that are using Islam as an excuse to kill.
Those "lunatics" may be hijacking the religion, but that also begs the question: why is it so easy for so many "lunatics" to hijack Islam in the first place? Another article (although highly-satirical) talked about how Christians weren't all blamed for the actions of Anders Breivik, but again, this misses the point: the number of violent Christian extremists in society is very small indeed, while the number of Muslims who consider themselves to be "fundamentalists" is comparatively large. Besides, Christianity mostly dealt with these issues three hundred years ago. By comparison, it appears that Islamic extremism has been undergoing a "renaissance" in recent times. This tells us that there is a fundamental weakness somewhere in how the faith is interpreted, if it allows so many people to use it as an excuse to terrorise society. The extremists are winning the battle within Islam because the moderates seem to lack the intellectual or doctrinal weapons to neutralise (or successfully ostracise) the extremists in the faith.
More bluntly, when there are spectacular attacks like these, regardless of if they are aimed Muslims or non-Muslims. it is not enough to say "they're not true Muslims". The actions of ISIS, for example, are applauded by many in Saudi Arabia; likewise, the Taliban are supported by a significant number of Pakistanis. And in the West, from Bradford to Bordeaux, police uncover terror plots by home-grown extremists almost every week. While there was a great deal of terrorism in the seventies and eighties, by the likes of the IRA in Britain, such a level of continual terror activity by those professing to one faith alone, is unprecedented. This is what makes it unique. And if ordinary Muslims cannot (or refuse to) see that, they are deluding themselves.
The enemy of my enemy...
As said earlier, the number of people professing to be "fundamentalist" Muslims seems to have undergone a "renaissance" in recent decades. This also includes Western converts.
By a strange coincidence, it's worth considering the rise of modern-day Islamic fundamentalism in concert with the rise of economic neo-liberalism. Both of these "ideologies" emerged as a world force around thirty-five years ago: more exactly, the year 1979 was pivotal to both.
In 1979, Margaret Thatcher became premier of the UK, and initiated the neo-liberal project, to be followed shortly afterwards by fellow neo-liberal disciple, Ronald Reagan in the USA. Since that time, this doctrine, also known as the "Anglo-Saxon model" has been responsible for the rise in the corrupt financial system: after markets became deregulated, banking abandoned economic logic and any remaining moral scruples, which led to the financial crisis of 2008. This disastrous doctrine is still the economic orthodoxy in the West.
In 1979, the Islamic revolution overthrew the rule of the Shah in Iran. Later that year, Islamic militants seized the grand mosque in Mecca. In Saudi Arabia, the social effect of the seizure, after taking it back, was to make the country even more fundamentalist than before, which has existed ever since. In Iran, the theocratic regime encouraged the spread of Islamic fundamentalism through entities such as Hezbollah. Further afield, Islam took a stricter course in Pakistan with its new military ruler, Zia ul-Haq in the same year, instigating a process of cementing stricter Islamic values, for instance, by making blasphemy a capital offence.
The Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan, also in 1979, made ul-Haq a useful ally to the USA in its fight against Communism, and thus began the relationship between Islamic fundamentalism and the West, in the theatre of Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda became one beneficiary of this. Thus the USA and the UK, the two arms of the "neo-liberal" model, became key financial and military allies of the regimes of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. This has continued to the present day. It should also not be forgotten that Reagan did a deal with the Iranian leadership for the release of the US embassy hostages - after he became president in 1981. There was also the infamous "Iran-Contra" imbroglio.
At this point, conspiracy theorists may be having a field day. The relationship between the Bush family and the Bin Ladens is well-established; others may well talk darkly of a convenient overlap between elites in the Middle East talking up their anti-Western rhetoric, and the "military-industrial complex" in the West talking up the threat of terrorism. That's for others to consider.
Many Muslims talk about extremists who carry out acts like the Charlie Hebdo being "bad apples"; coincidentally, this was the same excuse that was said of those at the banks who were responsible for the financial crisis. It doesn't wash. It was structural failures, and failures of the system itself, that brought about the financial crisis; likewise, it is problems with the structures and implementation of Islam that have brought about the "extremism" crisis in Islam today.
Swimming against the tide
The talk since the 1990s, and especially after 9/11, has been of a "clash of civilisations". More specifically, this is a dialectic played up by ideologues on the far-right in the West, as well as elements of the so-called "neo-cons"; similarly, it is the same rhetoric used by the radicalised edge of Islam, now fronted by the likes of ISIS and Al-Qaeda. For both it is a convenient card to play for their own ends: since the first "intifada", the fall of Communism and the first Gulf War, events have been used by Muslim extremists to justify their actions against the "Great Satan"; likewise, since 9/11, "neo-cons" and other far-rightists (e.g. in Europe) have used terror events and "the enemy within" to play up the threat, playing into the hands of the extremists to play the "victim" card, and turn more recruits to their cause.
In a wider sense, the stance taken by extremist Muslims, such as those who carried out the Charlie Hebdo attack, was a symptom of the inter-connected nature of today's world. Globalisation and the mass accessibility of the internet means that the cartoons designed to appeal to CH's narrow consumer base (itself a segment of French society) could be easily seen by fundamentalist Muslims in the Middle East, the last people who would be expected to be readers of CH. The same point could be made of the infamous "Danish cartoons", which resulted in furious protests as far afield as Indonesia. Only in the 21st century could a cartoon drawn in Denmark result in violent protests on the other side of the world!
In this sense, what these extremists (European far-rightists, as well as Islamic fundamentalists) are doing is stubbornly and violently swimming against the tide: their anger and violence is a reaction to the powerlessness they feel against the opening-up of global society. They want to turn the clock back to a time when their religion and values were unchallenged, and are prepared to use violence to make it happen.
Ultimately, they will fail, as the Counter-Reformation failed. Terrorism is the counter-reaction to the opening-up of global society, and the way that technology and ideas are spreading to places where they didn't exist before. There is no easy answer to the threat of terrorism; it may be the price that society must pay until global society eventually turns the corner and wins the intellectual battle. This is the battle that Islam is also going through, an intellectual battle to find its place in the modern world.
We must all wait, patiently, until that ends.
Thursday, January 8, 2015
The Charlie Hebdo attack: Al-Qaeda, terrorism and Islam
To paraphrase another author of an article about the Charlie Hebdo attack, the West doesn't have a Muslim problem; Islam has a terrorism problem.
The attack on the Charlie Hebdo offices was carried out by people claiming to work for Al-Qaeda in Yemen. Since the rise of ISIS in the news over the past year, Al-Qaeda has, comparatively-speaking, dropped off the media radar. The motivation for the attack (and the modus operandi; more on that later) was most obviously about making a simple, terrifying point: to punish those who has "offended" the Prophet, and to terrify others in the West into submission.
A "win-win" situation?
But it must also have been about far more than that as well: the more subtle point would have been to create a ideological fissure in Western society. By orchestrating such a high-profile, almost "surgical" attack at a Western media outlet, the terrorists seemed to have weighed-up the most probable social effects of the attack on Western society.
One, Western society can stand together against this kind of terror and continue life as normal (as powerfully-argued by Simon Jenkins here). Doing this (and by, for example re-publishing the "offensive" cartoons in response etc.) will result in further fuel being given to the extremists, by more clearly identifying the "dissolute" moral freedoms of the West ( i.e. a "win" for the extremists, in their eyes).
Two, Western society can be privately cowed into submission by the terror attacks, as many mainstream media outlets have been for the past ten years (they don't want to get killed, and value their life over their freedom of expression). After the initial anger, this subsides into a "self-censorship" setting that has been in place for some time already. This is precisely what the point of this act of terror was - to terrorise people into accepting the will of the terrorists.
Three, Western society could more carefully identify the issue of "home-grown" terrorism, and the fact that most of the extremists today develop due to flaws in the way that Muslim societies deal with the harsher and more intolerant aspects of their religion (more on why the extremists are winning here). As most of the attacks by Muslim extremists in the world are on fellow Muslims, this clearly a problem across the Muslim world in general, not just in the West.
By doing this in the West, it could cause a "culture war" with Muslim society in general (indeed, this may well already be true), pitting Muslims against each other, as is already happening in the Middle East. While this is an issue that Western governments really need to work in tandem with Muslim elders on, there seems to be little appetite for it at the moment. Again, the extremists may well easily spin this strategy back on the Muslim moderates, by calling them not "true Muslims", as they have been doing already for the last ten years. In short, things may well get bloodier before they better, if this strategy is to work long-term.
The problem here is a question of if Western society (and moderate Islam in general) is, frankly, prepared to pay the "blood price" for fighting against the tyranny of extremism. The people are Charlie Hebdo clearly were prepared to pay the price if need be, and, tragically, they did so.
Four: of course, there may well be an anti-Muslim backlash, as there was after the Lee Rigby killing in London. This is also exactly what the terrorists would wish for, too, for their own reasons.
France is one of Europe's most potentially-explosive social structures, due to the lack of integration between the Muslim community in France and "mainstream" French society. Issues of racism are not far under the surface, and with the recent rise of FN, France must appear an "easy" target for the likes of Al-Qaeda. While the UK can hardly afford to be complacent either about its relations to its large Muslim population (more on that problem here), the British police seem to be much more on the ball than there French counterparts, judging from the number of foiled terror plots compared to actual terror attacks.
With intolerance (i.e. anti Muslim sentiment) on the rise across Europe in general, the question is how to strike the right kind of balance between allowing freedom of religious expression, but preventing intolerance preached by extremists and worse. It looks like it may be a long time before we can square that particular circle.
Regardless of whatever the outcome is, if Western society is not prepared to die for their beliefs if need be, then the freedoms that people died for in Second World War were for nothing, and we have simply exchanged the extremism of the Nazis for the extremism of modern-day Islamofascism. In the modern world, the extremists don't need to invade the West to take over; they simply use the internet, and commit random acts of terror to achieve their aims.
Raising their game?
The attack on Charlie Hebdo, for all that it represented, also was a stark demonstration of the resilience and ingenuity of Al-Qaeda. As said earlier, the rise of ISIS has distracted much of the world's attention from Al-Qaeda. Doubtless, that must have hurt a little of their twisted sense of pride. But equally, the nature of this attack shows that they may well have been spending time to "raise the game".
As analysts and witnesses have stated, it bears the hallmarks of being a military-like operation: less a "terror act" than a "pinpoint strike" against a carefully-selected target. It was almost as though they had learned strategies from some of the anti-terror operations they have suffered in recent years from Western covert-ops. They knew exactly where, who and when to strike to achieve maximum effect. The fact that they timed their attack to coincide with a meeting when all the key staff would be there in one place shows a chillingly-efficient manner to their operation.
This attack is a game-changer in showing what the capabilities are of Al-Qaeda affiliates in 2015, and how they are an organisation that learns from its enemies. The question is: how to react? As explained in the scenarios above, none of the options provide an easy answer, and all possible strategies then may well provide some kind of succour to the extremists in one way or another, at least in the short-term.
The ball is in our court.
The attack on the Charlie Hebdo offices was carried out by people claiming to work for Al-Qaeda in Yemen. Since the rise of ISIS in the news over the past year, Al-Qaeda has, comparatively-speaking, dropped off the media radar. The motivation for the attack (and the modus operandi; more on that later) was most obviously about making a simple, terrifying point: to punish those who has "offended" the Prophet, and to terrify others in the West into submission.
A "win-win" situation?
But it must also have been about far more than that as well: the more subtle point would have been to create a ideological fissure in Western society. By orchestrating such a high-profile, almost "surgical" attack at a Western media outlet, the terrorists seemed to have weighed-up the most probable social effects of the attack on Western society.
One, Western society can stand together against this kind of terror and continue life as normal (as powerfully-argued by Simon Jenkins here). Doing this (and by, for example re-publishing the "offensive" cartoons in response etc.) will result in further fuel being given to the extremists, by more clearly identifying the "dissolute" moral freedoms of the West ( i.e. a "win" for the extremists, in their eyes).
Two, Western society can be privately cowed into submission by the terror attacks, as many mainstream media outlets have been for the past ten years (they don't want to get killed, and value their life over their freedom of expression). After the initial anger, this subsides into a "self-censorship" setting that has been in place for some time already. This is precisely what the point of this act of terror was - to terrorise people into accepting the will of the terrorists.
Three, Western society could more carefully identify the issue of "home-grown" terrorism, and the fact that most of the extremists today develop due to flaws in the way that Muslim societies deal with the harsher and more intolerant aspects of their religion (more on why the extremists are winning here). As most of the attacks by Muslim extremists in the world are on fellow Muslims, this clearly a problem across the Muslim world in general, not just in the West.
By doing this in the West, it could cause a "culture war" with Muslim society in general (indeed, this may well already be true), pitting Muslims against each other, as is already happening in the Middle East. While this is an issue that Western governments really need to work in tandem with Muslim elders on, there seems to be little appetite for it at the moment. Again, the extremists may well easily spin this strategy back on the Muslim moderates, by calling them not "true Muslims", as they have been doing already for the last ten years. In short, things may well get bloodier before they better, if this strategy is to work long-term.
The problem here is a question of if Western society (and moderate Islam in general) is, frankly, prepared to pay the "blood price" for fighting against the tyranny of extremism. The people are Charlie Hebdo clearly were prepared to pay the price if need be, and, tragically, they did so.
Four: of course, there may well be an anti-Muslim backlash, as there was after the Lee Rigby killing in London. This is also exactly what the terrorists would wish for, too, for their own reasons.
France is one of Europe's most potentially-explosive social structures, due to the lack of integration between the Muslim community in France and "mainstream" French society. Issues of racism are not far under the surface, and with the recent rise of FN, France must appear an "easy" target for the likes of Al-Qaeda. While the UK can hardly afford to be complacent either about its relations to its large Muslim population (more on that problem here), the British police seem to be much more on the ball than there French counterparts, judging from the number of foiled terror plots compared to actual terror attacks.
With intolerance (i.e. anti Muslim sentiment) on the rise across Europe in general, the question is how to strike the right kind of balance between allowing freedom of religious expression, but preventing intolerance preached by extremists and worse. It looks like it may be a long time before we can square that particular circle.
Regardless of whatever the outcome is, if Western society is not prepared to die for their beliefs if need be, then the freedoms that people died for in Second World War were for nothing, and we have simply exchanged the extremism of the Nazis for the extremism of modern-day Islamofascism. In the modern world, the extremists don't need to invade the West to take over; they simply use the internet, and commit random acts of terror to achieve their aims.
Raising their game?
The attack on Charlie Hebdo, for all that it represented, also was a stark demonstration of the resilience and ingenuity of Al-Qaeda. As said earlier, the rise of ISIS has distracted much of the world's attention from Al-Qaeda. Doubtless, that must have hurt a little of their twisted sense of pride. But equally, the nature of this attack shows that they may well have been spending time to "raise the game".
As analysts and witnesses have stated, it bears the hallmarks of being a military-like operation: less a "terror act" than a "pinpoint strike" against a carefully-selected target. It was almost as though they had learned strategies from some of the anti-terror operations they have suffered in recent years from Western covert-ops. They knew exactly where, who and when to strike to achieve maximum effect. The fact that they timed their attack to coincide with a meeting when all the key staff would be there in one place shows a chillingly-efficient manner to their operation.
This attack is a game-changer in showing what the capabilities are of Al-Qaeda affiliates in 2015, and how they are an organisation that learns from its enemies. The question is: how to react? As explained in the scenarios above, none of the options provide an easy answer, and all possible strategies then may well provide some kind of succour to the extremists in one way or another, at least in the short-term.
The ball is in our court.
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