Recently watched the documentary "The Inside Job", a chillingly effective and analytical look at the causes of the Financial Crisis. It is narrated by Matt Damon, who also acts as interviewer to those people of influence who were happy enough (or foolish enough) to want to be interviewed.
"The Inside Job" sets out in clear details the root causes for the Financial Crisis, and lays out in no uncertain terms essentially how amoral, all-powerful and corrupt the financial sector that controls the world's money truly is.
For those who think that to say "the banks and money men run everything" is a statement of a conspiracy-theorist, watching this film will show you how sadly correct much of that paranoia really is based on fact.
The Financial Crisis was not an accident. It was not inevitable.
It happened because thirty years ago the governments of the Anglo-Saxon world (Ronald Reagan in particular), threw away the rules that had protected the banking industry from carrying out the same amoral and reckless behaviour that had caused the Great Depression.
It happened because Ronald Reagan was a willing disciple to the views the the banking sector, who felt they had been constrained for too long by those same rules that had protected the economy from the irresponsibility of the banks.
In 1979, for example, the big banks of the USA (Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs etc.) had a modest number of staff, on a modest wage. There was the example of one broker who actually had two jobs in order to make a suitable income for his wife and children. Due to the throwing out of the rules restricted the banks, ten years later that same broker would be a millionaire. Those banks now have a staff many times higher than they had thirty years ago.
But even that deregulation did not mean that banks could not be regulated in other ways. In the financial industry, there are what are called Ratings Agencies: these give values to the assets that banks have when trading. Attempts to regulate the banks in other ways during the Clinton administration fell on deaf ears, and by that point the banks had long had sufficient clout to arm-wrestle the Department of the Treasury to make it effectively a huge lobby for the banking sector.
The Ratings Agencies are a valuable tool to let other banks know how healthy the assets of other banks are. But by the start of the 21st century, banks were already paying bonuses to those employees in the Ratings Agencies who would give those banks the highest ratings. In other words, corruption and bribery.
These "bonuses" would soon come back to haunt the Ratings Agencies. Because by this point the ever expanding economy was being fuelled by speculation and a property bubble creating by those same all-powerful, un-regulated banks. Furthermore, due to the Ratings Agencies and deregulation, those banks could, by 2007, take out loans that were tens of times higher than the entire bank's actual value - in some cases, loans worth up to 30 times the bank's actual assets.
This massive overlending (called "leverage" in banker's jargon) was made possible by offering, for example, mortgages to those who weren't actually able to afford them. Because of the inherent risk of offering loans to such clients, the interest rates were higher. But the banks, blindly ignoring the obvious risks, saw only the high interest rates, so these types of "risky" but highly profitable loans because the norm in many cases.
The final thing to remember, piling risk upon risk, was that the banks were able to divide all these "risky" loans into one big bundle with other, safer, loans. This bundle was then divided into many segments, and each segment swapped with other investment banks for financial gain. The "reasoning" was that dividing up the "risky" loans with the safe loans, it would make it safer for everyone concerned. But if it came to a time when anyone wanted to know who held the "risky" loans, no-one would have any idea where they were. Perfect, eh?
So when the whole house of cards finally came crashing down in the autumn of 2008, all the major banks became effectively bankrupt due to their own recklessness and stupidity, as well as the immorality of the corrupt system of Ratings Agencies.
The goverments balied them out; they had to in order to prevent another Great Depression. The fact that the leading banks of the financial world, who were so all-powerful, could be so financially idiotic as to not understand that they had created a huge confidence trick on each other and the rest of the world, is breathtaking.
So you would think that the governments would see that deregulation doesn't work.
Some governments thought that; fewer of them actually did anything that would remotely prevent it from happening again.
The reason was simple: the leading governments of the world were getting their advice from the leading financial experts of the world. The leading financial experts were trained in the same theories that had created the mess; furthermore, many of them were bring paid by the same banks that had created the mess, to give their "advice" to the governments of the world.
The result is that the leading banks of the world, except for the brief period when they thought they would go bankrupt in September 2008, were not in favour of deregulation. And the problem wasn't just that the governments' advice was coming from academics who were already financially tied to those same banks.
The other problem was that, in the past thirty years since deregulation, the banks had not only become much bigger; they had also become far fewer in number. In other words, the banking sector was a kind of financial oligarchy. In the USA, there were effectively only four major banks in the country; others had either gone bankrupt or been bought out by others since 2008.
That was what created the term "Too Big To Fail". This helped the banks play on governments' fear of causing another, even deeper, crisis, and left the governments' mute in the face of the banks' demands for financial protection.
So what should have been a golden opportunity for goverment to right the wrongs of deregulation thirty years ago, turned into the banks' golden opportunity to cement their financial power over government. The banks did the crime; the government paid for the time. And now all government taxpayers are funding that "bail-out", through cuts to government services and tax rises. A bail-out, indeed: the biggest in history.
And what lesson have the banks learned from this disaster of their own making? That we can do no wrong. We are Gods.
I wonder what Ayn Rand would have thought of this.
Tuesday, March 22, 2011
Sunday, March 20, 2011
Libya and the UN; resolution and intervention.
Now that the UN-backed resolution is being enforced onto the Libyan government, here would be a good time to reflect on the wider meaning and implications of what is happening in Libya under UN authority.
First of all, President Obama has made the obvious and wise decision of drawing lessons from both wars in Iraq. The USA's stance in the Libyan can be summarised as this: do it multilaterally; don't commit troops.
The reasons for this position are clear: learning the things that went right with the first war against Iraq (the UN-backed, international, Arab-supported, coalition to liberate Kuwait); and remembering the mistakes of the second (still unconcluded) Iraq war (the almost unilateral decision to invade Iraq with almost no legal basis or clear threat to other nations from Iraq). On the "don't commit troops" point, this is similar to President Clinton's war in Kosovo, which was done as mainly an air war with few troops involved on the US side. And after the mental scar that the second Iraq war still has on the Arab world, Obama is clearly minded to be seen NOT as an occupier, with American soldiers occupying the third Muslim country in ten years.
But there are also some wider, historic points to think about regarding the UN resolution against Libya. And this is about the history of previous conflicts over the past twenty years, and how they tie in with the UN and the international community.
The status of the UN resolution against Libya bears some similaritiries to the first Iraq war, and also the war in Kosovo, as I have mentioned. But there are important differences.
Today we have an Arab-backed, international coalition against the Libyan government, as existed against Saddam Hussein in 1991. The coalition against Saddam Hussein was created to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi forces; this resulted in many months of bombing before the actual invasion of ground forces took place.
In the war in Kosovo, President Clinton failed to get a UN resolution to legally back up the war to prevent the ethnic cleansing of the Muslim Kosovars; therefore, he and NATO fought a war without UN backing. Perhaps later President Bush and Dick Cheney had this precedent at the back of their minds when they looked at the options for a second Iraq war.
What we have today in Libya is a UN-backed air war to effectively bring about a change of government in Libya; this is neither to drive out an occupying force (as in the first Iraq war), or to prevent ethnic cleansing and promote an independence movement (as in the Kosovo war).
The UN resolution against Libya is to prevent "crimes against humanity" and "war crimes" such as the shelling of civilians; this sounds quite a lot like the reasons used to intervene in Bosnia (although this was also about massive ethnic cleansing too, like in the later Kosovo war). But there is no "ethnic cleansing" in Libya. It is, more or less, an irregular and bloody civil war; a power struggle between two sides, where the "normal" rules of war are thrown to one side for political reasons. And the UN has decided to back one side over the other.
In other words, from the history of UN international interventions in the past twenty years, there is almost no adequate precedent.
On the other hand, Muammar Gaddafi has plenty to be held account for.
For a start, as a clearly unstable, mentally-unhinged psychopath, he waged a war of terror against the USA in the 1980s. The Lockerbie bombing, and the bombing of a German nightclub frequented by American soldiers, were given the go-ahead under his watch.
There is the fact that during the same period, and before, he financed and supported various other terrorist groups around the world. For twenty years, he made Libya effectively a terrorist haven; in his own delusional mind, he saw himself as a kind of "anti-Westerm messiah".
There is the fact that as ruler of Libya, he managed to transform it into an Orwellian nightware (although there have been other dictators following this mould as well).
And there is the fact that when his population did start an uprising against his government last month, he brought in mercenaries from other African countries to terrorise and murder his own people, when his own army, presumably, did not have the stomach to do it themselves. By bringing in foreign fighters to fight (by which I mean, massacre) Libyan civilians, Gaddafi effectively made it an international affair.
So although this situation is unprecented, it is not entirely surprising that the international community saw fit to respond. But, this response would have almost certainly not happened without Arab support.
And the Arab support would not have happened if those Arab governments were not themselves concerned about appearing on the "right" side, to their own respective populations.
What has been called the "Arab Spring" of 2011 is the real game changer here. The Libyan uprising would not have happened without the Egyptian revolution; the Egyptian revolution would not have happened without the Tunisian revolution; the Tunisian revolution may not have happened without one poor fruit seller setting himself on fire in sheer desperation at his government in December 2010.
So the "Arab Spring" is the real reason that the UN passed this resolution, setting the precedent of an air war to support democratic forces against autocratic governments.
Let's cheer for the Arabs, then, who have made possible a UN resolution with potentially huge implications, if ever used as a precedent at a later date.
Though I'm not holding my breath; no wonder that the Chinese and Russians have been so wary of what this resolution might mean. That the UN now officially supports democracy, and is ready to takes sides to enforce it where necessary.
Gaddafi said recently that the UN's resolution was technically invalid as it went against the rules of the UN Charter: he meant the principle of not interfering into internal conflicts.
I suppose that, technically, he may have a point. But no one outside of Tripoli cares what he thinks any more. He IS crazy, after all...
First of all, President Obama has made the obvious and wise decision of drawing lessons from both wars in Iraq. The USA's stance in the Libyan can be summarised as this: do it multilaterally; don't commit troops.
The reasons for this position are clear: learning the things that went right with the first war against Iraq (the UN-backed, international, Arab-supported, coalition to liberate Kuwait); and remembering the mistakes of the second (still unconcluded) Iraq war (the almost unilateral decision to invade Iraq with almost no legal basis or clear threat to other nations from Iraq). On the "don't commit troops" point, this is similar to President Clinton's war in Kosovo, which was done as mainly an air war with few troops involved on the US side. And after the mental scar that the second Iraq war still has on the Arab world, Obama is clearly minded to be seen NOT as an occupier, with American soldiers occupying the third Muslim country in ten years.
But there are also some wider, historic points to think about regarding the UN resolution against Libya. And this is about the history of previous conflicts over the past twenty years, and how they tie in with the UN and the international community.
The status of the UN resolution against Libya bears some similaritiries to the first Iraq war, and also the war in Kosovo, as I have mentioned. But there are important differences.
Today we have an Arab-backed, international coalition against the Libyan government, as existed against Saddam Hussein in 1991. The coalition against Saddam Hussein was created to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi forces; this resulted in many months of bombing before the actual invasion of ground forces took place.
In the war in Kosovo, President Clinton failed to get a UN resolution to legally back up the war to prevent the ethnic cleansing of the Muslim Kosovars; therefore, he and NATO fought a war without UN backing. Perhaps later President Bush and Dick Cheney had this precedent at the back of their minds when they looked at the options for a second Iraq war.
What we have today in Libya is a UN-backed air war to effectively bring about a change of government in Libya; this is neither to drive out an occupying force (as in the first Iraq war), or to prevent ethnic cleansing and promote an independence movement (as in the Kosovo war).
The UN resolution against Libya is to prevent "crimes against humanity" and "war crimes" such as the shelling of civilians; this sounds quite a lot like the reasons used to intervene in Bosnia (although this was also about massive ethnic cleansing too, like in the later Kosovo war). But there is no "ethnic cleansing" in Libya. It is, more or less, an irregular and bloody civil war; a power struggle between two sides, where the "normal" rules of war are thrown to one side for political reasons. And the UN has decided to back one side over the other.
In other words, from the history of UN international interventions in the past twenty years, there is almost no adequate precedent.
On the other hand, Muammar Gaddafi has plenty to be held account for.
For a start, as a clearly unstable, mentally-unhinged psychopath, he waged a war of terror against the USA in the 1980s. The Lockerbie bombing, and the bombing of a German nightclub frequented by American soldiers, were given the go-ahead under his watch.
There is the fact that during the same period, and before, he financed and supported various other terrorist groups around the world. For twenty years, he made Libya effectively a terrorist haven; in his own delusional mind, he saw himself as a kind of "anti-Westerm messiah".
There is the fact that as ruler of Libya, he managed to transform it into an Orwellian nightware (although there have been other dictators following this mould as well).
And there is the fact that when his population did start an uprising against his government last month, he brought in mercenaries from other African countries to terrorise and murder his own people, when his own army, presumably, did not have the stomach to do it themselves. By bringing in foreign fighters to fight (by which I mean, massacre) Libyan civilians, Gaddafi effectively made it an international affair.
So although this situation is unprecented, it is not entirely surprising that the international community saw fit to respond. But, this response would have almost certainly not happened without Arab support.
And the Arab support would not have happened if those Arab governments were not themselves concerned about appearing on the "right" side, to their own respective populations.
What has been called the "Arab Spring" of 2011 is the real game changer here. The Libyan uprising would not have happened without the Egyptian revolution; the Egyptian revolution would not have happened without the Tunisian revolution; the Tunisian revolution may not have happened without one poor fruit seller setting himself on fire in sheer desperation at his government in December 2010.
So the "Arab Spring" is the real reason that the UN passed this resolution, setting the precedent of an air war to support democratic forces against autocratic governments.
Let's cheer for the Arabs, then, who have made possible a UN resolution with potentially huge implications, if ever used as a precedent at a later date.
Though I'm not holding my breath; no wonder that the Chinese and Russians have been so wary of what this resolution might mean. That the UN now officially supports democracy, and is ready to takes sides to enforce it where necessary.
Gaddafi said recently that the UN's resolution was technically invalid as it went against the rules of the UN Charter: he meant the principle of not interfering into internal conflicts.
I suppose that, technically, he may have a point. But no one outside of Tripoli cares what he thinks any more. He IS crazy, after all...
Sunday, March 13, 2011
Comparing models of "Muslim Democracy": the Turkish and Egyptian experiences
Nowadays, two of the most populous Muslim nations in and around the Middle east are, or appear to be in the process of becoming, democracies in the general sense of the word: Turkey and Egypt respectively.
The Turkish experience is the one that many Egyptians have been claiming to act as their inspiration, but this is itself deserves more than a cursory look at the similarities and differences: both between it and Western democracies in general, as well as the social differences between it and Egypt.
Turkey may be the most obviously Muslim "democracy" in the world (except for Pakistan and Lebanon, who have their own problems), but even that label deserves some qualifications.
Turkey was founded by Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) as a secular state, from the remains of the Ottoman Empire. It was NOT, initially a democracy. Ataturk understood that full "democracy" would be difficult for Turks to deal with straightaway, so the party he founded, the CHP, ruled the country unopposed until 1950, from the foundation of the republic in 1923. Ataturk died in 1938. Multiparty elections in 1950 resulted in the CHP being defeated by another party, and was out of power for ten years.
But this is not the only issue. For "Turkey" to remain a stable state, issues such as obvious ethnic and religious divides had to be pasted over by the state: The country's biggest city, Istanbul, for example, had a huge population of Greeks, and there were also Greeks scattered all across the nation, in the west in particular. This issue was dealt with through mutual population exchanges with Greece (who had a large number of Turks in the east of their country). But there still remained large numbers of Greeks in Istanbul upto the 1950s; a controversial "pogrom" against the Greeks took place in that decade, that encouraged almost all the Greeks to leave. Only a few thousand still remain at present.
Then there are the Kurds. These are people with a distinct language living mostly in the south-east of Turkey. Up to this day, the issue of representation is a controversial one. Due to the necessarily centralised and rigid parameters of the civil code, the Turkish state has huge difficulties in dealing with their linguistic and other issues. Kurdish "political parties" are usually banned; the party that gains the most sympathy from the Kurds is the ruling AKP, in power since 2002.
There are also the Armenians, as the Greeks, another Christian minority in Turkey, though generally they have had relatively few problems with the Turkish state over the years, as they have been accepting of their status within Turkey. For this reason, they don't need further mention.
So the foundation of the Turkish state was from its inception bound in insecurity, due to the ethnic and religious complexity of the country. The cult of "Kemalism" (in other words, following the secular "ideology" of Ataturk) has been the guiding principle of the Turkish state.
Until 2002, no openly religious party had been successful at the ballot box (apart from the brief and controversial rule of the religious "Refah" party in the mid-nineties, who were overthrown in a coup).
The fact that the "Islamist" AKP, who took power in that year, have remained in power and generally popular, is a testament to the lessons the AKP's politicians have learned: how to maintain, manufacture and manipulate popular opinion, as well as against the "secular" state itself. The last point, the campaign against the "secular establishment" is seen through the continuing "Ergenekon" conspiracy; a right-wing plot by nationalist politicians and military staff to engineer an internal crisis, allowing the military to take power from the "Islamist" government.
In general, the main point about the condition of "Turkish democracy" is this: the tenets of secularism and the status of Ataturk as a semi-revered founder of the republic, are inviolate and are not open to (negative) discussion.
Like Italy, Turkey has a plethora of parties, though only a small number of those that exist have ever tasted power in the lifetime of "Turkish democracy". Also like Italy, until the AKP came to power in 2002, most governments were coalitions of some sort, and their time in power was sometimes brief, especially in the seventies and nineties.
But the healthy number of parties (the lesser ones usually being a confusing combination of acronyms) does not change the fact that the status of "Turkish democracy" relies on the centralised state and in immovable civil code. This necessarily stymes opinion and dissent.
The irony now is that the governing AKP, who have been so critical of this rigid civil code over the years (as they had been at the wrong end of it in the past), are now using the same civil code to limit press freedom. The government is using it against those "secularists" who claim the AKP has its own Islamic agenda, and accuse the government of arrogance or worse.
The other components of the Turkish state, the judiciary, are caught in the middle of all this, between the government, military and secular sphere. Sometimes they have launched prosecutions against the government, sometimes against the military. The result has generally appeared to be a mess to most observers, with no sign of things being resolved in the near future.
So where does Egypt fit into all this?
Like Turkey, Egypt is culturally heterogenious: with a large Coptic Christian minority (10%), as well as the smaller Greek and Armenian churches. Also like Turkey, its modern secular state was founded by a military man, Abdul Nasser, in the 1950s. And, also like Turkey, the state has used the shield of "secularism" as a way to manage and impose its own version of "democracy" onto its population.
Until now. With the overthrown of Hosni Mubarak, there were fears of an Iranian-style Islamic revolution (as Iran itself had hoped, when it initially encouraged the protests). This fear, though, was based on a misunderstanding of the nature of Egpytian society, as well as wishes of the protesters themselves.
The protesters' model, as many of them said, was that of Turkey. But at the same time, 2011 in Egypt was not the same as 1923 in Turkey; for Egypt had already had their "Ataturk" moment with Nasser in the 1950s.
No, these young protesters wanted a model more like Turkey circa 2002. But at the same time, Turkey's AKP government happened as a gradual evolution using the current "Turkish democracy" system; it seems that what Egyptians are demanding is something less constrained by civil codes and unbending constitutions as Turkey - something more pure and unrefined.
We can see that by the fact that free expression and protest are happening organically as we speak. There have been signs of religious unrest between Coptic Christans and Muslims (though people have said that former Mubarak loyalists have been behind this in any case); but it also appears that Egyptians are, at least for the moment, willing to accept these occurances as the necessary "price" of true freedom.
That may sound a little like Donald Rumsfeld's notorious explanation of Iraq's anarchic "version" of democracy: "stuff happens". But the longer-term signs for Egyptian democracy are good. The religious divide in Egypt points towards a tendency for tolerance and acceptance of other points of view. The early years of Turkey's republic show us that there the religious and ethnic issues were papered over, with messy results in the long-term. Egypt seems to already be learning from those experiences; anyway, Egypt may be religiously diverse, but it ethnically fairly homogenous. Turkey, meanwhile, has yet to fully grasp the nettle of the Kurdish question.
So, to sum up, don't worry about Egypt: they know what they're doing. It may look a bit confusing now, but given time, Egypt has the clear potential to be a great example of Muslim Arab democracy. And it is also the biggest Arab country.
It would be ironic indeed if, after the lengthy fiasco and bloody chaos one American president caused to establish democracy in Iraq, his successor could give a speech in the Egypt, and less than two years later, preside over a spontaneous democratic revolution in that same country.
So much for the supposed benefits of "regime change".
The Turkish experience is the one that many Egyptians have been claiming to act as their inspiration, but this is itself deserves more than a cursory look at the similarities and differences: both between it and Western democracies in general, as well as the social differences between it and Egypt.
Turkey may be the most obviously Muslim "democracy" in the world (except for Pakistan and Lebanon, who have their own problems), but even that label deserves some qualifications.
Turkey was founded by Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) as a secular state, from the remains of the Ottoman Empire. It was NOT, initially a democracy. Ataturk understood that full "democracy" would be difficult for Turks to deal with straightaway, so the party he founded, the CHP, ruled the country unopposed until 1950, from the foundation of the republic in 1923. Ataturk died in 1938. Multiparty elections in 1950 resulted in the CHP being defeated by another party, and was out of power for ten years.
But this is not the only issue. For "Turkey" to remain a stable state, issues such as obvious ethnic and religious divides had to be pasted over by the state: The country's biggest city, Istanbul, for example, had a huge population of Greeks, and there were also Greeks scattered all across the nation, in the west in particular. This issue was dealt with through mutual population exchanges with Greece (who had a large number of Turks in the east of their country). But there still remained large numbers of Greeks in Istanbul upto the 1950s; a controversial "pogrom" against the Greeks took place in that decade, that encouraged almost all the Greeks to leave. Only a few thousand still remain at present.
Then there are the Kurds. These are people with a distinct language living mostly in the south-east of Turkey. Up to this day, the issue of representation is a controversial one. Due to the necessarily centralised and rigid parameters of the civil code, the Turkish state has huge difficulties in dealing with their linguistic and other issues. Kurdish "political parties" are usually banned; the party that gains the most sympathy from the Kurds is the ruling AKP, in power since 2002.
There are also the Armenians, as the Greeks, another Christian minority in Turkey, though generally they have had relatively few problems with the Turkish state over the years, as they have been accepting of their status within Turkey. For this reason, they don't need further mention.
So the foundation of the Turkish state was from its inception bound in insecurity, due to the ethnic and religious complexity of the country. The cult of "Kemalism" (in other words, following the secular "ideology" of Ataturk) has been the guiding principle of the Turkish state.
Until 2002, no openly religious party had been successful at the ballot box (apart from the brief and controversial rule of the religious "Refah" party in the mid-nineties, who were overthrown in a coup).
The fact that the "Islamist" AKP, who took power in that year, have remained in power and generally popular, is a testament to the lessons the AKP's politicians have learned: how to maintain, manufacture and manipulate popular opinion, as well as against the "secular" state itself. The last point, the campaign against the "secular establishment" is seen through the continuing "Ergenekon" conspiracy; a right-wing plot by nationalist politicians and military staff to engineer an internal crisis, allowing the military to take power from the "Islamist" government.
In general, the main point about the condition of "Turkish democracy" is this: the tenets of secularism and the status of Ataturk as a semi-revered founder of the republic, are inviolate and are not open to (negative) discussion.
Like Italy, Turkey has a plethora of parties, though only a small number of those that exist have ever tasted power in the lifetime of "Turkish democracy". Also like Italy, until the AKP came to power in 2002, most governments were coalitions of some sort, and their time in power was sometimes brief, especially in the seventies and nineties.
But the healthy number of parties (the lesser ones usually being a confusing combination of acronyms) does not change the fact that the status of "Turkish democracy" relies on the centralised state and in immovable civil code. This necessarily stymes opinion and dissent.
The irony now is that the governing AKP, who have been so critical of this rigid civil code over the years (as they had been at the wrong end of it in the past), are now using the same civil code to limit press freedom. The government is using it against those "secularists" who claim the AKP has its own Islamic agenda, and accuse the government of arrogance or worse.
The other components of the Turkish state, the judiciary, are caught in the middle of all this, between the government, military and secular sphere. Sometimes they have launched prosecutions against the government, sometimes against the military. The result has generally appeared to be a mess to most observers, with no sign of things being resolved in the near future.
So where does Egypt fit into all this?
Like Turkey, Egypt is culturally heterogenious: with a large Coptic Christian minority (10%), as well as the smaller Greek and Armenian churches. Also like Turkey, its modern secular state was founded by a military man, Abdul Nasser, in the 1950s. And, also like Turkey, the state has used the shield of "secularism" as a way to manage and impose its own version of "democracy" onto its population.
Until now. With the overthrown of Hosni Mubarak, there were fears of an Iranian-style Islamic revolution (as Iran itself had hoped, when it initially encouraged the protests). This fear, though, was based on a misunderstanding of the nature of Egpytian society, as well as wishes of the protesters themselves.
The protesters' model, as many of them said, was that of Turkey. But at the same time, 2011 in Egypt was not the same as 1923 in Turkey; for Egypt had already had their "Ataturk" moment with Nasser in the 1950s.
No, these young protesters wanted a model more like Turkey circa 2002. But at the same time, Turkey's AKP government happened as a gradual evolution using the current "Turkish democracy" system; it seems that what Egyptians are demanding is something less constrained by civil codes and unbending constitutions as Turkey - something more pure and unrefined.
We can see that by the fact that free expression and protest are happening organically as we speak. There have been signs of religious unrest between Coptic Christans and Muslims (though people have said that former Mubarak loyalists have been behind this in any case); but it also appears that Egyptians are, at least for the moment, willing to accept these occurances as the necessary "price" of true freedom.
That may sound a little like Donald Rumsfeld's notorious explanation of Iraq's anarchic "version" of democracy: "stuff happens". But the longer-term signs for Egyptian democracy are good. The religious divide in Egypt points towards a tendency for tolerance and acceptance of other points of view. The early years of Turkey's republic show us that there the religious and ethnic issues were papered over, with messy results in the long-term. Egypt seems to already be learning from those experiences; anyway, Egypt may be religiously diverse, but it ethnically fairly homogenous. Turkey, meanwhile, has yet to fully grasp the nettle of the Kurdish question.
So, to sum up, don't worry about Egypt: they know what they're doing. It may look a bit confusing now, but given time, Egypt has the clear potential to be a great example of Muslim Arab democracy. And it is also the biggest Arab country.
It would be ironic indeed if, after the lengthy fiasco and bloody chaos one American president caused to establish democracy in Iraq, his successor could give a speech in the Egypt, and less than two years later, preside over a spontaneous democratic revolution in that same country.
So much for the supposed benefits of "regime change".
Thursday, February 3, 2011
An Ode To Service Stations
Motorway Service stations are the coaching inns and caravanserais of the 21st century.
There are dozens of them throughout the UK (and on motorways in Europe too); each one of them feels like a small, fully-autonomous unit - for you science fiction fans, they're like a spaceport for the tired motorist, as (s)he powers along the circuits of the national network, traffic acting as the lifeblood to the economy, service stations as circuit boxes, relays for resting drivers.
OK, I'm waxing lyrical. But anyway, like there are tv programmes about airports, I would love to see a fly-on-the-wall production set in a service station. Each station employs dozens of people; each day, thousands of people pass through the doors of service stations, a multitude of lives.
OK, I'm still waxing lyrical. I'll get to my point. Since being a child, service stations have had a strange nostaligic hold on me.
There's something quintessentially British about sitting in a service station "restaurant", on plastic seats around food-stained formica tables, pouring tea from a scalding hot metal teapot (leaving you with second degree burns), from a spout that spills most of the tea on to the table and not into the polystyrene cup. Yes, those were the days!
Yes, those were the days; when you could guarantee a reassuringly awful meal from a service station, and you knew that you would still be determined to enjoy it no matter what. No matter that the chips were wet and tastless; no matter that the fried eggs swam in grease! No matter! Because we are British, and we are used to it! We are a nation that revels in adversity; we are ecstatic for blandness. And this is why: because modesty in pleasures enlightens and emboldens the mind!
Of course, this is probably complete tosh. British service stations were never pleasant to hang out in; but they were never meant to be. There was always something vaguely Socialist about British service stations upto about fifteen years ago. But people didn't complain; they were functional places and that was all they needed to be.
This changed though around fifteen years ago. Since then, instead of containing socialist-style canteens of culinary crappiness, they now are miniature commercial respites from the motorway. The service station industry of the UK learned about marketing and the high street. Since then, service stations have become retail outposts on the motorway; inhabited by WHSmith, Marks and Spencer, Burger King, Costa Coffee (which is not otherwise a major coffee house competitor), Starbucks and the like.
So now service stations, especially since the huge growth in car usage, are little money-making machines for their owners: the retail spaces pay their hefty rent to the leaser; the cost gets passed on to the too-busy-to-care motorist.
But at least service stations now look better; and the food is better; and the choices are better. The old-style socialist service stations are no more; the American-style capitalist havens of retail have taken their place. This is progress; or so they say...
There are dozens of them throughout the UK (and on motorways in Europe too); each one of them feels like a small, fully-autonomous unit - for you science fiction fans, they're like a spaceport for the tired motorist, as (s)he powers along the circuits of the national network, traffic acting as the lifeblood to the economy, service stations as circuit boxes, relays for resting drivers.
OK, I'm waxing lyrical. But anyway, like there are tv programmes about airports, I would love to see a fly-on-the-wall production set in a service station. Each station employs dozens of people; each day, thousands of people pass through the doors of service stations, a multitude of lives.
OK, I'm still waxing lyrical. I'll get to my point. Since being a child, service stations have had a strange nostaligic hold on me.
There's something quintessentially British about sitting in a service station "restaurant", on plastic seats around food-stained formica tables, pouring tea from a scalding hot metal teapot (leaving you with second degree burns), from a spout that spills most of the tea on to the table and not into the polystyrene cup. Yes, those were the days!
Yes, those were the days; when you could guarantee a reassuringly awful meal from a service station, and you knew that you would still be determined to enjoy it no matter what. No matter that the chips were wet and tastless; no matter that the fried eggs swam in grease! No matter! Because we are British, and we are used to it! We are a nation that revels in adversity; we are ecstatic for blandness. And this is why: because modesty in pleasures enlightens and emboldens the mind!
Of course, this is probably complete tosh. British service stations were never pleasant to hang out in; but they were never meant to be. There was always something vaguely Socialist about British service stations upto about fifteen years ago. But people didn't complain; they were functional places and that was all they needed to be.
This changed though around fifteen years ago. Since then, instead of containing socialist-style canteens of culinary crappiness, they now are miniature commercial respites from the motorway. The service station industry of the UK learned about marketing and the high street. Since then, service stations have become retail outposts on the motorway; inhabited by WHSmith, Marks and Spencer, Burger King, Costa Coffee (which is not otherwise a major coffee house competitor), Starbucks and the like.
So now service stations, especially since the huge growth in car usage, are little money-making machines for their owners: the retail spaces pay their hefty rent to the leaser; the cost gets passed on to the too-busy-to-care motorist.
But at least service stations now look better; and the food is better; and the choices are better. The old-style socialist service stations are no more; the American-style capitalist havens of retail have taken their place. This is progress; or so they say...
Tuesday, January 18, 2011
Tucson, Arizona; free speech and incitement during the "War On Terror"
A lot of talk has been said about the effect that the toxic atmosphere of political partisanship in the USA of recent times can have on the psychology of the mentally unbalanced.
The left blame the right for the violent rhetoric of the Tea Party; the right say the killer was a lone nut. Whatever the case, his shooting of the Congresswoman was intentional; not just a random killing spree like Columbine, but more like the political shootings of the Kennedys and Martin Luther King. Those shootings were supposedly by lone nuts, too.
The blame has also been put on the gun laws. That's another issue that links all shootings, random as well as political. What I'm more interested in is the issue of "free speech" that moderates as well as the right-wing defend to the hilt. For it is the right to "free speech" that encourages political violence that is the key issue.
In the UK, "free speech" is a given right, but the previous Labour government also created the crime of "incitement to violence and religious hatred", which does not exist in the USA as far as I know. Free speech advocates criticised this law as a breach of human rights, but if conspiracy to murder is a crime, then why not incitement to commit violence? Is there really a huge difference? Yes, there may well be a difference between words and actions, but in a civilised society it is also up to people to take responsibility for their own words and actions.
Let's take another, also infamous, example: the offensive drawings of the Prophet Mohammed that caused so much anger (and inspired revenge attacks) in the Islamic world. At the time, some Western governments defended the right of the Danish cartoonist to be gratuitously offensive, saying that free speech shouldn't have to take account of people's sensibilities. Fine, then: why did they not simultaneously publish in their newspapers all the most hateful anti-Semitic cartoons, KKK propaganda, homophobic rhetoric and so on? Perhaps because those governments were not conveniently "at war" with Jews, blacks and homosexuals.
So this is the real issue: "civilised" people take account of the world they live in, and respect one another's views and culture. Respectable people and media do not publish content that would be gratuitously offensive, and certainly violent.
It is an unusual thing to say that the Tea Party and secular countries like France have something in common: defending till beyond the realms of sanity the idea of "free speech": even speech that can kill. The French and American right-wing are therefore singing from the same blinkered hymnsheet: these two countries born out of the same idealistic revolution now seem to advocate the most bloodyminded form of "freedom": the freedom to create chaos.
The left blame the right for the violent rhetoric of the Tea Party; the right say the killer was a lone nut. Whatever the case, his shooting of the Congresswoman was intentional; not just a random killing spree like Columbine, but more like the political shootings of the Kennedys and Martin Luther King. Those shootings were supposedly by lone nuts, too.
The blame has also been put on the gun laws. That's another issue that links all shootings, random as well as political. What I'm more interested in is the issue of "free speech" that moderates as well as the right-wing defend to the hilt. For it is the right to "free speech" that encourages political violence that is the key issue.
In the UK, "free speech" is a given right, but the previous Labour government also created the crime of "incitement to violence and religious hatred", which does not exist in the USA as far as I know. Free speech advocates criticised this law as a breach of human rights, but if conspiracy to murder is a crime, then why not incitement to commit violence? Is there really a huge difference? Yes, there may well be a difference between words and actions, but in a civilised society it is also up to people to take responsibility for their own words and actions.
Let's take another, also infamous, example: the offensive drawings of the Prophet Mohammed that caused so much anger (and inspired revenge attacks) in the Islamic world. At the time, some Western governments defended the right of the Danish cartoonist to be gratuitously offensive, saying that free speech shouldn't have to take account of people's sensibilities. Fine, then: why did they not simultaneously publish in their newspapers all the most hateful anti-Semitic cartoons, KKK propaganda, homophobic rhetoric and so on? Perhaps because those governments were not conveniently "at war" with Jews, blacks and homosexuals.
So this is the real issue: "civilised" people take account of the world they live in, and respect one another's views and culture. Respectable people and media do not publish content that would be gratuitously offensive, and certainly violent.
It is an unusual thing to say that the Tea Party and secular countries like France have something in common: defending till beyond the realms of sanity the idea of "free speech": even speech that can kill. The French and American right-wing are therefore singing from the same blinkered hymnsheet: these two countries born out of the same idealistic revolution now seem to advocate the most bloodyminded form of "freedom": the freedom to create chaos.
Sunday, January 9, 2011
Cross-cultural crossover and misunderstanding: comparing Turkish-Azeri ties
There is the famous phrase "Iki devlet, bir milliyet" (or "two states, one nation") that has been used to describe the relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan, but more interesting are the cultural and social similarities and (more commonly) differennces.
To begin with, the language. By and large, the two languages are relatively similar: as similar as, say, Dutch and German, or Norwegian and German - but NOT as similar as, say, Norwegian and Swedish. This has been a cause for both Turks ans Azeris when using their native language in the other's country. Turks come to Azerbaijan speaking Turkish may well be pretty easily understood by Azeris, but as Turkish grammar forms are more various than Azeri (though Azeri has its own various, but differing grammar structures) they will instantly be identified as non-Azeris. One interesting explanation I heard is that Azeri structures bear more similarity to old Ottoman structures, that have since changed much over time in Turkey itself. In other words, when Turks hear Azeris speak, it sounds like they're speaking an archaic form of Turkish. The letters are different in each language, too, and, much more interestingly (and open for entertaining misunderstanding), are the differences in vocabulary.
To give just one example: the Azeri phrase "stop the bus, I want to get off", using the same words in Turkish translates as "hide the bus, I want to fall".
Another reason for the differences is also historical. As Azerbaijan was occupied by Russia for most of the last two centuries, many everyday words have been replaced by the Russian ones (a similar point could be said of Turkish when considering the effect that French has had on their language). Also, there are many leftover Persian or Arabic words in use in Azeri, more than in Turkish, from what I can tell.
In Azerbaijan, and Baku in particular, Russian is still the "imperial" language; like English in today's India, perhaps. Anyone who doesn't have at least a working knowledge of Russian in Baku can be looked down upon, in particular in officialdom or in respectable companies. There are still a large number of Azeris in the country who speak Russian as their first language, and it is almost essential to know at least some Russian to get certain level of intellectual respect from one's peers.
On the other hand, a Russian speaker who has no or limited understanding of Azeri (and one of my former students could be counted as one) struggles to get by with the average Joe on the street. This is Azerbaijan, after all, and not Russia, or even Kazakhstan (where Russian speakers are still a huge segment of the population), and a Russian speaker ignorant of Azeri could be considered elitist or snobbish by the same officialdom and respectable companies. As you can imagine, a fine balance seems to required, but that is where most people exist; seamlessly interchanging between Azeri and Russian mid-sentence throughout conversations.
This has a naturally direct effect on the culture. For Turks who consider Azeris as their linguistic and cultural kinsmen, it comes as a surprise when they find out that they are just one of three competing cultural influences on Azerbaijan: the others being Russia and Iran. For this reason, the cultural differences are subtle but many.
To begin with, contemporary Azerbaijan appears even more secular than Ataturk's Turkey. In Baku, the call to prayer is only heard in the old city, where almost all the historical mosques are. The only other mosques in Baku are relatively new ones built in a few working class neighbourhoods near the centre, or in out-of-the-way suburbs that belong to very devout Muslims. The city centre and much of the city appears practically religion-free. The legacy of Soviet Russia is an obvious explanation for this. The comparison to Turkey, which is also officially secular but has a muezzin-blaring mosque on almost every corner, is stark. The historical reasons for the situation in Turkey are also more complicated: Ataturk never succeeded in fully dampening the devout tendencies of some Muslims in Turkey; he only succeeded in postponing them. The rise of the AK party over the past decade is a testament to the fact that these Islamic sentiments were always just under the surface, waiting for the right opportunity to be returned to the forefront. But that's another story. Perhaps because pre-Soviet Baku was also the most cosmopolitan city in the Russian Empire is another reason why devout Islamism has seen only a fairly modest revival in Azerbaijan overall, and that devout Muslims are a fairly marginalised bunch that few modern Azeris have time for.
But don't let the ostensibly secular appearance of Azerbaijan make you think that this automatically applies to the mindset, though. Unlike Turkey, where the headscarf is prevalent (moreso in recent years), in Azerbaijan it is much less common, for the reason that it has a much stronger link to devout Islam. But the lack of headscarves distracts from other, more socially-conservative tendencies in Azerbaijan. Although there are signs that things are changing (more on that later...), being in an openly sexual relationship before marriage has been considered socially unacceptable in Azerbaijan. Azeri society still has largely traditional views of men and women - to the extent that for many women, the pinnacle of their life's achievement would be to have a good (rich) husband, healthy children, a good house etc etc. And naturally, many of the men expect the same of their women.
To be fair, these views are hardly unknown in the West, either (think of Greece or southern Italy), and there are these days plenty of young women in Baku beating this stereotype with successful careers, and men who have more enlightened views towards the opposite sex. Also, even more encourgingly, the number of young Azeris who have now lived abroad (and have returned to Baku with their Western mindset intact) is increasing all the time, and the streets of Baku are these days filled with contemporary young people. Baku city centre these days looks as much a wealthy Western city as Paris or Copenhagen, albeit with a slightly Middle Eastern flavour.
Then there are more everyday cultural issues such as clothing. Although Turks as shown in the media world dress to kill, and office workers dress to impress, the average Turk in the street seems to dress to...well, dress. In other words, casual clothes, jeans, T-shirts are the norm. Turkey is a young country with a huge youth culture - it seems they are too cool to feel the need to "impress"; much better to wear whatever you feel comfortable in. In this way, young Turks in particular seem like a throwback to eighties America; casual is the new smart.
Azeris, by comparison, certainly dress to impress, every single day, and especially when out with family and others. Azeris are much more conscious, it seems (as Italians are, perhaps) of looking good for the sake of others. Going to a smart cafe in your best clothes is totally normal to an Azeri; they would never consider otherwise. In this way, it may appear to make Azeris more conservative that their Turkish counterparts; maybe, but "conservatism" has many different meanings and expressions, as we can see from the different ways that Turks and Azeris express their culture.
In Baku what was only two years ago unheard of is now commonplace. As I said, Azeris tend to dress to impress; young Baku women these days dress to impress in more and more openly obvious ways. While Turkish women are still happily "sexy" in their T-shirts and jeans, young Azeri woman wear high-heels (though high heels are common for all ages of Baku women), short skirts (which were more linked to prostitutes in Baku in the past, though they still exist) and tonnes of makeup. From what I've seen, Turkish women tend to be much more indifferent to the use of makeup (again, "casual" is king in Istanbul). Whereas Turks may get their clothing and style inspiration from America and the West, Azeris tend to get it from Russia and Iran (Iranian women, even in a headscarf, are obsessed about wearing the right makeup).
One last thing: religion. Some Turks don't realise this, but whereas Turks are Sunni Muslim, Azeris are overwhelmingly Shia. This has an effect on the culture again, but also in subtle ways. The best way to sum it up would be to say that Azeris are more fatalistic as a nation than Turks. Turks have character flaws, too (what nationality doesn't?): a kind of whimsical melancholy that comes from the national character and history; a tendency to see things in black or white; but I don't want to linger on them all.
On the positive side, the long tradition of multiculturalism still exists in today's Azerbaijan to a healthy extent. This is also because nationalism is still quite a new concept to most Azeris. "Azerbaijan" as one empire never existed for long in history as a single entity; most of the time there were rival miniature kingdoms under pressure from Persia or Russia, which were all gone by the early 19th century.
Turkey's sense of self is much more obviously nationalistic, and that has been to the general detriment of multiculturalism. Like Azerbaijan, "Turkey" is also a comparively new concept, created out of the mind of Mustafa Kemal ("Pakistan" was created in a similar fashion after World War Two). Previously it had been the Ottoman Empire, where, although it was a Muslim empire, it was also hugely multicultural as it contained vast numbers of Christians, Jews and others. Many of these "minorities" had a huge cultural impact (and influence) on the Ottoman Empire. The creation of Turkey made all these people "Turks". The elephant in the room was that "Turkey" still contained many "minorities", and although the country was officially secular, in practise, it could be said that Turkish nationalism overlapped with cultural imperialism.
Nowadays, Turks are very protective and defensive of their identity (perhaps Azeris naturally will be too, after another decade of oil-fuelled confidence?), and this has made cultural re-opening a sensitive issue. Some commentators talk of the AK party's policies as a "New Ottomanism" with more engagement with the regional players and neighbours, and a re-flowering of multicultural life inside the country. The former may well be true, but the jury's still out on the latter. As for Azerbaijan, they're still playing their role in the Great Game, now with the added impetus of oil and gas to back them up.
Both countries are going places; just not necessarily to the same destination.
To begin with, the language. By and large, the two languages are relatively similar: as similar as, say, Dutch and German, or Norwegian and German - but NOT as similar as, say, Norwegian and Swedish. This has been a cause for both Turks ans Azeris when using their native language in the other's country. Turks come to Azerbaijan speaking Turkish may well be pretty easily understood by Azeris, but as Turkish grammar forms are more various than Azeri (though Azeri has its own various, but differing grammar structures) they will instantly be identified as non-Azeris. One interesting explanation I heard is that Azeri structures bear more similarity to old Ottoman structures, that have since changed much over time in Turkey itself. In other words, when Turks hear Azeris speak, it sounds like they're speaking an archaic form of Turkish. The letters are different in each language, too, and, much more interestingly (and open for entertaining misunderstanding), are the differences in vocabulary.
To give just one example: the Azeri phrase "stop the bus, I want to get off", using the same words in Turkish translates as "hide the bus, I want to fall".
Another reason for the differences is also historical. As Azerbaijan was occupied by Russia for most of the last two centuries, many everyday words have been replaced by the Russian ones (a similar point could be said of Turkish when considering the effect that French has had on their language). Also, there are many leftover Persian or Arabic words in use in Azeri, more than in Turkish, from what I can tell.
In Azerbaijan, and Baku in particular, Russian is still the "imperial" language; like English in today's India, perhaps. Anyone who doesn't have at least a working knowledge of Russian in Baku can be looked down upon, in particular in officialdom or in respectable companies. There are still a large number of Azeris in the country who speak Russian as their first language, and it is almost essential to know at least some Russian to get certain level of intellectual respect from one's peers.
On the other hand, a Russian speaker who has no or limited understanding of Azeri (and one of my former students could be counted as one) struggles to get by with the average Joe on the street. This is Azerbaijan, after all, and not Russia, or even Kazakhstan (where Russian speakers are still a huge segment of the population), and a Russian speaker ignorant of Azeri could be considered elitist or snobbish by the same officialdom and respectable companies. As you can imagine, a fine balance seems to required, but that is where most people exist; seamlessly interchanging between Azeri and Russian mid-sentence throughout conversations.
This has a naturally direct effect on the culture. For Turks who consider Azeris as their linguistic and cultural kinsmen, it comes as a surprise when they find out that they are just one of three competing cultural influences on Azerbaijan: the others being Russia and Iran. For this reason, the cultural differences are subtle but many.
To begin with, contemporary Azerbaijan appears even more secular than Ataturk's Turkey. In Baku, the call to prayer is only heard in the old city, where almost all the historical mosques are. The only other mosques in Baku are relatively new ones built in a few working class neighbourhoods near the centre, or in out-of-the-way suburbs that belong to very devout Muslims. The city centre and much of the city appears practically religion-free. The legacy of Soviet Russia is an obvious explanation for this. The comparison to Turkey, which is also officially secular but has a muezzin-blaring mosque on almost every corner, is stark. The historical reasons for the situation in Turkey are also more complicated: Ataturk never succeeded in fully dampening the devout tendencies of some Muslims in Turkey; he only succeeded in postponing them. The rise of the AK party over the past decade is a testament to the fact that these Islamic sentiments were always just under the surface, waiting for the right opportunity to be returned to the forefront. But that's another story. Perhaps because pre-Soviet Baku was also the most cosmopolitan city in the Russian Empire is another reason why devout Islamism has seen only a fairly modest revival in Azerbaijan overall, and that devout Muslims are a fairly marginalised bunch that few modern Azeris have time for.
But don't let the ostensibly secular appearance of Azerbaijan make you think that this automatically applies to the mindset, though. Unlike Turkey, where the headscarf is prevalent (moreso in recent years), in Azerbaijan it is much less common, for the reason that it has a much stronger link to devout Islam. But the lack of headscarves distracts from other, more socially-conservative tendencies in Azerbaijan. Although there are signs that things are changing (more on that later...), being in an openly sexual relationship before marriage has been considered socially unacceptable in Azerbaijan. Azeri society still has largely traditional views of men and women - to the extent that for many women, the pinnacle of their life's achievement would be to have a good (rich) husband, healthy children, a good house etc etc. And naturally, many of the men expect the same of their women.
To be fair, these views are hardly unknown in the West, either (think of Greece or southern Italy), and there are these days plenty of young women in Baku beating this stereotype with successful careers, and men who have more enlightened views towards the opposite sex. Also, even more encourgingly, the number of young Azeris who have now lived abroad (and have returned to Baku with their Western mindset intact) is increasing all the time, and the streets of Baku are these days filled with contemporary young people. Baku city centre these days looks as much a wealthy Western city as Paris or Copenhagen, albeit with a slightly Middle Eastern flavour.
Then there are more everyday cultural issues such as clothing. Although Turks as shown in the media world dress to kill, and office workers dress to impress, the average Turk in the street seems to dress to...well, dress. In other words, casual clothes, jeans, T-shirts are the norm. Turkey is a young country with a huge youth culture - it seems they are too cool to feel the need to "impress"; much better to wear whatever you feel comfortable in. In this way, young Turks in particular seem like a throwback to eighties America; casual is the new smart.
Azeris, by comparison, certainly dress to impress, every single day, and especially when out with family and others. Azeris are much more conscious, it seems (as Italians are, perhaps) of looking good for the sake of others. Going to a smart cafe in your best clothes is totally normal to an Azeri; they would never consider otherwise. In this way, it may appear to make Azeris more conservative that their Turkish counterparts; maybe, but "conservatism" has many different meanings and expressions, as we can see from the different ways that Turks and Azeris express their culture.
In Baku what was only two years ago unheard of is now commonplace. As I said, Azeris tend to dress to impress; young Baku women these days dress to impress in more and more openly obvious ways. While Turkish women are still happily "sexy" in their T-shirts and jeans, young Azeri woman wear high-heels (though high heels are common for all ages of Baku women), short skirts (which were more linked to prostitutes in Baku in the past, though they still exist) and tonnes of makeup. From what I've seen, Turkish women tend to be much more indifferent to the use of makeup (again, "casual" is king in Istanbul). Whereas Turks may get their clothing and style inspiration from America and the West, Azeris tend to get it from Russia and Iran (Iranian women, even in a headscarf, are obsessed about wearing the right makeup).
One last thing: religion. Some Turks don't realise this, but whereas Turks are Sunni Muslim, Azeris are overwhelmingly Shia. This has an effect on the culture again, but also in subtle ways. The best way to sum it up would be to say that Azeris are more fatalistic as a nation than Turks. Turks have character flaws, too (what nationality doesn't?): a kind of whimsical melancholy that comes from the national character and history; a tendency to see things in black or white; but I don't want to linger on them all.
On the positive side, the long tradition of multiculturalism still exists in today's Azerbaijan to a healthy extent. This is also because nationalism is still quite a new concept to most Azeris. "Azerbaijan" as one empire never existed for long in history as a single entity; most of the time there were rival miniature kingdoms under pressure from Persia or Russia, which were all gone by the early 19th century.
Turkey's sense of self is much more obviously nationalistic, and that has been to the general detriment of multiculturalism. Like Azerbaijan, "Turkey" is also a comparively new concept, created out of the mind of Mustafa Kemal ("Pakistan" was created in a similar fashion after World War Two). Previously it had been the Ottoman Empire, where, although it was a Muslim empire, it was also hugely multicultural as it contained vast numbers of Christians, Jews and others. Many of these "minorities" had a huge cultural impact (and influence) on the Ottoman Empire. The creation of Turkey made all these people "Turks". The elephant in the room was that "Turkey" still contained many "minorities", and although the country was officially secular, in practise, it could be said that Turkish nationalism overlapped with cultural imperialism.
Nowadays, Turks are very protective and defensive of their identity (perhaps Azeris naturally will be too, after another decade of oil-fuelled confidence?), and this has made cultural re-opening a sensitive issue. Some commentators talk of the AK party's policies as a "New Ottomanism" with more engagement with the regional players and neighbours, and a re-flowering of multicultural life inside the country. The former may well be true, but the jury's still out on the latter. As for Azerbaijan, they're still playing their role in the Great Game, now with the added impetus of oil and gas to back them up.
Both countries are going places; just not necessarily to the same destination.
Monday, November 22, 2010
Baku: A City Rejuvenated By Oil
Until the late 19th century, Baku was a small medieval wall town on the western shores of the Caspian Sea, famous only as a home of ancient Zoroastrianism.
Then it discovered oil.
It quickly attracted the attention of Europe's well-heeled rich, and many local farmers had the luck to dig underground, strike oil and become millionaires in months. By the beginning of the 20th century, it produced half the world's oil (by contrast, Kuwait, one of the world's richest petrostates today, produces a mere 5 per cent). By the start of the First World War, Baku (as part of the Russian Empire) had long overgrown the old medieval walled town and was full of mansions, parks and boulevards to rival Europe's richest and most famous cities.
This all ended with the Bolshevik revolution. Although briefly independent (as the Bolsheviks were at first too distracted by the civil war), by 1920 it was part of the Soviet Union, and Baku disappeared off the maps of the world. Baku's first "Oil Boom" was over.
During the Soviet era, Baku as a city stagnated, still well-off and cosmopolitan compared to the rest of the USSR, but its oil industry became inefficient and horribly polluting on the local environment, as the Soviets lacked the money to invest in more mordern, cleaner methods of extraction. Baku and the surrounding region became a toxic mess.
After independence in 1992, Western investment was not long in returning. After the "deal of the century" in the late '90s, BP and other oil multinationals brought a second "Oil Boom". Ten years on from that, Baku, looks to have restored its place on the world stage.
From a personal point of view, the changes in Baku over the past couple of years have been fairly astonishing. First arriving to Baku at the beginning of 2009, Baku looked like a city going places: buildings from the first "Oil Boom" were starting to be properly restored, and there were signs that also iconic ultra-modern structures were starting to be added to the cityscape.
There were still much room for improvement, of course, socially-speaking. The spread of the oil wealth clearly had not touched some people, but that was natural, considering the circumstances. Also, Baku being part of socially-conservative, Muslim Azerbaijan, led to some confusing misconceptions to the foreigner: although people dressed in a fairly Western style of clothing, a Western sense of liberal morality did not always accompany that. Social mores were still rather conservative and traditional.
Recently returning to Baku, after a break of several months, the extent of the changes, both physically and socially, have been remarkable. After many months of work, the city centre has been restored to match the grandiosity of the days of the first "Oil Boom", albeit with 21st refinements. The parks and boulevards of downtown Baku match those, in terms of style and elegance, of the most famous European cities. The city centre may, to architectural snobs, look like a confection of European styles, but this was all built by those Europeans a century ago.
The old city (called "Icherishehir" in Azeri) has been restored and polished up, to the effect that, once you pass through the old town walls, you feel as though you have stepped back a few centuries in time, if you ignore the souvenir hawkers. The old town is a labyrinth of alleyways and passages, and what's more, totally silent.
Socially, too, the changes have been sudden and seemingly irreversable. Young people as well as familes and pensioners, now take advantage of the newly-restored parks and public spaces, hanging out till late. The nightlife scene, at one time somewhat limited in its scope, is rapidly opening up and diversifying.
Baku looks to have regained its due sense of civic pride with gusto, and is a pleasure to spend time in, provided you have the money of course. In other words, Baku is well and truly open for business.
Then it discovered oil.
It quickly attracted the attention of Europe's well-heeled rich, and many local farmers had the luck to dig underground, strike oil and become millionaires in months. By the beginning of the 20th century, it produced half the world's oil (by contrast, Kuwait, one of the world's richest petrostates today, produces a mere 5 per cent). By the start of the First World War, Baku (as part of the Russian Empire) had long overgrown the old medieval walled town and was full of mansions, parks and boulevards to rival Europe's richest and most famous cities.
This all ended with the Bolshevik revolution. Although briefly independent (as the Bolsheviks were at first too distracted by the civil war), by 1920 it was part of the Soviet Union, and Baku disappeared off the maps of the world. Baku's first "Oil Boom" was over.
During the Soviet era, Baku as a city stagnated, still well-off and cosmopolitan compared to the rest of the USSR, but its oil industry became inefficient and horribly polluting on the local environment, as the Soviets lacked the money to invest in more mordern, cleaner methods of extraction. Baku and the surrounding region became a toxic mess.
After independence in 1992, Western investment was not long in returning. After the "deal of the century" in the late '90s, BP and other oil multinationals brought a second "Oil Boom". Ten years on from that, Baku, looks to have restored its place on the world stage.
From a personal point of view, the changes in Baku over the past couple of years have been fairly astonishing. First arriving to Baku at the beginning of 2009, Baku looked like a city going places: buildings from the first "Oil Boom" were starting to be properly restored, and there were signs that also iconic ultra-modern structures were starting to be added to the cityscape.
There were still much room for improvement, of course, socially-speaking. The spread of the oil wealth clearly had not touched some people, but that was natural, considering the circumstances. Also, Baku being part of socially-conservative, Muslim Azerbaijan, led to some confusing misconceptions to the foreigner: although people dressed in a fairly Western style of clothing, a Western sense of liberal morality did not always accompany that. Social mores were still rather conservative and traditional.
Recently returning to Baku, after a break of several months, the extent of the changes, both physically and socially, have been remarkable. After many months of work, the city centre has been restored to match the grandiosity of the days of the first "Oil Boom", albeit with 21st refinements. The parks and boulevards of downtown Baku match those, in terms of style and elegance, of the most famous European cities. The city centre may, to architectural snobs, look like a confection of European styles, but this was all built by those Europeans a century ago.
The old city (called "Icherishehir" in Azeri) has been restored and polished up, to the effect that, once you pass through the old town walls, you feel as though you have stepped back a few centuries in time, if you ignore the souvenir hawkers. The old town is a labyrinth of alleyways and passages, and what's more, totally silent.
Socially, too, the changes have been sudden and seemingly irreversable. Young people as well as familes and pensioners, now take advantage of the newly-restored parks and public spaces, hanging out till late. The nightlife scene, at one time somewhat limited in its scope, is rapidly opening up and diversifying.
Baku looks to have regained its due sense of civic pride with gusto, and is a pleasure to spend time in, provided you have the money of course. In other words, Baku is well and truly open for business.
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