In my last article about the ongoing "Ukraine Crisis", I talked about the "Russian Gambit":
"What are Russia's intentions? While accepting a de facto split of Ukraine on the ground (at least in the short term), accepting it de jure would be another matter, and we know that Russia follows the line that the opposition now in power in Kiev is engineered by fascists that have come to power through a violent coup. On Saturday, having fled Kiev, Yanukovich may well have asked for Russian protection for a Russian-speaking eastern and southern rump state. But the Kremlin may have explained their own motivation, based on their analysis of the opposition: to allow the opposition a taste of power in Kiev (while having no control of the east), playing a waiting game for the disparate opposition to violently turn on each other, allowing Yanukovich and his party to return to power in Kiev soon afterwards, with Russian help or not, depending on the situation."
Seen from this perspective, the events of the past twenty-four hours in particular make some sense. On Wednesday, Putin declared a sudden "mobilisation" of forces in the west and centre of Russia, with full "exercises" to begin on Friday, and for several days. This also led to naval forces being stepped up in readiness.
With convenient timing, this was followed overnight by the seizure in Simferopol (Crimea's capital) of two key government buildings (the parliament and government house) by a large group pro-Russia militia. Surrealism had become the norm on Thursday in the Crimean capital, as the gunmen were cheered on by supporters outside, while the local police that had briefly surrounded the building, disappeared.
While this was going on, local MPs were being allowed into the building, albeit without the use of their phones; official parliamentary business was thus being guided by the wishes of several dozen armed men.
Who the men are is unclear; Russian special forces "incognito"? If not directly or indirectly guided by Moscow, they could instead be members of the "Berkut" forces, disbanded by the new Kiev government for their brutality against anti-government protesters, but welcomed in Crimea, out to make a name for themselves and push events along.
By the evening, the (still occupied) Crimean parliament had agreed to hold a referendum on Crimea's future status and election for the same day as presidential elections declared by the Kiev government. What is clear is that Crimea represents a "low-hanging fruit" for Moscow; easy to pick away from the loose grasp of a distant and impotent Kiev government.
As mentioned in my "Russian gambit", it looks as though Putin took one look at the makeup of personalities in Kiev and has decided to bide his time; they appear divided and out of their depth. While the Kiev government has declared presidential elections three months from now, this is a suitable length of time (neither too short nor too long) for the former opposition in Kiev to screw things up, as Putin guesses they will. Meanwhile, Yanukovich's "Party Of The Regions" has declared his successor as their candidate for the May elections.
By June, Crimea could easily be part of Russia in all but name, with Yanukovich's successor in power in Kiev, all without a shot being fired. Exactly as Putin would prefer.
The Kiev conundrum
Events in Kiev in the past few days have hardly given much confidence that those in power in Kiev have a strong idea of what they are doing, or with a clear understanding of the task facing them.
The interim government announced today the new line-up of the cabinet: many of them are politicians from Yuliya Tymushenko's "Fatherland" party (some of them with a corrupt reputation of their own); the others are non-political figures such as journalists and actors, as well as a few posts for the right-wing "Svoboda" (Freedom) party.
This line-up of figures has the appearance of a coalition of corrupt party hacks in collusion with unpleasant nationalists and inexperienced (and naive?) non-partisan figures. In short, it looks like a mess. When the cabinet was announced for approval (like in a Roman forum) to the "Euromaidan", many of them received heckles. Worse, the interim government's finance minister then explained that they would have to make many unpopular economic decisions: this is code for "austerity", given that the government has inherited a massive debt that the EU and the IMF are keen to restructure by taking the economy to pieces.
Even ignoring the inevitable unpopularity that "austerity" would bring to the protesters that had supposedly supported the "revolution", most of Ukraine's productivity is the east, the natural homeland of Yanukovich's supporters. There is next to no chance that the reforms that the EU and the IMF are talking about would ever get through without getting the approval of "the east", which is never going to happen.
Apart from the "cloud cuckoo land" ideas of the interim government, what's more baffling is the stance of EU. It's clear to any objective observer that the Ukraine "revolution" that had been brewing for a few months now was supported on the ground by the foot-soldiers of "Svoboda" and "Pravy Sektor" (Right Sector); the latter are a fascist mob that consider "Svoboda" a group of soft moderates. Since the "revolution" over the weekend, the fascist mob have been acting as the street security throughout most of Kiev, as well as in their real stronghold in the west, Lvov. There is little evidence that the mob have put away their weapons yet, or have any serious intention of doing so.
What on earth are the EU doing so conspicuously supporting a government of uncertain designs and unstable character, that was brought to power with the help of a fascist militia? It looks for all the world that the EU has seriously lost the plot.
Anything that makes the West look incompetent makes Putin look ever smarter; the "chess grand master" whose moves are unplayable against.
Ukraine in early 2014 now resembles some of the weak and unstable governments that were established in Europe in the aftermath of the First World War, and in the run-up to the Second World War. A more contemporary comparison would be to the weak post-Soviet governments that existed in the first years after the fall of Communism.
In each of these comparisons, the result was messy, often resulting in extreme governments and conflict. In a previous article, I compared the Ukraine crisis to the so-called "July Crisis" that led to the First World War. While we're not at that stage yet (and may never be, if the "Russian Gambit" holds true), the end game is still mired in uncertainty.
It has been announced that Yanukovich is to give a press conference on Friday afternoon in Rostov-on-Don. For what possible purpose? As Moscow has declared that they are willing to support his person, this may be yet another manoeuvre in the great "chess game" of Ukraine...
Thursday, February 27, 2014
Sunday, February 23, 2014
The Ukraine Crisis: the players in a European "chess game"
In a recent analysis of the Ukraine Crisis, I talked about three possible outcomes; optimistic, middling, and the "worse case" scenario. The "worse case" scenario was:
"Civil war erupts, with Crimea seceding. Russia decides to intervene directly to protect its strategic interests, as Ukraine represents its "last line of defence"
As of Sunday, now seventy-two hours on from that "worse case" scenario, events seem much closer to that than the most optimistic resolution.
The Russian gambit
As the deal was signed between Yanukovich and the opposition politicians on Friday, it appears that Yanukovich had already decided that the "deal" wasn't worth the paper it was written on.
The decision of Yanukovich to make a "tactical withdrawal" to Kharkov in the middle of the night, while initially bringing reactions of surprise and victorious exultation from the opposition in Kiev come Saturday morning, in reality had a much more ominous motivation.
Later that afternoon, it became clear that Yanukovich's decision to flee from the Ukrainian-speaking capital, Kiev, to the Russian-speaking "eastern capital", Kharkov, was not an acceptance of defeat, or an abrogation of his presidential duties. In the same way that Charles I's decision to flee London for the safety of Oxford was the opening move that created the English Civil War, Yanukovich's retreat to Kharkov had a similar motivation.
During Saturday, Yanukovich's supporters in the eastern districts initially gave serious consideration to forming a breakaway, Russian-backed province of the (Russian-speaking) east and south of Ukraine. Then there were rumours that he was trying to flee to Russia, along with some of his most senior supporters. It was after this, however, that Yanukovich, later in the day, made an announcement that he was the legitimate president, and that those in Kiev were fascists and thugs: words than sound like they were manufactured in Moscow.
An educated guess is that he had been on the phone to the Kremlin, who had their own reasons for not wanting him to surrender half the country so easily. Since yesterday, Yanukovich's support base (The Party Of The Regions) seem to be abandoning him, while still considering the Kiev government to be illegitimate; this may also be part of a Kremlin-formulated gambit.
What are Russia's intentions? While accepting a de facto split of Ukraine on the ground (at least in the short term), accepting it de jure would be another matter, and we know that Russia follows the line that the opposition now in power in Kiev is engineered by fascists that have come to power through a violent coup. On Saturday, having fled Kiev, Yanukovich may well have asked for Russian protection for a Russian-speaking eastern and southern rump state. But the Kremlin may have explained their own motivation, based on their analysis of the opposition: to allow the opposition a taste of power in Kiev (while having no control of the east), playing a waiting game for the disparate opposition to violently turn on each other, allowing Yanukovich and his party to return to power in Kiev soon afterwards, with Russian help or not, depending on the situation.
The above scenario makes some sense in Russian eyes, and events on the ground give some credence to Moscow's thinking, if this is indeed what is on their mind. The Kremlin is playing a long game in Ukraine, and may be happy in the short-term to see opposition in-fighting cause a rapid disintegration of a new Kiev government; all the better if the EU, in its ignorance of the make-up of the opposition, ally themselves with fascists and thugs, who will soon become discredited. It will vindicate Moscow's gambit in the Ukraine Crisis, and lead to the Russia-leaning party coming back into power, with a much weaker opposition.
At the moment, with Yanukovich leaking support from his own party base, Moscow's loyalty to him personally also looks increasingly expendable. For Moscow, he is just one man; the preservation of Yanukovich's party is much more important than the man himself, in order for their gambit to succeed.
The players in Kiev
Who are the opposition? As just mentioned, the EU's support for them seems more in hope than expectation; they support the opposition's "Euro-philia" without looking too carefully at the motivations of the different players that the opposition are made of.
Already, as of Sunday, the opposition in parliament in Kiev look to be over-reaching: repealing laws that give Russian-speakers in the east and south linguistic equality with Ukrainian-speakers. While this may only look like it's reversing a perceived Yanukovich indulgence, this sends a clear signal to Yanukovich's supporters in the east, and given the polarised climate of Ukraine at the moment, hardly sends a message of mutual understanding and goodwill. At present you have a government in Kiev that considers itself the government of whole country, and an almost identical situation in "eastern capital" Kharkov and the rest of the east and the south. This is the recipe for a civil war: all you need is a spark.
Those in Europe who compare these events in Kiev to the Orange Revolution are dangerously behind the times. Yuliya Tymushenko, the now-released former-PM, no longer has a serious power-base; since her time in prison, she has become discredited (as the catcalls during her speech to the protesters show), and others have taken her place.
Furthermore, as Moscow already knows, the opposition movement itself is a disparate group: the only aim that truly united them was to oust Yanukovich. Now that's done, what next? The opposition comprises pro-EU groups, as well as anti-Semitic extreme nationalists. Those nationalists already have a serious hold on the city of Lvov, the "second city" of "western" Ukraine. There is therefore the very real danger that even in the firmly-opposition half of the country, in-fighting over "territory" could break out between nationalists and moderates.
And then there are those areas that are more "contested", where the mix between Ukrainian speakers and Russian speakers is more even. What happens there? A linguistic (and election) map shows you that the westernmost regions are the most "Ukrainian", and those in the south-east and Crimea are the most "Russian". Most of the rest is one big grey area. It is here where the risk of violence may be the highest, and could result in a "worse case" scenario.
Meanwhile, the Kremlin looks on, waiting to see if its gambit will come off; and whether "intervention" will be necessary...
"Civil war erupts, with Crimea seceding. Russia decides to intervene directly to protect its strategic interests, as Ukraine represents its "last line of defence"
As of Sunday, now seventy-two hours on from that "worse case" scenario, events seem much closer to that than the most optimistic resolution.
The Russian gambit
As the deal was signed between Yanukovich and the opposition politicians on Friday, it appears that Yanukovich had already decided that the "deal" wasn't worth the paper it was written on.
The decision of Yanukovich to make a "tactical withdrawal" to Kharkov in the middle of the night, while initially bringing reactions of surprise and victorious exultation from the opposition in Kiev come Saturday morning, in reality had a much more ominous motivation.
Later that afternoon, it became clear that Yanukovich's decision to flee from the Ukrainian-speaking capital, Kiev, to the Russian-speaking "eastern capital", Kharkov, was not an acceptance of defeat, or an abrogation of his presidential duties. In the same way that Charles I's decision to flee London for the safety of Oxford was the opening move that created the English Civil War, Yanukovich's retreat to Kharkov had a similar motivation.
During Saturday, Yanukovich's supporters in the eastern districts initially gave serious consideration to forming a breakaway, Russian-backed province of the (Russian-speaking) east and south of Ukraine. Then there were rumours that he was trying to flee to Russia, along with some of his most senior supporters. It was after this, however, that Yanukovich, later in the day, made an announcement that he was the legitimate president, and that those in Kiev were fascists and thugs: words than sound like they were manufactured in Moscow.
An educated guess is that he had been on the phone to the Kremlin, who had their own reasons for not wanting him to surrender half the country so easily. Since yesterday, Yanukovich's support base (The Party Of The Regions) seem to be abandoning him, while still considering the Kiev government to be illegitimate; this may also be part of a Kremlin-formulated gambit.
What are Russia's intentions? While accepting a de facto split of Ukraine on the ground (at least in the short term), accepting it de jure would be another matter, and we know that Russia follows the line that the opposition now in power in Kiev is engineered by fascists that have come to power through a violent coup. On Saturday, having fled Kiev, Yanukovich may well have asked for Russian protection for a Russian-speaking eastern and southern rump state. But the Kremlin may have explained their own motivation, based on their analysis of the opposition: to allow the opposition a taste of power in Kiev (while having no control of the east), playing a waiting game for the disparate opposition to violently turn on each other, allowing Yanukovich and his party to return to power in Kiev soon afterwards, with Russian help or not, depending on the situation.
The above scenario makes some sense in Russian eyes, and events on the ground give some credence to Moscow's thinking, if this is indeed what is on their mind. The Kremlin is playing a long game in Ukraine, and may be happy in the short-term to see opposition in-fighting cause a rapid disintegration of a new Kiev government; all the better if the EU, in its ignorance of the make-up of the opposition, ally themselves with fascists and thugs, who will soon become discredited. It will vindicate Moscow's gambit in the Ukraine Crisis, and lead to the Russia-leaning party coming back into power, with a much weaker opposition.
At the moment, with Yanukovich leaking support from his own party base, Moscow's loyalty to him personally also looks increasingly expendable. For Moscow, he is just one man; the preservation of Yanukovich's party is much more important than the man himself, in order for their gambit to succeed.
The players in Kiev
Who are the opposition? As just mentioned, the EU's support for them seems more in hope than expectation; they support the opposition's "Euro-philia" without looking too carefully at the motivations of the different players that the opposition are made of.
Already, as of Sunday, the opposition in parliament in Kiev look to be over-reaching: repealing laws that give Russian-speakers in the east and south linguistic equality with Ukrainian-speakers. While this may only look like it's reversing a perceived Yanukovich indulgence, this sends a clear signal to Yanukovich's supporters in the east, and given the polarised climate of Ukraine at the moment, hardly sends a message of mutual understanding and goodwill. At present you have a government in Kiev that considers itself the government of whole country, and an almost identical situation in "eastern capital" Kharkov and the rest of the east and the south. This is the recipe for a civil war: all you need is a spark.
Those in Europe who compare these events in Kiev to the Orange Revolution are dangerously behind the times. Yuliya Tymushenko, the now-released former-PM, no longer has a serious power-base; since her time in prison, she has become discredited (as the catcalls during her speech to the protesters show), and others have taken her place.
Furthermore, as Moscow already knows, the opposition movement itself is a disparate group: the only aim that truly united them was to oust Yanukovich. Now that's done, what next? The opposition comprises pro-EU groups, as well as anti-Semitic extreme nationalists. Those nationalists already have a serious hold on the city of Lvov, the "second city" of "western" Ukraine. There is therefore the very real danger that even in the firmly-opposition half of the country, in-fighting over "territory" could break out between nationalists and moderates.
And then there are those areas that are more "contested", where the mix between Ukrainian speakers and Russian speakers is more even. What happens there? A linguistic (and election) map shows you that the westernmost regions are the most "Ukrainian", and those in the south-east and Crimea are the most "Russian". Most of the rest is one big grey area. It is here where the risk of violence may be the highest, and could result in a "worse case" scenario.
Meanwhile, the Kremlin looks on, waiting to see if its gambit will come off; and whether "intervention" will be necessary...
Thursday, February 20, 2014
The Ukraine Crisis: The Russian Angle, Scenarios, and the ghost of 1914
The "Ukraine Crisis" that erupted a few days ago has
been smouldering beneath the surface for years, with the current
anti-government (Pro-European) protests ongoing for three months.
The initial cause of those protests was the rejection of the government
of further EU agreements, in favour of greater economic co-operation with
Russia; the deeper reason was endemic corruption of the governing
administration.
On one side, there is the incumbent (pro-Russian) government,
supported by Russia; on the other, are the "pro-European" (and
pro-EU) opposition, backed by the EU and the USA.
Now the situation has turned to armed violence in the centre of
Kiev, with the situation unravelling in the regions, especially those dominated
by the largely Ukrainian-speaking opposition in the west and north. Even
Crimea, an ethnically Russian region on the Black that also hosts Russia's
Black Sea fleet, has threatened to secede and join Russia if things get much
worse.
On the one hand, the West has decisively thrown its lot in with
the opposition, supporting sanctions against the government; on the other hand,
Russia has decisively thrown its full support behind the government (what that
means precisely at this stage is unclear), calling the opposition "fascists",
and the EU's demands "blackmail".
Seen through a Russian lens
Ukraine broke away from Russia (then the Soviet Union) a little
over twenty years ago, but Russia has only really took Ukraine as being
nominally independent ever since. The reasons for this are cultural and
historical; regardless of what Ukrainians (Russian-speaking or not) may think
of it, the Russians still consider Ukraine to be firmly part of Russia's sphere
of influence.
Apart from Ukraine and the break-up of the former Soviet Union
twenty years ago, Russia's perspective on the current Ukraine Crisis must be
considered in relation to recent actions in Russia's back-yard, and areas of
Russian influence in general.
From this point of view, we must go back to the Balkans. The
break-up of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s and the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo
resulted in the collapse of the Milosevic government in Belgrade, Russia's last
firm ally in the Balkans.
Moving on to the 21st century, you had the Orange Revolution in
Ukraine in the middle of the first decade, as well as the Rose Revolution in
Georgia, both bring pro-Western governments on to Russia's doorstep. Regardless
of the exaggerated Russian paranoia at these events, these both happening only
a couple of years after their neighbouring Baltic States has joined NATO (as a
result of the "War On Terror"), it meant that Russia had very few
"friendly" nations left around it.
Furthermore, with China rapidly growing in stature, Russia had
also lost economic influence in Central Asia; and the USA was using the
"War On Terror" to utilise military bases in places like Uzbekistan.
By this point, Russian paranoia of "encirclement" begins to gain an
element of credence.
Things began to hot up in 2008. Early in that year, Kosovo
declared independence from Serbia, Russia's one-time ally. Russia supported
Serbia's protests, and in the end only a modest number of countries recognised
the new nation's sovereignty.
However, Russia got its own back soon afterwards, by unilaterally
accepting the independence of two breakaway (Russian-speaking) regions of
Georgia; then when the pro-Western Georgian President, Saakashvili, ordered the
"reclaiming" of those two regions while Vladimir Putin was watching
the opening ceremony of the Beijing Summer Olympic Games, Russia had reason to
believe they were being taken for fools, regardless of Saakashvili's claims of
Russian provocation. A brief war led to those regions being kept firmly from
Georgian control, with the West unwilling to directly intervene; only Russian
restraint, under pressure from the West to cease hostilities, allowed
Saakashvili to remain in power.
The "Arab Spring" that began in early 2011 brought
another challenge to Russia's "perspective" on the world. During the
Cold War, the Middle East has been as much a battleground for influence has any
other part of the world, and Russia's friendly relations with Syria (and
Russia's naval base on the Syrian coast) have been the still-fruitful product
of that.
The UN-backed war against Libya in 2011 was considered a dastardly
trick by the West on Russia, hoodwinking them into backing what would
ultimately be the collapse of the anti-Western (and implicitly, pro-Russian)
government of Gaddafi.
Thus, last summer, when the US, France and the UK supported
military action against the savage crimes of the Syrian (pro-Russian)
government during its ongoing civil war, Russia did everything it could to
prevent it from happening, successfully keeping their sole remaining ally in
the Middle East from harm.
Russia's geopolitical positioning since the end of the Cold War
has been to promote the status quo in the developing world,
and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. Naturally,
this is because it is in Russia's interests to do so. This follows also with relations
with Iran, as Russia has been playing its part to be "helpful" to
both Iran and the West.
It is from this chain of events that we get a better perspective
of Russian thinking. Seen through this lens, Ukraine represents to the Russian
administration something more like a "red line" that cannot be
crossed. After the perceived humiliations, encirclement and loss of allies in
the last fifteen years, Ukraine is Russia's last "big prize", along
with Syria. It has naval assets it both countries. The Orange Revolution led to
a short-lived pro-Western government; the current (pro-Russian) government
replaced it in the following elections.
Politically, strategically and culturally, it cannot afford to
"lose" Ukraine.
Russian paranoia about Western-backed "fascists"
attempting a coup against the pro-Russian government therefore has a long
history to back it up. The timing of the violence, happening during the Winter
Olympics in Sochi, would be seen as no coincidence in Moscow; neither would the
fact that the US military sent a surveillance boat to the Black Sea to help
with "anti-terrorism".
Ghosts of 1914
The hundredth anniversary of the start of the First World War
brings back some uncomfortable parallels to the current situation in Ukraine.
It should be remembered that the spark that led to the war
starting was in the Balkans: A Bosnian Serb nationalist, backed by elements of
the Serbian military and government, killed the heir to Austria-Hungary. Russia
supported Serbia, encouraging her to reject the demands of Austria.
What is important here is the role of Russia; without Russia's
support, Serbia would likely have given in to Austrian demands (which,
incidentally, where modest compared to those that NATO demanded of
Serbia/Yugoslavia in 1999; while Austria was looking for a way to humiliate
Serbia, it still gave plenty of room for Serbia to wriggle out of war). In this
respect, Russia shares a large part of the blame for escalating the situation:
first, by telling Serbia to stand up against Austrian aggression; second, by
creating the narrative orthodoxy (regardless of the truth) for the reasons for
the war in the first place i.e. Austrian aggression, which gave France and
Britain a reason to join on Russia's side.
Jump forward a century, and we see much the same narrative played
out again, albeit in the theatre of Ukraine and not Serbia, with the West
(EU/USA) playing the role of Austria against Russia. Like in 1914, Russia
accuses the West of aggression and blackmail with its demands on its ally; and
also like in 1914, by Russia encouraging the Ukrainian government to
"stand firm" and offering its full support, it risks escalating the
situation further.
It should also be remembered that the years preceding the First
World War included various "crises" and regional wars; the Balkan
Wars of 1912 and 1913, like the unrest in the Middle East since the "Arab
Spring" resulted in unpredictable and unstable politics in
strategically-important countries.
In this way, we see that Russia's perspective has never really
changed; only the situation has.
Three scenarios
Where will this lead? Three possibilities offer themselves.
The optimistic scenario:
Government ministers soon withdraw their support from the
President, forcing him to do a deal with the opposition. Mediation with
both Russia and the West working with both sides to calm the situation. At
present, this looks unlikely, at least in the short-term; violence is
intensifying as the two camps are drifting apart.
The middling scenario:
Low-level violence continues for some weeks, until ministers tire
of the chaos, and encourage both Russia and the West to mediate.
The worst-case scenario:
Civil war erupts, with Crimea seceding. Russia decides to
intervene directly to protect its strategic interests, as Ukraine represents
its "last line of defence"; the West's response depends on the level
of influence that "hawks" have in the EU nations and Washington.
Hawks in the West may argue for a strong response after being denied by Russia
a "just war" in Syria the previous year.
Although last this scenario looks far-fetched, the psychology of
the various players in the West is important; Obama's rhetoric against Russia
in the Ukraine Crisis has thus far been (uncharacteristically) very strong. In
this way, perhaps the thought of "missing out" on a strike against
Syria is playing on his mind?
On such things can wars be decided.
A further analysis of the situation in Ukraine (and Moscow's intentions) can be found here.
A further analysis of the situation in Ukraine (and Moscow's intentions) can be found here.
Sunday, February 16, 2014
The UK Floods Crisis: summing up how Cameron's Conservatives rule Britain
The "Floods Crisis" has taken many weeks to build up into a political crisis, which finally happened around Monday morning last week (10 February), when the Thames Valley west of London began to flood on an scale not seen for generations.
Since then, the flooding has intensified. Large areas of the Somerset Levels have now either flooded completely, or cut off from the "mainland" a number of villages for weeks, as well as tens of square miles of prime agricultural land. And the flooding is predicted to get only worse, with the Severn Valley badly affected, as well as many other parts of Southern England. And that doesn't even mention the storms that have hammered coastal communities in recent weeks, tearing parts of the national infrastructure to pieces.
The strange irony for the government is that whereas before the New Year, the talk was of the political threat of thousands of Romanians and Bulgarians flooding the country once they have the right to freely come to The UK. That threat never materialised; instead, we have a "natural flood" of historic proportions, flooding thousands of hectares of prime agricultural land, towns, villages and affluent suburbs, providing an entirely different sort of political crisis.
A damning indictment of "austerity"
An excellent piece by Jonathon Freedland pointed out how the cuts to the workforce of the Environment Agency (EA), as well as overall reductions in their budget, demonstrate how low down on their list of priorities the government takes the natural environment, in spite of all Cameron's earlier talk of the "greenest government ever".
With climate change making flooding an increasing problem for Britain, the only sensible action is to increase investment in flood protection, or actions that can at least mitigate their effects. If you can't move thousands of people off flood plains, then you have to provide adequate protection, like the Dutch have been doing for centuries.
The Floods Crisis has shown the intellectual poverty of "austerity". You may think you're saving money in the short term, but you will pay far, far more in the long-term if you don't defend yourself against future threats. In fact, the analogy may be taken to that of the armed forces. The government's attitude to the EA seems to be only to spend money on them when there is a crisis: equivalent in attitude to saying that armies are only useful in wartime, so why spend money on them in peace-time? It is this bone-headed reactive rather than proactive attitude to government that has helped to contribute to this crisis. And since the knee-jerk response of the government has been to "send in the army", we can also see how ill-equipped our armed forces are for genuine crises.
"Make do and mend" government
While the military on a personal level are doing only their very best, their civilian masters have spent the last four years doing them down, reducing their numbers and their budget to a minimum. The numbers of forces on the ground seem pitifully small compared to the crisis; the government talk of deploying a thousand here of there; where are the rest of them?
Again, like a hundred years ago at the start of the First World War, we see a situation that invites the "lions led by donkeys" comparison. This time, however, it is the Westminster bubble, and Cameron's circle of Eton-educated incompetents that are the "donkeys", leading their troops into floods without so much as a pair of Wellington boots. Worse, they send these ill-equipped (but well-meaning) troops to flood-hit areas without a clear plan, and too late. The main job the army has done is fill and lay down thousands of sand bags, often in areas already under three feet of water. It's not their fault that they're carrying out orders that appear utterly stupid and ineffective. But, as filling and laying down sand bags looks like something is being done, that seems to be the main thing.
Apart from "sand bag duty", do "the donkeys" in government have no other ideas for the army?
Like the incompetent elite that sleepwalked into war a hundred years ago, we have an Eton-educated elite that is sleepwalking Britain into a snowballing disaster from nature. And the reasons for their incompetence are the same now as they were then.
A damning indictment of Cameron's priorities
Cameron was finally pushed into doing something only after The Thames Valley flooded. Prince Charles went to the Somerset Levels more that a week ago, which had been flooded (and completely ignored by the government) for six weeks; only after Charles intervened did Cameron start to pay attention.
This also invites comparisons to the pitiful and ignorant response that George W Bush's government had to Hurricane Katrina; but in some ways, this is even worse, because the hypocrisy of Cameron's attitude was laid bare when he quickly jumped to attention once the wealthy homes of Tory heartland of The Thames Valley were flooding. And the hypocrisy of "austerity" was displayed when he announced that "money was no object". It is "austerity" for those outside of Cameron's range of thought (eg. the poor, those on benefits, those living in "the regions"), but "money is no object" for those close to his heart (the rich, and the Eton-educated elite).
This is another variation on the principle that has guided much of economics since the Financial Crisis: namely, "Corporate Socialism".
Lastly, Cameron's personal response to the floods has made his superficiality clear to see. His tours of affected areas have appeared like no more than photo opportunities. True, others have done the same, but his obvious insincerity as the national leader simply putting on a show of Churchillian "Dunkirk spirit" goes unequalled to his rivals. Ed Milliband's visit into the flooded Tory heartland was a PR disaster waiting to happen, but Cameron's "floods tour" simply looks like over-kill long after the crisis started.
Cameron talks about it being not the right time to start the blame game. No wonder: he knows who's really to blame. He had to intervene to quell in-fighting between his ministers over the right response to the floods, after his lack of leadership over his ministers turned into a farce involving Lord Smith last week.
Ultimately, the "Floods Crisis" is likely to be "Cameron's Katrina", and for good reason. Cameron's failings as a person and a leader have been adding up over the years he's been in office, and this national emergency has shown them as clear as day.
Since then, the flooding has intensified. Large areas of the Somerset Levels have now either flooded completely, or cut off from the "mainland" a number of villages for weeks, as well as tens of square miles of prime agricultural land. And the flooding is predicted to get only worse, with the Severn Valley badly affected, as well as many other parts of Southern England. And that doesn't even mention the storms that have hammered coastal communities in recent weeks, tearing parts of the national infrastructure to pieces.
The strange irony for the government is that whereas before the New Year, the talk was of the political threat of thousands of Romanians and Bulgarians flooding the country once they have the right to freely come to The UK. That threat never materialised; instead, we have a "natural flood" of historic proportions, flooding thousands of hectares of prime agricultural land, towns, villages and affluent suburbs, providing an entirely different sort of political crisis.
A damning indictment of "austerity"
An excellent piece by Jonathon Freedland pointed out how the cuts to the workforce of the Environment Agency (EA), as well as overall reductions in their budget, demonstrate how low down on their list of priorities the government takes the natural environment, in spite of all Cameron's earlier talk of the "greenest government ever".
With climate change making flooding an increasing problem for Britain, the only sensible action is to increase investment in flood protection, or actions that can at least mitigate their effects. If you can't move thousands of people off flood plains, then you have to provide adequate protection, like the Dutch have been doing for centuries.
The Floods Crisis has shown the intellectual poverty of "austerity". You may think you're saving money in the short term, but you will pay far, far more in the long-term if you don't defend yourself against future threats. In fact, the analogy may be taken to that of the armed forces. The government's attitude to the EA seems to be only to spend money on them when there is a crisis: equivalent in attitude to saying that armies are only useful in wartime, so why spend money on them in peace-time? It is this bone-headed reactive rather than proactive attitude to government that has helped to contribute to this crisis. And since the knee-jerk response of the government has been to "send in the army", we can also see how ill-equipped our armed forces are for genuine crises.
"Make do and mend" government
While the military on a personal level are doing only their very best, their civilian masters have spent the last four years doing them down, reducing their numbers and their budget to a minimum. The numbers of forces on the ground seem pitifully small compared to the crisis; the government talk of deploying a thousand here of there; where are the rest of them?
Again, like a hundred years ago at the start of the First World War, we see a situation that invites the "lions led by donkeys" comparison. This time, however, it is the Westminster bubble, and Cameron's circle of Eton-educated incompetents that are the "donkeys", leading their troops into floods without so much as a pair of Wellington boots. Worse, they send these ill-equipped (but well-meaning) troops to flood-hit areas without a clear plan, and too late. The main job the army has done is fill and lay down thousands of sand bags, often in areas already under three feet of water. It's not their fault that they're carrying out orders that appear utterly stupid and ineffective. But, as filling and laying down sand bags looks like something is being done, that seems to be the main thing.
Apart from "sand bag duty", do "the donkeys" in government have no other ideas for the army?
Like the incompetent elite that sleepwalked into war a hundred years ago, we have an Eton-educated elite that is sleepwalking Britain into a snowballing disaster from nature. And the reasons for their incompetence are the same now as they were then.
A damning indictment of Cameron's priorities
Cameron was finally pushed into doing something only after The Thames Valley flooded. Prince Charles went to the Somerset Levels more that a week ago, which had been flooded (and completely ignored by the government) for six weeks; only after Charles intervened did Cameron start to pay attention.
This also invites comparisons to the pitiful and ignorant response that George W Bush's government had to Hurricane Katrina; but in some ways, this is even worse, because the hypocrisy of Cameron's attitude was laid bare when he quickly jumped to attention once the wealthy homes of Tory heartland of The Thames Valley were flooding. And the hypocrisy of "austerity" was displayed when he announced that "money was no object". It is "austerity" for those outside of Cameron's range of thought (eg. the poor, those on benefits, those living in "the regions"), but "money is no object" for those close to his heart (the rich, and the Eton-educated elite).
This is another variation on the principle that has guided much of economics since the Financial Crisis: namely, "Corporate Socialism".
Lastly, Cameron's personal response to the floods has made his superficiality clear to see. His tours of affected areas have appeared like no more than photo opportunities. True, others have done the same, but his obvious insincerity as the national leader simply putting on a show of Churchillian "Dunkirk spirit" goes unequalled to his rivals. Ed Milliband's visit into the flooded Tory heartland was a PR disaster waiting to happen, but Cameron's "floods tour" simply looks like over-kill long after the crisis started.
Cameron talks about it being not the right time to start the blame game. No wonder: he knows who's really to blame. He had to intervene to quell in-fighting between his ministers over the right response to the floods, after his lack of leadership over his ministers turned into a farce involving Lord Smith last week.
Ultimately, the "Floods Crisis" is likely to be "Cameron's Katrina", and for good reason. Cameron's failings as a person and a leader have been adding up over the years he's been in office, and this national emergency has shown them as clear as day.
Friday, January 31, 2014
Why Labour will (probably) win the 2015 election
Although the opinion polls at the moment (the end of January 2014) give only a small lead for Labour over the Conservatives, there are more reasons that not to believe that Labour will win the next general election.
Party Discipline
For one, the Labour Party is united, and the Conservatives aren't; on Europe, the Tories' division is becoming not only a regular feature of parliamentary amendments, it's showing David Cameron to be a laughing stock as the leader of his party.
The amendment to help deport terror suspects, raised by Conservative MP, Dominic Raab, was called illegal by the government. However, instead of opposing the idea due to its illegality, under the direction of David Cameron, the government told its MPs to abstain - the Conservative MPs that support the government, that is. The fact that the Conservative-led government feels so terrified of its own backbenchers that tells them to sit on their hands, is astounding, and probably unprecedented in modern British politics. So the government had the amendment thrown out thanks to the votes of Labour and the LibDems.
The Conservative Party has basically fractured, and cannot be honestly called a "party" in the fullest sense. As I've said previously, there are now the "Cameroons", who support the government, and the "rebels", who are, for the want of a better word, "UKIP-lite". The "rebels" (who number around a hundred) have no fear of their leader, because they have already calculated that: their re-election depends on how well they come across to their constituents and their constituents' expectations, rather than how well they toe the "party line"; and they will never get a promotion because Cameron and Osborne only promote people within their circle, so therefore have nothing to lose by opposing them.
We know how that went for the Conservatives the last time they were in government (although there were other factors at play, of course). A divided party doesn't win elections.
Public Perception
David Cameron was appointed as Conservative leader partly because of his background in PR. It's therefore ironic that he has given the Conservatives such a radical image re-haul, that the average person on the street thinks they are all a bunch of Eton-educated toffs.
Head-to-head, Cameron beats the personal popularity ratings of Ed Milliband hands down, but both leaders are at odds with the public popularity of their parties. Cameron is more popular personally than his party is; the Labour Party is more popular than Ed Milliband is personally.
Which perception is more important: leader or party? Past evidence would suggest the former, but the issue is more complex than that. Few people warmed to Margaret Thatcher's personality; yet she was elected Prime Minister three times. Jim Callaghan, the incumbent Labour PM that Thatcher succeeded, seemed much more obviously "humane" and "likeable"; but it was his party's perception that did the most damage in that election. John Major was hardly an awe-inspiring public figure, yet he won a huge number of votes in the 1992 general election.
It could be said that "personality politics" is a relatively new fascination, then. We can blame Blair for that (!). In this way, Cameron was always trying to emulate Blair's approach with the Conservatives; by contrast, Ed Milliband has done almost everything to distance himself from that approach since becoming Labour leader. But while Cameron's approach has seemed obviously superficial, the person in Westminster politics that is the biggest example of "personality politics" is Nigel Farage. The UKIP leader has created a new phenomenon in modern British politics, and his party are the great unknown for 2015 (more on that later).
Apart from the "personality" of the leaders, the public perception of the party is just as important, as I mentioned about 1979. In general, few of the public warm to the Tories, but those swing voters that vote for them do so out of a grudging respect for their perceived competence at the job, and doing the best for British interests. The Conservatives' term in office with the LibDems has, apart from the odd exception, been a catalogue of incompetence and a betrayal of British interests. Although the economy may appear to be on the rise (more on that in a moment), public perception has not yet given the Conservatives the benefit of the doubt yet.
Although Labour have appeared rudderless in the ideas department much of the time since the last election, in recent times, Ed Milliband has been able to give more flesh to the bones of his "vision" for the country. He has been able to cannily tap into public dissatisfaction and frustration at the "cost-of-living crisis", correctly seeing this as an issue that the Tories would ignore at their peril. This is because although elections are, in general, about "the economy, stupid", the public also understand that "the economy" improving is not automatically the same as saying that "their life" is improving. In this age of "austerity" and rising living costs, the debate has moved on from simple GDP figures showing that "the economy" is improving. Things are more complicated than that, and Ed Milliband has seen that the public have realised that too.
Ideas like "bashing the bankers" or "squeezing the rich" may be used by the Tories to say that Labour are a bunch of Marxists, but some people also recognise an injustice when they see it, and see that the Conservatives are doing nothing about it.
What's the plan?
Each of the parties have a "plan" for the economy, and for Britain's future.
The Conservatives' plan seems to be a permanently slimmed-down state, and tapping in to people's dislike for "benefit cheats" in order to achieve it. Furthermore, the Conservatives' idea of the economy appears based on (almost) the same national economic model as the previous government's, and all of those of the past thirty years: the promotion and indulging of the financial industry as the major national economic generator, making service industries reliant on the success of the financial industry, while allowing manufacturing to essentially fend for itself (or be given over to foreign investors).
Labour's plan (although it lacks clarity at this point) seems to be based on a more humane approach to government service provision, a less stringent application of "austerity", and more active government support with jobs schemes and the like, as well as some possible steps to help rein in the uncontrolled activities of some privatised utility industries.
UKIP's plan is not taken seriously by either Labour or the Conservatives, yet both of them are secretly terrified what effect they may have the 2015 election indirectly. In terms of domestic politics, UKIP are more "pro-austerity" than the Tories (and appear more "pro-City" as well), but also argue that many of the economic problems are caused by EU workers taking "British" jobs, and EU regulations tie up The UK from spending money on things that are more useful (as well as EU laws affecting a plethora of other issues). Because neither the Conservatives or Labour want to talk about "Europe" seriously, UKIP is given a free rein on this whole issue: this, as well as Farage's version of "personality politics", explains why so many voters see UKIP as the real alternative to the usual suspects.
Based on these three comparisons, it is not hard to see that, on the balance of things, people are more likely to vote for the "easiest" of the three options: Labour. Theirs offers the least hassle for the average person, and the most comfort in the future.
The jokers in the pack
The "UKIP effect" is one thing that makes the 2015 election unique in modern politics; different from the SDP/Alliance in 1983, for example. That election is the nearest comparable general election, but again the variables are different this time around.
The "UKIP voter" tends to be either a former Tory, or a traditional Labour supporter, or a new voter. Nigel Farage seems to think UKIP can supplant the Conservatives as the second biggest party in the North, at least in terms of votes cast. This is possible, given that Northerners have a different social attitude and background to "traditional" Conservative voters in the South. UKIP's simple, anti-establishment appeal is something that would appeal more in the North (this also explains why they are attracting new voters); in the South, they tend to attract "traditional" Conservative voters because their appeal is based on preserving or regaining a lifestyle that has passed with the coming of the EU and social change.
So while UKIP threaten both Labour and the Conservatives in terms of votes (if not many actual seats), this means more problems for the Conservatives than Labour, both in the North as well as the South.
While the recent polls talk of a narrowing of the gap between Labour and the Conservatives, this is due to less a rise in the Tories' popularity, than a relative decline in Labour's, to the benefit of UKIP. The Conservatives are still only in the low thirties even in the more optimistic polls, with Labour in the mid-thirties. No government went on to win an election in such circumstances before. It's almost unheard of for the governing party to increase its percentage of the vote from one election to the next.
Besides, this government is a coalition, in any case. It was formed because the Conservatives couldn't get the votes needed. They are even less likely to do so now; even assuming that the recovery continues purring ahead flawlessly, it relies on ignoring other variables, such as UKIP, and the damage done to the public's perceptions of the Conservatives from their often shambolic (and unpleasant) manner of governing. And the fact that most of the Conservatives' "austerity" programme hasn't even been fully put into practice yet; this may also be at the back of some voters' minds. Would some Turkeys really vote for Christmas?
And then there is the electoral system, still skewed in Labour's favour, which the Tories failed to convince the LibDems to support them to change. That was always going to be a painful opportunity for the Conservatives to miss.
They may not get another chance for a while.
Party Discipline
For one, the Labour Party is united, and the Conservatives aren't; on Europe, the Tories' division is becoming not only a regular feature of parliamentary amendments, it's showing David Cameron to be a laughing stock as the leader of his party.
The amendment to help deport terror suspects, raised by Conservative MP, Dominic Raab, was called illegal by the government. However, instead of opposing the idea due to its illegality, under the direction of David Cameron, the government told its MPs to abstain - the Conservative MPs that support the government, that is. The fact that the Conservative-led government feels so terrified of its own backbenchers that tells them to sit on their hands, is astounding, and probably unprecedented in modern British politics. So the government had the amendment thrown out thanks to the votes of Labour and the LibDems.
The Conservative Party has basically fractured, and cannot be honestly called a "party" in the fullest sense. As I've said previously, there are now the "Cameroons", who support the government, and the "rebels", who are, for the want of a better word, "UKIP-lite". The "rebels" (who number around a hundred) have no fear of their leader, because they have already calculated that: their re-election depends on how well they come across to their constituents and their constituents' expectations, rather than how well they toe the "party line"; and they will never get a promotion because Cameron and Osborne only promote people within their circle, so therefore have nothing to lose by opposing them.
We know how that went for the Conservatives the last time they were in government (although there were other factors at play, of course). A divided party doesn't win elections.
Public Perception
David Cameron was appointed as Conservative leader partly because of his background in PR. It's therefore ironic that he has given the Conservatives such a radical image re-haul, that the average person on the street thinks they are all a bunch of Eton-educated toffs.
Head-to-head, Cameron beats the personal popularity ratings of Ed Milliband hands down, but both leaders are at odds with the public popularity of their parties. Cameron is more popular personally than his party is; the Labour Party is more popular than Ed Milliband is personally.
Which perception is more important: leader or party? Past evidence would suggest the former, but the issue is more complex than that. Few people warmed to Margaret Thatcher's personality; yet she was elected Prime Minister three times. Jim Callaghan, the incumbent Labour PM that Thatcher succeeded, seemed much more obviously "humane" and "likeable"; but it was his party's perception that did the most damage in that election. John Major was hardly an awe-inspiring public figure, yet he won a huge number of votes in the 1992 general election.
It could be said that "personality politics" is a relatively new fascination, then. We can blame Blair for that (!). In this way, Cameron was always trying to emulate Blair's approach with the Conservatives; by contrast, Ed Milliband has done almost everything to distance himself from that approach since becoming Labour leader. But while Cameron's approach has seemed obviously superficial, the person in Westminster politics that is the biggest example of "personality politics" is Nigel Farage. The UKIP leader has created a new phenomenon in modern British politics, and his party are the great unknown for 2015 (more on that later).
Apart from the "personality" of the leaders, the public perception of the party is just as important, as I mentioned about 1979. In general, few of the public warm to the Tories, but those swing voters that vote for them do so out of a grudging respect for their perceived competence at the job, and doing the best for British interests. The Conservatives' term in office with the LibDems has, apart from the odd exception, been a catalogue of incompetence and a betrayal of British interests. Although the economy may appear to be on the rise (more on that in a moment), public perception has not yet given the Conservatives the benefit of the doubt yet.
Although Labour have appeared rudderless in the ideas department much of the time since the last election, in recent times, Ed Milliband has been able to give more flesh to the bones of his "vision" for the country. He has been able to cannily tap into public dissatisfaction and frustration at the "cost-of-living crisis", correctly seeing this as an issue that the Tories would ignore at their peril. This is because although elections are, in general, about "the economy, stupid", the public also understand that "the economy" improving is not automatically the same as saying that "their life" is improving. In this age of "austerity" and rising living costs, the debate has moved on from simple GDP figures showing that "the economy" is improving. Things are more complicated than that, and Ed Milliband has seen that the public have realised that too.
Ideas like "bashing the bankers" or "squeezing the rich" may be used by the Tories to say that Labour are a bunch of Marxists, but some people also recognise an injustice when they see it, and see that the Conservatives are doing nothing about it.
What's the plan?
Each of the parties have a "plan" for the economy, and for Britain's future.
The Conservatives' plan seems to be a permanently slimmed-down state, and tapping in to people's dislike for "benefit cheats" in order to achieve it. Furthermore, the Conservatives' idea of the economy appears based on (almost) the same national economic model as the previous government's, and all of those of the past thirty years: the promotion and indulging of the financial industry as the major national economic generator, making service industries reliant on the success of the financial industry, while allowing manufacturing to essentially fend for itself (or be given over to foreign investors).
Labour's plan (although it lacks clarity at this point) seems to be based on a more humane approach to government service provision, a less stringent application of "austerity", and more active government support with jobs schemes and the like, as well as some possible steps to help rein in the uncontrolled activities of some privatised utility industries.
UKIP's plan is not taken seriously by either Labour or the Conservatives, yet both of them are secretly terrified what effect they may have the 2015 election indirectly. In terms of domestic politics, UKIP are more "pro-austerity" than the Tories (and appear more "pro-City" as well), but also argue that many of the economic problems are caused by EU workers taking "British" jobs, and EU regulations tie up The UK from spending money on things that are more useful (as well as EU laws affecting a plethora of other issues). Because neither the Conservatives or Labour want to talk about "Europe" seriously, UKIP is given a free rein on this whole issue: this, as well as Farage's version of "personality politics", explains why so many voters see UKIP as the real alternative to the usual suspects.
Based on these three comparisons, it is not hard to see that, on the balance of things, people are more likely to vote for the "easiest" of the three options: Labour. Theirs offers the least hassle for the average person, and the most comfort in the future.
The jokers in the pack
The "UKIP effect" is one thing that makes the 2015 election unique in modern politics; different from the SDP/Alliance in 1983, for example. That election is the nearest comparable general election, but again the variables are different this time around.
The "UKIP voter" tends to be either a former Tory, or a traditional Labour supporter, or a new voter. Nigel Farage seems to think UKIP can supplant the Conservatives as the second biggest party in the North, at least in terms of votes cast. This is possible, given that Northerners have a different social attitude and background to "traditional" Conservative voters in the South. UKIP's simple, anti-establishment appeal is something that would appeal more in the North (this also explains why they are attracting new voters); in the South, they tend to attract "traditional" Conservative voters because their appeal is based on preserving or regaining a lifestyle that has passed with the coming of the EU and social change.
So while UKIP threaten both Labour and the Conservatives in terms of votes (if not many actual seats), this means more problems for the Conservatives than Labour, both in the North as well as the South.
While the recent polls talk of a narrowing of the gap between Labour and the Conservatives, this is due to less a rise in the Tories' popularity, than a relative decline in Labour's, to the benefit of UKIP. The Conservatives are still only in the low thirties even in the more optimistic polls, with Labour in the mid-thirties. No government went on to win an election in such circumstances before. It's almost unheard of for the governing party to increase its percentage of the vote from one election to the next.
Besides, this government is a coalition, in any case. It was formed because the Conservatives couldn't get the votes needed. They are even less likely to do so now; even assuming that the recovery continues purring ahead flawlessly, it relies on ignoring other variables, such as UKIP, and the damage done to the public's perceptions of the Conservatives from their often shambolic (and unpleasant) manner of governing. And the fact that most of the Conservatives' "austerity" programme hasn't even been fully put into practice yet; this may also be at the back of some voters' minds. Would some Turkeys really vote for Christmas?
And then there is the electoral system, still skewed in Labour's favour, which the Tories failed to convince the LibDems to support them to change. That was always going to be a painful opportunity for the Conservatives to miss.
They may not get another chance for a while.
Sunday, January 26, 2014
Extremism, Islam and British appeasement: how Islam has become Britain's "national religion" by default
I've written before about how Islam has slowly encroached into Britain's national imprint, through using the language of "freedom of expression" to defend the interests of its extremists.
As I wrote in that article:
"Islamofascists have been able to preach their violent, undemocratic and pernicious ideas under the protection of "free speech"; at the same time, they have also been allowed to conduct behaviour that could land any British non-Muslim in prison, while claim the right to religious expression; and most subversive of all, have denounced and threatened anyone who criticises their faith, ideas or behaviour with violence"
There are regular stories in the press about this, and another one this week (highlighted by Nick Cohen) displays to what extent the BBC, Britain's national broadcaster, and the Liberal Democrats (part of the government), have succumbed to the will of extremist Islam.
It is as though the very institutions of Britain and its ruling politicians have given up on the idea of real, universal, freedom of expression: freedom of expression is dying as an idea in Britain because no-one in authority believes it is worth fighting for, at least when it comes to Islam.
This seems to be how "freedom of expression" is defined in Britain these days: the state will defend your freedom of expression, unless your point of view questions something about Islam. Thus Islam holds the unique and vaunted position in The UK of being the only religion people are terrified of offending.
In this way, it has become the "default" religion of The UK, by virtue of its unassailable status.
A state within a state?
From a practical point of view, then, extremist Islam has been given almost free rein in The UK. While the police and intelligence services may closely monitor the more radical parts of Muslim society in Britain as part of the "War On Terror", on a day-to-day basis, the authorities do not interfere with the actions of the Muslim community.
On the surface, this may seem a good thing, but this also means that the authorities have been turning a blind eye to cultural practices that are clearly illegal in British law, and would get any non-Muslim in conversation with the police if they repeated the same behaviour.
When I talk about "cultural practices", I'm talking about domestic violence that goes unreported by battered wives; arranged (and underage) marriage that is got around in the Muslim community by being organised in Pakistan rather than in Britain; marriage between relatives, that creates children with deformities and cognitive dysfunction; there was the famous case of the "rape ring" in the Greater Manchester area, which suggests an endemic culture of misogyny; there is the incendiary rhetoric that goes on in the mosque and in the community (the police are paid to monitor this, however); and finally, the idea that all Muslims' first loyalty is to their faith, their family, and only lastly their country.
While the danger of the last point can be over-stated (if you compare this to the "Red Scare" back in the day), the effect that extremist Islam has had on British culture in the past ten years has been noticeable and undeniable. The policies of Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Turkey have been called "creeping Islamisation", but in a different way the same could be said of life in Britain.
Assigning blame
Ten years ago, for example, there was no stigma attached to criticising (or simply discussing) some aspects of Islam. In the light of the 9/11 attacks, shining a strong spotlight on Islam seemed like only the most natural thing in the world.
In Britain, this "critical eye" seemed not to last very long, though. Because Britain had had a culture of tolerance, its defenders said, it was unfair to overly-blame "every Muslim" for the terrorism of its extremists. This is a fair point, but at the same time every "ordinary" Muslim has a moral responsibility to stand up to the extremists and pick apart their false arguments and dangerous rhetoric. This has not really happened.
So on one hand the Muslim community has shown weakness as a whole towards its own radical brethren, and thus allowed the radicals to hijack the faith and hold the rest hostage. On the other, some in the British establishment have held up the historical "culture of tolerance" as a sign that Britain didn't really have "a problem" with Islam and its Muslim population; unlike, say, France.
This is complacent and it misses a crucial point, though. Historically, the wave of Muslim South Asians who came to Britain after the Second World War to fill in a weakness in the British economy and labour force: in other words, the arrival of these populations to Britain was a sign of Britain's fundamental weakness and failure of its Imperial model. The empire had collapsed in on itself, almost literally, from a population point of view.
I'm not saying this was a mistake; simply a sign of the times. However, it is possible that the relative weakness of the British state after the Second World War was simply storing up problems for later. While those South Asian immigrants who arrived were subjected to local prejudice, racism and (sometimes) worse for decades, from an official government point of view, they were allowed to live, culturally and religiously-speaking, much the same way as before.
And here begins "the problem" that the British establishment refuses to accept it created. The British government, by the Sixties and Seventies, believed it was creating something like a "multi-cultural" nation. But it some crucial cultural respects, especially in regards to the Muslim community, it wasn't: it was creating mono-cultural ghettos in towns and cities with sizeable Muslim populations.
When "multiculturalism" goes wrong
This form of so-called "multiculturalism" was mostly a sham when it came to the Muslim community, because they either tended to be encouraged to move to post-industrial towns in the North, or to poor inner city areas in larger cities, such as Birmingham and Leicester, to name two. And when immigrants are not encouraged to integrate, but allowed to stay together, the result is a closed-off community. When you introduce religion into the mix, you have a potential time-bomb on your hands, as Britain has seen post-9/11.
By the Nineties, "multiculturalism" had become part of the establishment's "PC" campaign, so that by the late Nineties, the Muslim community was one of many parts of Britain's "multicultural tapestry" that became "Cool Britannia". Britain was "cool" because it allowed different cultures and religions to freely exist without government sanction, or so it thought.
This brings us to the present day, where the British tolerance for "the other" has become almost a fetishisation in parts of the establishment, while the Muslim community has become increasingly dysfunctional. I say dysfunctional, but what I really mean is that the extremists have seized the banner for the whole of the Muslim community. A combination of weakness within the Muslim community, and the British establishment's weakness for allowing "culture" to trump freedom of expression (or even the proper application of the law), have brought us to the current situation.
It is not "multiculturalism" that has brought about this situation: it is the state actively allowing (even encouraging) mass mono-culturalism in some parts of Britain for decades, then congratulating itself on its own "tolerance".
Real multiculturalism does exist in some cities in Britain: places where there are dozens of nationalities living in the same neighbourhood. This is what multiculturalism really means: when people exchange their cultures freely while living in a third country, for example. But this tends to be where Muslims do not make up a noticeable chunk of the local population.
When you have a weak state and a weak community, you allow the social conditions for extremism to breed, take root, and finally control others through fear.
This is what has happened in Britain over the last ten years.
As I wrote in that article:
"Islamofascists have been able to preach their violent, undemocratic and pernicious ideas under the protection of "free speech"; at the same time, they have also been allowed to conduct behaviour that could land any British non-Muslim in prison, while claim the right to religious expression; and most subversive of all, have denounced and threatened anyone who criticises their faith, ideas or behaviour with violence"
There are regular stories in the press about this, and another one this week (highlighted by Nick Cohen) displays to what extent the BBC, Britain's national broadcaster, and the Liberal Democrats (part of the government), have succumbed to the will of extremist Islam.
It is as though the very institutions of Britain and its ruling politicians have given up on the idea of real, universal, freedom of expression: freedom of expression is dying as an idea in Britain because no-one in authority believes it is worth fighting for, at least when it comes to Islam.
This seems to be how "freedom of expression" is defined in Britain these days: the state will defend your freedom of expression, unless your point of view questions something about Islam. Thus Islam holds the unique and vaunted position in The UK of being the only religion people are terrified of offending.
In this way, it has become the "default" religion of The UK, by virtue of its unassailable status.
A state within a state?
From a practical point of view, then, extremist Islam has been given almost free rein in The UK. While the police and intelligence services may closely monitor the more radical parts of Muslim society in Britain as part of the "War On Terror", on a day-to-day basis, the authorities do not interfere with the actions of the Muslim community.
On the surface, this may seem a good thing, but this also means that the authorities have been turning a blind eye to cultural practices that are clearly illegal in British law, and would get any non-Muslim in conversation with the police if they repeated the same behaviour.
When I talk about "cultural practices", I'm talking about domestic violence that goes unreported by battered wives; arranged (and underage) marriage that is got around in the Muslim community by being organised in Pakistan rather than in Britain; marriage between relatives, that creates children with deformities and cognitive dysfunction; there was the famous case of the "rape ring" in the Greater Manchester area, which suggests an endemic culture of misogyny; there is the incendiary rhetoric that goes on in the mosque and in the community (the police are paid to monitor this, however); and finally, the idea that all Muslims' first loyalty is to their faith, their family, and only lastly their country.
While the danger of the last point can be over-stated (if you compare this to the "Red Scare" back in the day), the effect that extremist Islam has had on British culture in the past ten years has been noticeable and undeniable. The policies of Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Turkey have been called "creeping Islamisation", but in a different way the same could be said of life in Britain.
Assigning blame
Ten years ago, for example, there was no stigma attached to criticising (or simply discussing) some aspects of Islam. In the light of the 9/11 attacks, shining a strong spotlight on Islam seemed like only the most natural thing in the world.
In Britain, this "critical eye" seemed not to last very long, though. Because Britain had had a culture of tolerance, its defenders said, it was unfair to overly-blame "every Muslim" for the terrorism of its extremists. This is a fair point, but at the same time every "ordinary" Muslim has a moral responsibility to stand up to the extremists and pick apart their false arguments and dangerous rhetoric. This has not really happened.
So on one hand the Muslim community has shown weakness as a whole towards its own radical brethren, and thus allowed the radicals to hijack the faith and hold the rest hostage. On the other, some in the British establishment have held up the historical "culture of tolerance" as a sign that Britain didn't really have "a problem" with Islam and its Muslim population; unlike, say, France.
This is complacent and it misses a crucial point, though. Historically, the wave of Muslim South Asians who came to Britain after the Second World War to fill in a weakness in the British economy and labour force: in other words, the arrival of these populations to Britain was a sign of Britain's fundamental weakness and failure of its Imperial model. The empire had collapsed in on itself, almost literally, from a population point of view.
I'm not saying this was a mistake; simply a sign of the times. However, it is possible that the relative weakness of the British state after the Second World War was simply storing up problems for later. While those South Asian immigrants who arrived were subjected to local prejudice, racism and (sometimes) worse for decades, from an official government point of view, they were allowed to live, culturally and religiously-speaking, much the same way as before.
And here begins "the problem" that the British establishment refuses to accept it created. The British government, by the Sixties and Seventies, believed it was creating something like a "multi-cultural" nation. But it some crucial cultural respects, especially in regards to the Muslim community, it wasn't: it was creating mono-cultural ghettos in towns and cities with sizeable Muslim populations.
When "multiculturalism" goes wrong
This form of so-called "multiculturalism" was mostly a sham when it came to the Muslim community, because they either tended to be encouraged to move to post-industrial towns in the North, or to poor inner city areas in larger cities, such as Birmingham and Leicester, to name two. And when immigrants are not encouraged to integrate, but allowed to stay together, the result is a closed-off community. When you introduce religion into the mix, you have a potential time-bomb on your hands, as Britain has seen post-9/11.
By the Nineties, "multiculturalism" had become part of the establishment's "PC" campaign, so that by the late Nineties, the Muslim community was one of many parts of Britain's "multicultural tapestry" that became "Cool Britannia". Britain was "cool" because it allowed different cultures and religions to freely exist without government sanction, or so it thought.
This brings us to the present day, where the British tolerance for "the other" has become almost a fetishisation in parts of the establishment, while the Muslim community has become increasingly dysfunctional. I say dysfunctional, but what I really mean is that the extremists have seized the banner for the whole of the Muslim community. A combination of weakness within the Muslim community, and the British establishment's weakness for allowing "culture" to trump freedom of expression (or even the proper application of the law), have brought us to the current situation.
It is not "multiculturalism" that has brought about this situation: it is the state actively allowing (even encouraging) mass mono-culturalism in some parts of Britain for decades, then congratulating itself on its own "tolerance".
Real multiculturalism does exist in some cities in Britain: places where there are dozens of nationalities living in the same neighbourhood. This is what multiculturalism really means: when people exchange their cultures freely while living in a third country, for example. But this tends to be where Muslims do not make up a noticeable chunk of the local population.
When you have a weak state and a weak community, you allow the social conditions for extremism to breed, take root, and finally control others through fear.
This is what has happened in Britain over the last ten years.
Monday, January 20, 2014
Benefits Street: the "something for nothing" culture, lifestyle choices and the Conservatives' sadistic welfare policy
The Conservatives' attack on welfare focuses on communicating the impression that welfare for many is a "lifestyle choice"; moreover, they imply that much of Britain's welfare spending is spent on "benefit cheats", "skivers", and people simply too lazy to get "a real job".
The Channel Four show "Benefits Street" plays directly to this perception, in spite of the fact that in many ways, the real "Benefits Street" is in Westminster. And it would make for more shock-value entertainment, as well.
Who else but the Tories could castigate poor people for "living off the state", while some of their MPs feel perfectly entitled to have the taxpayer pay for their moats and duck ponds? Such a shameless lack of regard for misuse of public funds beggars belief, let alone their indifference at what society might think of such amoral behaviour.
And yet, this is the essence of George Osborne's political strategy: no more of the "something for nothing" culture, he says with an evil glint in his eye. His aim is to divide the working poor against the unemployed poor.
Because wages are falling behind the increasingly-high cost of living, it means that, for many, work no longer pays. The government seem to have accepted this truth, but their answer is as cynical as it is sadistic. How? Because the government's solution to the falling value to wages in real terms, is to restrict and cut the value of benefits. This is an act of schadenfreude (or psychological sadism, in English) against those on benefits. To make the working poor feel psychologically better, they punish the unemployed poor.
Crucially, the working poor are still no better-off financially by these cuts; they simply gain sadistic pleasure from knowing that the unemployed poor should be worse-off than they are.
The politics of choice
The Conservatives say that being on benefits is a "lifestyle choice". Well, it's worth remembering what the word "choice" actually means, in an economic and political sense.
In an economic sense of the word, "choice" comes from money. The more money you have, the more options it gives you. This is simple economics. So in this logical sense of the word, being rich is a "lifestyle choice", because those with lots of money choose to keep the money for themselves and spend it on their own lifestyle; they could equally choose to give the money to the needier in society (eg. as charity), or spend the money on investment (eg. to create more jobs by expanding their company).
In this way, as I said in a previous article when talking about the psychology of the rich:
"they have an "anti-social" view of society - or, in other words, refuse to act like responsible members of society. This is where the psychology of the "classic psychopath" appears: a lack of empathy and understanding for others, and the amoral pursuit of power for its own end. This explains why they would support the actions of the current Conservative government in The UK regarding "austerity": the state should be smaller because they see it as useless"
By contrast, those with little money have far fewer economic choices. The rich resent paying taxes on who they see as "benefit cheats" and "skivers". The reality is that only a tiny percentile of the benefit-eligible population are guilty of fraud; many of those on benefits are still in work, and so the benefits they receive are a testament to the failure of the jobs market to offer a salary that people can actually live on.
Again, the government does nothing to rectify this, but uses the most cynical of misdirection and scapegoating tactics by demonizing the unemployed poor, not to mention the young.
If anything, those people who are guilty of choosing to stay on benefits rather than get a job (yes, there are some!), are only guilty of making a rational economic choice. For them, if the salary offers less money after tax and NI deductions (not to mention lost housing benefit) than they can get while still unemployed, of course it would be in their economic interests not to work!
It's not their fault that they can't get a job that doesn't offer them a living wage. It is the fault of the labour market, and the government, for doing nothing to rectify the broken labour market and the increasing cost of living.
Being on benefits isn't a "lifestyle choice" for those kinds of people, but the only choice that some of the unemployed poor have: to choose to stay on unemployment benefit rather than take a job that will give them less money. For those people, it is their economic imperative, because the government refuses to make it economically worthwhile for them to work.
The "politics of choice" really boils down to how you choose to live your life, but those choices are also defined by the extent of economic choice.
The Conservatives, as they mostly represent (and consist of) the affluent, have no problem with "economic choice", so their political choices reflect this: this explains their hatred of seeing "their money" being spent on the "feckless" unemployed. But as they are rich, the fact they have more economic choice also means that they have more moral responsibility towards society, because their economic choices can have a much larger effect on society, positive or negative, depending on what they choose to do with their money.
Instead, they choose to feel that society owes them something; that they are entitled to special treatment because they are rich (regardless of where the money came from), not to mention getting far more in "benefits" than the poor, in the way of a plethora of government subsidies and financial guarantees.
This is something many of the rich hate being reminded of. It is more a case of the poor funding the government's "something for nothing" culture for the rich.
Sadism as government policy
As Ayn Rand liked to say, people are bound to operate according to their own self-interest.
Of course, if the government restricts benefits to such an extent (as some in government would like to) that the unemployed have no economic choice but to work for a pittance (and therefore get into debt), then the government will have changed the economic choices of those unemployed. But this doesn't make Britain a better place economically or socially, let alone morally.
The attitude of the government simply makes life a race to the bottom; depressing wages by making cheaper and cheaper (even free) labour possible, while at the same time doing nothing to suppress the rising cost of living (because the government doesn't believe in intervening in the free market, unless you're rich). At the same time, the housing market has reached a completely dysfunctional level, helped by Osborne's cynical and economically-illiterate "Help To Buy" scheme. I could go on.
The Conservatives' approach to running the economy is amoral because it operates according to the psychology (and motivations) of the rich. It assumes that because the rich hate seeing their money being spent on others, those economically lower down the food chain will feel the same way. But from a psychological (and economic) point of view, they don't because their economic realities are very different. Those lower down in society sometimes have to rely on the welfare state when they fall on hard times.
Those hard times are these days permanent for some sections of society, including the "working poor".
The Channel Four show "Benefits Street" plays directly to this perception, in spite of the fact that in many ways, the real "Benefits Street" is in Westminster. And it would make for more shock-value entertainment, as well.
Who else but the Tories could castigate poor people for "living off the state", while some of their MPs feel perfectly entitled to have the taxpayer pay for their moats and duck ponds? Such a shameless lack of regard for misuse of public funds beggars belief, let alone their indifference at what society might think of such amoral behaviour.
And yet, this is the essence of George Osborne's political strategy: no more of the "something for nothing" culture, he says with an evil glint in his eye. His aim is to divide the working poor against the unemployed poor.
Because wages are falling behind the increasingly-high cost of living, it means that, for many, work no longer pays. The government seem to have accepted this truth, but their answer is as cynical as it is sadistic. How? Because the government's solution to the falling value to wages in real terms, is to restrict and cut the value of benefits. This is an act of schadenfreude (or psychological sadism, in English) against those on benefits. To make the working poor feel psychologically better, they punish the unemployed poor.
Crucially, the working poor are still no better-off financially by these cuts; they simply gain sadistic pleasure from knowing that the unemployed poor should be worse-off than they are.
The politics of choice
The Conservatives say that being on benefits is a "lifestyle choice". Well, it's worth remembering what the word "choice" actually means, in an economic and political sense.
In an economic sense of the word, "choice" comes from money. The more money you have, the more options it gives you. This is simple economics. So in this logical sense of the word, being rich is a "lifestyle choice", because those with lots of money choose to keep the money for themselves and spend it on their own lifestyle; they could equally choose to give the money to the needier in society (eg. as charity), or spend the money on investment (eg. to create more jobs by expanding their company).
In this way, as I said in a previous article when talking about the psychology of the rich:
"they have an "anti-social" view of society - or, in other words, refuse to act like responsible members of society. This is where the psychology of the "classic psychopath" appears: a lack of empathy and understanding for others, and the amoral pursuit of power for its own end. This explains why they would support the actions of the current Conservative government in The UK regarding "austerity": the state should be smaller because they see it as useless"
By contrast, those with little money have far fewer economic choices. The rich resent paying taxes on who they see as "benefit cheats" and "skivers". The reality is that only a tiny percentile of the benefit-eligible population are guilty of fraud; many of those on benefits are still in work, and so the benefits they receive are a testament to the failure of the jobs market to offer a salary that people can actually live on.
Again, the government does nothing to rectify this, but uses the most cynical of misdirection and scapegoating tactics by demonizing the unemployed poor, not to mention the young.
If anything, those people who are guilty of choosing to stay on benefits rather than get a job (yes, there are some!), are only guilty of making a rational economic choice. For them, if the salary offers less money after tax and NI deductions (not to mention lost housing benefit) than they can get while still unemployed, of course it would be in their economic interests not to work!
It's not their fault that they can't get a job that doesn't offer them a living wage. It is the fault of the labour market, and the government, for doing nothing to rectify the broken labour market and the increasing cost of living.
Being on benefits isn't a "lifestyle choice" for those kinds of people, but the only choice that some of the unemployed poor have: to choose to stay on unemployment benefit rather than take a job that will give them less money. For those people, it is their economic imperative, because the government refuses to make it economically worthwhile for them to work.
The "politics of choice" really boils down to how you choose to live your life, but those choices are also defined by the extent of economic choice.
The Conservatives, as they mostly represent (and consist of) the affluent, have no problem with "economic choice", so their political choices reflect this: this explains their hatred of seeing "their money" being spent on the "feckless" unemployed. But as they are rich, the fact they have more economic choice also means that they have more moral responsibility towards society, because their economic choices can have a much larger effect on society, positive or negative, depending on what they choose to do with their money.
Instead, they choose to feel that society owes them something; that they are entitled to special treatment because they are rich (regardless of where the money came from), not to mention getting far more in "benefits" than the poor, in the way of a plethora of government subsidies and financial guarantees.
This is something many of the rich hate being reminded of. It is more a case of the poor funding the government's "something for nothing" culture for the rich.
Sadism as government policy
As Ayn Rand liked to say, people are bound to operate according to their own self-interest.
Of course, if the government restricts benefits to such an extent (as some in government would like to) that the unemployed have no economic choice but to work for a pittance (and therefore get into debt), then the government will have changed the economic choices of those unemployed. But this doesn't make Britain a better place economically or socially, let alone morally.
The attitude of the government simply makes life a race to the bottom; depressing wages by making cheaper and cheaper (even free) labour possible, while at the same time doing nothing to suppress the rising cost of living (because the government doesn't believe in intervening in the free market, unless you're rich). At the same time, the housing market has reached a completely dysfunctional level, helped by Osborne's cynical and economically-illiterate "Help To Buy" scheme. I could go on.
The Conservatives' approach to running the economy is amoral because it operates according to the psychology (and motivations) of the rich. It assumes that because the rich hate seeing their money being spent on others, those economically lower down the food chain will feel the same way. But from a psychological (and economic) point of view, they don't because their economic realities are very different. Those lower down in society sometimes have to rely on the welfare state when they fall on hard times.
Those hard times are these days permanent for some sections of society, including the "working poor".
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