The Scottish referendum, home rule and the West Lothian Question

Scotland voted against becoming an independent country, by 55% to 45%. While the result was not quite as close as the polls predicted, many pollsters suggested this may well happen due to the "shy noes", which is indeed what happened.
That all being said, put in other terms, for every twenty voters, 9 were for separation - which suggests a very divided electorate. And now a few days on from the vote, Scotland feels like a different country psychologically and politically from a few months ago; perhaps permanently so.

Having energised the population like never before in living memory, the SNP look to be the political beneficiaries of the "Yes" campaign: many Labour voters voted for independence on the back of an attitude of complacency and seeming distant indifference from Westminster. One example of this was the surreal moments when Scottish Labour MPs came to their constituencies north of the border to campaign (and where many of them indeed hailed from), to be told by one-time Scottish Labour supporters to "eff off back to Westminster".
The referendum had the effect of making many Scottish Labour voters swing over to the "Yes" campaign and firmly into the SNP camp. That change may well be irreversible, with large implications for some of their seats in the Scottish (post) industrial heartlands. In other words, the SNP have turned overnight into a "Ukip north of the wall".

I'm alright, jock

A closer analysis of the referendum shows us that the vote was based on economic interests above all. The areas that voted yes were the (post) industrial heartland around Glasgow, and Scotland's fourth city, Dundee. Aberdeen (already wealthy from oil), and Edinburgh (wealthy from a vibrant economy), as well as the Scottish countryside regions and islands, all voted no.

This makes cold economic sense, if not being politically or psychologically heart-warming.
Those people who voted "yes" did so because they saw that they had nothing to lose and were more than willing to risk what little they had gained from the union with England (well, London). Glasgow and Dundee have never recovered from the (London-inspired) economic malaise brought on by the disappearance of the industries thirty years ago; in this sense, a vote for "yes" is a vote of desperation as well as aspiration.

(At this point, a wag might suggest that Glasgow and Dundee be given independence from the rest of "no" Scotland and the UK, seeing as that's what they voted for)

Those who voted "no" did so because of a simple attitude of "I'm alright, jack" - they were doing fine (or at least, not badly enough to want to risk something) from the union with London. To these people, independence meant change and uncertainty, and like any conservative cautionary individual, would prefer the devil they knew than the devil they didn't.

Another angle was the "age gap": the comparison of generational attitudes. Alex Salmond gave the vote to sixteen year olds with the transparent view that they would be more inclined to vote for independence. Not enough research has been done yet to show if this was truly proved to be the case. It follows some logic to suggest that older people (e.g. over fifty) may well look to their pensions and be terrified of the thought of what would happen to them come independence; on the other hand, younger people have the rest of their lives to look forward to aspiration rather than the caution and worry of an approaching mortality.

"What's your problem, Scotland?"

One last thought is comparing the independence movement and referendum in Scotland to contemporary and recent referendums in other parts of Europe. Catalonia is planning a referendum of its own in the coming weeks and months; Flanders in Belgium has had similar ideas for years. Even Italy has some (rudimentary) independence movements, such as the Veneto (Venice region), and others.
Since the end of the Cold War, Slovakia has split from the Czechs, the Baltic states have split (or re-detached themselves) from Russia, and Yugoslavia has fracturing into half a dozen pieces. Most recently, Kosovo declared independence in 2008.

A more comparable example to that of Scotland and the UK, is the case of Montenegro. This nation became joined with Serbia after the First World War (and also involved a union of crowns, as both Montenegro and Serbia were independent monarchies in 1914); Serbia also had other Slavic parts of the former Austria-Hungary as its reward for starting the First World War. The resulting nation became known as Yugoslavia, though it was in effect a "Greater Serbia", given its much larger population. When Yugoslavia fractured in the 1990s, Montenegro (apart from Kosovo) remained the only "partner" in this union of states with Serbia.
Finally, around ten years ago, Montenegro had its own independence referendum, which was won by only one percent of the vote (if that). That vote cast the last part of "Yugoslavia" into oblivion and history. Serbs and Montegrins are linguistically and culturally as alike as Scots and English. The question many "yes" voters in Scotland (and in other successful independence movements in Europe) ask other Scots is "why would you not want to be a free and independent country?" In short, what is your problem?

Many people in Glasgow and Dundee this weekend may feel they are living in a nation of scared sheep. While this is an unfair insult to many "no" voters, the anger from the "yes" camp is understandable: if places like Montenegro or Slovakia - neither of which have many recognisable resources - would be independent countries, then why not Scotland, with its oil, industry and educated population?
However this question may soon become academic, thanks to the "cunning plan" of David Cameron...

"I have a cunning plan..."

A week is a long time in politics, so they say, this this past week is certainly following that rule.
This time last week, panicked by the close opinion polls. Cameron, Milliband and Clegg agreed to a "vow" to grant Scotland extensive new powers - as explained by their spokesperson, the former PM Gordon Brown.
This was the "devo-max" option that Alex Salmond originally wanted on the referendum vote; Westminster was now offering a vote for either a Salmond-inspired "indy-lite", or a Westminster-panicked "devo-max". Salmond had been playing a poker game with Westminster for the last few years over Scotland's future, and Westminster had blinked.

Or so it seemed. Another analysis of the situation reveals that David Cameron saw a ruthless opportunity in what looked like another flapping episode at Downing Street. Cameron has plenty of form for both being at times a hopeless strategist and also a ruthless opportunist: it is for this reason why he has so many enemies in his own party as well as in general. It also explains why many view him as being a disaster on so many levels for the country. His current "cunning plan" is possibly the most dastardly of all, in terms of its huge implications.

In short, Cameron is happy to give "home rule" to Scotland, provided there is a quid pro quo for England (and Wales and NI, in theory).
Cameron's vision for preserving the UK in a modernised form is to give tax and law-giving powers to Scotland, provided Scottish MPs have no rights to vote on equivalent bills in England. In this way, Scottish MPs would be emasculated to having a right a sit in Westminster, but in effect do little else (and have no right to sit in a Westminster government either).

If Cameron's vision rings true, the same could also be true for Wales and NI, eventually leaving Westminster as an English-only parliament at some way down the line, with Downing Street effectively as an English-only government. In this scenario, while the Westminster government would represent (and formulate) foreign policy and British interests abroad, almost all other major internal decisions would be left to the devolved governments in London (Westminster), Edinburgh, Cardiff and Belfast.

The "Balkanisation" of Britain?

The political ramifications for Labour are massive.
Cameron has clearly calculated that as the Tories are now an English-only party, this leaves Labour (and to a lesser extent, the Lib Dems) as the only truly "British" party in the country. Therefore, the best way to screw Labour electorally and politically is to give them what they had been asking for all these years - full devolution! This would leave the Tories at a natural advantage in an English-only Westminster, and make it more difficult for Labour to form a government.

Labour have dodged the bullet of Salmond's referendum only to be hit in the solar plexus by Cameron's "devo-max" plan.

Cameron has therefore gone from nearly breaking apart the UK by accident to now having a plan to effectively break up the UK on purpose.

The next seven months will prove to be pivotal and seismic in Westminster, With the Tories now keen to embrace some kind of "fast-track" devolution package before the general election in May (which they would ordinarily expect to lose), they see this plan as killing two birds with one stone: turning the tables on Labour by putting them in an impossible position - to accept their plan would be electoral suicide, but to reject it would be not much better.
The "England first" strategy also seems to be with Ukip in mind - though its easy to suspect that may also backfire, as Cameron has been trying to "out do Ukip" for the last eighteen months, with disastrous results.

These are truly crazy times, when you have a Conservative Prime Minister whose plan is to effectively break up the union in order to hold on to power.

The smartest politician in the UK? Alex Salmond

The English just don't get the Scots. Probably, they never really have.

Scotland joined with England way back in 1707 (because they were bankrupt). Nationalism and independence only became a serious political issue again in the 1970s, when the then Labour government held referenda in Scotland and Wales for devolution; this flunked because not enough people bothered voting to make the vote binding.
After eighteen years in opposition, Labour made devolution one of their main ambitions when they regained power in 1997. Part of this was ideological, part of it was expedient: on one hand, Labour was in favour of regionalism and giving more powers to Scotland anyway; but on the other hand, Labour hoped that devolution would make Scotland effectively a Labour mini-state (like Wales, where they were the dominant party), and also, would silence the likes of the Scottish National Party from any talk of outright independence.

Alex Salmond became leader of the SNP twenty years ago; before that he was an economist for RBS.
Part of the problem that English politicians have with Alex Salmond is one of misperception from the very start. Salmond seems a very easy target for Westminster to poke fun at; at times arrogant and pontificating, self-serving and with an immature temperament, English parliamentarians are at a loss to explain his popularity north of the border - a sort of tartan George Galloway.
But the Scots see him differently. What might be seen as "arrogance" to the English, the Scots would as likely see as Celtic exuberance; what might be seen as "pontificating" to the English, the Scots would as likely see as being precise with the facts. After being treated by previous governents as one big oil rig, Scotland saw in Salmond a politician who was prepared to go against the grain of politics. And there was another point to this English misperception; his seemingly larger-than-life (and easily mocked) persona hid a very canny political operator.

Devolution for Scotland after 1997 was meant to be the dream solution for Labour; giving them more power locally while appearing as the champion of decentralised democracy. And they got Alex Salmond to support it.
But after a few years, something odd started to happen in Scotland: the SNP gradually gained more and more support. At the first two elections (1999 and 2003), Labour were so comfortably ahead that they were not concerned, but then in the 2007 election the unthinkable happened: the SNP actually won one more seat than Labour. This was Salmond's ironic parting gift to Tony Blair, who was due to step down as PM only weeks later: "thanks for the devolution, now goodbye and let me get on with it".

Without a majority, with the other parties in a pact to make sure that Salmond would be unable to govern without them, he did exactly what they hadn't expected: his party governed alone, as a minority administration. By standing against him, they had only made Salmond even stronger. And when in power, he consistently failed to act as the maverick lunatic they had painted him as - he sought co-operation and compromise on every issue where possible, putting the idea of independence on the back-burner, while encouraging a progressive approach to the environment. In other words, by Salmond encouraging cross-party co-operation, the other parties had tarred themselves with the same brush as Salmond. He had effectively encouraged the parties to discredit themselves by agreeing with his policies.
That was certainly how many Scots saw it. This approach proved so successful that come 2011, his party won an outright majority of its own.

And this is where the plot really starts to thicken. By now, with the UK government a Tory-led coalition, this makes Salmond's job even easier. Although the SNP's ultimate aim is independence, Salmond is as pragmatic to understand that not all Scots want independence - at least, not yet. This is why the straight "in-out" referendum he once supported has been modified to a referendum with most likely three choices: the status quo (partial powers), independence, or something called "devo-max".
The term "devo-max" needs a little explanation. This is where Scotland would have powers over all decisions except for defence and foreign policy - to be within the UK, but not infact governed by it. In other words, Scotland controls all their own important stuff at home, while London supplies the army and the boring diplomatic stuff about what happens abroad. There's another word for this arrangement: a protectorate, or dependency. On one hand, it would make Scotland a semi-detached part of the UK; on the other hand, it would allow the Scots to have their cake and eat it.
You could well imagine that Westminster MPs and the UK government would be keen to do without this kind of arrangment: like having the responsibility of baby-sitting a rebellious child but without the power to chastise it. But after having four years of popular and effective Scottish government under his belt, the credibility lies with Salmond rather than the parties of Westminster; having a UK government led by a party that has barely any representation or credibility in Scotland also does no harm.

Salmond is playing a long game. He has said that his party promised to have a referendum before the next Scottish elections; most likely in 2014. But again, the UK government is playing into his hands. Now the Tory-led government have said that the referendum should be sooner, and only an "in-out" referendum, without the "devo-max" option, the one which many Scots happen to prefer. In that way, London are acting exactly according to type, committing all the errors and clunky insensitivity that Salmond has been accusing them of all these years.
Salmond is not bothered by "devo-max"; anything that gives him/Scotland more powers is better than the status quo, and anyway the slice-by-slice taking of powers from London to Edinburgh fits in perfectly to a gradualist approach to independence.

So far, Salmond has out-witted successive UK governments; he was SNP leader until he stood down from the leadership, only to step into the role of Scotland's First Minister; effectively Prime Minister of a semi-independent Scotland. English politicians are clueless how to handle him and his approach to independence; their varied tactics continue to backfire spectacularly.

All in all, due to Salmond, Scots look set to vote for a further repatriation of powers in the next couple of years, leaving Scotland's status in the UK hanging on a virtual thread. I'm no huge believer in the Union, but if I were Scottish then I would see great sense in supporting "devo-max" - it's like independence, but without the hassle.