Brexit, British identity, esoteric Fascism and Julius Evola

Walking in Carlisle recently, I came across this image on a wall.

Unable to get the image of this stark, black-and-white Union Jack from my mind, it got me thinking about the nature of identity and symbolism.
The "Union Jack" is a trinity of three flags: the three crosses of England, Scotland and Ireland. When its symbolism is reduced to its core essence, however, it can be easily manipulated into something else once taken from its flag. The image of black-on-white intersecting crosses begins to bear a strong resemblance to something much more primal and paganistic: the eight-pointed star.

The eight-pointed star has several meanings in different cultures and religions. The increase in violent far-right activity in Britain since the EU referendum has been well-noticed by the media, and one aspect of this is the use of symbolism by some of these groups. For these far-right groups, symbolism is an integral part of their sense of identity. The symbolism of the Union Jack is in its unique identity, and the cultural history that the far-right attach to that. Then, if reduced to its core (as above) it can be seen to represent the eight-pointed star. In far-right esoteric symbolism, the eight-pointed star is also a symbol of chaos, and chaos is an integral aspect to Fascist thought. We'll look at why that is a little later.

Earlier in the year, the New York Times wrote a piece on Steve Bannon's apparent interest in the thoughts of Julius Evola, a one-time Fascist thinker who later became an icon for post-war Fascist thought.
Evola's inspiration came from the Roman Empire, in the pure idea of Fascist renaissance. In his eyes, society had become decadent and corrupted by the changes to society like materialism and democracy. He was also an esoteric pagan. He was a anti-Semite who saw Jewish infiltration of European society going as far back as the foundation of Christianity, whose values of egalitarianism, forgiveness and charity were anathema to the hierarchical, pagan traditions of Rome. For Evola, Christianity was thus a "soft" faith: a religion of slaves that, to a pagan Fascist like him could even be seen as "Feminist", in for example in having the Virgin Mary as one if its key figures.
Hard though may be to understand now, early Christianity was a radical creed that accepted all regardless of background. As Evola saw it, this represented a deeper esoteric battle of ideas: of hierarchical paganism versus egalitarian monotheism.
It was this growth of egalitarianism through Christianity (with its roots in Judaism) which Evola argued was what led to Rome's collapse, and mankind's slow deterioration to materialistic pursuits like banking and capitalism. The spread of democracy was thus the "final insult" to his extreme ideology of Fascist elitism, where he saw power had been gradually passing down the hierarchy from the elite to the uneducated masses. To him, Fascism was therefore the way to rectify this and restore society from decadent, egalitarian materialism to a hierarchical, pagan elitism that strove for spiritual values. The seemingly contradictory belief that the Jews were responsible for both Capitalism and Communism was thus explained as being a consequence of following the Jewish materialist conspiracy; thus the way to remove Jewish influence was to abandon the pursuit of "materialistic" Capitalism or Communism.
Evola's elitism was further inspired by the Indian caste system, whose polytheistic culture he saw as a parallel in some ways to the society that existed in the Rome of the pagan gods. Their belief in their "Aryan" origins explains the fascination that many Fascists had with India, as well as a underlying fascination with paganism. Evola admired many aspects of German culture as he respected how the ancient German tribes initially fought against Rome before finally being accepted as part of it. The ancient Germans were pagans, as were the Roman. The same was also true of the Celts, whom the Romans had had long experience of, from the Gauls to the various tribes of Britain. It was the war-like paganism that these three (Romans, Germans, Celts) shared that was what Evola saw as making them racial kin and thus more spiritually-pure, and therefore "superior".

In a different way, Hitler's respect for England came from this kind of racial-spiritual prejudice. For Hitler, England was a "brother" of the German Reich. His respect for English culture came from what he saw as some elements of "shared history" in how both the Germans and Anglo-Saxons had carved out their own territory in the past. As the ancient Germans had carved out territory on the eastern Baltic ("Prussia") eight hundred years ago by defeating and subduing the native pagan tribes, the Anglo-Saxons had even earlier created their own domain by defeating and subduing the Celtic pagan tribes of Britain. Similarly, in Hitler's eyes, the English had proven their greater destiny by creating an empire of their own across the world, including (most symbolically) India. In this way, in the English controlling the Indian subcontinent - the ancient homeland of the Aryans - they had proven to the rest of the world that they were an "Aryan master-race". This explains why Hitler's favourite film was  "Lives Of A Bengal Lancer", about an example of military exploits during Britain's long occupation of the subcontinent. Thus also explains why Hitler felt somehow "betrayed" by Britain's declaration of war on Germany. Like Kaiser Wilhelm II, he grew to both love and hate England; his pursuit to defeat Britain came more from the narcissistic rage felt by a spurned suitor than on any real ideological grounds.

This explains how some of the English far-right see themselves as some kind of "chosen people", whose former empire was given away after the Second World War. The Fascist thinking of Evola lends itself to believing that modern democracy is somehow softening society, and "European values" are destroying native culture. Similarly, Hitler's own romantic view of the English adds to the mystique of the lost days of Empire as well as the "origin myth" of how the Anglo-Saxon tribes were a noble warrior caste in search of a new land to colonise - their own Arcadia, which they later on created in North America. Building on from the "shared heritage" of the ancient Germans, Romans and Celts, the more esoteric-minded of the English far-right might therefore see the "British Empire" as some kind of pinnacle of cultural Teutonic-Celtic symbiosis.
Meanwhile, those who support "White Power" in the USA, likewise see the USA's destiny not as a melting pot of races, but as the "successor" to the legacy of Britain's imperial power projection - their own perversion of the idea of an "Aryan" English-speaking super-state. From its origins as the Thirteen Colonies, the USA eventually superseded its British "parent", and those "White Power" fanatics that now cheer on Donald Trump's slogan of "Make America Great Again", feel in their heart that it is about "Making America White Again". The cultural bonds that tie "White Power" in America and the culture war behind "Brexit" are strong.

Although Fascism is a deeply-hierarchical ideology, thinkers like Evola also saw that violence was the only means to bring about change. As mentioned earlier, the eight-pointed star is also a symbol of chaos, and Fascism in the modern world could only come about through means of chaos. As it is by definition an extreme ideology, extreme ideas could only be considered applicable in extreme times (i.e. in times of great upheaval). For this reason, as well as Fascists idolizing violence as a means to demonstrate power and chauvinistic virility, they are also the means they use to bring about the chaos necessary to enact their agenda.
Extreme agendas can only be exacted in extreme times: the same is also true of the radical agenda hidden within those who advocate for a "Hard Brexit". In the chaos that could easily follow such an unprecedented series of events, who knows what kind of state Britain would be in. The "millenarian" belief of change only being possible through some kind of  turbulent "conflagration" is something that many Fascists believed in passionately. This also seems to be shared by some people in government.
And, one can imagine, the guy who drew this image in Carlisle.

Putin's psychology: is he really the "new Hitler"?

Following Putin's annexation of Crimea and the Russian-inspired unrest in Ukraine following the February "revolution", there has been lots of talk of Putin as the "new Hitler". For this reason, it's worthwhile to look at that comparison in more detail, to see how much it stands up to scrutiny.

The "new Hitler" theory

To give this theory a better standing, it also makes sense to compare Nineties Russia with Weimar Germany. To a large extent, this historical comparison rings true.

The effect of the Cold War on Russia/the Soviet Union was politically, socially and economically similar to what the Great War had on Imperial Germany.

After the Great War, Imperial Germany was constitutionally ripped apart (by losing its imperial status and converted to a republic), with some of its territories hacked off to create (or re-create) other nation-states. In the decade following the Great War, Weimar Germany went through two economic collapses, both stemming from Western influences; one immediately following the empire's destruction (about repayment of war compensation), and another following the Great Depression, around ten years later.

 After the Cold War, the Soviet Union began to collapse in on itself, in a similar manner to what happened to Imperial Germany, its constituent former "SSRs" broke away into independent nation-states, leaving Russia proper as a republic. At the mercy of the triumphant Western powers, Russia went through economic "shock therapy", resulting in massive inflation and a destruction of living standards. For the rest of the nineties (like Weimar Germany in the 1920s), Russia was ruled by a weak government, resulting in rampant corruption and the selling-off of assets to various new "oligarchs". The Russian default of 1998 created another economic meltdown, socially comparable to what Germany experienced after 1929. As the social and economic conditions in Germany were ripe for someone like Hitler to seize power, the same could be said for Russia in 1999. All it needed was the right man.

Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin and Adolf Hitler as young men were both products of their respective governments.
Hitler was a man happy to fight for his native Austria in the Great War, and thus was emotionally bound to his government and what it stood for; he was devastated by its dismemberment, searching for a new purpose, an explanation, and someone to blame. To the first point, his answer was to restore the "Reich" that had just been wiped out by the Western allies; to the last point, his answer was the Jews.
Putin was a Soviet careerist, making good on his dreams as a youngster to work for the KGB; when the Berlin Wall came down, he was working in East Germany. Similarly, when the Soviet Union collapsed, Putin was searching for a new role, eventually getting Yeltsin's attention and nomination as Prime Minister in 1999, as Russia was still fighting its way through the effects of the default of the previous year.

According to this angle on Putin, advocates of this theory argue that Putin now represents the biggest threat to Europe and Western stability since Hitler, because he wishes to restore Russia to greatness, in effect turning the clock back twenty five years, and the de facto restoration of the Soviet Union.

But there are other very important factors to consider, that make this above theory too simplistic, and largely erroneous.

The Stalin template

I've written before about how Stalin came to power, and the lengths he was prepared to take to keep hold of it. Stalin lives long in Soviet mythology, more because of what advances he achieved in the economy and living standards while he was in power.
Putin no doubt knows all about how Stalin came to power, and ruled the Soviet Union for thirty years until his death. Hitler's motivation to power was to gain revenge on his perceived enemies and to dominate Europe. Stalin's motivation was much more simplistic: the amoral pursuit of power. Stalin couldn't really be said to have an "agenda" beyond his own advancement and preservation; and at this, he was ruthlessly successful and cunning to achieve it. Similarly, while Hitler used the Nazis to dominate Europe military as a geo-political goal, Stalin's domination of Eastern Europe was almost accidental. Stalin was simply in the right place at the right time to advance his interests in Europe in the best way he saw fit. In this way, Stalin could be called a ruthless opportunist, not a megalomaniac like Hitler.

Looking at things in this perspective, Putin's psychology and motivation is more comparable with Stalin than Hitler. While both Hitler and Putin's young careers and outlook came from their governments, both Stalin and Putin's childhoods were similar in more ways.
Hitler was a introverted and socially-awkward youth and young man. Stalin was a brat as a child, getting into fights, hanging out with kids some years older than him, and not taking school seriously; Putin, born and raised in Soviet Leningrad (St Petersburg), was the same. With Stalin, it was discovering Communism as a teenager that straightened him out to an extent and gave him a purpose; with Putin, it was the KGB.

Putin's psychology is therefore bound with the paranoia of the mind of a former spy-master, as well as the cunning of a ruthless opportunist.
It is clear that Stalin is much closer to the template that Putin follows; Stalin, after all, ruled the largest country in the world for half of his lifetime like a "mafia Don", made it second only to the USA, a nuclear power and entered the space race; the fact that he also killed tens of millions of his own people (many more than Hitler) in order to do it, was only a detail to Stalin.

Putin's rise to power, and the manner of holding on to it, follows the same pattern as Stalin. Like Stalin, Putin is in reality an unconvincing speaker; he has used the "cult of personality" like Stalin in order to create a "Putin myth". This serves both to boost his image, but also to boost the image of Russia in Russians themselves; in the same way that "Stalin was the Soviet Union", "Putin is Russia". If Putin is seen as strong, then so, by extension is Russia.

Putin has used ruthless (if modern) methods to achieve and hold power internally; while Stalin killed millions to achieve it, Putin uses modern, legal (but no less politically ruthless) methods. After gaining the financial support of the oligarchs to become Prime Minister and President, he quickly destroyed the power of those same oligarchs who dared to think of themselves as his superior; similarly, the media was brought into line using ruthless methods; newspapers and TV stations being discredited, closed down; people who persisted in displeasing the Kremlin (after stubbornly not getting the message) had a habit of dying in mysterious circumstances or being fatally mugged. And so on.

A clash of civilisations

Like Stalin, Putin's approach to foreign affairs is guided by self-interest and opportunism. Putin's reaction towards the Ukraine Crisis is exactly that: a reaction. There is little indication that there has ever been a long-term plan to restore the "glory of Russia" like some modern-day Hitler, wanting to dominate Europe. Putin simply sees world and Russian affairs through the idea of "spheres of influence"; Stalin thought in a similar way. Stalin occupied Eastern Europe because the opportunity presented itself; Putin has done the same thing with Crimea.

Putin is reacting towards the Kiev government in the way he is because he feels politically threatened by its existence, and the precedent it sets. Stalin got the Soviet Union involved in the Spanish Civil War for similar reasons: he feared the spread of Fascism throughout Europe, and the threat it potentially posed to his position; Putin's support for Yanukovich and the rights of Russian-speakers in Ukraine is framed through his own self-interest. His motivations are far from benign, of course; like Stalin, he has already declared that he is perfectly willing to do whatever is necessary in Ukraine. If, after non-military options have been exhausted, that means invading, so be it. Putin has no moral qualms about his actions; the main thing that guides his actions are their beneficial convenience. War is inconvenient, until it becomes the only method to achieve an aim.
Western fears of him pushing his tanks as far west as Moldova, and fears of aggression in the Baltic States, may be over-stretched in the latter, but not in the former. For Putin, it is simply a matter of what is the most convenient geo-political arrangement for his interests in Europe.

No doubt, Putin would smile at the thought of being compared to Stalin; this is precisely what he would like people to think. For older Russians, Stalin represents stability and strength; his amoral ruthlessness is a side-issue. This issue about how Russians view their government puts it at the direct opposite to a Westerner. A Westerner fears a strong government, because of the West's culture of liberal individualism; a Russian fears a weak government, because of a Russian's desire to feel protected. This fundamental difference in perspective is what marks the emergence of a "clash of civilisations" between an Eastern and Western mentality and world-view.
This also explains why Putin continues to champion "conservative" values against Western immorality, and why his opportune nationalism is him pushing at an open door.

In the same way, Erdogan in Turkey is championing traditional Islamic values. Both Putin and Erdogan are natural authoritarians who have played a very cunning same over the last ten years to preserve and extend their power.
They follow a number of other authoritarian European figures in the last hundred years, and are simply the modern version of an old style of politics.

Politics and psychopathy

It's well-established that politics attracts psychopaths.

Finance is another industry that has been known to attract psychopaths due to the many opportunities for fraud and manipulation it provides, the high esteem those individuals are afforded in modern (Capitalist) society, the low risk of being caught, and finally the light punishment received relative to the harm caused to individuals and companies if they are caught.
The above points explain a lot about why the financial crisis happened, and why economic crashes are a regular feature of modern Capitalism.

Psychopaths are drawn to power, and "educated" psychopaths are drawn to those careers that enable the greatest opportunities with amoral power for the least risk; apart from finance, you are next most likely to see them in big business, the legal industry (even within the police itself) and even within the medical profession. It comes as no surprise that one of the UK's (and the world's) most prolific serial killers, Harold Shipman, was a doctor.

In an earlier summary of the main attributes of psychopaths, I compared the psychology and motivations of Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin. Psychopathy consists of a number of variables, and as Kevin Dutton (author of "The Wisdom Of Psychopaths") suggests, it can lead to different "types" of psychopaths (a "mixing deck" approach).

As I said in a previous article about Hitler and Stalin:
"Joseph Stalin...is a prime example of an amoral sadist. This is the "classic psychopath" amoral use of sadism for the purposes of pure convenience eg. a psychopath dictators' unflinching use of mass murder to achieve a particular result (i.e. the preservation of power), without any show of empathy for the victims; likewise, a psychopathic CEO who fires thousands of staff at a stroke, or recklessly causes an environmental disaster (such as in Bhopal, India thirty years ago) could also be classified as signs of "amoral sadism". This psychopath does not feel any measurable "pleasure" from such actions; he simply does it to achieve a result that benefits him. 
By contrast, Adolf Hitler could more realistically be called a "malicious sadist". This is a psychopath who has more a malignantly narcissistic syndrome channeled into a need for "revenge" against perceived enemies or to "right" or a long-perceived "wrong" at the expense of "the enemy"; Hitler's sadism was obviously directed at the Jews (and others who he felt had maligned him in the past). With the "malignant sadist", it is the overwhelming narcissism that is the main motivation for sadism"

The psychopathy of Hitler and Stalin appeared to be "wired" differently. They were both drawn to politics for different reasons, and displayed their "type" of psychopathy in different ways. I mentioned the "classic psychopath" (such as Stalin) and the "malignant sadist" (such as Hitler). More simply, the "classic psychopath" in the political arena seeks amoral power for its own end; the "malignant sadist" seeks power for the purpose of sadistic "revenge", or something similar.

In modern, democratic politics, it is possible to hypothesize that at least some of those people in politics may well fit into this description, simply according to the law of averages and the natural attraction that politics has to the psychopath. 

But using the two "types" highlighted before, it's also possible to hypothesize that a "classic psychopath" and a "malignant sadist" in the modern democratic political system could be drawn to different ends of the political spectrum to achieve those ends.

Put more simply, there is a natural reason why poorer people tend to be left-wing and richer people tend to be right-wing: self-interest.

"The politics of envy"

In the UK, one of the most common criticisms by the right-wing (and the Conservatives in particular) of the Labour Party is that their politics represents "the politics of envy". In the USA, the Republicans and The Tea Party make the selfsame accusations at the Democrats.

Regardless of the motivations for this accusation (more on that later), the redistribution aspect of left-wing politics in general makes the inherent implication that, come the accession to power, there will be "winners" and "losers", and the past "wrongs" will be "righted". Those who were in positions of power and wealth have everything to lose as the status quo is up-ended. 

In this scenario, a "malignant sadist" may be able to exploit the situation: using populism, for example, such a demagogue-like figure may be able to manipulate his faction's willingness to right the injustices enacted by the status quo (the establishment), and may also use other scapegoats to target for his own purposes. It should not be forgotten that Hitler (the original example I gave of "malignant sadism") created a party called the "National Socialists", which was originally more a blend of nationalism and old-style socialism.

Mussolini's Fascists were Hitler's inspiration for this; it is this reason why right-wing conservatives tend to call left-wing ideologues "fascists". 

"There is no such thing as society"

Thatcher's famous quote has been used by the left to demonstrate that Thatcher's vision, continued in today's Conservatives in The UK government, have no interest in the common good. Their current "austerity" feels a lot like an unofficial war on the poor. Right-wing politics tends to favour the inclinations of the rich because the rich will, naturally, want to preserve their situation the most and have government affect them the least.

It is for this reason why the rich have difficulty understanding the needs of the poor; because they are rich, they assume the poor are that way because they are lazy, or stupid. 

The rich resent paying taxes for services they do not use (such as the NHS in The UK); in this way, they have an "anti-social" view of society - or, in other words, refuse to act like responsible members of society. This is where the psychology of the "classic psychopath" appears: a lack of empathy and understanding for others, and the amoral pursuit of power for its own end. This explains why they would support the actions of the current Conservative government in The UK regarding "austerity": the state should be smaller because they see it as useless.
Some of them would rather pay no tax and simply hire private security to protect their assets; indeed, many already do, while legally avoiding paying as much tax as possible. Because they don't need to use government services, they cannot see why they should pay for them. They fail to see tax and government services as the "price of civilisation" and their responsibility as a functioning member of society; instead, those that use government services (that they pay for through tax) are called "skivers" or "benefit cheats".

They talk about "the politics of envy" because they cannot see what they do as an injustice on the rest of society, as the left-wing sees them. The fact that much of their good fortune in life is either due to an inherited lifestyle or through corrupt connections is ignored. The psychology of David Cameron and others like him reflects this.

In this way, right-wing politics (best reflected in Ayn Rand's thinking) reflects much of the world view of the "classic psychopath": where an individual cannot relate to others' lives (especially those in a worse situation), and refuses to act constructively with the rest of society. For these people, there is no such thing as society; only the amoral dog-eat-dog world of the individual.

While my original example of Stalin hardly fits into "right-wing politics", the wider point I was making was how Stalin was an example using amoral methods to achieve his own success at the expense of others, and preserving his status ruthlessly once he was at the top. In this way, he more closely resembles a modern-day venture Capitalist than a Socialist.

A vicious circle of hate

When psychopaths achieve status at both ends of the political spectrum, the result can be ugly.

Politics in the The USA has long been called cynical, due to the amount of negative language used against each side, while all the time the lobbying industry keeps things corruptly ticking over. American politics is widely seen as dysfunctional compared with other democracies in Europe. This is what happens when corporate interests have so much power over the views of politicians, and when negative politics is seen as the only way to achieve power.

I said at the start of the article that politics attracts psychopaths. So a system like in The USA, where an amoral and cunning politician can make lots of money from "selling" his vote to the highest corporate bidder, may well attract them even more. Let's not forget that, at a conservative estimate, there are at least 300,000 psychopaths in The USA. The truth may be double or triple that.

A two-party system (where there is one ostensibly "left-wing" and one "right-wing" party in control of the system) can be manipulated by psychopaths at opposite ends of the political spectrum, so that there is a "vicious circle of hate" where each side feels the need to out-do they other at polarising rhetoric.The end result of this can be horrific, as in Germany in 1932, when the Nazis and the Communists were competing for power, or more recently in Egypt since the "Arab Spring". 

In an office environment, psychopaths manipulate others to breed mistrust and in-fighting, leaving them to walk over the bones of others.

In the political environment, psychopaths can achieve far worse. 

Fascism, marketing and the "confidence trick": why Iain Duncan Smith says "I believe I am right"

I wrote last week about the link between marketing and Fascism, and how these links have been modified to adapt to an age of almost limitless technology. The language of marketing is used to encourage people to give up masses of personal information to their governments, via online companies like "Facebook", who willingly co-operate with the surveillance state.

This is an example of how Fascism operates in the 21st century: where surrendering privacy is transformed by marketing language into an "opportunity" for the individual, rather than a (very real) threat. Mussolini's Fascist state was contemporaneous with the rise of "marketing" as an institution in the West; to an extent, this was then extended after the Second World War in post-war USA, as consumerism was equated with patriotism and helping to preserve the "American way of life"; technological advances in the late '90s and early 21st century have enabled the kind of mass surveillance, with the consent of the individual, that was impossible before.

Politics has always had a difficult relationship with facts, and all politicians are guilty of manipulating the facts for their own purposes, at one time or another. However, the rise of propaganda in politics and the manipulation of language for political purposes occurred in tandem with the rise of marketing as a "science". The manipulation of facts and language for the purpose of propaganda became almost a science, with a philosophy in its own right; although began by Mussolini, Hitler's Nazi regime, under the guidance of Joseph Goebbels, were the real pioneers in manipulating language for political purposes in the modern era.

Using one example, the word "fanatical" became manipulated in meaning in the early days of the Nazi regime; from its previous (widely-understood) negative meaning, "fanatical" was transformed into a positive attribute - Hermann Goering, was described as a "fanatical" animal lover, for example. The Nazi regime talked of "fanatical" beliefs as being a positive asset, rather than a sign of ideological extremism. Al-Qaeda would surely recognise and agree with such a sentiment today, and Political Islam in general shares much of this ideological thinking. In other words, the strength of your beliefs is is manipulated into being more important that the realism of your ideas - this is in the crux of Fascist psychology.

"I believe I am right"

Bringing this up-to-date, the manipulation of language and a disregarding of "facts" is seen in Conservative politicians in the UK Coalition government.
The five most dangerous words that can come out of a politician's mouth are "I believe I am right"; words spoken recently by government minister, Iain Duncan Smith. His portfolio is "Work and Pensions", which includes government policy towards distribution of government benefits for the needy. In spite of him being told by official statistic agency, the ONS, that he is abusing statistics in an dishonest way for political purposes, and that his ideas were essentially lies, his response was "I believe I am right". In other words, faced with the facts, he was able to simply ignore the truth and state that he was no longer bound to reality, and that reality is what he said it was. Such behaviour would easily be found within the Nazi regime.
These five words are so terrifying because it means that a politician can make his own reality, unbound by rules. Hitler also believed what he was doing was "right"; Osama Bin Laden also believed what he was doing was "right". It is the signature of an authoritarian, and a Fascist who uses the language of morality to equate himself with God.

Austerity in the UK and Europe is also explained using the language of marketing and Fascism. Hitler said that if you repeat the lie long enough, people will believe it. Psychologically, the bigger the lie is, the more difficult it is to dispel, because the reality of a "big lie" becomes so horrifying for people that it is much easier not to think about it.
So there is a reason why Cameron says "There is no alternative!". If you repeat this enough times, people will believe it: it is a marketing strategy of carpet-bombing a product's slogan. Also, it gives people an easy answer to having to think of another economic strategy (such as the successful growth-led strategy of the Obama administration, or a long-term production-led strategy of Germany's government).

George Osborne does the same, as combined economic government strategist, and electoral strategist for the Conservative Party. The language he uses is even more nakedly divisive and compelling: that of "strivers versus skivers", implying (without any facts to support it, of course), that the economy's ails are a result of the government giving too much money to the "undeserving" poor. The massive bank bail-out (that effectively created the new concept of "Corporate Socialism") is not mentioned. Neither is it mentioned that by far the largest amount of public spending goes on pensions, rather than benefits on the "undeserving" poor; but the government doesn't want to declare war on the elderly - the defenceless poor are a much easier scapegoat. But scapegoating is a very well-worn Fascist strategy as well.

Confidence is the key to holding power. If a politician appears confident in his beliefs, then regardless of the facts, he has the ability to hoodwink the electorate very convincingly. George Osborne's confidence in the growth of the British economy goes against all the facts, when you compare it to other countries' experiences. But the government has been able to ignore sensible comparison.

David Cameron may be the most incompetent premier that Britain was seen for years, but the fact that he exudes self-confidence, makes people have confidence that he knows what he is doing.

This is why the opposition seem to have an incoherent strategy compared to the Conservatives; it's difficult to be coherent when you're fighting against a self-confident opponent that doesn't follow any rules.

From Hitler and Mussolini to Putin and Erdogan: A short history of authoritarianism in modern Europe

Authoritarianism as an ideology has existed since time immemorial. In the twentieth century, the term became synonymous with Fascism amongst the left-wing, and with Communism amongst the right-wing. It has become the stick to beat your enemies on the other side of the political spectrum with.

The end of the Second World War was assumed as many to be the end of authoritarian government in Europe. After the tragedies brought upon Europe by Fascism, no-one thought it would ever happen again. The modern EU, and its precursor, the EEC, are attempts to stamp out its ideology; though the irony is that, by now, some in Europe (especially on the political right) see the modern EU as little more than an authoritarian super-state. Many people in Southern Europe see the EU's bureaucracy as ran from Brussels, but financed from Berlin. Whatever your point of view, authoritarianism never truly dies; it simply learns to adapt to the new rules, and morphs accordingly.

The ideology is simply about the concentration of power in the hands of the state, and an erosion of freedom, accountability, inclusion and democratic principles: in other words, tyranny.
Authoritarianism in Europe can be simply explained through the (male) personalities that have helped to define it.

After the First World War, Europe was economically weak. The European nation-states were broadly (if imperfectly) democratic, but wracked by political weakness after the legacy of the war. For many states, all it needed was a strongman with a vision, and a bit of good fortune and timing, and the house of cards could come collapsing down.

Mussolini

With the rise of Bolshevism in Russia, this was Europe's bogeyman at the time. All major countries were affected by civil and political strife because of this. Benito Mussolini in Italy was the first person in a major European country to strike a blow for authoritarianism, with his "Fascist" party.
Mussolini's "March on Rome" in 1922 was basically a coup d'etat against the elected government. At the same time traditionalist yet revolutionary, Mussolini's party appealed across class divides. As he was a charismatic speaker with a hypnotic personality (Hugo Chavez being a contemporary, if ideologically-opposed, comparison), he held on to power through force of will.

It is often forgotten now that Mussolini's early years in power involved coalitions of Fascists with other parties. His path to an authoritarian police state was a gradual one over several years.
He changed electoral law to raise the threshold for other parties to enter parliament, and increasing use of propaganda was used to discredit parties opposed to Mussolini's "reforms". After excluding more and more parties from parliament, by 1926, Italy was a one-party state; a strong personality cult around Mussolini was created, as well as youth organisations to add to the militant (violent) wing of the party, to intimidate any remaining opponents. Before long, anyone in state employment (such as teachers) had to adhere to "Fascist" principles, while the media became tightly controlled so that they were obliged to follow the government line. Although there was technically a "free press", in reality, all media outlets needed licences issued by the government, though this fact was not widely known to the public.
Under Mussolini, the Italian economy became an amalgam of socialist and capitalist ideas; on the the one hand providing subsidies and agricultural projects for farmers, while on the other destroying union power and encouraging "prestige projects", that gained Italy international economic credibility, as well as a fortune for those capitalists with links to the government.

For more about the "economics of Fascism", see here.

Hitler

While Mussolini was the yardstick for any aspiring authoritarians in Europe to follow, there were people like Hitler in Germany who wanted to take things even further. While Mussolini was learning the the ropes of government, in 1923, Hitler and his "Nazi" Party attempted a coup in Munich in 1923. This landed Hitler in a short term in prison, and while Germany's "Weimar" government was able to find a way through the same crisis years that had brought Mussolini to power in Italy, when the Great Depression hit in 1929, the mainstream parties of Germany suffered from a lack of credibility and vision.
By now Hitler had made the "Nazi" Party one of the biggest parties in the country, with its own militia, the SA. The SA had an ugly reputation, mostly for beating up Communists and Socialists. 1932 was the pivotal year, when the economic crisis and mass unemployment sent many voters to either the Nazis or the Communists. Political violence increased. President Hindenburg met with the then-Chancellor (equivalent to Prime Minister), von Papen, who represented the main moderate rightist party, after election in the autumn. Neither Von Papen nor Hindenburg liked Hitler, or took him too seriously, but at the same time took the rise of the Nazis as a worrying threat to Germany's stability. As the Nazis were the largest party, von Papen suggested offering the Chancellorship to Hitler, with von Papen as the vice; effectively there to keep Hitler under control, but allow Hitler to take the blame for any blunders, or so he thought.

But Hitler was no political novice, and was able to turn the tables on von Papen very quickly. The Reichstag fire in February 1933, shortly after Hitler assumed office, was used for Hitler to gain emergency powers. Von Papen was quickly sidelined, and for the next eighteen months, Hitler set about "Nazifying" the rest of Germany. Under the cloud of crisis, attacks on Jews increased, concentration camps for political opponents (and some Jews) were established, while the general air of menace increased. The Gestapo (secret police) were established, which massively increased the surveillance of the population. There was a move towards "co-ordination" encouraged by the Nazi government, which led to massive self-censorship, and encouraged a willingness to fall in behind the revolutionary air of Nazi Germany.
While all this was happening, however, the increasing role of the SA, and its leader, Ernst Rohm, was a source of political infighting amongst the Nazi hierarchy. Rohm wanted the SA to replace the regular German army, who were loyal to President Hindenburg. By the late spring of 1934, the political infighting and casual violence of the SA was of such concern to von Papen and Hindenburg, that Hindenburg was seriously considering a coup d'etat to have Hitler replaced. By now, Hitler was equally paranoid about Rohm and the SA's power, and in the "The Night Of Long Knives" later on that summer, had Rohm, other SA leaders and any perceived allies in the Nazi party, killed.
Hitler then spun this as a successful counter-attack against a Rohm-led coup d'etat, which earned the respect and gratitude of Hindenburg. Soon after, Hindenburg died, and Hitler abolished the title of "President", and made himself "Leader" as well as Chancellor of Germany. From this point on, there was no looking back.

Franco

Apart from Mussolini and Hitler, the most successful authoritarian leader in Europe was Franco in Spain. In simple longevity and endurance, Francoist Spain (whose Fascist ideology was called Falangism) long outlived Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. Franco borrowed heavily from Mussolini and Hitler, but was much more like Mussolini in that his ambitions were mainly internal rather than external. Franco wanted a strong state; he was less interested in recapturing the colonies of the former Spanish Empire, as it was a practical impossibility.
In this sense, Franco's longevity could be down to learning from the "overstretch" that brought about Hitler's fall, and similarly, Mussolini's disastrous alliance with the Nazis. He emphasized Spain's Catholic heritage, as well as the Capitalist (and staunchly anti-Communist) side of Fascism, in its own Falangist style. Franco's emphasis on neutrality during the Second World War, and the fact that he was staunchly anti-Communist when the Cold War began, meant that Franco was left to his own devices, or seen as a friend of Capitalism to America and the West. This is what allowed Fascism to endure in Spain until Franco's death in 1975.

Putin

Authoritarianism in Russia is nothing new; in fact, Russia has hardly known any different. In that sense, comparing authoritarianism in Russia to that in Europe is a little unfair. That being said, I said earlier that authoritarianism is best seen through its leading personalities, as most authoritarian regimes need a strong leader in order keep them in power. In Vladimir Putin, postmodern Europe has its best exemplar of how to create and maintain an authoritarian state.
As a KGB man in the Soviet Union, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Putin initially retreated into anonymity. The Russian state in the 1990s resembled many of the qualities of "Weimar" Germany: a weak central state, an economy out of control, with a military of uncertain political loyalty. In another sense, though, it was worse. Corruption exploded, with the rise of the "oligarchs", who took advantage of the state's weakness by making newly privatised industries their own private fiefdoms. Putin entered into President Yeltsin's cabinet in 1997, where he quickly rose, becoming Prime Minister in 1999. By this time Yeltsin was seen as a political liability and incapable of effective (or even sober) leadership, leaving Putin ideally placed in the forthcoming presidential elections when Yeltsin resigned at the end of 1999.

Putin saw his role as recapturing the functions of the Russian state that had been allowed to fall away during Yeltsin's tenure; that even included actual territory, such as Chechnya, which had been effectively independent since 1991. Putin saw that Chechnya was brought back into the fold by whatever means necessary, in a brutal war that lasted through the winter of 1999-2000.
Under Putin, the oligarchs were brought under control of the state. Those that didn't abide by Putin's rules were either forced into line, imprisoned, or forced into exile. At the same time, other oligarchs that were Putin allies came into prominence to challenge the "old" oligarchs.
While the economy improved significantly under Putin's watch, the media came under unprecedented attack from the state. Some critical journalists were killed, while others were imprisoned. Meanwhile, the media in general was regulated tightly by the state. Opposition media outlets were allowed, but the impression seemed to be that they served a purely cosmetic function - even providing the government a useful scapegoat when necessary. It hardly needs to be mentioned that the legal system in Russia is tipped heavily in favour of the status quo.
The same can be said of opposition parties. Putin's party, "United Russia" have an overwhelming majority of seats in the parliament, with the opposing parties giving a fig-leaf of democracy. Election procedures are widely seen to be rigged. Meanwhile, like in previous authoritarian (Fascist) states, there is a widespread youth wing to Putin's party called "Our Russia"; these zealous teenagers have been known to vandalise and intimidate other "enemies of the state", while the police turn a blind eye. The same can be said of any hooligans who attack democracy campaigners, or social liberals.
The constitution has also been amended to suit Putin's wishes. The constitution allowed for only two consecutive presidential terms, so before he stepped down to swap places with Dmitri Medvedev, his Prime Minister, he boosted the powers of the PM at the expense of the President. Then, during his term as PM, the law was changed to increase Presidential terms from four to six years. As agreed with Medvedev, they swapped places once more in 2012, so that now Putin may potentially run for another two consecutive terms, but now for twelve years rather than eight. So Putin can be president until 2024.

Erdogan

I wrote last week about Erdogan's role in the Gezi Park protests, and when looking at his behaviour over the twelve years of his premiership, his behaviour more fits that of an authoritarian than a democrat. I compared him before to Britain's demagogue-like former-PM, Margaret Thatcher, but although she did largely reshape Britain in her own image, it was because of her economic ideas, and she did not tinker massively with the inner workings of the state, such as the judiciary, the military, media regulation and so on. Erdogan has, and that's what makes him less of a democrat and more of an autocrat. Yes, he has been working within the confines of a democratic system, he has also been reshaping that system to fit to his own wishes. Circumstances simply force him to player a longer and more cunning game. Mussolini did the same thing before; so did Hitler; so has Putin.
What makes Erdogan seem out-of-place compared to those above is the fact he is Muslim. But Franco was passionately Catholic, and used his faith too to explain much of what he did to Spain. Erdogan uses his faith to explain the need to make social reforms so that they, so he implies, more closely reflect the ideas of the devout majority. But this is not democracy; it is ochlocracy - rule of the mob, where a demagogue most feels at home. Authoritarianism uses the same techniques to stay in power; it is called "divide and rule".
While Erdogan says he is happy to abide by the democratic will, he has already moulded the political system to his benefit. The electoral system was altered to raise the threshold for parties to enter parliament, limiting number of parties in parliament.. He has also intimidated the media so that they dare not criticise him or face prison (Turkey has the highest numbers of journalists in prison in the world at the moment). Meanwhile, the judiciary have already been filled with Erdogan place-men, and the military, once a strong force in the background of Turkish politics, has been emptied of Erdogan critics so that it no longer can disrupt the political process (or replace any politician that oversteps the boundaries). He has hugely expanded the number of Islamic schools, using education as a tool being another common method of "spreading the word". Education (as a form of indoctrination) is one of the most valuable weapons in the authoritarian armoury.

Peaceful protest, like in Gezi Park is met by overwhelmingly disproportionate police force. Using the language of authoritarianism, peaceful protesters are seen as equivalent to terrorists, thus justifying brutal police behaviour. Like in Russia, now that Erdogan has the support of half of the population, the "other fifty per-cent" (the mostly secular, Western-minded opposition), are seen as a useful scapegoat for all Turkey's problems. They are the "roadblocks to reform".
Foreign conspirators are blamed for unrest; another common authoritarian (and fascist) scapegoat, blaming the Western media for spreading "disinformation" (i.e. the truth). For ten years Erdogan has courted Western attention, and has seen Turkey's economy grow massively as a result. Now that Turkey has grown self-sufficient, and paid off its debt to the IMF, Erdogan no longer needs to worry about Western opinion: they have served their purpose. Erdogan's careful nurturing of the Middle East and the Gulf States (as well as Russia and the Far East) in tandem with the West, has meant he can now safely ignore the West's haranguing and focus on the East, using the West and "Western immorality" instead as a useful scapegoat for any internal dissent. This follows the same path that his contemporary Putin followed (in initially flattering the West in his first few years in power, before using them as a scapegoat when Putin no longer needed Western investment). Previous authoritarian (Fascist) dictators made this approach typical.
Like Putin, Erdogan wants to become President, once he has altered the constitution to give him greater powers. The Gezi Park protests, now that the media, judiciary and military are under Erdogan's thumb, may be seen as a vehicle to advance his cause; an opportunity for him to destroy the secular half of the country through provocation, stoke up fears of violence from his opponents, then use the "emergency" to make a further, irreversible power-grab.
This is a standard method of gaining power by authoritarians; engineer a crisis, and seize the opportunity.

Authoritarianism never dies; it simply learns to adapt to the rules of the game.

Read here for more about Erdogan and his ministers' Orwellian use of language to achieve their aims.