The Scottish referendum, home rule and the West Lothian Question

Scotland voted against becoming an independent country, by 55% to 45%. While the result was not quite as close as the polls predicted, many pollsters suggested this may well happen due to the "shy noes", which is indeed what happened.
That all being said, put in other terms, for every twenty voters, 9 were for separation - which suggests a very divided electorate. And now a few days on from the vote, Scotland feels like a different country psychologically and politically from a few months ago; perhaps permanently so.

Having energised the population like never before in living memory, the SNP look to be the political beneficiaries of the "Yes" campaign: many Labour voters voted for independence on the back of an attitude of complacency and seeming distant indifference from Westminster. One example of this was the surreal moments when Scottish Labour MPs came to their constituencies north of the border to campaign (and where many of them indeed hailed from), to be told by one-time Scottish Labour supporters to "eff off back to Westminster".
The referendum had the effect of making many Scottish Labour voters swing over to the "Yes" campaign and firmly into the SNP camp. That change may well be irreversible, with large implications for some of their seats in the Scottish (post) industrial heartlands. In other words, the SNP have turned overnight into a "Ukip north of the wall".

I'm alright, jock

A closer analysis of the referendum shows us that the vote was based on economic interests above all. The areas that voted yes were the (post) industrial heartland around Glasgow, and Scotland's fourth city, Dundee. Aberdeen (already wealthy from oil), and Edinburgh (wealthy from a vibrant economy), as well as the Scottish countryside regions and islands, all voted no.

This makes cold economic sense, if not being politically or psychologically heart-warming.
Those people who voted "yes" did so because they saw that they had nothing to lose and were more than willing to risk what little they had gained from the union with England (well, London). Glasgow and Dundee have never recovered from the (London-inspired) economic malaise brought on by the disappearance of the industries thirty years ago; in this sense, a vote for "yes" is a vote of desperation as well as aspiration.

(At this point, a wag might suggest that Glasgow and Dundee be given independence from the rest of "no" Scotland and the UK, seeing as that's what they voted for)

Those who voted "no" did so because of a simple attitude of "I'm alright, jack" - they were doing fine (or at least, not badly enough to want to risk something) from the union with London. To these people, independence meant change and uncertainty, and like any conservative cautionary individual, would prefer the devil they knew than the devil they didn't.

Another angle was the "age gap": the comparison of generational attitudes. Alex Salmond gave the vote to sixteen year olds with the transparent view that they would be more inclined to vote for independence. Not enough research has been done yet to show if this was truly proved to be the case. It follows some logic to suggest that older people (e.g. over fifty) may well look to their pensions and be terrified of the thought of what would happen to them come independence; on the other hand, younger people have the rest of their lives to look forward to aspiration rather than the caution and worry of an approaching mortality.

"What's your problem, Scotland?"

One last thought is comparing the independence movement and referendum in Scotland to contemporary and recent referendums in other parts of Europe. Catalonia is planning a referendum of its own in the coming weeks and months; Flanders in Belgium has had similar ideas for years. Even Italy has some (rudimentary) independence movements, such as the Veneto (Venice region), and others.
Since the end of the Cold War, Slovakia has split from the Czechs, the Baltic states have split (or re-detached themselves) from Russia, and Yugoslavia has fracturing into half a dozen pieces. Most recently, Kosovo declared independence in 2008.

A more comparable example to that of Scotland and the UK, is the case of Montenegro. This nation became joined with Serbia after the First World War (and also involved a union of crowns, as both Montenegro and Serbia were independent monarchies in 1914); Serbia also had other Slavic parts of the former Austria-Hungary as its reward for starting the First World War. The resulting nation became known as Yugoslavia, though it was in effect a "Greater Serbia", given its much larger population. When Yugoslavia fractured in the 1990s, Montenegro (apart from Kosovo) remained the only "partner" in this union of states with Serbia.
Finally, around ten years ago, Montenegro had its own independence referendum, which was won by only one percent of the vote (if that). That vote cast the last part of "Yugoslavia" into oblivion and history. Serbs and Montegrins are linguistically and culturally as alike as Scots and English. The question many "yes" voters in Scotland (and in other successful independence movements in Europe) ask other Scots is "why would you not want to be a free and independent country?" In short, what is your problem?

Many people in Glasgow and Dundee this weekend may feel they are living in a nation of scared sheep. While this is an unfair insult to many "no" voters, the anger from the "yes" camp is understandable: if places like Montenegro or Slovakia - neither of which have many recognisable resources - would be independent countries, then why not Scotland, with its oil, industry and educated population?
However this question may soon become academic, thanks to the "cunning plan" of David Cameron...

"I have a cunning plan..."

A week is a long time in politics, so they say, this this past week is certainly following that rule.
This time last week, panicked by the close opinion polls. Cameron, Milliband and Clegg agreed to a "vow" to grant Scotland extensive new powers - as explained by their spokesperson, the former PM Gordon Brown.
This was the "devo-max" option that Alex Salmond originally wanted on the referendum vote; Westminster was now offering a vote for either a Salmond-inspired "indy-lite", or a Westminster-panicked "devo-max". Salmond had been playing a poker game with Westminster for the last few years over Scotland's future, and Westminster had blinked.

Or so it seemed. Another analysis of the situation reveals that David Cameron saw a ruthless opportunity in what looked like another flapping episode at Downing Street. Cameron has plenty of form for both being at times a hopeless strategist and also a ruthless opportunist: it is for this reason why he has so many enemies in his own party as well as in general. It also explains why many view him as being a disaster on so many levels for the country. His current "cunning plan" is possibly the most dastardly of all, in terms of its huge implications.

In short, Cameron is happy to give "home rule" to Scotland, provided there is a quid pro quo for England (and Wales and NI, in theory).
Cameron's vision for preserving the UK in a modernised form is to give tax and law-giving powers to Scotland, provided Scottish MPs have no rights to vote on equivalent bills in England. In this way, Scottish MPs would be emasculated to having a right a sit in Westminster, but in effect do little else (and have no right to sit in a Westminster government either).

If Cameron's vision rings true, the same could also be true for Wales and NI, eventually leaving Westminster as an English-only parliament at some way down the line, with Downing Street effectively as an English-only government. In this scenario, while the Westminster government would represent (and formulate) foreign policy and British interests abroad, almost all other major internal decisions would be left to the devolved governments in London (Westminster), Edinburgh, Cardiff and Belfast.

The "Balkanisation" of Britain?

The political ramifications for Labour are massive.
Cameron has clearly calculated that as the Tories are now an English-only party, this leaves Labour (and to a lesser extent, the Lib Dems) as the only truly "British" party in the country. Therefore, the best way to screw Labour electorally and politically is to give them what they had been asking for all these years - full devolution! This would leave the Tories at a natural advantage in an English-only Westminster, and make it more difficult for Labour to form a government.

Labour have dodged the bullet of Salmond's referendum only to be hit in the solar plexus by Cameron's "devo-max" plan.

Cameron has therefore gone from nearly breaking apart the UK by accident to now having a plan to effectively break up the UK on purpose.

The next seven months will prove to be pivotal and seismic in Westminster, With the Tories now keen to embrace some kind of "fast-track" devolution package before the general election in May (which they would ordinarily expect to lose), they see this plan as killing two birds with one stone: turning the tables on Labour by putting them in an impossible position - to accept their plan would be electoral suicide, but to reject it would be not much better.
The "England first" strategy also seems to be with Ukip in mind - though its easy to suspect that may also backfire, as Cameron has been trying to "out do Ukip" for the last eighteen months, with disastrous results.

These are truly crazy times, when you have a Conservative Prime Minister whose plan is to effectively break up the union in order to hold on to power.

How the UK became an anachronism

The UK (or to give it its full title, "The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland") is in trouble.

As I recently wrote, and as it's often in the news, Scotland is planning to decide on its constitutional marriage arrangements with its southern neighbour. Either divorce (independence) a marriage of convenience (devo-max), or to retain the current awkward arrangements.

If Scotland did choose independence, the "UK" by definition, would no longer exist - because there would no longer be a "United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland"; just a Kingdom of England, Wales and Northern Ireland. It's Scotland that gives Britain the name "Great".
It seems extraordinary (ignorant as well as arrogant) that Westminster politicians have not realised what "The UK" is: a legal union of two states, England (with Wales and Northern Ireland), and Scotland. Westminster seems to think that it carry on as before if Scotland leaves the union, with Scotland as a "successor state", as the EU also appears to believe. But by that logic, there would be two successor states; England and Scotland, not Scotland and the "RUK". Westminster's logic of a legally-superior "RUK" is a fantasy land where Westminster can have its cake and eat it.
Westminster and the EU's logic is based on a false understanding of the special form of historic union between England and Scotland. Scotland would not be a "successor" state. England does not "own" Scotland, in the way that other states have "broken away" from their larger, former overlords. The example of South Sudan breaking away from Sudan is not appropriate; the nearest contemporary comparison would be the "Velvet divorce" of Czechoslovakia, but even that is not totally accurate, as their state was an artificial creation after the First World War, it was not a legal union of two states. This is what Westminster fails to remember, and the EU for that matter, too.

Since "The UK" joined the EU, surely all legal documents have applied equally to Scotland as well as England, as in any political union. But equally, Scotland leaving the union should not be the same as Scotland leaving the EU: as Scotland joined the EU in the same treaty as England, but in its own legal right as one half of "The UK". Everyone outside of Scotland seems for have forgotten that Scotland has a separate legal system. When Scotland joined with England in 1707 it deferred its parliament to Westminster, but retained independent legal apparatus. This is why I agree with Alex Salmond's explanation why Scotland should not have to "re-join" the EU as a "successor state". Either both Scotland and England are "successor states" to a defunct "UK", or neither. There could be no such thing as a "RUK" in legal terms, as there are only two legal "parts" to the union - England and Scotland. If one pulls out, it's all over: you have two brand new entities. The nearest legal comparison to such a situation would be the break-up of the Soviet Union, or the that of the former Yugoslavia. But the EU didn't have to deal with any of those countries being already member-states. And even those were unions of several or more states, not just two, like the UK. The ignorance of EU politicians on the unique legal nature of "the UK" is as surprising as it is insulting.
Catalonia's independence movement bears many similarities to Scotland's, and in more ways than one. For Spain itself is a "legal union", at least historically. For Spain before Franco was a Kingdom of two crowns: Castille (centred on Madrid) and Aragon (cented on Barcelona). So Catalans' interest in Scottish independence is also based on the historic similarities in the relationship between the union of England and Scotland, and the union of Castille and Aragon (now called Catalonia). The fear of Catalans copying the Scots is the reason why Madrid is so hostile towards Scottish independence, and why they are trying to make things awkward for Scotland's relationship with the EU.

That all said, the most likely outcome for Scotland is "devo-max", also called Home Rule, where Scotland remains part of the UK for appearance's sake, but only foreign policy and military arrangements come from London.

But even that option is worth talking about, and people would be wrong to downplay its significance. Because Home Rule for Scotland, which is almost certain to be the most likely outcome in 2014, means the end of the UK as we know it.

And what is this "UK" anyway? According to polls, more English people favour Scottish independence than the Scots themselves; it seems the British public as a whole are in favour of financial independence for its constituent parts (i.e. they raise their own taxes, rather than a lump sum decided in London). Even some Tory MPs favour this idea, as they see the financial sense of financial devolution.

By that definition, the "UK" as a concept no longer has the support of the majority of British people. The UK could soon turn into a big house party where all the guests agree to bring their own drinks. Forget the idea of "collective responsibility".

With the UK's status quo as good as dead by the end of 2014, the most likely arrangement would be some form of quasi-federal status of the different parts of the UK; after Scotland votes for Home Rule, no doubt the voices from Wales will become louder. Infact, the Welsh have already made noises on that issue, so expect Cardiff take start causing trouble in tandem with Edinburgh. At the current rate of frantic political debate, the Welsh assembly may well ask for a referendum on "devo-max" itself before very long.

And then there's England itself, by far the largest part of the UK. One reason the Welsh are not happy about Scottish independence is that it would make England seem even more dominant politically; the Welsh don't want to be left alone with the insufferable English and an intractable Ulster problem.
England itself has regional issues; cost of living disparities that cause much Northern resentment at a distant-seeming, aloof London elite, are just one example. So even the cry for regional devolution with England may well become impossible to ignore within a few years.

So, where does that leave "the UK"?
By 2015, as things stand, David Cameron in all likelyhood will be Prime Minister of an international power with much reduced central authority. His constitutional power north of the border, with a Home Rule Scotland, would be negligible. If Wales soon demands Home Rule within the UK, then the same would be said of Wales. Northern Ireland's parliament may well also ask for similar powers, leaving Cameron "Prime Minister of the UK", but in practice, effectively just Prime Minister of England, but responsible for the defence and foreign policy of all parts of this so-called "UK".
This will make Cameron, and future UK Prime Ministers, more like an "official" head of government, if not in reality on the ground. The UK will effectively be more federalised, and less centrally-powerful in some ways, than the EU is now.
There's a beautiful irony to that fate for "Euro-cynic" Cameron.

So within four years, the UK will, barring a miracle, become another type of unique constititional entity in the world. Already the UK was renowned in the world as being the only joint monarchy of two consensual states (and confusing foreigners endlessly about what "Great Britain" and "The UK" was, and why the country has four different national sporting teams).
And we'll make it even more confusing after 2014, whereby "The UK" will have a national government that doesn't even properly rule within its own borders, making "The UK" as a nation-state less powerful than the smaller nation-states within it.

There is a wonderful irony here. That the UK, that most conservative of countries, that cherished its establishment and its institutions only fifteen years ago, has been so transformed in itself that the country's own people seem to be indifferent to the country's constitutional existence.
What happened to the "British"? The Scots, Welsh and English have rediscovered their sense of national identity, in spite of the common cultural ties. The other irony here is that there are probably more people from ethnic minorities who would call themselves "British" (albeit with a hyphen) than the "natives".

In this way, it adds to my idea that Britain as a socio-cultural concept is as distinct from Europe as is Scandinavia; everyone knows what "Scandinavians" are, their culture and peculiarities, even though, as a whole, they are several different nations. The UK exists as a default option for those people of the British Isles who don't feel quite up to the idea of going our own ways.

As Alex Salmond said, if Scotland went it alone, England would lose a surly lodger and gain a good neighbour. That's also what the Scandinavians did a hundred years ago; in spite of the friendly jokes that Scandinavians have between themselves (their version of the "Englishman, Scotsman and Irishman" jokes), they get on well as seperate nations.

In that sense, borders hardly matter at all if the cultural ties are still strong, as they are between the UK and Ireland. It looks like the UK will live on for a while yet, but any new British "marriage of convenience" will be no more than that: a pact between financially independent nations to pretend, for the sake of convenience, to be a single country, with a symbolic head of state, and a symbolic head of government.

And that seems a very "British" way of dealing with something. Funny.