A recent survey discovered that people in Britain are these days far more likely to identify as a "leaver" or "remainer" than as a firm supporter of a political party. This is just one clear indication of the seismic effects that the EU referendum and Brexit have had on the wider political and social culture of Britain.
Looking back through the various ideological "turns" that have happened in Britain since the creation of the "party" system following the Civil War (more on that in a moment), there have been only a few significant shifts in ideological allegiance since then.
The two-party system
The two-party system of "Tories" and "Whigs" that emerged from the aftermath of the Civil War was the established convention until the Labour Party emerged as a force in the early 20th century. Between the restoration of 1661 and the repeal of the Corn Laws and universal male suffrage around two hundred years later, there were long periods of either Tory or Whig rule, often lasting for decades. The Whigs changed their name to the Liberals, but the interests and ideology they represented did not; the same can largely be said for how Tories became "Conservatives".
Things only became truly "interesting" with significant reform of the electoral system, with the Labour Party only appearing as a genuine electoral force after the end of the First World War. Put in this light, it could be argued it took a disastrous continental war for any significant ideological and social change to occur; the same could be said of the election of the Attlee government in 1945.
That "shift" to the Labour Party occurred relatively quickly during the inter-war period, and the collapse of the Liberals.
This "shift" after the First World War is significant because it marks the period when the political system properly seemed to reflect the modern nature of British society as an industrial power. The Labour Party was formed precisely because it saw the Tories and the Liberals as not being representative of the interests of working people, especially those involved in industries. In this way, Britain was an industrial power, but its traditional political masters were not ideologically sympathetic to industry.
Since the Civil War, the Tories and the Whigs (now Conservatives and Liberals) have represented much the same ideological ground with the same natural interests and inclinations. On the one hand, the Tories were the standard-bearers of the interests of the landowning ruling class, while the Whigs were supporters of the merchant class.
These allegiances were formed from the divisions created by the Civil War, with the Tories the supporters of monarchy and the central power of the executive, and the Whigs the supporters of a restrained monarchy that gave more power to parliament and looser regulation of the economy. To complicate matters further, some Tories were also sympathetic to the Catholic cause even up to the Jacobite rebellion, while Whigs were consistently and fervently Protestant.
Old prejudices
This puts into perspective why many Tories, even today, are dismissive of industrial strategy and the wider concerns of business. Those prejudices go back centuries.
Following the "postwar consensus" that began with the Attlee government, the paranoia that seemed to grip the Tories about industry and the power of the unions by the 1970s led to Margaret Thatcher's ideological warfare on Britain's industrial base.
Using Libertarian ideology as a justification for destroying the power of the unions and - consequently - Britain's industrial base, Thatcher used ideas of free markets borrowed from Liberal thought to implement what was in reality a deeply-Tory aim: to change Britain from being an industrial power (which it had been for nearly two hundred years) to a post-industrial power.
But the term "post-industrial" is itself misleading, as what it really means is creating a modern-day version of a "pre-industrial" society: a society that has modern technology, but no significant industry. The only valued parts of the "economy" are those that can generate growth for the elite without significantly increasing the economic power of the masses, while relying on technology (such as through a complicit media) to keep people ignorant of the truth. The "service economy" that was created by Thatcher is the natural result of this strategy, where the elite use their in-built advantage (e.g. as landowners) to horde ever greater quantities of assets. This is the root of modern inequality in Britain. It is a "class war" by the rich against the poor; a "war" founded on historic prejudices and fear.
In other words, it is about creating an economy that is only interested in "self-sustenance" rather than genuine growth; an economy that just provides the bare essentials to keep the masses from revolt, but equally (through the "service economy") creates the social circumstances to keep them in a state of chronic insecurity; not knowing what the next month will bring, reliance on "the devil you know" is how the ruling class keep the masses in check. It is a modern spin on the psychological relationship between master and servant. How do you get a servant to keep on supporting his master?
The fact that the Conservative government today, in the midst of Brexit, seems to be doing its best to undermine industry, simply is the latest chapter to this story. The Tories' distrust of the EU stems from historic prejudice; the same kind of prejudice that makes them paranoid about industry. Anything that takes power away from the political centre is seen as instinctively dangerous to a Tory. Anything that promotes the rights of workers, anything that might put at risk their own assets or their money-making ability is seen as inherently threatening.
The Tories only supported the EU at first because they thought they could use it as a way to gain influence in Europe and make money themselves. When they realized that the former was based on an inflated sense of their own abilities, and that the latter involved a necessary trade-off of their own powers, their enthusiasm for Europe turned to a feeling of "betrayal". Thus Britain's media had nearly thirty years of negative headlines and criticism of the EU before the referendum happened. At the same time, the government often saw attacking the EU as a "win-win" scenario back home, which provided a convenient scapegoat. That long-stoked sense of the EU as the "bad guy" led to large segments of the British population having a natural antipathy towards Europe.
An ancient divide
The historic division of Tories and Whigs after the Civil War now translates as the division between "leavers" and "remainers".
The referendum, as the survey mentioned at the start explained, seems to have created another historic "shift" in party allegiances. In effect, Brexit has destroyed the two-party system that has existed since 1945. What we are now seeing is a realignment of historic divides, a "culture war" that first appeared at the time of Charles I.
Theresa May's efforts to hold the Conservative Party together are fruitless. As the saying goes "the centre cannot hold". Something has to give somewhere.
Historic comparisons are never exact, and Conservative thinking of the likes of the ERG is fundamentally different from those Tories that supported the monarchy during the Civil War. In many ways, the actions of the hard-right Libertarians within the Tories today mirror the puritanical motivations of the "Roundheads" (later "Whigs"). This is what makes the ideological comparison confusing and complicated.
But in reality, in spite of the ERG's "Roundhead" tactics, their aims are purely reactionary, and in that way, are historically-consistent with Tory ideology. They represent people who are descendants of the landed gentry. Their agenda is to "finish the project" in Britain that Thatcher began, and they can only do that with Britain outside the EU. Their motivations are about "taking back control", but not giving to parliament, but to a centralized government. They are indifferent to the fate of British industry, as they see it more as a threat to their own narrow interests.
Meanwhile, "remainers" represent a social outlook more in common with historic Whigs. As it was the merchant class that were the natural supporters of parliament after the Civil War, it is "remainers" today who see parliament as the voice of moderation. Those that see parliament today as remote and out-of-touch are the same people who see "remainers" as cosmopolitan rootless liberals; similar accusations would have been thrown at Whigs by Tories back in the day.
It is an old divide between an open and closed view of the world; change versus tradition.
Those who voted for "change" by voting to leave the EU are only fooling themselves about their motivations: all the evidence is that it was a vote of desperation, a vote to make things "how they used to be" - in other words, for traditional values.
The only thing for certain now is that the divide that was exposed by the referendum will be there for a long time to come, in one form or another.
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